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ABSTRACT 
The African continent is the global region to have experienced the worst oppression under the 
Europeans imperialists. Colonialism was a system based on the imposition and acceptance of 
superiority of the coloniser over the colonised. Before the colonial intervention, many African 
governing systems were traditional monarchies, many of which seem, by design or accident, to 
have struck a viable balance between autocracy and democracy, due to the ritualised control of 
power. Within such systems, extensive powers were accorded the monarch but only on trust and 
in reciprocity. From the 1950s right up to the 1980s, the African continent was ravaged by wars of 
liberation which were part of the momentous mission to remake African societies, to regain 
Africa’s historical agency so cruelly seized by the west through colonialism. The anti-colonial 
wars were protracted and brutal. These were defensive, unavoidable wars, waged at enormous cost 
in African lives and livelihoods, driven by the desire to maintain or regain political autonomy, the 
precondition for establishing the social contract of democracy, the political culture of human 
rights, and the economic possibilities of development. Thus the hallmark of African nationalism 
was to establish autonomous African democratic systems that would allow Africa to develop and 
build institutions rooted in the African systems of governance. Unfortunately, independence 
brought little respite from the ravages of war for people in many sub-Saharan African countries.  
The instabilities and insecurities of post-colonial Africa are rooted in the political and cultural 
economies of both colonialism and the post-independence latched on to the shifting configurations 
and conjunctures of the international division of labor, especially the legacies and challenges of 
state-making and nation-building. Sub-Saharan Africa has been caricatured as a place of 
continuous civil wars and conflicts. There are also the struggles over underdevelopment, 
dependency, and sustainable development, and how to establish modern societies that are 
politically, economically and technologically viable in a highly competitive, unequal and 
exploitative world. The diversities of sub-saharan Africa’s nation-states, the fact that they are 
almost invariably multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural in the midst of 
relatively high levels of material poverty and uneven spatial and social development, dominated 
by authoritarian governments, created a combustible mix that periodically erupted into civil wars. 
At the heart of all these conflicts and wars were struggles over power and resources; power 
concentrated around the state and its governance structures, developmental capacities, delegative 
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practices, distributional propensities, and resources in terms of their availability, control and 
access. Typical examples are countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and Democratic Republic 
of Congo who experienced conflicts soon after independence, inspired and or instigated and 
supported by the former colonisers. The process of trying to bring about peace, security and 
development by adhering to the democratic practice proved to be very difficult to achieve to an 
extent that many Africans in the post-colonial era began to question the relevance of the western 
democratic precepts in Africa. The African nationalists borrowed the values of democracy from 
the western philosophers and used these in prosecuting the wars of liberation but post-independent 
Africa witnessed the failure to adhere to this to achieve the merit of peace and security even under 
the western democratic principles characterized by periodic elections.  
This study explores the ways through which dominant democratic frameworks inherited from 
western liberalism can be renegotiated and adapted to account for historical and cultural realities 
in the Sub-Saharan Africa milieu, in order to stimulate political and economic development. This 
study contends that western liberal democracy can be adapted to suit African contexts although 
there is a lack of solid linkages between western liberalism and African democratic practices. In 
order for sustainable development to be realized in Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy must be 
implanted in the vital nodes of the African cultural and ethical values. It is instructive to note that 
western imperialism has affected this ethic resulting in numerous challenges assaulting both 
leadership and governance in post-colonial Africa. Concomitant with imperialism, Western liberal 
views of democracy have been appropriated in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In academic 
circles, attempts are increasingly being made to universalize such Western values on the basis of 
Nationalism discourse articulated by African nationalist leaders. However, indications are that the 
dominant liberal framework is not universally applicable, for in post-colonial African countries it 
appears not only to be at odds with humanistic values and principles that gave impetus to the rise 
of African Nationalism, but also responsible for governance and leadership challenges afflicting 
most post-colonial states in Sub Saharan Africa. Against the background of attempts to 
universalize Western liberal democracy, this study examines the resultant tension that arises in an 
African post-colonial context. As an example, the study reviews the presence and continued 
resonance of the ideology and practice of nationalism and nationalist politics in most African 
countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique, and examines how such politics 
may collide with other different forms of democratic frameworks. The current democratic 
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frameworks within which post-colonial African states function are devoid of the African ethic and 
therefore need to be adapted to suit the African context viewed in light of its past. Drawing from 
post-colonial theory, the study argues for a renegotiation of the dominant democratic frameworks 
inherited from Western societies in the context of not only nationalist politics but also of the 
historical and cultural realities of Sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis is an academic and political 
intervention where post-colonial critical analysis is deployed as a methodological locus of 
enunciation as opposed to conventional and dominant methodologies of the western centric 
episteme. A hybridized model of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa is achievable. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study 
Some ethical principles were at the heart of leadership of African nationalism. African struggles 
for independence from colonialism were motivated by the need to implement politically, 
economically and socially transformative values aginst the inhumane system of colonialism which 
discriminated against the majority of the African population. Western liberal values such as self-
determination became an ethical principle aimed at guiding the African quest for total 
emancipation from all forms of oppression. The western classical liberal principle of treating the 
individual with dignity was collectivised by African nationalists as to mean the dignity of the 
whole nation. The values of political liberalism which was appealed to by African nationalists was 
appealed to by African antionalists as a counter values against colonial oppression and also as a 
justifying value for  a protracted armed struggle against colonial and settler oppression. 
This study seeks to find possible ways through which dominant democratic frameworks inherited 
from Western societies can be renegotiated and adapted to account for historical and cultural 
realities or diverse contexts of Sub-Saharan Africa that stimulate political and economic 
development. With reference to ideology and practice of nationalism and nationalist politics in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and its apparent collision with the purported universal democratic 
frameworks, the study explores ways in which Western liberal democracy can be adapted to suit 
African contexts. This thesis is inspired by the current lack of solid linkages between western 
liberalism and African democratic practices. This thesis argues that western democratic practices 
can be useful in accounting for the lived realities and experience of those who are from the African 
context. This thesis is influenced by the post-colonial epistemic perspective which is a political, 
philosophical and critical theoretical lensing which inaugurates the new holistic solutions for 
African democratic governance. This thesis privileges the existential and experiential sites of 
African humanity which have been ignored for a long time. This then speaks to the exhaustive and 
limits of western liberal values. Therefore, this thesis is a political intervention where post-colonial 
critical analysis is deployed as a methodological point of departure as opposed to conventional and 
dominant methodologies of the western centric episteme. 
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The main thrust of the study derives from tensions that continue to arisebetween post-colonial 
African democracies, local forms of democracy and the globalised Western liberalism, the effect 
of which ostensibly figures strongly not only in the continued social and political polarization in 
Africa, but also in the material inequalities between the black masses and the white communities 
in post-colonial African states whose self-imposed governance has spanned half a century. The 
key argument advanced in the thesis is that the current democratic frameworks within which post-
colonial African states function are devoid of the African ethic and therefore partly account for the 
political and development challenges afflicting post-colonial African states. In this study, such 
frameworks need some revision. Appealing to post-colonial theory would provide not only useful 
insight into the current flaws of democratic frameworks used in post-colonial Africa but also 
suggest ways in which such frameworks inherited from Western societies can be renegotiated and 
contextualized within the African cultural and moral values underpinned by the Ubuntu philosophy 
or African cultural and values of Ubuntu or Hunhuism.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The thesis examines the ideology and practice of modern nationalism and nationalist politics in 
the contemporary Sub-Saharan African democracies. The focus of the study hinges on the fact that 
there is continued social and political polarization as well as material inequalities in democratic 
post-colonial governments more than half a century after colonialism. The vortex of power 
relations that have colonial routes starting from the colonial encounter has generally maintained a 
hegemony of western values in sub-Saharan Africa.This huge gap centred on unequal access to 
resources and opportunities has created an environment that has proved to be well cultivated for a 
‘predestination’ of conflict and lack of development in Africa. This means as Said (1989) aptly 
states, the ‘othering’ of the African and for that matter, the African people in sub-Saharan Africa 
as subjects. Thus, there is need to tap from the existing African nationalist values in the 
reconstruction of a novel post-colonial order that will capacitate the prosecution of socio-economic 
and political developments in the continent. However, possible ways through which African 
political and cultural realities can be used to enrich and domesticate the Western liberal democratic 
frameworks that have been accepted as universal in ways that can promote development in the 
sub-continent must be explored.  It is argued that the western liberal democratic systems are not 
an anti-thesis to African nationalism in as much as the former cannot be sine qua non to the latter. 
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1.3 Review of Literature 
Post-colonial theory as articulated by scholars such as Spivak (1990), Bhabha (1986) and Fanon 
(1967) among other subaltern writers is thus employed as the conceptual framework for this study 
which argues for a renegotiation of the dominant democratic frameworks inherited from Western 
societies in the context of not only African Nationalism but also of the historical and cultural 
realities of Sub Saharan Africa. Employing post-colonial theory is premised on the assumption 
that post-colonial discourse gives the local people “the necessary authority and political and 
cultural freedom to take their place and gain independence by overcoming political and cultural 
imperialism (Sawant, 2012: 120). This is particularly true considering the violent assault by 
colonialism and its accompanying ideology on African civilisation which post-colonial theory 
agree to have deemed everything African inferior (Fanon, 1965; 1967). Post-colonial theory goes 
further to provide lenses for self-criticism for, as Parajape (1996) argues, “we cannot continue to 
blame only the West for our sorry state of subjection but, instead of mimicking metropolitan 
systems, need to strengthen ourselves and institutions and develop our needs”. Accordingly, the 
thesis hopes to develop a plural, hybrid transnational and multicultural framework or model for 
progressive African leadership and governance (Derrida, 1993). The framework which is hoped to 
account for Africans life conditions, values and culturalcircumstances will be drawn from a critical 
study of various experiences of post-colonial African states with a particular focus on the 
continued practice of microcosm nationalist politics in Zimbabwe which reflects the macrocosm 
sub-continent experience. This chapter is made up of an introduction, background to the study, 
statement of the problem, justification of the study, objectives, research questions, and significance 
of the study, assumptions, delimitations, limitations, definition of key terms and conclusion. 
According to Pratt (1992), western colonialism has a history that stretches from Christopher 
Columbus in the 15th century. The colonies became contact zones where disparate cultures met in 
asymmetrical power relationships (Ibid). Western colonialism extracted wealth, resources, and 
even people, from the territories that were conquered (Young, 2001). This economic imbalance 
served to advance the growth of modern-day capitalism (Loomba, 1998). The economic inter-
relation between metropole and colony marked a departure from pre-capitalist forms of 
colonialism, such as the Crusades which were sanctioned by the Roman Pontiff against the 
Muslims in the 7th century. Colonialism was not just built on establishing Western economic 
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superiority, it was also concerned with attaining cultural and ideological Western hegemony (Jack 
and Westwood, 2009). Whilst formal colonialism has ended, imperialism and neocolonialism 
continues; the specific form of imperialism associated with territorial invasion and settlement that 
is colonialism is over, but the attitudes of dominating metropolitan centres ruling distant territories 
that is in the form of imperialism still exists (Sharp, 2008; Young, 2001). It is a historical fact that 
formal colonialism has ceased but neocolonialism, as seen through cultural and economic 
imperialism, remains. Whilst the involvement of the developed world may be beneficial to African 
nations, the discursive and ideological legacies of colonialism often give a false and damaging 
representation of Africa.  
In this study the post-colonial theoretical lense was adopted. Post-colonialism thus serves as a 
radical critique of colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism centred on subverting Western 
authority by de-colonising the mind and disturbing the “universalising posture and mythical status 
of western knowledge systems” (Jack and Westwood, 2007:248). It does so by applying ideas from 
poststructuralist writers to show how contemporary knowledge systems are reminiscent of colonial 
and neocolonial discourses. Whilst it has been argued that post-structuralism is from a self-
referential view of the West presented as a universal standpoint and so may give a Eurocentric 
approach to postcolonial theory (Mir et al, 2003; Prasad and Prasad, 2003), key poststructuralist 
writers have come to contribute heavily to postcolonial theory especially that which surrounds the 
deconstruction of hegemony discourses that shape power/knowledge relations (Foucault, 1976; 
Escobar, 1995b). A discourse “propagates a view of the world (a knowledge) that becomes, over 
time, so taken for granted as to be almost invisible” (Kenny, 2008:59). Applying a Foucauldian 
analysis, Said (1978),in his seminal work on post-colonialism seeks to uncover the ontological and 
epistemological frameworks that shape colonial and neocolonial discourses. Orientalism is 
founded on an artificial distinction between the self and the 'other', territorialized as the Occident 
and the Orient (Gregory, 2004; Said, 1978). Whilst Said's Orient refers to the Middle East, 
Orientalism has been subsequently expanded to refer to that which is not the developed, Western 
world (Prasad, 2003).  
Said (1978) suggests that the Orient is imaged to be in a sort of cultural stasis, mired in the past in 
comparison to the dynamism of the West and the New World. The Orient is identified as 
everything that the West is not: irrational, barbaric, lazy, passive and ‘trusting in psychological 
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truth’ (Cromer in Said, 1978). Within this system of knowledge ‘abstraction is always preferable 
to reality’ (Said, 1978). Therefore the system itself, rather than the subject of its representations, 
is unchanging: actual observations can always be interpreted as fulfilments of inherited prejudices; 
for example a rich Jew can fulfil the stereotype of the ‘grasping’ Jew because he is imagined to 
have gained wealth at the expense of non-Jews while a poor Jew is equally a threat as he begs for 
non-Jewish wealth. The Occident is synonymous with modernity whilst it produces the Orient that 
is always irregular and excessive, thus the modern is valued over the pre-modern. These binaries 
elevate the self-whilst degrading the 'other' which allows for legitimate Western intervention in 
the 'backward', developing world in order to liberate the 'other' from their perpetual stasis (Gregory, 
1995; Kwek, 2003; Westwood, 2004). Orientalist discourses are argued to be the new face of 
oldfashioned exoticism (Rushdie in Westwood, 2001). Exoticism was fuelled by an ethnographic 
imagination based on primitivism, the West was 'civilised' whilst the non-West 'savage', and 
tropicalization, the non-West was a source of wonder – exotic and sexual stimulating - but 
simultaneously the natives were perceived as corrupt, indolent and unclean (Castillo, 1997; Prasad, 
2003).  
The way in which Orientalism, and exoticisms, assimilate contradictions and variations makes it 
apparently invulnerable to the paradigm shifts that Kuhn argues result from the buildup of 
anomalies, allowing it to remain relevant in the postcolonial era. The ideological motivation that 
legitimised the colonial project in Africa, as a civilising mission to bring light (science and 
rationality) to the dark continent, continues to pervade much of Western involvement in Africa in 
the postcolonial era (Jack and Westwood, 2009); Orientalist representations allow the West to 
claim knowledge of, about, and over the 'other'. However, it is worth highlighting some of the 
limitations in Said's critique on Orientalism (Gregory, 2004; Moore-Gilbert, 1997; Porter, 1994). 
Whereas Foucault at least recognises breaks between forms of power and knowledge without fully 
explaining the transition between them, for Said there is the sense that Orientalism always has 
been and always will be there is some form. Said therefore tries to ascribe to Orientalism both an 
infinite flexibility and essential rigidity. For example, both argue that 'Orientalism is the doctrinal 
antithesis of development' and that by the 1940s there had been 'such changes in Orientalism that 
it became scarcely recognisable'. Moore-Gilbert (1997) points out that in fact the power of 
Orientalism is constantly renegotiated and contested by the 'other'. Therefore, Orientalism is not 
timeless, uniform and inevitable and one needs to recognise the possibility of alternatives and 
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resistance. These forms of reading are very critical in understanding the dynamics of governance 
in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa today. 
The contemporary western precepts of democratic rule and institutions such as political parties, 
and what they ought or should do to be a viable democratic player have influenced the conception 
of politics in Africa. These normative notions were manifested during colonialism and linger in 
thepost-colonial era. It appears as though the Africans have been told by the Western world that 
democracy must fall within a particular paradigm if they truly and sincerely want to be considered 
democratic.The evident challenges of western democracy in present-day Africa and the triumph 
of dictatorship, under various guises, in most parts of Africa, need little demonstration. From a 
western perspective, democracy has generally failed in Africa and has been a cause for the increase 
in human suffering and misery.It is a fact that democratic structures in the modern setting include, 
inter alia, such things as a system in which there is separation of powers between those who make 
laws, those who execute them, and those charged with punishing infringements of the law; as a 
system in which all citizens without any exception are equally subject to the same laws. In addition, 
it is a system which guarantees freedom of thought and expression; a system where the will of the 
majority holds sway on contentious issues but where the rights of minorities are protected by law. 
This is also a system where fundamental human rights are respected and protected; a system, most 
importantly, where power is subject to strict controls and regular periodic renewal or change of 
mandate.Then it needs no arguing that most post-independence African countries have failed in 
practising democracy. Some of such structures existed in the precolonial traditional governing 
systems of Africa, in spite of the fact that most were monarchies in which change at the top could 
come only at the passing on of the incumbent. 
Wiredu (1995) perceptively notes that, most modern African governing systems would seem to 
have borrowed from the traditional past the principle of non-change at the helm of power without 
also modernising the traditional strict control of power wielded by the pre-colonial kings. For that 
reason, heads of African states have been mostly de facto monarchs wielding power without any 
checks and balances, power without any responsibility. Typical examples are heads of state such 
as Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire, Jean-Bedel Bokasa of Central African Republique, Houphouet 
Boigny of Ivory Coast, Gyasimbe Eyadema of Togo, Omar Bongo of Gabon and Paul Biya of 
Cameroon (Ibid). On the other hand, most African countries have also borrowed from the 
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industrialised Western countries the idea of multi-parties as one of the structures of democracy, 
without any attempt to indigenise it in line with local conditions. The result in many cases has been 
the multiplication of political parties along ethnic and sectarian lines, leading to a cacophony of 
divisions and civil strife. Democracy in Africa need not necessarily follow Western models or 
paradigms, some of whose elements are in fact only dubiously democratic. According to Wiredu 
(1995), democracy in any actual context needs to adapt itself to the culture, world-view, values, 
customs and practices of the society in question, as long these do not contradict the fundamentals 
of democracy. Democracy is also, in principle, quite possible within a non-party or a one-party 
system (Nyerere 1975). It is a well-known fact that public decision-making in traditional Africa 
was usually effected by the method of consensus, which in no way implied unanimity or total 
agreement, but rather an exhaustive discussion of differences, the recognition of the irreconcilable 
ones, and the fashioning of a way forward which permitted the suspension of disagreements. Such 
a procedural method if appropriately modernised could be quite compatible with democratic 
values. Julius Nyerere sufficiently demonstrated this with his idea of UJAMAA (Ibid).But 
democracy, anywhere at any time, must necessarily subscribe to democratic values translated into 
and sustained by democratic structures. 
Many post-colonial African states have been plagued by wars and armed conflicts, political 
instability, communal violence and displaced persons, together with being at the mercy of natural 
catastrophes such as drought and famine all attributed to lack of good governance. The failure on 
the part of African states to respond effectively to the challenges in their midst has been attributed 
to bad governance, tyranny and authoritarianism. According to Francis (2006), the inherited 
colonial legacy, predicated on Westphalian sovereign statehood, is often blamed for much of the 
crisis of nation building. Thus the subversion of the state system by the ruling elites to ensure 
regime survival and serve their vested interests has led to power struggles and rebel insurgencies 
fighting for control of state power. It is against this backdrop that the western media have long 
labelled Africa as the ‘lame dark and hopeless continent’ in need of divine intervention.  According 
to Francis (2006:33), the literature on the African state is suffused with adjectives and epithets 
describing the African state as “quasi state; weak state; failed state; collapsed state; soft state; 
vampire state; swollen state; shadow state; fictive state; garrison state; neo-patrimonial state; lame 
leviathan; belly politic and kleptocratic state and many more”. These pejorative terms point to the 
fact that something is fundamentally wrong with the African state system. Given this background, 
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Africa has been faced with a stark choice, to either choose the western liberal democratic ethos of 
governance as well as mobilising her people towards sustained political will, the pooling of 
resources together and maintaining unity. The idea that Sub-Saharan African states must unite in 
terms of co-operative peace, security and development is urgent in the post-colonial state. The 
need for sustained democratic governance system is critical in order to promote regional peace and 
security systems that are necessary for conflict stabilisation and preventive diplomacy. It is 
possible to promote de jure democratic systems that are reinforced by indigenous de facto systems 
of peace and security that must be institutionalised and extended in order to improve governance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The western liberal democratic values inspired the rise of African 
nationalism to significant levels although certain values of the latter proved to be antagonistic to 
the western liberal values and orientation as shall be discussed in preceding chapters. 
Schmitter and Karl (1991:76) define modern political democracy as “a system of governance in 
which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens … through the 
competition and cooperation of their elected representatives”. It is thus no strange that post-
colonial African nationalism has embarked on reconstructing African nationhood by appealing to 
African traditional values such as political decision making through consensus and the centrality 
of communitarianism as part and parcel of a transformed post-colonial African society. Ubuntu lies 
at the heart of the African way of life and impacts on every aspect of people’s wellbeing. Thus, it 
is a fact that Ubuntu can be regarded as the soul force that drives almost every facet of societal life 
in African societies. In the researcher’s view that consensus as enshrined in African 
communitarianism appears to be at variance with Western liberal democracy which gives 
prominence to majoritarian rule. The capacity of African culture to express compassion, 
reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity for the benefit of everyone in the community is 
undoubtful. Against the background of attempts to universalize Western liberal democracy, this 
study thus examines the resultant tension that in such circumstances is bound to arise in an African 
post-colonial context. The study takes the Zimbabwean political environment as an example of 
how different forms of democratic frameworks may collide. 
While various political and developmental challenges that continue to characterise post-colonial 
Sub Saharan Africa as evidenced by inter alia xenophobia in South Africa and land reform program 
in Zimbabwe can be attributed to issues of moral leadership and governance, they may as well be 
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a result of a decentred approach that has come to be accepted and applied as a universal framework 
for democracy. If the former is true, questions can still be asked as to what factors have affected 
contemporary African leaders’ commitment to the ethos and ideology of African nationalism 
discourse? If the latter has to be explored, the question would be to what extent does the collision 
between liberal democracy and other forms of democracy that African leaders often appeal to 
account for the political and development challenges that post-colonial sub Saharan Africa 
encounters today? The same constructive African post-colonial criticism can be discerned in the 
works of the proponents of African democratic values as predominantly consensual democracy. In 
this regard, recourse is usually made to African ethical concepts such as Ubuntu/Unhu as ethically 
transformative to African politics and economics. The works of Stanlake and Marie Samkange, 
(1980); Augustine Shutte (1993; 2009); Ruel Khoza, (2006) and John Mbigi (1969) are efforts 
aimed at demonstrating that African traditional values can be fused with inherited western values 
in a way that can promote a new post-colonial political and economic order. 
While the findings of this study are limited to moral values and the rise of African nationalism for 
the aim is not to study morality as a discipline on its own, not all the aspects of African nationalism 
and moral values are addressed in the study. Texts are selected on the basis of their relevance to 
the issue under investigation; hence the study must be regarded not as a comprehensive discussion 
of a particular scholar, but an engagement of scholars on the basis of their relevance to the issues 
under investigation. It is also important to note that as a political activist my commitment to 
scholarly objectivity can easily be compromised when discussing particular political issues. Be 
that as it may, the trustworthiness of the study relates to its clearly defined methodological 
framework that is located within ontological and epistemological parameters recognised in the 
social sciences discipline. A comprehensive review of related literature and critical analysis, 
through the lenses of the post-colonial theory filters the possible biases pointed above. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To examine the values and ethics that inform the governance and leadership systems used 
in contemporary Sub-Saharan democracies.  
10 
 
2. To examine the extent to which these governance and leadership values and ethics resonate 
with the African philosophy of Nationalism. 
3. To explore possible ways through which African political and cultural realities can be used 
to enrich and renegotiate the Western liberal democratic frameworks that have been 
accepted as universal in ways that can promote development in the sub-continent.  
4. To provide an ethical and practical lessons that inform African governance and democratic 
leadership in Sub-Sahara Africa 
1.5 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the study seeks to answer the following key questions:  
4 What values and ethics inform the contemporary governance and leadership systems in post-
colonial Africa? 
5 To what extent are the values of African Nationalism philosophy resonating with these 
governance and leadership systems? 
6 To what extent can the western liberal democratic framework be renegotiated to ensure the 
enrichment of African cultural values in ways that can strengthen governance and leadership 
systems as well as promote development in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
7 What ethical and practical lessons for Africa inform African governanceand democratic 
leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
1.6 Theorical Frameworks upon which the thesis will be constructed 
As alluded to earlier on, western liberal values such as self-determination became an ethical 
principle aimed at guiding the African quest for total emancipation from all forms of oppression 
(Rotberg, 1966). The Western classical liberal principle of treating the individual with dignity was 
collectivised by African nationalists as to imply the dignity of the whole nation. A transition from 
individualism to nationalism found its complement in the concept of majority rule, or what is 
commonly known as liberal democracy. In the light of the research problem identified thus far, 
this study is based on African post-colonial criticisms as one of its main theoretical frameworks. 
In this study, African post-colonial criticism and post-colonial theory are used interchangeably. 
However, a distinction is made between deconstructive African post-colonial and constructive 
post-colonial criticism. Deconstructive African post-colonial criticism is usually based on the 
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critique of post colonial African political and economic landscape. In this regard, works of Franz 
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Balck Skin, White Masks, and Ali Mazrui’s works, Violence 
and thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa, Political Values and the Educated Class in 
Africa are some of the scholarly works that deal with the moral dilemmas inherent in African 
nationalism from its inception up to the present day. Literay works such as those of Chinua Achebe 
and Ngugi wa Thiongo demonstrate tensions that exist between African traditionalism and 
modernity (as conflated with western culture) in emerging post colonial and economic values. 
On the other hand, constructive post-colonial criticism attempts to go beyond the deconstructive 
legacy of colonialism on post-colonial African society by arguing for the inclusion of afrocentric 
indigenous knowledge systems within the mainstream of political and economic discourses. 
Within the political landscape, constructive African post-colonial criticism has manifested itself 
in the form of assertiveness within the dominant Euro-centric political and economic moral 
discourses. The African renaissance discourse which was advocated by Thabo Mbeki in his 
domestic and international speeches as well as the Ubuntudiscourse is part and parcel of the 
emerging constructive African post-colonial criticism in socio-economic and political spheres. The 
same constructive African post-colonial criticism can be discerned in the works of proponents of 
African democratic values as predominantly consensual democracy. In this regard, recourse is 
usually made to African ethical concepts such as Ubuntu/Unhu as ethically transformative to 
African politics and economics. The works of Stanlake and Marie Samkange, Hunhuism, 
Augustine Shutte Ubuntu, Ruel Khoza Let Africa Lead and lovemore mbigi, Ubuntu are efforts 
aimed at demonstrating that African traditional values can be fused with inherited western values 
in a way that can promote a new post-colonial and economic order. From the foregoing, it is also 
clear that part of the theoretical framework to be adopted in this study is comparative because 
African nationalism was inseperable from westrn values of political liberalism 
1.7 Research Methodology 
In the context of this study, complex textual descriptions of phenomena were adopted. The 
research method adopted in this study is the emic approach or an insider’s perspective. This is 
critical despite the demerits of the researcher’s biases under this approach to research. As a cabinet 
minister having been in government for over thirty years, I have been involved in dealing with the 
governance challenges in post-colonial Africa as well as contributing to conversations on African 
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nationalism and western lberal democracy.This thesis is minly theoretical. It begins by providing 
an historical account on the primacy that was given to western political liberal values during the 
rise of African nationalism to a few selected countries south of the Sahara. The thesis begins by 
presenting a condensed summary of the main tenets of western political liberal values and 
thereafter goes on to show from an historical perspective how these values were instrumental to 
the rise of African nationalism. This discussion is based more on theoretical ideas of other scholars 
on western political liberal values from a multi-disciplinary perspective. This approach includes 
some of the significant epochs of the history of African nationalism and western liberal values. In 
this regard it is hoped that this approach shed more light on the discussion of western liberal values 
in post-colonial African political and economic context. 
Secondly, such an historical analysis is followed by a discussion on deconstructive African post-
colonial criticism as presented in some of the world’s influential writers that were identified in the 
study. Since the study is critically objective, the researcher presents the arguments of 
deconstructive African post-colonial critics with specific reference to ethics in post-colonial 
African politics. After presenting the arguments of deconstructive African post colonial critics, the 
arguments of constructive African post-colonial critics are also presented. Since the study is 
critical and objective, it is anchored on the persuasiveness of the presented arguments.This study 
is comparative in the sense that it demonstrates whether western values of political liberalism are 
compatible with African political traditional values as espoused by the proponents of constructive 
African political critics. In this regard, significant works of African scholars and African 
politicians were selected with the aim of showing their contribution to the debate. The method of 
investigation adopted in this study are critical, analytical, historical and comparative in its 
orientation. Sources of data are exclusively written materials from the library, archives as well as 
the internet and discussion with selected foreign diplomats in Zimbabwe. 
This research study begins by presenting a condensed historical analysis of the main characteristics 
of the western values of political liberalism followed by a symbiotic relationship between African 
nationalism and western liberal values. The discussion is thus based more on theoretical ideas of 
other scholars on western political liberal values from a multidisciplinary perspective. This 
approach will include all the significant epochs of the history of African nationalism and western 
liberal values. In this regard it is hoped that this approach can shed more light on the discussion of 
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western liberal values in post-colonial African cultural, social, political and economic context. The 
historical analysis is followed by a discussion on deconstructive African post-colonial criticism as 
presented in some of the influential writers that were identified in the study. Since the study is 
critically objective, the aim is to present the arguments of deconstructive African post-colonial 
critics with specific reference to ethics in post-colonial African politics. After presenting the 
arguments of deconstructive African post-colonial critics, the arguments of constructive African 
post-colonial critics are then presented. Here an attempt is made to be as objective as possible in 
the presentation of each school of thought with the aim of presenting greater objectivity in the 
study. Since the study is critical and objective, it will be mainly on the basis of the persuasiveness 
of the presented argument that will provide the main point of view which the study will adopt. 
However, it needs to be stated here that this study is not a study in advocacy on a particular value 
system which should be central to post-colonial African development. 
1.8 Significance of the Study 
The study is justified in that it adds academic value in demystifying the ideology and practice of 
nationalist politics which has often been reviewed against the history of colonialism. The study 
contends the historical fact that African struggles for independence from colonialism were mainly 
motivated by the need to implement politically, economically and socially transformative values 
against the inhumane system of colonialism (Mazrui, 1982) should not be taken to suggest that 
Africans learnt of nationalism from the colonialists. Rather, the value of political liberalism which 
was practiced by colonialists among themselves was appealed to by African nationalists not only 
as a counter value against colonial oppression but also as a justifying value for a protracted armed 
struggle against colonial and settler oppression. The study also aids to an understanding that even 
though modern African nationalistic crusade could have been triggered by colonialism, it was 
aimed at the revival of the already existing traditional African nationalist and humanistic values as 
the bedrock of the envisaged post-colonial order. The traditional nationalistic values became the 
antitheses of the colonially dehumanising imperial values that had kept Africans at the margins of 
society.  
1.1 Location of the Study 
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This study is conceptually focused on ethics, governance and leadership and the rise of African 
nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study focused on selected Sub-Saharan African countries 
that have shown potential in embracing African nationalism in diverse and progressive ways. 
Thethesis specifically concentrated on Anglo-phone, Lusophone and Franco-phone countries 
situated within the Sub-Saharan block. The study made use of the various African ambassadors 
and diplomats stationed in Harare. This is mainly because the diplomats represent the opinions of 
their countries in terms of politics, ideology and historical understandings.  The study also made a 
closer scrutiny at how western liberal democracy influenced the rise of African nationalism. Key 
to the study is the attempt to assess whether there is any link between western liberalism and 
African nationalism. The time frame to be covered will be from 1960-201l which in the 
researcher’s perspective is a critical phase when most African nationalists got independence as 
well as an era characterized by remarkable post-colonial developments in Africa.  
1.10Validity, Reliability and Rigour 
The term validity refers to the extent to which findings in a study accurately reflects on the specific 
phenomenon that researcher is attempting to measure. This is about the best available 
approximation to the truth or falsity of a given inference, proposition or conclusion.  Reliability is 
basically the repeatability of a measurement or the degree to which an instrument measure the 
same way each time it is used under the same condition with the same participants.  However, 
reliability does not imply validity.Inorder to generate valuable and trustworthy data from 
interviewies and content analysis, discipline, knowledge, and hard work by the researcher were 
put in the research.Texts were selected on the basis of their relevance to the issues under 
discussion, and authors were discussed on the basis of their relevance to a subject 
matter.Ambiguity identified was removed and this enhanced the validity and reliability of the 
interview questions. The selection of words used in the interviews were simple so that the 
respondents understood them. In this study, reliability and validity was also assured by having 
clear research questions congruent with the research design. In order to remove the possibility of 
bias, the researcher sent the interview guide to the thesis supervisor for correction. The supervisor 
after correcting part of the questions and suggesting adjustments, gave the researcher green light 
and permission to proceed to do data collection. 
1.11Limitations 
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The researcher was constrained in terms of time to collect data. The study sample needed time to 
respond to the researcher’s interviews as the data was collected during a time when the researcher 
had a lot of both business and political activities, a time during which this study had to be 
conducted.  Be that as it may, the researcher had to appoint research assistants who helped in the 
collection of data.  Because of limited time frame and prohibitive costs, sampling in all strategic 
locations in Africa was necessary so as to deal with a manageable number of respondents. In order 
to minimize some of the highlighted challenges, data gathering methods and triangulation was 
done to balance limitations of one with the strengths of the other. Researcher biases somehow 
influenced the reliability of findings because of the researcher’s political standing.  Although the 
researcher tried to increase reliability of the research findings by using assistants, the method 
introduced further limitations of having data being collected by different interviewers.  Further the 
validity of the findings may have been affected by the interviewers that may have been influenced 
by the controversies surrounding the state of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, Hawthorne 
effect was experienced especially as the researcher was dealing with interviewees at their work 
places. To counteract this threat to internal validity, the researcher took his time in explaining the 
nature of the research to the respondents.  The challenges of democracy in Africa have affected 
almost everyone. Time and lack of finance also constrained research which is why the researcher 
delimited this study.  However, the researcher solved this problem by getting a loan from a bank 
and it became feasible to carry out this research. As a politician, my commitment to scholarly 
objectivity can easily be compromised when discussing particular issues. Thus scholarly 
objectivity can easily be compromised by political allegiance and biases. However, in order to 
mitigatate this, the researcher adopted phenomenological lenses in his analysis. 
1.12Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1:Introduction and Scope of the Study 
The first chapter explores how the dominant democratic frameworks inherited from western 
societies can be renegotiated and adopted to account for historical and cultural realities or contexts 
of Sub-Saharan Africa in ways that will stimulate political and economic development. In this part, 
the background to the study was highlighted emphasizing on the evolution of modern governance 
and leadership issues. The statement of the problem was outlined together with the key research 
questions that constituted the bedrock foundation of the study. 
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Chapter 2: A Historical Analysis of African Nationalism 
The second chapter looked at the historical analysis of colonialism and African nationalism and it 
outlines the key theoretical underpinnings influencing the study such as the African post-colonial 
criticism and its key contours. Key features such as: challenging the hegemony of western 
scholarship; rejection of colonial reading; challenging universality; dismantling totalizing 
narratives; and equal representation in the domain of knowledge were discussed in detail. The 
governance and leadership challenges and the initiatives taken by the African countries towards 
sustainable development, security, dignity and peaceful co-existence of people were also observed. 
Chapter 3: The Symbiotic Relationship between African Nationalism and Western Liberal 
Values 
The third chapter examines the symbiotic relationship between African nationalism and western 
liberal values. Key African nationalists and how they were influenced by western liberal values 
are discussed. These are Leopold Sedar Senghor; Kwame Nkrumah; Julius Nyerere; Felix 
Houphouet-Boihny; Seretse Khama; Tom Mboya; and Sekou Toure to just mention but a few. This 
chapter also attempts to discuss the nexus between western liberalism and African nationalism. It 
concludes by highlighting how African nationalism and liberalism are critical in addressing 
leadership and governance issues in post-colonial Africa.  
Chapter 4:ACritical study of Western values of Political Liberalism in Post-Colonial Africa 
in the light of Deconstructive African Post-Colonial Critcism 
The forth chapter discussed the western values of political liberalism in post-colonial Africa in 
light of deconstructive African post-colonial criticism. The deconstructive post-colonial 
perspective represents a radical shift from colonialism, not in complete abandonment of such 
discourse but in search of other discourses.  
Chapter 5: The Discontent with Western Values Of Political Liberalism and the Alternative 
forms of Democratic Values in the African Context. 
The fifth chapter discusses the discontent with Western values of political liberalism and the 
alternative forms of democratic values in the African context. The chapter also seeks to understand 
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the tenets, values and principles that define the morphology of liberalism and their philosophical 
presumptions.  
Chapter 6:Constructive African Post-Colonial Criticism and Democracy by Consensus 
alternative 
The sixth chapter examines the constructive African post-colonial critics and democracy by 
consensus alternative. It attempts to link traditional systems of governance and western democratic 
values. The chapter concludes by proposing the hybridized model of democracy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa which is believed to assist with the solutions relevant to the current socio-political problems 
besetting current democratic experiences in Africa. 
Chapter 7:Conclusion to the Study 
Finally, chapter seven draws conclusions on the need for a holistic model of democracy for Sub-
Saharan countries that is cognizant of and in consonant with the African culture and context. In 
order, to be effective, the proposed hybridized model ought to be implemented by each government 
in Sub-Saharan Africa in partnership with all national and international development stakeholders. 
This is the only way democracy, good governance and leadership development can be consolidated 
in conformity with the national, socio-cultural and economic context and in line with commitments 
made at international level. 
 
CHAPTER TWO: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the historical analysis of African nationalism and its development. The 
circumstances that influenced the development of African nationalism are explored with specific 
reference to the economic and political developments of colonial Africa. It is a fact that African 
nationalism can only be discussed within the context of colonialism because it was an attempt to 
respond to the impact of colonialism. The need for an African ideology as catalyst of social and 
political development of African societies has been central to the efforts of colonized people to 
attain nationhood. Confronted with a subtle self-conscious national identity founded 
simultaneously on liberal ideals and the lifeblood of African colonized people, nationalist leaders 
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such as Kwame Nkrumah; Julius Nyerere; Leopold Senghor; Patrice Lumumba; Tom Mboya and 
Robert Mugabe chose to challenge the residues of colonialism by pursuing nationalist political 
ideas that represented the interests and liberation of the African people. The chapter begins by 
discussing the conceptual definition of nationalism and further highlights African nationalism as 
a creation of colonialism. 
In the context of this study, African nationalism is defined as a political ideology pursued by 
Africans in an attempt to assert the rights, aspirations and claims that oppose European colonialism 
in its various forms. In essence, African nationalism is a quest for the radical emancipation and an 
attempt at total independence from colonizers and to consolidate the new nations. The nationalist 
leaders such as Aime Cesaire (Martiniquan poet), Leopold Sedar Senghor (the first President of 
Senegal) and Kwame Nkrumah (the first President of Ghana), sought to highlight the common 
cultural and political history of Africa. The positive aspects of black history and culture were 
articulated through their individual writings, speeches and political activities. However, not all the 
negritude advocates were fixated on highlighting the glorious African past as the location of 
contemporary African identity and mobilization. African nationalists also simultaneously pursued 
modernisation goals, while at the same time holding on to tradition. It is also instructive to note 
that African nationalisms in Africa took various forms that are highlighted in the context of their 
diversified forms.  
In Ghana Kwame Nkrumah’s nation building strategies encompassed the propagandistic use of 
political iconography, expressed through symbols of nationhood, including money, postage 
stamps, monuments, museums, dress, non-verbal maxims, the national anthem, emblems, and both 
national and party flags. The premiership of the self-proclaimed ‘founder of the State of Ghana’ 
was characterized by the ‘cult of personality’ where the president branded the nation with his 
image by personalizing these public symbols of nationhood. This nationalist and ideological 
stamping resulted in creation of cultic nomenclatures such as ‘Osaghefo’ which means the messiah 
as reference to the indispensability of the president.  The legacy of white supremacy in Africa is 
linked both culturally and historically to European enslavement and colonization of indigenous 
populations throughout the African continent. Although the process of colonialism has not 
followed an identical path in each area where indigenous Africans were subjugated, there are 
affinities if one uses the nation-based paradigm which advocates for the understanding of racial 
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dynamics as products of colonialism and also as outcomes of relationships which were global and 
epochal in character. This chapter evaluates the origins of colonialism in Africa, the development 
of African nationalism and its salient features. 
In the chapter the rise of African nationalism is viewed as inseparable to the African colonial and 
precolonial experience, for African struggles for independence from foreign invasions and colonial 
servitude were evidently bound to nationalistic aspirations (Nantambu, 1998; Mazrui 1978). In 
this chapter, it is important to explore how African nationalism was a creation of colonialism, a 
creation of the state as well as how it contributed to the quest for a just society.  
2.2 A Conceptual Definition of Nationalism 
Nationalism as a universal human construct has been studied extensively because of its resiliency 
as a major societal force. Literature on nationalism, let alone African Nationalism, is not only 
complex but is at times conflicting and perplexingly paradoxical. In light of the violent occupation 
and division of Africa and its influence on modern African Nationalism articulated in the previous 
chapter, the present chapter is an historical analysis of the roots of what has come to be known as 
modern African Nationalism.  The chapter argues that modern African Nationalism, though rooted 
in the initial primary resistance to pre-colonial foreign invasions and imposition of colonial rule 
aimed at entrenching European political, socio-economic and biological imperialism, it culminated 
in mass nationalistic movements mobilised around the desire for what is now known as democracy 
or self-government’ aspects which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, are often considered 
as inherent values of the Western World.  
Due to the divided scholarship that has resulted in a profound ambivalence surrounding its 
definition, the chapter discusses different resultant types and/or stages of African Nationalism and 
its historical periodization advanced by scholars with the aim of arriving at a meaningful definition 
applicable in this thesis. In this chapter, the rise of African Nationalism is viewed as inseparable 
to the African colonial and pre-colonial experience, for African struggles for independence from 
foreign invasions and colonial servitude were evidently bound to nationalistic aspirations 
(Nantambu, 1998; Mazrui, 1978). This brings to fore some of the specific questions that this thesis 
grapples with: What were these aspirations? Have African nationalists, half a century into 
independence, managed to deliver on these aspirations? If not, what possibly went wrong? How 
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can the bona fide spirit of nationalism be reignited in the post-independent Sub Saharan African 
leadership? In order to achieve its objectives, the chapter begins by defining nationalism before 
contextualizing it in the African context. It goes on to highlight different periods and stages through 
which African Nationalism morphed to become modern African Nationalism. 
As noted above, literature on nationalism is arguably complex, conflicting, inchoate, contradictory 
and at times paradoxical. As such (and perhaps due to its multifaceted nature and manifestation) 
nationalism has become notorious for its indefinability as it exhibits characteristics that have both 
universal and also unique properties that are peculiar to individual nations (Mazrui, 1977). Due to 
this acknowledged complexity, it is perhaps instructive to begin by unpacking the concept of 
nationalism etymologically. As an adjective, the word nationalism is a derivative of the noun 
nation. This word is loaned from the Latin noun ‘nationem’ which means breed or race (Connor 
1978: 381). The word nation is thus defined in the dictionary of International Relations as; 
A social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a 
sense of homogeneity. ‘Nation’ is difficult to define so precisely as to differentiate the term 
from such other groups as religious sects, which exhibit some of the same characteristics. 
In the nation, however, there is also present a strong sense of belonging associated with a 
particular territory considered to be peculiarly its own (Plano and Olton 1969: 119). 
In the light of the above definition, it is abundantly clear that the word nation implies a 
psychological bond that exists among a particular people such as ‘a sense of homogeneity’ and ‘a 
sense of belonging to a particular territory’. Accordingly, Anderson (1983: 11), through what has 
been described as one of the most successful definitions of nationalism, sees nations as ‘imagined 
communities,’ which are ‘limited,’ ‘sovereign,’ and rooted in a deep sense of ‘community’.  
In Greek, the term ‘nation’ is derived from the word ‘ethnos’which refers to a group of people who 
share a common descent (Connor 1978). Presently, such groups can be found in different regions 
or states. In this regard, Ethnos can refer to a majority or a minority. Some scholars have thus used 
the word ethnicity to refer to a people who share a common descent. In this regard, it is used in the 
pristine sense of the word nation (Connor 1978: 386-387).For Rotberg, “pre-colonial tropical 
Africa had very few nations in the accepted sense, and even that retained their national identity 
intact throughout the colonial interlude as colonies themselves usually comprised two or more … 
tribal and political entities” (Rotberg 1966: 36).  This is contrary to the notion that nations are 
supposed to share a sense of common culture and common consciousness.  
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It is in light of the above that in Western literature about Africa, African societies are usually 
described as tribes instead of nations. Thus an African state is usually described as composed of 
various tribes who have allegiance to different tribal affiliations instead of the nation as a whole 
(Mazrui, 1982). Here the word ‘tribe’ carries with it elements of primitivism in the process of the 
evolution of human societies as tribes are presumed to be evolving into becoming nations. 
Tribalism is thus defined as “the sentiment of loyalty to an ethnic or linguistic group, which seeks 
to improve its particular interest within the state” (Curtin, 1966: 147). It is from this perspective 
that tribes are distinguished from the ideal of the nation which does not seek to segregate itself 
within national frontiers. Colonialism created tribes where kinship became the main determinant 
factor for belonging. The word tribe was used in a derogatory way by European anthropologists 
and ethnologists where it came to imply “primitive, inferior, or savage” (Ibid: 147). For this reason, 
tribalism was characterized by African nationalists and scholars as ideological. Archie Mafeje 
characterized tribalism as one of the problems that confronted Africa. For Mafeje, “The problem 
in Africa is not one of empirically diversified behaviour but mainly one of ideology, and 
specifically the ideology of tribalism. European colonialism, like any epoch, brought with it certain 
ways of reconstructing African reality. It regarded African societies as particularly tribal” (Mafeje 
1971: 253).  
Mafeje sees tribalism as ideological in the sense that it served certain European colonial political 
administrative purposes. For example, in the case of the then Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), 
designated areas for Africans were statutorily described as Tribal Trust Lands that were under the 
governance of chiefs. Resorting to linguistic evidence, Mafeje argues that;  
in South Africa the indigenous population has no word for ‘tribe’; only for ‘nation’, ‘clan’, 
and ‘lineage’ and, traditionally, people were identified by territory…In many instances the 
colonial authorities helped to create the things called ‘tribes’, in the sense of political 
communities; this process coincided with and was helped along by the anthropologists’ 
preoccupation with ‘tribes’. This provided the material as well as the ideological base of 
what is now called ‘tribalism’ (Mafeje 1971: 254). 
In the light of the above, it can be argued that the word ‘tribe’ served ideological purposes which 
were beneficial to colonialism. As stated in the preceding discussion, the word tribalism carried 
with it some racial connotations where it implied the denigration of an African. Under colonial 
rule, tribalism thus helped colonial administrators to avoid the issue of whether their colonial 
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territories should be regarded as nations or not. There is no doubt that African Nationalism was 
based on the quest of trying to go beyond tribalism as an ideology of colonialism aimed at 
pacifying Africans.  
Tribalism was based on the presumption that kin relations were more important than anything else. 
Membership to a tribe is usually based on descent. From a tribal perspective, blood affinity and 
geographical orientation are considered as determining factors in relating to other people. Some 
scholars, for example, Masipula Sithole (1985) has used tribalism and ethnicity interchangeably 
arguing that “tribalism as understood in contemporary African politics has nothing to do with 
‘primitivism’. For him, the terms ethnic group and tribe, or ethnicity and tribalism refer to the same 
phenomenon. Sithole goes on to argue that African politicians use ethnic allegiance with the aim 
of making some political gains. According to Sithole, politicians who discourage invoking 
tribalism do not exist as most are conscious of the fact that such reluctance would put them at a 
disadvantage. In other words, ethnicity is appealed to by African politicians also for their political 
advantages. However, ethnicity has always been singled out by African nationalists as a stumbling 
block to nation building (Nkrumah, 1968). Thus the idea of state-nation is partly based on the aim 
of countering ethnicity and tribalism. In order to achieve this aim, sometimes African politicians 
have advocated a one-party state as part and parcel to nation building in post-colonial Africa. 
Highly evolved societies were expected to exist as nations because nations and nationalism, as 
Rotberg (1966) puts it, were by the end of the nineteenth century assumed to be “the most complete 
embodiments of a natural human need” (Rotberg 1966: 36). If nationalism was the highest 
accomplishment of human social existence, it can equally be said that tribalism was the lowest 
form of human social existence.  
It is the above phenomenon that makes the definition of African Nationalism problematic because 
if nationalism is based on the idea of common origins and common belonging, hence a country 
with numerous ethnic groupings such as most post-colonial African states, as with the United 
States of America, can easily fail to qualify to be called a nation. As a nation of immigrants who 
do not share a sense of homogeneity and a sense of common belonging, America cannot qualify 
to be called a nation in the primordial sense of the word. Thus Connor (1978) categorically 
dismisses the notion of calling America “a nation of immigrants” arguing that; Whatever the 
American people are (and they may well be sui generis), they are not a nation in the pristine sense 
23 
 
of the word … The unfortunate habit of calling them a nation, and thus verbally equating American 
and German, Chinese, English, and the like, has seduced scholars into erroneous analogies (Connor 
1978: 381).The idea of referring to America as a nation is based on substituting a nation for a state. 
As Connor argues, the habit of inter-utilizing nation and state probably developed as alternative 
abbreviations for the expression nation-state, the coining of which is illustrative of an appreciation 
of the vital differences between nation and state. As Connor (1978: 382) puts it, the word nation-
state “describes a territorial political unit (a state) whose borders coincided or nearly coincided 
with the territorial distribution of a national group”. However, disqualifying multi-ethic African 
states as “non-nations” on the bases of multi-tribes is flawed as the geographical entities that are 
now called nations were drawn to the convenience of the Europeans.  It should be noted that 
colonial authorities drew boundaries of their new territories without paying any regard to the actual 
distributions of a myriad national peoples, ethnic communities, traditional monarchies, chiefdoms 
and other African societies renting apart African nations and in the process making ethnically 
homogeneous boundaries rare (Meredith, 2005; Mazrui, 1982).  
Among many other homogeneous groups that were divided, for example, include the Venda who 
were partitioned between Zimbabwe and South Africa, the Tonga between Zimbabwe and Zambia 
and the Bakongo between French Congo, Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola (Meredith, 2005). 
The resultant situation is such that states governed by one colonial authority contained diversities 
of peoples except for few monarchies and dynasties such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt that were 
retained as they were (Meredith, 2005). Thus, Kwame Nkruma, in his address to the 1964 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in Cairo bemoaned this deliberate divisive legacy 
by colonialists as the greatest wrong which they inflicted on us, and which we now continue to 
inflict on ourselves in our present state of disunity (Nkrumah, 1964). Meredith (2005) observes 
that by the time the scramble for Africa was over, 10,000 African polities had been amalgamated 
into forty European colonies which gave birth to the modern states of Africa. Thus, for Nkrumah, 
the colonialists left Africans divided into economically unviable States which bear no possibility 
of real development.As a form of resistance to colonial occupation, these diverse African groups 
were, however, able through their leaders to forge a sense of belonging to that geographical entity 
and formed mass nationalistic movements whose mobilising ideology can be viewed as African 
Nationalism. While common territory, ethnicity, language and culture may in fact be present in a 
nation, the existence of a nation does not necessarily imply the presence of all of them. As 
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Nkrumah (1970) argues; “The community of economic life is the major feature within a nation, 
and it is the economy which holds together the people living in a territory. It is on this basis that 
the new Africans recognise themselves as potentially one nation, whose domination is the entire 
African continent”. Nkrumah is suggesting that a state may exist on a multi-national basis. Here it 
is important to emphasise that the rendering of the nation-state as a complex and contradictory 
entity conceivably complicates both the understanding and practice of nationalism. This reality 
amply illustrates the complexity surrounding the definition of what really nationalism is. Be that 
as it may, key scholars who have attempted to define nationalism, among them Rotberg (1966), 
define it as a consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of their membership of a nation 
and/or, in the case of African Nationalism, the desire to further the liberty or prosperity of a 
particular nation.  
While argued to have universal properties, characteristics of nationalism are also determined by 
unique political, socio-cultural, economical and historical forces in a particular context. In Africa, 
the issue of nationalism cannot be divorced from the desire to build nations after the attainment of 
independence from colonialism discussed in the previous chapter. The ambition of a post-colonial 
African state has always been building a nation. In the quest for nationhood, the desire was to go 
beyond the state that was created by colonialism. It is precisely in light of the above view that the 
notion of African Nationalism, which is the focus of this chapter, comes to the fore. Understanding 
African Nationalism – its origins, stages/types as well as its accompanying ideology - is 
particularly important as it helps to achieve one of the key tasks that this study seeks to achieve; 
that is to understand the philosophy underlying African Nationalism. The section below thus 
addresses the notion of African Nationalism in light of the African colonial experience discussed 
in the previous chapter.  
2.3 African Nationalism as a creation of Colonialism 
The devastating consequences of colonialism, dehumanization of the indigenous African peoples 
and genocidal destruction of the socio-economic, political and religious values of the Africans led 
to the genesis of African nationalism as a response to the impact of colonialism. The consequences 
of the colonial systems of leadership and governance are ipso facto the fundamental reasons that 
led to the creation of African nationalism. The African people and their values became chattels 
under the colonial systems of governance and this was evident in the Anglophone, Francophone 
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and Lusophone regions of colonial Africa. African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius, 
Nyerere, Patrice Lumumba, and Kenneth Kaunda among others have persistently argued that 
colonialism left behind fragmented African societies that were in most cases organized on the 
principle of tribes and ethnic groupings (Nkrumah, 1964). In this regard, under colonialism, tribes 
or ethnic groups were regarded as nations that had the right to self-determination within their ethnic 
or tribal territories. Thus African Nationalism is widely viewed as a political movement for 
national self- determination or a feeling of affinity among people of African descent based not 
only on their shared cultural norms but also on a common historical experience. One such historical 
experience shared by nearly all Africans was colonial oppression, both in Africa and in the diaspora 
as evidenced by the anti-colonial ideology of pan-Africanism championed by William E.B. 
DuBois, the Africa-American advocate of people of colour around the world, and intellectual 
father of pan Africanism. Pan-African movement of the 1900 was founded as an effort to express 
the desires of oppressed Africans everywhere to protest openly and to show great concern about 
their undemocratic treatment by British imperial rule in Africa (Contee 1969: 49) 
Though widely accepted, the above view to African Nationalism and its associated anti-colonial 
pan-African ideology limits its origins to colonialism. While this may be accepted for what will 
be discussed in the sections ahead as modern African Nationalism that conceivably began after 
World War I among African diaspora intellectuals and revolutionaries all over the world, and 
subsequently as secondary resistance movements within the African continent itself to not submit 
to European rule (Korn, 1965; Rotberg 1966), there are debates suggesting that African 
Nationalism, like nationalism elsewhere in the world, is not new but pre-dates colonialism 
(Nkrumah, 1964). These arguments are based on different scholarly views on the factors which 
are thought to account for the rise and growth of African Nationalism. These include among others; 
colonialism and its policies (Korn, 1965; Rotberg 1966), Western and missionary education as 
well as the Second World War (Meredith, 2005). 
While an appreciation of the factors that led to the rise of African Nationalism are critical in 
understanding its meaning, scholars battling to arrive at a common understanding of this 
movement utilised these factors to come up with what some refer to as stages or types of African 
Nationalism (Adeleke, 2012); while others come up with periodization of nationalism (Nantambu, 
1998). For the researcher, these typologies are useful especially in helping achieving the objective 
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of this thesis of unpacking the philosophy behind African Nationalism. This is because different 
factors conceivably caused different kinds of national movements and this happened at different 
historical epochs. The stages and periodization of African Nationalism are perhaps the most 
effective ways not only through which one can understand this phenomenon but also through 
which the philosophy underlying this movement can be gleaned.  
In the section below, stages of African Nationalism are explored. Under each stage, an attempt is 
made to examine not only the factors that gave impetus to the movement, but also its philosophy 
and objectives. Adeleke (2012) provides an instructive analysis of divergent scholarly opinions 
which reflect what he calls “a conceptual disagreement” on the roots of African Nationalism. In 
his analysis, most scholars concur with Coleman’s (1971) typology of African Nationalism which 
places the political movement in categories shown in Figure 2.1below. 
Figure 2.1: Ademola Adeleke’s (2012) stages of African Nationalism 
 
Source: Developed by author. 
The above typology shows three progressive stages of nationalism. While there is consensus on 
the meaning and objective of modern nationalist movements, Adeleke (2012) acknowledges that 
there are divergent opinions on whether primary resistance and secondary revolts have any 
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connection with modern nationalist movements and whether they can in fact be described as 
nationalist movements. For the purposes of the present chapter, his typology conjures pertinent 
questions on when, why and how did African Nationalism originate? These questions speak not 
only to the various factors that led to the rise of African Nationalism but also provide a common 
ground to the debate about the nature and age of this political movement. Answers to these 
questions are central to the achievement of the objective of this study which aims to understand 
the philosophy that underlies this political movement.   
African Nationalism refers to the revolution that was initiated in the nineteenth century before the 
establishment of colonial rule. Adeleke (2012) describes it as traditional form of nationalism led 
by the traditional ruling elite who struggled against a change in the status quo. Its objective, as 
Thompson (1969) notes, was to retain the old order as resistance movements and organizations 
sought to restore the status quo and freedom of Africans in Africa, as well as those of the diaspora 
who had constantly struggled to rise from centuries of degradation and dehumanization that began 
during the slave trade in the 15th Century.  
Nkrumah clearly lends credence to the above in his autobiography where he claims that  
In the very early days of the Christian era, long before England had assumed any 
importance, long even before her people had united into a nation, our ancestors had attained 
a great empire, which lasted until the eleventh century, when it fell before the attacks of 
the Moors of the North. At its height, that empire stretched from Timbuktu to Bamako, and 
even as far as to the Atlantic (Nkrumah, 1971). 
The above assertion by Nkrumah points to existence of pre-colonial African nations suggesting 
that African Nationalism, like nationalism elsewhere in the world, is not new. This is contrary to 
the common view in Western scholarship as espoused by Rotberg who argues that African 
Nationalism is a creation of colonialism (Rotberg, 1966).  
In the annals of African history, one finds coherent organized African communities with a very 
strong sense of identity, prepared to defend their territorial and cultural integrity against those who 
would want to destroy or undermine them. Nantambu (1998), notes that African Nationalism began 
when African peoples resisted several disparate invaders, many years before slave trade in the 15th 
Century. For example, in the ancient Kemet (now Egypt), Africans had resisted and fought close 
to a dozen wars against the following among other invaders: 
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a) Hyksos or Sheperd Kings in 1783 B.C 
b) Assyrians, (Syrians) in, 666 B.C 
c) Persians, (Iranians) in 552 B.C and 343 B.C 
d) Greeks under Alexander the Great in 332 B.C 
e) Romans in 30 B.C 
f) French, under Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 
g) The British in 1881 
Nationalism thus started when the first historic ruler of the first dynastyin Kemet, Pharaoh Aha 
(also known as Narmer (renamed Menes by the Greeks) united the upper and lower Kemet into 
one nation with Memphis as the capital city (Nantambu, 1998).  
In addition, when the great African King, Mansa Musa of Mali was on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 
1324-1325, the Wolof people – who had been forcibly brought under the Mali Kingdom – seized 
the opportunity to rebel against the Mali Kingdom, the Wolof people were expressing nationalism, 
a separate national identity and a desire to govern themselves in their own land. The effective 
resistance put up against European colonization by the Ashanti people of Ghana, the Hehe of 
Tanzania, the Ndebele and Shona people of Zimbabwe or the Zulus of South Africa among many, 
suggest a very strong sense of national identity that was already in place and a fierce determination 
not to succumb to any other authority but their own.  
The King of the Yao People in Tanzania exhibited a strong sense of primary resistance when he 
unequivocally rubbished a Germany Commander who had been sent to him to affirm the German 
colonial claim to his country in 1890: 
I have listened to your words but can find no reason why I should obey you – I would rather 
die first…If it should be friendship that you desire, then I am ready for it, today and always; 
but to be your subject, that I cannot be…If it should be war you desire, then I am ready, 
but never to be your subject…I do not fall at your feet, for you are God’s creature just as I 
am…I am Sultan here in my land. You are Sultan there in yours. Yet listen, I do not say to 
you that you should obey me; for I know that you are free man…As for me, I will not come 
to you and if you are strong enough, then come and fetch me (Boahen Adu A. 1987: 23-
24) 
Similarly, the following remarks by King of the Mossi people of Burkina Faso dismissing a French 
Captain demonstrate a strong sense of nationalism that existed in Africa prior to colonialism.   
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I know the whites wish to kill me in order to take my country, and yet you claim that they 
will help me to organize my country. But I find my country good just as it is. I have no 
need for them. I know what is necessary for me and what I want. I have my own 
merchants…and consider yourself fortunate that I do not order your head to be cut off. Go 
away now, and above all, never come back (Boahen Adu A. 1987: 25) 
In modern Namibia, spirit of nationalism can be gleaned from the remarks by the leader of the 
Nama people that “the Lord has established various Kingdoms in the world. Therefore I know and 
believe that it is no sin or crime that I should wish to remain the independent chief of my land and 
people” (Boahen Adu 1987: 25). While primary resistance lacked a geo-political focus, for the 
continent by then had not yet been carved up into political units, there were vast nations that these 
Kings led.  
That the sense of patriotism reflected above is indicative of nationalism is unarguable. Patriotism 
is regarded as one of the great political consequences of nationalism (Mazrui, 1982). However, 
Westerners, for their own reasons chose to call these nations implied above as ‘tribes’ despite the 
fact that many of them were extremely large with well-structured social and political institutions. 
Ample evidence shows that these groups were nations occupying specific territories that they were 
willing to defend, if threatened or attacked. The sentiments expressed by the African Kings and 
leaders demonstrate nothing but nationalism by a people who wanted either such relations with 
foreigners as between equals or to be left alone.While primary resistance was as intensely 
nationalistic as modern nationalism (Adeleke, 2012), a critique against traditional nationalism by 
some scholars is that for aiming at maintaining the status quo, it was backward looking and 
negative (Coleman, 1971). However, it is a historical fact that scores of early African nationalists 
who resisted colonial occupation died in battle or were executed or sent into exile after defeat. The 
defeat meant not only establishment of colonial rule but also secondary forms of resistance as well 
as a new crop of nationalist responding to different challenges.    
The subsequent form of nationalist movement linked to the advent of colonialism at the end of the 
19th century has been described as secondary revolts (Adeleke, 2012). This was resistance against 
specific administrative actions in territorial boundaries established by the European powers after 
the partition of the continent. Here, the colonial rule had presented African societies with 
challenges which required mass organisation and commitment to create a nation state which could 
take its place on the basis of equality in the international state system (Ranger, 1968; Adeleke, 
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2012). Thus the subjugation of African and harsh colonial policies is often viewed as having led 
to the growth of African Nationalism in Africa. Proponents of this view, chief among them being 
Rotberg (1966) argue that the partition and subsequent colonial rule of Africa by European powers 
was a stimulus without which there might have been no African Nationalism. For Rotberg, the 
arbitrarily division of the continent by colonialists into administrative entities where imported 
legal, linguistic, and cultural concepts were imposed was the basis upon which the present nations 
of independent Africa were created. What this suggests is that African Nationalism was an offshoot 
of European colonialism. Such scholars also argue that nationalism in colonial Africa was attained 
through detribalization. From this perspective, colonialism is viewed as having provided the 
colonized Africans with a common experience and a common history which was not available 
during pre-colonial times. Rotberg provides us with what he calls three stages of African national 
consciousness. These stages were, “awakening, incipient action and triumph”. It is perhaps this 
form of nationalism that he categorises as awakening. According to Rotberg, the awakening of the 
previously pacified Africans as a result of the introduction of colonial labour system, racial 
discrimination, colonial codes of behavioural expectation and colonial contempt towards African 
traditional way of life. These experiences caused middle class Africans to form associations of 
resistance which were “important outlets for the expression of nationalistic feeling” (Rotberg 
1966: 39-41). 
Evils of colonialism such as forced labour, over taxation, land alienation, racial discrimination and 
forced growing of cash crops, among others made the African people hate the colonial masters 
(Roteberg, 1966). Colonization was mostly a negative exploitative and oppressive experience 
which led to unhappiness. Africans have had memories of that experience even though some may 
appear to have benefited materially. They were humiliated, their culture denigrated and destroyed 
and their land confiscated. European immigrants, who were encouraged to come to Africa as 
pioneer farmers and given large tracks of land to farm, forced Africans to provide cheap labour, 
which resulted in severe consequences for African communities.Large plantations were 
established for growing cash crops. In fact, at the very beginning of colonial occupation, the 
African resistance took the form of armed revolt. The Temne and the Mende people of Sierra 
Leone revolted against the hut tax. The Nama and the Herero people in Namibia revolted against 
Germany forced labour. Evidence of several human limbs and ears in King Leopold’s Congo 
proves that many Africans there resisted forced labour.  
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These kinds of revolts were typical of primary resistance discussed earlier. They were spontaneous 
and involved mass uprisings. African nationalists denounced the underlying philosophy behind the 
colonizers’ mission. Thus the stage of incipient action, according to Rotberg (1966) involved 
African active opposition towards the colonial establishment. Incipient action involved an active 
opposition to colonial labour system, repressive rules that favoured the colonial settlers 
economically and politically as well as rules that segregated against the Africans. For example, in 
the case of the then Rhodesia, “A separate Native Affairs Department (NAD) was established to 
administer every facet of African life. Native commissioners were placed in charge of land 
allocation, tax collection and pass administration; they had powers to appoint chiefs and headmen, 
to amalgamate and subdivide tribes and preside over African criminal and civil cases” (Meredith 
1979: 21-22). Incipient action also involved academic questioning and active protest against the 
legitimacy of the colonial political administrative establishment. This is evidenced by Nkrumah in 
his reflection that; “The Europeans relegated us to the position of inferiors in every aspect of our 
everyday life. Many of our people came to accept the view that we were an inferior people. It was 
only when the validity of that concept was questioned that the stirrings of revolt began and the 
whole structure of colonial rule came under attack” (Nkrumah 1968). 
In the case of Zimbabwe, incipient action involved mass mobilization rallies, urban marches, 
lobbying the British government for active intervention and lobbying the United Nations for help 
(Meredith 1979: 31; Rotberg 1966: 41-42). It cannot go without saying that incipient action in the 
case of Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa has involved an armed struggle 
for the overthrowing of colonial rule.The stage of triumph was about the destruction of colonial 
establishments and the final ushering of independence to the previously colonized African 
countries. Triumphant nationalism was enabled by the African nationalists’ ability to take 
advantage of the general discontent of the majority of the African population against colonialism 
in a way that made the governing of colonial countries an implausible task for colonialists. The 
stage of triumph was also about nation-building. As Rotberg puts it;  
I would be the last to say that the mere achievement of independence by a territory 
concludes the working of the ethos of nationalism within it. …Almost everywhere, the new 
rulers, inheriting the problems that colonial administrations were either unwilling or not 
equipped to face, are involved in a difficult struggle to finish the process of unification that 
began almost at the beginning of the colonial era (Rotberg 1966: 46). 
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It is thus central to Rotberg’s analysis of African Nationalism that colonialism was the main causal 
factor to the rise of African Nationalism. However, contrary views have been aired against 
Rotberg’s conceptualization of African Nationalism as a creation of colonialism. If African 
Nationalism was a creation of colonialism, it becomes implausible for us to imagine whether at 
any space period of time Africans had ever understood themselves as nations. Rotberg’s 
presumption can even lead one to question whether African nationalists had ever existed before 
the advent of colonialism.  
That African nationalists have existed prior to the colonial interlude as already shown undermines 
Rotberg’s conceptualization of African Nationalism. Moreover, any invasion of a particular people 
by a foreign people has always led to a revolt against the invading people. This is a natural response 
in the world trend of imperialism found when people are faced with foreign invasion (Chigwedere, 
1998). As with all invasions that have been experienced by African peoples in various parts of the 
continent, the colonial invasion was not different. When the Ndebele (Zulu) people invaded the 
territory of the Shona people, this invasion was met with stiff resistance from the Shona people in 
Zimbabwe. Spirit mediums among the Shona people such as Chaminuka were in the forefront of 
the rebellion against the Ndebele colonialism. In this regard, Chaminuka, Nehanda and Kaguvi 
Shona spiritual mediums became the inspirational nationalistic mystical force against Ndebele 
colonialism as well as British colonialism that followed thereafter. Equally, the Basotho people 
under the monarchic nationalism of Moshoeshoe resisted the imperialistic invasions of Chaka the 
Zulu.  
In light of the above examples, linking African Nationalism exclusively to European colonialism 
is historically misleading. Rotberg’s account of African Nationalism would have been plausible if 
he stated from the outset that he was tracing it with specific reference to European colonialism. 
His account for African Nationalism is unintelligible because it gives the impression that African 
Nationalism started with the colonial experience among Africans. Since the practice of resisting 
outside invasion has been there since time immemorial, Rotberg’s account of African Nationalism 
is thus acceptable if categorised under secondary resistance African Nationalism.While revolts 
against administration policies could also be described as another form of traditional nationalism, 
the difference with the former is that here other factors such as Christian missionaries, through 
religion and education, contributed immensely to the movement. According to Ajayi (1972) 
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missionaries believed that Christianity could best flourish in Africa if a new social, economic, and 
political environment similar to the European nation state system could be created on the continent. 
As such they found it necessary to raise a new African middle class who would carry through the 
revolution they had initiated. For Ajayi (1972), the rise of this class of Africans is the greatest 
contribution of the missions to African Nationalism.  
Missionary education had three goals: firstly to provide the basic literacy that would enable 
Africans to absorb religious education and training and help in the spread of the gospel; secondly 
to impart the values of Western society, without which missionaries believed the Africans could 
not progress, and thirdly to raise the level of productivity of the African workers (both semi-skilled 
and clerical) without necessarily empowering them sufficiently to challenge colonial rule. Limited 
or flawed as it might have been, it was enough to whet the appetite of African people for more 
education and to pique their political consciousness.Thus missionary education had dual 
consequences for Africans. On one hand it gave African elites skills with which to articulate their 
demands and question the legitimacy of colonial authorities. On the other hand, it also turned out 
to be a powerful medium of African acculturation of Western Christian (and political) values, 
values that the African very cleverly and ingeniously to the utter surprise of his colonial master, 
incorporated into political debate over the struggles for freedom.  
As Ali Mazrui puts it, the destruction of the ‘pagan’ African culture was an important aim of the 
Christian education. Next to making the boys and girls upright Christians, it was naturally 
accompanied by attempts to replace African culture with some aspects of the English way of life 
(Mazrui, 1978). Noteworthy is the fact that Majority of the first generation of African leaders, 
among them Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Leopold Senghor 
(Senegal),Nelson Mandela (South Africa), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Robert Mugabe 
(Zimbabwe), Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), and Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Malawi) were products of 
missionary education. These were educated at institutions such as Achimota College in the Gold 
Coast; the Ecole Normale William Ponty in Senegal; Makerere in Uganda; and Lovedale and Fort 
Hare in South Africa that had been established in Africa through the efforts of Christian 
missionaries (Meredith, 2005). 
Another sense in which the church influenced the growth of African Nationalism was in the 
doctrine and content of the teachings. Christian doctrine stressed the spiritual kinship of people, 
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the idea that all human beings regardless of colour and nationality were God’s children and equal 
in the eyes of God-therefore endowed with a right to treat each other and to be regarded with 
kindness and consideration. The church however failed to translate this into practice. The church 
was contemptuous of Africans and their culture. It behaved as though it did not expect Africans to 
notice the contradiction between the benevolence of the doctrine and the virulence of the racism 
exhibited by some of the missionaries. Thus in South Africa, African pastors of religion organized 
the first nationwide political movement to address the needs of the Africans and oppose the 
impending racist legislation beingcontemplated by the white minority government in 1912.  It is 
important to note here that it wasnot missionary idealism only that inspired modern African 
Nationalism but the real inspiration came from the people’s colonial experience. 
It is from the above perspective that scholars hold that European initiative and policy, and African 
resistance were important in the development of secondary African Nationalism (Ranger, 1968, 
Ajayi, 1972). However, secondary revolts have been accused for being utilitarian because 
nationalist leaders could appropriate the issues for their cause. Meredith (2005) supports this claim 
arguing that while a few espoused nationalist ambitions; the pre-occupation of African elites 
produced by colonial education in the 1920s was a pursuit of roles in administration which 
prompted them to regard traditional chiefs as rivals for power. It is from this perspective that Lord 
Milverton, reflecting a general European sentiment, remarked in 1956 that African Nationalism 
was “just a craving for power by a small group of individuals” (Korn, 1965). The above reflects a 
new crop of nationalists who were created by colonial and Western missionary education. The 
emergent of this class of nationalists is associated with yet another form of nationalism whose 
objective some argue, as discussed below, was completely different from that of primary 
resistance. 
2.3.1 African Nationalism as a Creation of the State 
African nationalism was as a movement that eventually led to the creation of the state after the 
attainment of political independence in most African states such as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe, South Afirca, Angola and Mozambique to just mention but a few. Most African 
nationalists eventually became the first leaders and were responsible for creating the new Africa 
post- colonial state. Modern African Nationalism can be described as a form of anti-colonial 
nationalism or pan-Africanism which, according to Ajayi (1960, 1972), is often traced to the 
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emergence of a new class of educated Africans who had a vision to the future. This new class of 
educated African elites, with the support of different social/economic groups with own interests to 
protect, forged alliances in initiatives directed toward securing greater political rights and 
independence for the country. This eventually led to the creation of a state after independence 
whose focus was modelled in light of the western values of political liberalism. 
According to Ajayi (1960), the educated African was a product of a social revolution initiated by 
the Christian missions in the nineteenth century. The missionaries introduced not only European 
ideas of nation-building but, as already highlighted, they also educated the Africans who imbibed 
these ideas. As a recipient of four earned United States degrees and an honorary doctorate from 
his alma mater, Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, Nkrumah’s nationalism is attributed to 
Western intellectual training and ideas. In fact, Nkrumah was a close associate of Du Bois in the 
Pan-African movement and in anti-imperial causes. It was through the monetary and ideological 
efforts of Nkrumah that Du Bois was able to spend his last few years in Ghana working on the 
“Encyclopaedia Africana” (Contee, 1971).Although he died before realising his dream, scholars 
still believe that the publication of this encyclopaedia would have further spurred both Afro-
American and African Nationalism and the desire for self-determination (Contee, 1971). 
As such, it is plausible to agree with those who have argued that African Nationalism emerged out 
of the Western intellectual tradition which liberally perceives nationalism and the growth of 
‘nationhood’ in the post-colonial world as a combination of three ideals namely: collective self-
determination of the people, the expression of the national character and individuality, and finally 
the division of the world into unique nations each contributing its special genius to the common 
fund of humanity (Chatterjee, 1986; Kendhammer, 2007).Over and above their developed 
consciousness, severe economic, social and political consequences of colonial rule; the new 
generation of the educated elite was stimulated into political agitation by issues related to the 
Second World War in which African soldiers who were recruited for war service participated. 
African units who had helped to defeat the Italians in Ethiopia realised their potential to change 
the status quo; those who had been deployed to India and Burma learnt how nationalist movements 
there had, regardless of their poverty and illiteracy, forced promises of self-governance (Meredith, 
2012).  
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The Atlantic Charter of 1941 drawn by W.Churchil (Britain) and F. Roosevelt (USA) for the 
respect of people’s rights to choose a government of their choice inevitably increased desire for 
self-determination in Africa. After the Second World War, ex-servicemen returned home with 
skills, experience and high expectations for the future; and the Charter was taken by African elites 
as a form of official encouragement to demand some share in the government of their own 
countries. It is against this background that Second World War is considered to have also 
encouraged African Nationalism. It is in light of the above that Rotberg (1966) understands African 
Nationalism as having been fuelled by some of the European ideals such as self-determination 
whereby, according to this ideal, each nation had the right to run its own affairs without external 
interference. Colonialism constituted interference in African political and economic affairs. The 
presence of colonialism in the midst of African societies thus provided a sufficient ground for 
patriotic agitation for self-determination. However, it is not only ethnocentric but quite unorthodox 
to exclusively attribute values of self-determination to Europe. Self-determination is a value that 
also existed in other cultures around the world from time immemorial. Such values are also 
adequately captured in the African philosophy of Ubuntu, a philosophy which can be traced as far 
back to the classical African idea of Ma’at that originated in Egypt centuries before Western 
civilization (Asante, 2015; Murove, 2009; Nantambu, 1998). 
Another unique characteristic of modern African Nationalism is its emphasis on Pan Africanism. 
For many, initially the Pan-African idea was essentially American rather than African but as the 
movement over the years changed its constitution and character especially through DuBois, Pan-
Africanism enhanced the idea of national determination among Africans, under their own leaders, 
for their own benefit (Walden, 1974). Julius Nyerere defined African Nationalism as a new kind 
of nationalism and that it is “meaningless, dangerous and anachronistic if it is not at the same time 
pan – Africanism” (Nyerere, 1968). For Mazrui (1983), Pan Africanism started with alienated 
black nationalists in the Caribbean and North America, sometimes eager to start the process of a 
black return to the African continent, while at other times merely emphasizing the need for black 
liberation both in Africa and the Americas. These include among others Marcus Guvey and 
William E.B Dubois, advocates for the Back to Africa Movement and people of colour around the 
world respectively.  
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As an intellectual father of Pan-Africanism, few claim greater importance than DuBois’ singular 
role in shaping anti-colonial discourse through not only theorizing African Nationalism 
(Kendhammer, 2007), but also through organizing Pan-African Congresses of the 1910s and 20s 
to fight for independence of African colonies from European powers. For Contee (1969: 79), 
DuBois was personally responsible for contributing the ‘terminology of self-determination and 
anti-imperialism’ to the early African nationalist movements and his influence on the first 
generation of political leadership in Africa of the 1960s has been amply demonstrated by many 
scholars (Kendhammer, 2007; Walden, 1974; Contee; 1969).According to George Padmore (in 
Walden, 1974) DuBois’ vision of a Pan-African movement gave reality to the dream so much so 
that it found acceptance as the basic ideology of emergent African Nationalism. DuBois is thus 
credited for providing the intellectual justification for the Pan-African program, having organised 
the first important Pan-African Congress in 1919, influenced the course of the 1921 conference, 
and laid much of the groundwork for the ideas and the ideological foundations which dominated 
Pan-Africanism after World War II.  
DuBois’ vital and decisive role in the early days of Pan-Africanism can also be illustrated by his 
political activities and writings where he positioned himself as not only an African-American 
concerned with the worldwide problem of race, but as a Western trained intellectual attempting to 
construct a discourse of anti-colonial nationalism from within the same classically liberal tradition 
that had generated colonial ideology in the first place (Kendhammer, 2007: 52).DuBois is famous 
for his assertion made at the dawn of the century that “the problem of the twentieth century was 
the problem of the colour line” (DuBois, 1903). 
The resolution of the Fourth Pan-African Congress (PAC) of 1927 also shows clearly DuBois’s 
demands for African freedom. The Congress notes that Negroes everywhere need: 
a. A voice in their own government. 
b. Native rights to the land and its natural resources.  
c. Modern education for all children.  
d. The development of Africa for the Africans and not merely for the profit of Europeans.  
e. The re-organization of commerce and industry so as to make the main object of capital and 
labour the welfare of the many rather than the enriching of the few.  
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f. The treatment of civilized men as civilized despite differences of birth, race, and colour 
(DuBois 1927: 672). 
It is thus not surprising to learn that modern African Nationalism, deriving its influence from Pan 
Africanism illustrated above, is known for its quest for a just society, the provenance of whose 
values lies squarely in the Western ideas of liberalism as espoused by Fourth Pan-African Congress 
of 1927. The injustice against Africans manifested itself through, among other things, the racial 
exclusion of Africans during colonialism from the mainstream of the colonially established nation. 
As with DuBois, the racial inception of Pan Africanism is also given credence by Karioki (1974) 
and Nyerere (1974) who variously view Pan Africanism as a movement born outside Africa in 
reaction to racialism. It should be noted, however, that as already demonstrated, while racialism 
was the cause of Pan Africanism in the West, it was just a contributing factor to the secondary 
resistance form of African Nationalism (Nantambu, 1998).  
As we have seen in the preceding discussions, colonialism defined Africans as tribes and ethnic 
groupings whilst reserving the colonial settlement(s) as a nation. The fight against colonialism was 
thus aimed also at establishing a new African nation that differed yet from the colonial 
establishment. Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea cannot be bettered when he stated the objective of 
Guinean nationalism as follows: 
We of the Guinean nation have made the rehabilitation of the African people and of the 
African man our chief preoccupation, because we want Africa with all her prerogatives to 
liberty and dignity, after recovering full sovereignty, to asset her whole personality and 
become an African Africa. Then our continent will be able to project on to the international 
scene her own reality, and so participate in full consciousness and determination in her 
historic responsibilities to create a better world, opening to humanity a new age of greater 
democratic justice, of real brotherhood and lasting peace. Our aim is to rehabilitate the 
people who were under humiliating foreign domination and to make possible their 
complete reintegration into world society [his italics] (Touré 1979: 13). 
In light of the above, it can be deduced that African Nationalism was aimed at advancing the liberty 
and dignity of the African people against the racial and dehumanizing system of colonialism by 
creating a new just society. It can also be deduced that modern African Nationalism has an element 
of supra-nationalism in as far as it is aimed at being recognized by the whole world.  
Kwame Nkrumah’s Africa Must Unite (1970) belongs to the same genre of supra-nationalism in 
the sense that he saw all of Africa as constituted of one nation. The main concern of supra-
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nationalists was that the whole continent should be seen as one, and that should constitute a 
common consciousness throughout the continent. African supra-nationalism was partly aroused 
by the consciousness of slavery and colonialism. In this regard, people of the African descent felt 
that they were one, and that they should be understood by the world as a single nation. In this vein, 
Nkrumah had this to say, “A notable contribution to African Nationalism and Pan-Africanism was 
the ‘Back to Africa’ movement of Marcus Garvey” (Nkrumah 1970: 133).   
Liberal values of freedom and equality were the antitheses of slavery and colonialism. At the same 
time, these values were seen as inspiring African unity. As David Robertson puts it, 
Nationalism is the political belief that some group of people represents a natural 
community which should live under one political system, be independent of others and, 
often, has the right to demand an equal standing in the world order with others. Although 
sometimes a genuine and widespread belief, especially under conditions of foreign rule, it 
is equally often a symbolic tool used by political leaders to control citizens (Robertson 
1993: 333-334). 
Proponents of African supra-nationalism were mostly of the belief that the independence of a 
particular African state from colonialism was meaningless without the independence of the whole 
continent. As for Nkrumah, the African continent represented a natural community which was 
supposed to be free from all forms of exploitation by foreign forces. For Nkrumah, it was the whole 
of the African continent which was supposed to be understood as a sovereign.  
When Ghana attained its independence in 1957, Nkrumah stated that;  
There would be no meaning to the national independence of Ghana unless it was linked 
with the total liberation of the African continent. While our independence celebrations were 
actually taking place, I called for a conference of all the sovereign states of Africa to discuss 
plans for the future of our continent (Nkrumah 1970: 136).  
As a supra-nationalist, Nkrumah saw the independence that was attained by African states as step 
stone towards the total emancipation of the whole continent from colonialism and the ultimate 
realization of African unity. The quest for African unity was not only motivated by the need to rid 
the African continent of colonialism, rather, the aim was to gradually establish a United States of 
Africa. However, Julius Nyerere did not agree with Nkrumah’s vision of supra-nationalism. 
Nyerere argued that the ideal of African unity was not even attainable at the regional level. For 
Nyerere, “The truth is that we do not in fact have unity in East Africa, and it is now clear that it 
cannot be achieved as easily as we hoped and expected. What we do have is such economic 
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integration between our sovereign states that frictions are inevitable in the absence of efficient 
decision-making machinery” (Nyerere 1968: 61).  
For Nyerere the ideal of unity was attainable during the time of colonialism because decisions on 
matters of colonial policy were made by the colonizing country that had a common master. He 
argued that a decision on any matter could always be obtained, and always had to be accepted even 
by the country which disagreed with the decision (Nyerere 1968: 62). The argument which is being 
proffered by Nyerere is that African Nationalism did not imply African unity as espoused by supra-
nationalists. The reality of divisions based on the notion of sovereignty could not be overlooked. 
The separation of Africa into sovereign states which was initiated by colonialism was the main 
barrier towards the evolution of an African common consciousness.  
According to Nyerere;  
The question we now have to answer is whether Africa shall maintain this internal 
separation as we defeat colonialism, or whether our earlier proud boast – ‘I am an African’ 
– shall become a reality. It is not a reality now. For the truth is that there are now 36 
different nationalities in free Africa, one for each of the 36 independent states – to say 
nothing of the areas still under colonial or alien domination. Each state is separate from the 
others: each is a sovereign entity. …Can the vision of Pan-Africanism survive these 
realities? ... I do not believe the answer is easy. Indeed I believe that a real dilemma faces 
the Pan-Africanist. On the one hand is the fact that Pan-Africanism demands an African 
consciousness and an African loyalty; on the other hand is the fact that each Pan-Africanist 
must also concern himself with the freedom and development of one of the nations of 
Africa. These things can conflict. Let us be honest and admit they have already conflicted 
(Nyerere 1968: 208). 
 
For Nyerere the ideal of African super nationalism was not realistic because this ideal overlooked 
the reality that African states existed as sovereign entities which are first and foremost concerned 
with the development of their own nations. Commitment to a general African consciousness would 
inevitably come into conflict with national consciousness. When it comes to African Nationalism 
one can say that Nyerere was a particularist in the sense that he put emphasis on the particular 
nation state instead of the African continent as a universal for African Nationalism.   
From a philosophical perspective, “particularity denotes a thing which is not universal, is concrete 
rather than abstract, is one amongst many particulars, is something which is unique, and is 
potentially more real, immediate and familiar” (Vincent 2002: 9). It is a particularistic perspective 
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which says that nation-states are more real than a federation or unity of states. It is not surprising 
when Nyerere says that, “in order to avoid internal conflict and further disunity each nation state 
is forced to promote its own nationhood. This does not only involve teaching a loyalty to a 
particular unit, and a particular flag, although that is serious enough. It also involves deliberately 
organizing one part of Africa economically, socially, and constitutionally to serve the interests of 
the people of that part of Africa” (Nyerere 1968: 209).  
In light of the above, there is no doubt that Nyerere understood modern African Nationalism in 
terms of commitment to nation-states in their geographical territories instead of the whole 
continent of Africa. He puts it categorically that, “each state of Africa devises for itself a 
constitution and a political structure which is most appropriate to its own history and its own 
problems” (Ibid, 209). Nyerere’s approach to the philosophy of particularity derives from the 
political concept of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty advances the idea that each state was 
an autonomous entity which can enter into agreements with absolute authority and could 
promulgate laws that are binding to all citizens within its jurisdiction. External interference with 
the affairs of a sovereign country is thus described as a violation of international law – a law that 
regulates the relations of states as equals (Vincent 2002: 24-28). 
 
Thus Nyerere conceived modern African Nationalism as not only about African political control, 
but also aimed at controlling the economy from foreign control. According to Nyerere, “economic 
nationalism has nothing to do with the ideologies of socialism, capitalism, or communism. It is 
universal among nation states. The time, and the method, of securing such control where it does 
not already exist will vary. But it would be absurd to expect Africa to accept that the well-beingof 
its people should be indefinitely controlled from outside” (Nyerere 1968: 263). Economic 
nationalism was thus expressed in the form of the domestication of capitalism through the adoption 
of African communalism which Nyerere called Ujamaa. Nyerere’s argument for economic 
nationalism was based on the presumption that socialism and African traditional values were 
compatible. Thus he argued, “We in Africa, have no more need for being ‘converted’ to socialism 
than we have of being ‘taught democracy’. Both are rooted in our past: - in the traditional life 
which produced us” (Nyerere 1968: 170).  
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Economic nationalism was also articulated by Tom Mboya when he characterised those who 
equated African socialism as victims of “intellectual imperialism”. For Mboya, African socialism 
could be deciphered from African traditional values. Other proponents of economic nationalism 
such as Sékou Touré went as far as to argue that in order to avoid the problem of equivocation 
between African socialism and western socialism, the word socialism should be dropped and 
replaced by the word communaucracy. He writes, “We use the expression communaucratic 
precisely in order to avoid all equivocation and all false analogies…Our solidarity, better known 
under its aspect of social fraternity, the pre-eminence of group interests over personal interests” 
(Touré 1979: 141). Thus for Touré, communaucracy differed radically from individualism which 
is a dominant value in capitalism.  
The foregoing discussion may be viewed as comprehensive and quite elucidatory in as far as the 
nature, stages and objectives of African Nationalism are concerned. However, what remains 
important to understand, which is of particular interest to this study, is the philosophy underlying 
the notion of nationalism and ways in which this spirit can be applied to improve post-colonial 
African governance in order to achieve modern nationalistic objectives. Are there any lessons that 
Sub-Saharan Africa can either learn or provide in this respect? These are some of the questions 
that the study attempts to find answers to. 
2.4 African Nationalism as a Quest for a Just society 
Injustices during the colonial period in Africa manifested in various policies of discrimination 
against the indigenous African people. Inequalities, segregation, unjust laws, lack of democracy 
in its various manifestations characterized the colonial state. Abuse of political power by the 
colonial authorities was banal and the quest for emancipation was inevitably irresistible among the 
colonized groups. That being the context, African nationalism came as a quest for a just 
society.Concurring that African nationalist movement struggled to resist against foreign 
aggression and all forms exploitation (economic, social, and political) of natives by colonialists, 
in the fight for nationhood or nation building, Nantambu (1998: 569) asserts that the fundamental 
objective of African Nationalism is “the total liberation and unification of all African peoples 
under African communalism”. For Nantambu, the development of African Nationalism can be 
categorised into four major historical epochs illustrated in Figure 2.2 below 
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Figure 2.2: Kwame Nantambu’s periodization of African Nationalism 
 
Source: Developed by author (2016) 
The periodization of what Nantambu calls Pan-African Nationalism shown in Figure 2.2 further 
illustrates the already stressed fact that the phenomenon of African Nationalism is not new but 
predates European colonisation of Africa as the struggle for African people goes as far back as 
3200BC. Examples have already been given of the struggles in the ancient Kemet that African 
Nationalists had against foreign invasions. 
A further aspect raised by Nantambu, which is particularly important for this study is the primary 
objective of African Nationalism which he puts as; 
[T]he total liberation and unification of all African peoples under African communalism. 
[It] seeks to achieve African nationhood and nationality; human perfectibility based on 
seven cardinal principles of Ma’at; self- reliance; self-determination; the creation of Pan 
African nationalist solidarity and confraternity among all African peoples on the continent 
and in the diaspora; a cooperative, humanistic, and communal value system [my italics] 
(Nantambu, 1998: 569).   
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As with Nantambu, African scholars who write on African communalism relate it to the African 
philosophy of Ubuntu and often trace the phenomenon to the principles of Ma’at noted above 
(Murove, 2009; Mkhize, 2008; Karenga, 2004). The seven cardinal virtues of Ma’at are truth, 
justice, order, harmony, balance, compassion, and reciprocity. Indeed these are the values that 
African Nationalist fathers like DuBois, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kaunda among others always 
advocated. From an Ubuntu philosophical perspective, these are the ideals that define African 
persons, communities and thus nations (Lubombo, 2015; Murove, 2009). In light of the above 
evidence, it may be pertinent to question if Ubuntu is the philosophy which underlies African 
Nationalism. 
Strong evidence has been adduced early in this chapter suggesting that modern African 
Nationalism derives its influence from Pan Africanism which was championed by Western trained 
intellectuals who were created by colonial and Western missionary education.  African 
Nationalism is known for its quest for a just society the provenance of whose values lies squarely 
in the Western ideas of liberalism as expressed through inter alia The Fourth Pan-African 
Congress of 1927, and The Atlantic Charter of 1941. Nkrumah’s nationalism has thus been 
attributed to Western intellectual training and ideas as evidenced by not only his education but also 
his association with Du Bois.Given the above compelling evidence, the notion of the Western 
liberal values’ influence on African Nationalism is thus difficult to ignore. The question on which 
philosophy can be said to have best informed African Nationalism is thus difficult to attempt here 
before an explication of Western liberal values, identifying which of its values are found in modern 
African Nationalism. This is the task that the next chapter sets off to address. 
It is important to end by underlining that the object of African Nationalism can be described as 
nationhood and a quest for a just society. Be that as it may, it has been argued that modern African 
Nationalism has in fact diluted the quest for nationhood. While it (modern African Nationalism) 
is a reality that played a part in ending territorial colonialism, Ali Mazrui (1982) contends that 
nationhood in Africa has in fact remained an ambition rather than a reality. He argues that while 
modem African Nationalism was born and prospered under the stimulation of racial solidarity and 
shared blackness, ethnic-consciousness is the greatest enemy of African nationhood whose acute 
ethnic cleavages have hampered the transition from African Nationalism to African nationhood. 
While this caveat is important, it is however, not what this thesis endeavors to address. The 
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important issue here is to understand, as attempted above and will be further examined in the next 
chapter, the philosophy underlying the notion of nationalism and ways in which this spirit can be 
applied to improve post-colonial African governance in order to achieve modern nationalistic 
objectives. 
Virtually all former colonized African countries were negatively affected in many ways, most 
important of which was the erosion of their cultural values. Any nation whose cultural values were 
eroded also lost its identity because culture defines who we are, how other people see us and how 
we are able to relate to our natural and social environments in order to ensure survival in a social 
environment bedeviled by unbridled contestation for political and economic supremacy. Africa is 
the world’s second-largest and second most-populous continent, after Asia. At about 30.2 million 
km² (11.7 million sq mi) including adjacent islands, it covers 6% of the Earth's total surface area 
and 20.4% of the total land area (Sayre, 2009). With a billion people (as of 2009), in 61 territories, 
it accounts for about 14.72% of the world's human population (Sayre, 2009). The African continent 
is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, both the Suez Canal and the Red Sea along 
the Sinai Peninsula to the northeast, the Indian Ocean to the southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean to 
the west. The continent has 54 sovereign states, including Madagascar, various island groups, and 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, a member state of the African Union whose statehood is 
disputed by Morocco (Asante, 2007). Pre-colonial Africa had as many as 10,000 different states 
and polities with sundry political systems and groupings (Meredith, 2006).  
These comprised small family groups of hunter-gatherers such as the San people of Southern 
Africa; a more structured unit of social groups such as the family clan groupings of the Bantu-
speaking people of central and southern Africa, heavily structured clan groups in the horn of 
Africa, the large Sahelian Kingdoms, and autonomous city-states and kingdoms such as those of 
the Yoruba and Igbo People in West Africa, and the Swahili coastal trading towns of East Africa 
(Mokhtar, 1990). By the 9th century AD, a string of dynastic states, including the earliest Hausa 
states, stretched across the sub-Saharan savannah from the western regions to central Sudan. 
O’Brien, (2005) postulates that the most powerful of these states were Ghana, Gao, and the Kanem-
Bornu Empire. Ghana fell in the 11th century but was succeeded by the Mali Empire which 
consolidated much of western Sudan in the 13th century. Kanem accepted Islam in the 11th 
century. In the forested regions of the West African coast, independent kingdoms grew up with 
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little influence from the Muslim north. In addition, Oliver and Anthony (1994) perceptively note 
that the Kingdom of Nri of the Igbo was established around the 9th century and was one of the 
first so established. It is also one of the oldest Kingdoms in modern day Nigeria and was ruled by 
the Eze Nri. The Nri kingdom is famous for its elaborate bronzes, found at the town of Igbo Ukwu. 
The bronzes have been dated from as far back as the 9th century.  
The essence of this brief historical analogy is to present a clearer perspective of and deeper insight 
into pre-colonial African societies, how well they had established their own mode of governance, 
attained their own pace of civilisation, evolved home grown political systems and processes of 
ruling, making a process that guaranteed and sustained the peace on the continent. The point is that 
Africa is a dynamic continent with spirited efforts at democratising and developing. Africa is not 
a monolithic concept; there is a degree of differentiation in Africa measurable in terms of 
governance and identity. For instance, few countries (like Senegal, Namibia, Ghana, South Africa, 
Botswana) that are doing well in Africa in terms of good governance and democratic consolidation 
have begun to take exceptions to the definition of Africa as a failed state. Also, cultural 
heterogeneity of Africa has started to play out as countries in the North Africa (Morocco and 
Tunisia for instance) see themselves as part of Arab rather being African. So, there is a great deal 
of disparities on the continent. 
Most Africans were marginalized. The marginal Africans later formed a common front to make 
their grievances known, which cumulated to protest. Some of them were made through books, 
newspapers and leaflets. Africans who were given education, with the help of their counterparts in 
other continents, protested against the colonial order by publicising the corruption and injustice 
perpetrated by the colonial master. Also the contribution of Africans during the first and second 
World Wars demystified the claim of superiority of the colonial master. For instance, Sithole cited 
in Ashby (1963) wrote:  
World War II has a great deal to do with the awakening of the people of Africa. During the 
war the African came in contact with practically all the peoples of the earth. He met them 
on a life and death struggle basis. He saw the so-called civilised and peaceful and orderly 
white people mercilessly butchering one another just as his so-called savage ancestors had 
done in tribal wars. He saw no difference between the primitive and civilised man. In short, 
he saw through European pretensions that only Africans were savages. They had a 
revolutionising psychological impact on the African.  
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The Second World War came as a factor of enlightenment for the struggle of the black people for 
their independence. During the struggle for freedom, especially cultural freedom, Africans were 
confronted with certain challenges expatiated by Ashby (1963:43) in the following words:  
More and more in proportion as we adopt Western manners and the Western way of life, 
the native cultural patterns lose their sharpness…. Are we to abandon all the values of our 
traditional life for those of the alien culture? … The best thing is …to try to have it both 
ways. We must accept the lingua franca that history has already forced upon us but we 
must fight tooth and nail to preserve our own languages in all the instinctive aspects of our 
culture. 
It is in line of African nationalism that Pan-Africanism should be placed. Even though it has 
an external origin and influences, it should be accounted as a child of African nationalism 
which according to Boahen started in the 1870’s British colonies whilst the political demands  
of French West Africa dated about the 1950’s (Boahen 1981:151). The new waves of nationalism 
in West Africa were prompted by the colonial era and it was at the Manchester meeting of 1945 
that the movement has known a formal organised beginning. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kwame 
Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and Akintola of Nigeria were present at the meeting. According to 
Davidson (1972:65-66): 
History of a continent that among the aims of the meeting were the demands for ‘autonomy 
and independence’. In Which Way Africa, he was more explicit about the resolutions of 
the delegates who stipulated ‘We are determined to be free’; they said, ‘But if the western 
world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a 13 last resort, may 
have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom….  
Infected by the seed of the philosophy dominating pan-Africanism, Africans became more active 
in the movement whose head office was transferred to Africa. The meeting of Manchester in 
Britain had no representation from Francophone Africa. At the end of the meeting, Kwame 
Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya returned to their countries to implement 
the resolutions of the Congress, taking up the struggle for local independence. The road to 
independence in Africa started in Manchester, which thus became a historical town for Africans. 
The struggle for independence is one of the impacts of the pan-Africanism movement in West 
Africa. 
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Nkrumah (1968) perceptively notes that; 
The notion that in order to have a nation it is necessary for there to be a common language, 
a common territory and a common culture, has failed to stand the test of time or the scrutiny 
of scientific definition of objective reality. Common territory, language and culture may in 
fact be present in a nation, but the existence of a nation does not necessarily imply the 
presence of all three. Common territory and language alone may form the basis of a nation. 
Similarly, common territory plus common culture may be the basis. In some cases, only 
one of the three applies. A state may exist on a multinational basis. The community of 
economic life is the major feature within a nation, and it is the economy which holds 
together the people living in the territory. It is on this basis that the new Africans recognise 
themselves as potentially one nation, whose dominion is the entire African continent. 
African nationalism desired to change the arbitrary and often illogical boundaries set up by the 
colonial powers in their mad scramble for Africa. Many students of African Affairs were 
constantly asking about what sort of societies or governments were hoped for after independence. 
Africa surging with nationalist movements striving to win freedom and independence. The motive 
behind various nationalist movements was geared towards the security of all our people, higher 
standards of living and social advancement (Mboya 1958). African states would not tolerate 
interference from outside by any country. Mboya (1959), asserts that; “we do not intend to be 
undermined by those who pay lip service to democracy, but have a long way to go in their own 
countries. We will never, never sell our freedom for capital or technical aid. We stand for freedom 
at any cost”. 
Kwame Nkrumah is a consequence of the impact of the colonial rule in West Africa and an African 
nationalist. Nkrumah, after the victory of his party, the C.P.P. spoke and expatiated on the impact 
the new nation Ghana could have on the rest of Africa. On March 6th, 1957, he declared; “We 
have a duty to prove to the world that Africans can conduct their own affairs with efficiency and 
tolerance and through the exercise of democracy. We must set an example to all Africa” (Bourret, 
1960:202). At the independence of the Gold Coast he declared that his objectives were the 
liberation of the entire Africa and her union. According to Bebey (1973:97), Nkrumah argued that, 
“The independence of the Golf Coast has no value if it is not followed with the liberation of the 
rest of Africa…First, seek for your political freedom, all shall be added in compensation”.  The 
idea of United Africa was so great in the mind of Nkrumah that there was a provision in the 
Constitution of Ghana, to give up sovereignty, the National Sovereignty of Ghana, if need be for 
the birth of the United States of Africa (James, 1977:163).  
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All African leaders of newly independent states were faced with the pressing need to invent one 
system for their people. Forster (1994:481-482), contends that; “it was in view of this need that 
Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere adopted socialism while leaders such as Kamuzu Banda were 
more traditionalists and were hostile to socialism”. In later years, Hountondji in his African 
Philosophy, myth and reality reported that Kwame Nkrumah was careful in the use of the 
terminology ‘African socialism’. For Hountondji (1996:138), “Nkrumah would not like to define 
Africa as a world apart, all societies being subject to the same laws in the world and felt that the 
African revolution should not be separated from world revolution”. In view of this, Nkrumah 
preferred to use ‘socialism in Africa’ rather than ‘African socialism’ (Ibid).  Africa 
Todaydescribed Nkrumah as a person of vision whose fame was echoed in Ghana and outside. His 
pan-Africanism politics and his assistance to refugees made him gain popularity (Africa Today, 
1991:976). In his classification of African leaders, Dessarre insisted on the fact that Nkrumah was 
one of the African leaders who had faith in the unity of Africa and for whom no sacrifice was too 
great in order to forge the union. Dessarre also classified Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita along 
with Kwame Nkrumah.  
However, Houphouet Boigny, Leopold Sedar Senghor and Fulbert Youlou were not clearly 
supportive of the question of union, which they regarded with suspicion. Even if Senghor saw in 
the policy of Nkrumah an intelligent vision, he was reserved about the future of the vision which 
he acclaimed doubtful (Dessarre, 1961:30; 171-172). His suspicion is based on the fact that Africa 
unity must not be linked to only anti-colonialism for fear of given it a fragile foundation. He wanted 
the unity of Negro Africans be based on their common values summed in what he called 
“Africanité”. This “Africanité” of Senghor takes into consideration non-Black Arabs and Berbers 
of North Africa (Onésimo Silveira, 1976:113). Sékou Touré was influenced by Kwame Nkrumah 
to opt for autonomy when all other French colonies of Africa South of Sahara voted in favour of 
cooperation in 1958. A pan-Africanist, Sékou Touré as described by Charles-Henry Favrod in 
l’Afrique Seule was an African leader who admired and supported the ideas of a free Africa 
(Favrod, 1961:240). Since September 28, the flag of freedom, of independence and of sovereignty 
has been hoisted, raising the admiration and the pride of all African peoples, of all these masses 
who, had to loose, by getting their independence, a portion of their misery and their humiliation 
(Touré, 1960:354)). Sekou Touré was ready, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, to alienate the 
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sovereignty of Guinea for the United States of Africa. Also he could tolerate class struggles on the 
basis of the survival of African solidarity.  
According to the Guinean leader of Le Parti Démocratique Guinéen, one single party in the State 
was democratic enough, for it reflected the general interest. The birth of OAU in 1963 was as a 
compromise between the point of view of the Casablanca block and the opinion of the Monrovia 
group. It was the first attempt of unifying Africa, which was the main focus of pan-Africanism that 
16 opposed colonialism, oppression, racism, and exploitation. The transposition of OAU into AU 
in Lusaka, Zambia in 2001, was an institutional shift from the main focus of pan Africanism 
Bekerie, (2001:2). According to Bekerie (2001:2), “Now pan-Africanism with African Union is: 
Reaffirmation and redemption centering on the empowerment and development of all African 
people”. Soon after, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was created to 
alleviate the suffering of the Africans. Nigeria was not alone in the campaign to oppose the vision 
of the United States of Africa proposed by Nkrumah, there were also Felix Houphouet-Boigny, 
Haile Selassie of Ethopia and others who were suspicious of the Accra government in attempting 
an internal re-colonisation of Africa. Ayele Bekerie was of the opinion that: As Africa emerged 
from colonialism in the 1960s, leaders such as Ghana’s Dr Kwame Nkrumah argued that Africa 
could only survive as a single entity. Others such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and 
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia believed that the newly independent countries must first build 
strong nation states (Bekerie, 2001:8).  
The end of Nkrumah’s government marked the beginning of the end of pan-Africanist ideas in 
Africa. These ideas will reappear with the wind of globalisation. For Ayele Bekerie, it is time for 
an African Union to make Africans more efficient and effective in the management of world affairs 
(Bekerie, 2001:10). Thus the failure of Nkrumah’s politics was an echo of the failure of other 
African governments. Whatever might be his shortcomings, he was known to be the most eloquent 
pan-Africanist and nationalist in West Africa. He was a devoted, courageous and intelligent leader 
who knew that the strength of government was in the masses and the workers. No one will doubt 
his devotion to African unity. According to Hountondji, Nkrumah believed that the creation of the 
United States of Africa was the most urgent necessity in the struggle against neo-colonialism 
because the main instrument of neo-colonialism was balkanisation (Hountondji, 1996:138). 
Besides Hountondji and others, Dennis Austin in Politics in Ghana portrayed Nkrumah as not 
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merely the ‘Hero of the Revolution’ but ‘Africa’s Man of Destiny’. This is better interpreted by 
the words of the pan-Africanist: ‘Our victory in the forthcoming general election is Africa’s hope. 
We …are determined to be free and to use our position as a free independent sovereign state to 
help in the redemption of all Africa’ (Austin 1970: 214). Dessarre in her book Quel sera le destin 
de l’Afrique, attests to the commitment of the Ghanaian leader of the C.P.P. She saw that he was 
resolute and ever determined for the cause of Africa. Despite all, Dessarre said, there was no pan-
Africanism, and there was no Africa. Africa was still searching for herself (Ibid). 
Consciencismand Africa must unite were the two books, which summarise the ideology, 
philosophy and orientation of the African visionary, Kwame Nkrumah. In Consciencism, he 
concentrated more on the contribution and impact of the philosophies on equality in the society. 
The traditional African society is socialist; a society where a human being is spiritual, full of 
dignity, integrated and equipped with values. The rules and regulations of the clan explain African 
communalism where everybody works for the society and where an individual is defined in 
relation to the society. He raised the alarm that the peaceful coexistence of the Africans was 
brought to an end by the forces across the Sahara and the sea. The new African society is 
submerged and influenced by traditional, Islamic, and Euro-Christian ideas. The new situation in 
Africa called for an appropriate ideology. This ideology or rather this philosophy should take in 
consideration African humanism. The philosophy which will manage the three conceptions of life, 
the African, the Islamic and the Euro-Christian shall be called philosophical consciencism, said 
Kwame Nkrumah (Kodjo, 1987:168). While advocating socialism as the best adapted ideology for 
the African situation, he observed that colonialism, imperialism, disunity and underdevelopment 
are obstacles to the development of political consciencism, thus affecting social justice and natural 
equality. The effective application of consciencism lays on the level of education and awareness 
of the populace.  
The principal theme in Africa must unite is centered on the independence of European colonies of 
Africa, a freedom which must be obtained at all costs. After liberation, the independent states of 
Africa must unite, because for Kwame Nkrumah the force and power of Africa lay in her unity 
while the strength of imperialism is found in disunity. He rejected in Africa must 
unite the theory of race inequality suggested by some Western anthropologists, position adopted 
by the first nationalists, Africanus Beale Horton, Du Bois and James Johnson. He insisted that the 
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struggles for political independence should be intensified and other needs would be added to it. At 
independence, Ghana needed a new orientation. This led Nkrumah to the invention of an adapted 
ideology. He wanted the ideology to be called socialism in Africa rather than African socialism. 
Kwame Nkrumah and his party embarked in the unification of Ghana and changed the constitution 
of the country to reflect African realities. While recalling the principles of pan-Africanism and the 
contribution of the Congress of Manchester in 1945 and the role he played as secretary of the 
organisation, he insisted on the unity of independent African states. Only in unity can Africa 
contribute her own quota to the management of the world affairs. 
Negritude is a consequence of the foreign influences particularly the Europeans on Africans. It 
was an immediate reaction to the policy of acculturation adopted by the colonial officers. 
Negritude was a means of protest, a weapon in the struggle to attain equality (Davidson, 1971:74). 
Every student of African origin wanted then to identify with the Negritude movement, which was 
set to culturally free the African. “Engagé” or not, converted to Christianity or not, militant or not, 
some African elite were at the same time writer and political elite, and all of them had the same 
focus: Africa. It is interesting to note that these West African elite, writers and politicians who 
were aware of the colonial master’s culture, spearheaded the struggle for independence. This elite 
had no choice than to write and talk in the language of the colonial master such as English and 
French (Wauthier, 1964:24- 25).  
It should be noted that Tovalou Houénou, a native of Dahomey, today known as Benin Republic, 
might be called the forerunner of the negritude movement. After taking his degree in law at the 
University of Bordeaux, he established his chambers in Paris. He was greatly influenced by the 
pan-African movements. He wrote L’Involution des métamorphoses et des métempsychoses de 
l’univers where he questioned the right of some to dominate others. He defended the equality of 
race, attacked Eurocentrism and the assumption of cultural superiority. Houénou in his attempt to 
fight racism published also two journals Ligue universelle pour la défense de la race noire and 
L’action coloniale. An anti-colonialist, he published also Les continents (Langsley, 1973:291-292; 
294-295). Other people, however, refer to DuBois as the founding father of Negritude. He 
published in 1914 The Souls of Black Folks, considered as a reference book to all militant protest 
groups against the ill treatment of the Negro by the West. Senghor’s main target was the defence 
of African culture and realities like his predecessors, James Johnson, Dr. James Africanus, etc. 
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The defence could only be carried out through writing. At the International Congress of Black 
Writers and Artists held at the Sorbonne in 1956, Léopold Sédar Senghor declared that African 
literature was a literature of struggle and liberation. In fact the African writer at the time had the 
colonial situation as a point of reference in developing his theme (Wauthier, 1964:154). 
 For Senghor, Negritude was the only and best ideology, which could give the best interpretation 
in his entire life of the African Negro. Négritude, an ideology and literary movement of the French-
speaking Black intellectuals became a comprehensive weapon to fight the unwanted colonial 
situation. The literature of Négritude was to reposition the Black man in relation to his past. 
Senghor said that the conceptions of the world differed depending on the people, the race and the 
civilization. While Africans are noted for being emotional, European rationalism dictates the path 
to a logical way of seeing things. Both ways of interpreting the world are valid and summarised in 
the well-known dictum of the poet-President. This famous, controversial and questionable formula 
explains why some concerned African intellectuals were calling him to order. 
Itwould be almost as naive to assert that African states were committed to the principle of majority 
rule, if by that we mean a system of government that allows the majority of the people periodically 
to choose their own rulers in free elections. Again, the African states that were committedto 
liberation in Africa approached their own internal societies in a spirit of democratic dedication to 
majority rule. The African states were committed to racial sovereignty which means the people in 
a given society should not be dominated by a racially alien minority. The rulers of each society 
should as far as possible be racially or ethnically representative. Foreign rule was not merely rule 
by a nation-state from abroad, but could be rule by a foreign racial or ethnic minority. From an 
African nationalist perspective, white rule in Southern Africa was considered illegitimate partly 
because it violated the principle of racial sovereignty. From the foregoing, it is critical to note that 
African nationalism was philosophically rooted in pan-African ideas whose key motif was the 
creation of the African state as well as the quest for a just society which stood as the anti-thesis of 
the colonial enterprise. 
2.5 A Textual Reading of Pan Africanism 
Pan-Africanism was born out of a realization that the African people were a downtrodden group 
and that they are not only culturally related but also share similar problems and aspirations. It 
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therefore made sense to pull together for mutual support to liberate themselves and even to have a 
more effective voice in the affairs of the world (Akintoye 1976, July 1992, Word, 1967, etc). It is 
this realisation that ignited the desire and the quest for eventual unity for all the Africans, and even 
the coming together of the black people in Diaspora. The quest was began in earnest, in the early 
part of the twentieth century. The initial players in the pan-African movement were intellectuals 
and thinkers from this continent and blacks in the Diaspora. The attainment of Ghana’s 
independence in 1957 marked a second phase in pan-Africanism with the players taking political 
leadership and a more pro-active role in the liberation of the whole continent from colonialism, by 
not only strengthening the spirit of challenge to colonialism but also giving practical support to 
the movement to liberate Africa. With more countries attaining their independence from 
colonialism, it was realized early by the political leaders that the fragile nation-states, born out of 
the accidents of history that colonialism had bequeathed to Africa, would be too weak, too poor, 
too politically vulnerable to serve the needs of her peoples after the heroic struggle for 
independence (Nyongo 2000:3) . For example Kwame Nkrumah believed that Africa could never 
be truly independent of the former colonial powers unless it was strong, and it could only be strong 
if it was politically and economically united, (Mazrui and Tidy 1984:343). Nkrumah’s belief was 
shared by many other progressive pan-Africanists, among them, Sekour Toure of Guinea, Madibo 
Keita of Mali and Nyerere of Tanzania.  
Writing about the essence of unity for the Africans, Nyerere (1966: 336) asserts that: Africa wishes 
to have the political strength to prevent other powers using her for their own ends, and it wishes to 
have the economic strength to justify and support a modern economy, which is the only basis on 
which prosperity can come to its people….For each one of us is so weak in isolation…. It is for 
this concern for unity and solidarity that the pan-Africanism movement established institutions 
and organs to deal with specific needs, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) established 
in 1963, being the most prominent. It was envisaged that continental or regional cooperation could 
be expressed via the OAU. The OAU was not only to coordinate and intensify cooperation but it 
was thought to be a precursor of ultimate unity and solidarity of the African states. A few successes 
in Africa are attributable to the OAU. In the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, the OAU intervention 
contributed to the ultimate settlement, and was partly responsible for restraining the world powers 
from interfering and turning the conflict into an international one (Akintoye,1976). The OAU has 
also prevented some disputes from developing into full-scale wars. The liberation movement 
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received moral and material support from the OAU. Internationally the OAU enabled African 
countries to speak with a united voice on world issues, increasing the influence of Africa at the 
United Nations and the world generally. But after about four decades, the achievements of the 
OAU have been so modest that the original goal of facilitating and speeding –up the goals of the 
pan African movement have not been realised. Rather the movement has undergone a number of 
hurdles, owing to the unwillingness of some political leaders to surrender part of their countries 
sovereignty for the sake of African unity.  
The tragic consequence of this procrastination has been the proclamation of unity as the ultimate 
goal of pan-Africanism by the political leaders while at the same time failing to agree on the 
approach and substance let alone the meaning of the term “unity”. Lamenting about this curious 
scenario, Nyerere (1966:334) says, for many years African politicians from all parts of the 
continent have called for African unity. They have presented the political and economic arguments 
for it, and left details alone. But this cannot continue much longer. Hard thought and detailed 
negotiations have now to replace slogans if the objective is to be attained. It is due to the OAU 
poor showing as a pan African institution with clear goals of achieving unity and solidarity for the 
African people that a need was felt to rename it the African Union (AU). It is envisaged that the 
new outfit will deliver what the former failed to deliver. In fact for the pan-Africanist that 
Mwalimu Nyerere was, the issue of unity, whether at the national or continental levels was not just 
a mere slogan. It was a lifetime undertaking and commitment. It was part and parcel of the 
development of the African people. It is no wonder that as early as in 1958, Mwalimu invited 
nationalist colleagues from East and Central Africa , Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Zanzibar and Malawi to meet in Mwanza to form the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and 
Central Africa.(PAFMEYA) whose immediate objective was to co-ordinate the struggle for 
freedom and independence for all the territories.  
In 1962, this organisation was expanded to include other countries, namely those of southern 
Africa, thus becoming the Pan-Africa Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa 
(PAFMECSA). The creation of the OAU was therefore a watered down version of what the real 
pan-Africanists had in mind. Referring to this turn of events Nyongo (1990:4) notes that instead 
of establishing a vibrant and active continental organisation which would destroy colonialism and 
build on its ruins, Africa created a club that was more content with the past achievements of its 
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members than on the creative energies of their highest aspirations While the quest for unity and 
solidarity of the African people seem to elude the political leaders and as the intellectuals and 
thinkers seem to be sidelined from responding to the challenges of sustaining independence and 
making it meaningful for the broader populace, Africa seems to slide into deeper crises. Inter-state 
and intra-state conflicts are a common occurrence, while social, political and economic woes seem 
to multiply by the day.  
The African continent remains the most underdeveloped of the third world continents. Mazrui and 
Tidy (1984) observe that by the close of the seventies, Africa had 7.5% of the world’s population 
yet it only enjoyed 1.2% of global Gross National Product, with illiteracy standing at 74% 
compared to Asia’s 47% and Latin America’s 24%. Africa also trails in statistics of life 
expectancy, infant mortality, and public health expenditure and energy consumption. They regret 
that attempts at political and economic co-operation between African states in an effort to 
overcome balkanisation and related poverty have been limited in scope and lacking in positive 
results (Mazrui and Tidy 1984: 326-7). It is the submission of this thesis that to accomplish the 
pan-African goals and objectives, realise a renewal and a reawakening for the African people, 
Africa must embrace a new approach which rests on recognition of the role of language, an 
indigenous African language, which will not only facilitate social integration but also spur 
technological and economic prosperity.  
It must be realised that continued reliance on imperfectly mastered foreign languages retards 
ingenuity and performance in scientific and technical pursuits. This hampers economic growth, 
political stability and social cohesion. It clearly appears that lack of meaningful unity and solidarity 
of the African peoples is a result of failure by the players to recognise and appreciate, the inherent 
power enshrined in our cultural heritage which can be harnessed to foster social integration. The 
leaders have completely overlooked an enviable tool to galvanize the populace. There is total 
absence of linguistic nationalism in Africa than say China or India or Malaysia or Bangladesh. 
Echoing Sedar Senghor’s sentiments, Mazrui and Tidy (1984: 298) observe that one of the 
obstacles to cultural liberation has been an excessive emphasis on political and economic liberation 
as processes in themselves, divorced from the struggle for cultural independence: “Cultural de-
colonisation is more fundamental than many have assumed. Yet cultural imperialism ‘obscures 
awareness’, making it the most dangerous form of 
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colonialism. Accordingly, “the lack of political will for an economic transformation may in part 
be due to a state of mental and cultural dependency” (Mazrui and Tidy, 1984:298).  
It is a painful legacy of Western civilization which fostered a myth that whatever comes from there 
is the best, by tailoring its educational, cultural and social values to Europeanize and de-Africanize 
the Africa via the European languages and culture. The acquisition and imitation of these 
languages and culture was rewarded thoroughly and made a status symbol. Those who learned 
these languages tended to despise those who did not. They identified more with the colonisers, as 
they out-did each other in speaking the foreign tongue with eloquence. This had to do with 
maintaining intercourse with the masters as well as to secure the opportunities availed by such 
knowledge. Describing the situation then Emerson (1962:136) writes: The imperial languages 
were of course tied to the prestige system of the white since the Whiteman, with the partial 
exception of the missionary and the scholar, generally learned the local languages as an act of 
grace or better to rule or trade with the subordinate peoples where it was assumed that the native 
who wanted to advance must rise to the level of the foreign language. The result was that 
indigenous languages were despised by the elites. But as Ngugi wa Thiongo remarks, “when you 
hate your own language, therefore you hate who you are, and you hate your neighbour.” 
Through language people can understand themselves more fully as well as be able to understand 
others; that they can enhance their cultural identity and development of their personality. Thus 
foreign languages have tended to divide society along the lines of social status. Those who can 
speak these languages are a minority, yet they are the well-to-do in society owing to the 
opportunities availed by the foreign languages. On the other hand these languages shut the same 
opportunities for the majority of the people who have no access to them. The majority of the people 
are segregated from the communicative process that is fundamental to the economic, social, 
political and the cultural structures of the modern state. How then can development take place 
when the majority are not involved? Pan-Africanism has also been a victim of foreign languages. 
In the early sixty’s, different regions of Africa were divided linguistically due to loyalty to different 
former colonial masters, thus there existed the Anglo-phone and the Francophone African 
countries. For example, the latter formed the Brazzaville Group in 1960, which was later changed 
to the Afro-Malagasy Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OAMEC) in 1961 in Yaoundé. 
When it changed name to Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM), it immediately signed a defence pact 
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with France. In 1965 the name was changed to Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagasy 
(OCAM) OR Common Organisation of Afro-Malagasy States. This Organisation even set up a 
joint company; air-Afriqui. Though these differences seem to be down played currently, the then 
linguistic schisms in commonwealth (Anglo-phone) and French community (Franco-phone) 
tended to arouse political differences. Continued dependence on foreign languages to articulate 
African concerns will not realise the dream of pan Africanism.  
Mazrui and Tidy (1984:300) have articulately argued that; English and French are invaluable in 
various ways for modern African development: they help integrate African in world culture, and 
they are politically neutral in the context of Africans multi-ethnic societies. But they do not 
necessarily help to overcome the crisis of national integration which is one of the most fundamental 
political problems facing African countries. There is therefore the need to rediscover Africa’s own 
languages not only for social integration but also to enhance her cultural identity and guarantee an 
effective development of the African personality in terms of self-reliance, self-confidence, 
resourcefulness and innovativeness . Neo-colonialism and imperialism will be things of the past, 
and Africa will develop a continental identity. Stressing the need for promotion and use of African 
languages.Rescoe (1977:4) writes: “African aspirations, ideally, should be expressed in African 
language. How can national hopes, with their special nuances rising from traditional societies and 
their values inherited from a non-European ethic, resonate in people’s hearts via a language which 
is firstly alien, the product of a foreign way of life and world view and secondly spoken by only a 
small minority”. Mwalimu Nyerere’s rejection of Euro-centricity forged a national unity and 
identity by promoting Kiswahili as the national and official language. In fact he will be 
remembered forever for one of his greatest contributions, that of pushing the growth of Kiswahili 
in east and central Africa. Mwalimu believed, with good reason that Kiswahili could promote 
African unity, just as it had done in Tanzania. This should serve as a wake-up call for Africans to 
emulate Mwalimu. 
The Pan Africanist movement resonated differently to the Congolese because of their uniquely 
African history. Because of the Congo's inland location it took longer for Europe to claim the lands 
than it did to claim coastal Africa. By the time of Belgian colonization, slavery was already illegal 
in the United States and most of Europe. Although that does not mean the Congolese would not 
be subject to atrocities to a similar degree. When explorer/ novelist Joseph Conrad wrote of an 
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expedition down the mighty Congo River, he literally named the novel Heart of Darkness. King 
Leopold II immediately took an interest in the region and sought to bring it under his control. To 
put the absurdity of this land grab in perspective, the Congo was approximately eighty times the 
size of Belgium at the time. King Leopold's infamous legacy on the land included forcing labor 
for the capitalization of Rubber and precious minerals including copper and uranium.  
In 1908 King Leopold, under international pressure, turned the country over to Belgium. The 
Belgian Congo was then established colonial networks and infrastructures developed across the 
region. One of the unique features of the Belgian Congo that differed from other African colonies 
was its European population. Congo had far less "Afrikaners" than its neighboring nations due to 
Belgium utilizing the colony as a workspace; Europeans generally arrived in the Congo for 
business and then departed after completion. This population dynamic played a crucial role in the 
Congo's independence movement. In South Africa, which had a high number of "Afrikaners," 
politics were dominated by the Dutch-German Europeans who had settled in Africa long before 
the Belgian Congo existed. "Indigenous" Europeans in Africa were often the most racist whites in 
all of Africa so the fact that there were a smaller proportion of them in Belgium in theory would 
make post-colonial politics more authentically Congolese. Without the presence of large "native" 
white populations to influence politics, black sovereignty was at the forefront of the independence 
movement.  
The first wave of independence involved northern African states with Libya, Egypt, Sudan, 
Tunisia, and Morocco-all gaining independence between the years 1951 and 1956. The 
neighboring states were heavily influenced by nationalistic sentiments fostered by the early stages 
of decolonization. Early stages of nationalism were brewing to the South of the newly liberated 
states. Meanwhile the Pan-African movement was gaining momentum in the United States as well 
as the Congo. Finally in 1959 the Congolese demanded independence. By the late '50s there were 
already multiple political parties in the Belgian Congo, most notably the Parti Solidaire Africain, 
ABAKO, and le Mouvement National Congolaise (MNC). The United States supportedthe 
Congolese independence movement, as Americans were strong supporters of self-determination 
throughout the world. Decolonization provided American companies theability to penetrate 
markets once monopolized by European nations. Among the popularand influential voices of 
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Congolese nationalism was that of Patrice Lumumba, who wasalso a prominent member of Le 
Mouvement National Congolaise. 
When the newly independent Republic of Congo held its first elections, Patrice Lumumba was 
elected Prime Minister. Lumumba's dream of unity and independence was finally achieved. 
Although his dream of sovereignty had not yet been secured. While the dream of independence 
was universal across the nation, visions of a free Congo differed across ethnic groups and parties. 
Almost immediately after Lumumba's election, relations amongst political parties began to 
deteriorate. Foreign nations were supporting different factions and political powers in the region. 
In July 1960, not long after Lumumba's election, Katanga and Kasai would succeed from the 
Republic of Congo propelling the nation into civil unrest. Even though the Congo was already 
falling apart, Patrice Lumumba was one of the only people seen as capable of holding it together-
only holding the Congo together under the collectivist ideologies of Lumumba was not desirable 
to the US. The other option of holding it together was strict rule-something that was not part of the 
United States mission in the region, but became a necessity with growing unrest and the increasing 
threat of the USSR. Only 12 weeks after being elected, Patrice Lumumba was removed from power 
in a coup supported by the CIA and was 
subsequently placed on house arrest. Ironically the soldiers that kept him captive in his own home 
were UN soldiers. He managed to escape, but within a matter of weeks was recaptured and later 
on executed. Events of the death remain blurry and differ slightly from source to source, but the 
general consensus is that the US and CIA "let" rebels kill Lumumba. 
 Despite the United States supporting self-determination, they did not come to the aid of the first 
democratically elected president in Congolese history. In an article from British Newspaper, The 
Guardian that honored the 50th anniversary of Lumumba's death, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja 
alludes to the Cold War as the reason for the United States' actions. The natural resources found 
in the Congo are key for nuclear warfare-a defining feature of the Cold War. Also the author of 
another book on Congolese history, Ntalaja's Guardian article is titled Patrice Lumumba: the most 
important 1516. The death marked a major defeat for the Pan-African movement, while it 
represented a win for the west in a battle that it did not need to fight. 
The United Nations, which was heavily influenced by the West -especially the United States, was 
enlisted in the battle against Lumumba's Congo and in favor of the United States' and Mobutu's 
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Congo. There were members of the international justice organization whose writings provide key 
insight into its role in the Congo Crisis. While one primary source, by UN secretary general Thant, 
details an agenda that is laid out for the nation and not a support system for self-detemination 
(Thant 1962). Outcries over the course of action taken by the UN have been vocalized. In 
particular, African studies pioneer John Henrik Clarke was very vocal about his opinion. In the 
wake of Lumumba's death, he released a statement titled: the Lue of Patrice Lumumba." The life 
of Patrice Lumumba proved that he was a product of the best and worst of Belgian colonial rule. 
In more favorable circumstances, he might have become one of the most astute national leaders of 
the twentieth century. He was cut down long before he had time to develop into the more stable 
leader that he was obviously capable of being. When the Congo emerged clearly in the light of 
modem history he was its bright star" (Henrik 1962). 
Later in Clarke's statement, he claims that Patrice Lumumba was as anti-Western as he was anti-
Communism, which supports the portrayal of the Congo Crisis as a microcosm of the Cold War to 
be an unnecessary approach to the conflict. However by portraying the situation as a Communist 
one, the West was able to justify supporting Mobutu in the eyes of many Americans. Although a 
harsh dictator, he was also staunchly anti-communist. Lumumba proclaimed all he wanted was a 
united and sovereign Congolese people, but that his aspiration was not part of the "Western 
agenda." Furthermore, Lumumba pointed out before his death that the UN should have 
beenhelping his vision along with groups regardless of ethnicity or ideology. The UN, he claimed, 
had its high officials compromised by the likes of Western nations (Lumumba 1960). While 
Lumumba was executed on Jan 17, 1961, his grim concerns of the independence movement would 
hold true and ultimately affect the nation for years beyond independence. The outside forces that 
he rightfully feared established and supported a dictatorship that would cripple his nation for the 
following forty years. International forces fostered an environment that would make the next forty 
years as unjust for the Congolese as the previous eighty starting with King Leopold's Congo Free 
State (1885-1908). 
After disposing of his predecessor, Joseph Mobutu picked up the fight against unrest where 
Lumumba left off- only this time with a more oppressive hand. The unrest only picked up with the 
removal of Patrice Lumumba from office. At the time of Lumumba's death, the nation had been 
divided into four main factions, each with a different foreign nation supporting them. By 1961 the 
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nation had fractured into rival groups all with conflicting ideologies. The USSR, Belgium, and the 
United States all had connections to factions seeking to capitalize on the induced power vacuum 
in the economic and strategically important region. Some literature provides an insight to the 
conditions at this point in Congolese history. Pieces written shortly after such as Mobutuand the 
Congolese, provide a view on the situation soon after Mobutu "stabilized" the nation in 1965. The 
book is published by the Royal institute of International Affairs in 1968, only three years after 
Mobutu seized total power. Although it is important to note as soon as Lumumba's coup, and even 
before starting when Lumumba appointed him head of the Armee National Congolaise, Mobutu 
held significant power in the country. The book depicts his coup as an American backed action. 
The literary piece even asserts that the kleptocracy forming in the late 1960s Congo was essentially 
a Pro-American Dictatorship. In addition the book details the general public's relation to the whole 
situation-i.e. how education and the economy changed during the conflict. The timing of the 
writing is of particular interest because the Congo Crisis had only recently ended, but the atrocities 
that would ensue under Mobutu were only in their early stages. However, to the United States, 
Mobutu's Congo provided an alternative to the collectivist Congo Lumumba proposed. US 
involvement only became more entrenched over time with the development of Cold War tensions. 
The USSR and America were vying for influence over the strategic and resource rich Africa. 
Decolonization provided a power vacuum that both international powers entered with a bang. This 
vacuum is not natural as the Congo had favorite leader to unite and progress the country - it is a 
colonial "cliche" used during the Cold War to justify actions. 
2.6 The tenets of African Nationalism 
The most important principle operating in African attitudes to problems of southern Africa is the 
principle of continental jurisdiction. This is a kind of African Monroe Doctrine, seeking to keep 
outsiders from interfering in African affairs and aspiring to consolidate the autonomy not only of 
individual African states but of the African continent as a whole. Primary initiatives in African 
affairs under the principle of continental jurisdiction have to come from Africans themselves first 
and foremost. Motivated by relative concern for both racial sovereignty and continental 
jurisdiction, African states and movements have attempted to Independent African statesand the 
struggle for southern Africa realize two forms of pan-Africanism, especially in the second half of 
the twentieth century. These two forms of solidarity have been, first, pan-Africanism of liberation 
63 
 
and, second, pan-Africanism of integration. Pan-Africanism of liberation seeks to reduce alien 
control over African affairs, whereas pan-Africanism of integration seeks to encourage Africans 
to form larger economic communities or wider political federations.Pan-Africanism of liberation 
is partly concerned with keeping outside powers at bay, whereas pan-Africanism of integration 
seeks to bring Africans themselves together. On balance so far in the twentieth century, pan-
Africanism of liberation has been significantly more successful than pan-Africanism of 
integration. One African country after another has succeeded in at least ending political 
colonialism and establishing at least formal sovereignty. A number of other African states have 
pushed their economic liberation even further ahead. And the struggles to end first Portuguese rule 
in Africa, and more recently other forms of white minority domination in Southern Africa, have 
known their moments of triumph. 
Pan-Africanism of integration, on the other hand, has had one failure after another. These have 
ranged from the breakup of established federations, like the collapse of the Mali Federation in 
1960, to the collapse in 1977 of the East African Community, which had once linked Kenya, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania in an elaborately institutionalized form of regional 
co-operation.In short, Africans in the second half of the twentieth century have been far more 
capable of uniting in order to keep colonialism at bay than of uniting in order to bring each other 
closer together. In southern Africa the two forms of pan-Africanism have sometimes pulled in 
different directions. For example, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland while it lasted 
seemed, on the one hand, to be a possible basis of pan-Africanism of integration in the future once 
white control was ended; and yet since white control was indeed already omnipresent, pan-
Africansolidarity was aroused more in the effort to end that white control than in the effort to 
preserve a unification of three colonial territories. 
In a related sense, South Africa might have served the long-term aims of pan-Africanism of 
integration by absorbing and incorporating South West Africa (Namibia) into the body politic of 
the republic. But since the republic itself was under white racist rule, the absorption of Namibia 
would have resulted in the expansion and consolidation of apartheid. On the other hand, apartheid 
itself in its doctrine of homelands aspires to break up the republic into cultural segments, beginning 
with the independence of the Transkei in 1976. This doctrine of separate black 'homelands' runs 
counter to pan-Africanism of both liberation and integration. It compromises the freedom of the 
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homeland territories and of their citizens working in white-dominated South Africa itself; and it 
also attempts to cause serious fragmentation among blacks just at the time when prospectsfor black 
solidarity in South Africa itself are brighter than they have ever been in history.As for the front-
line states (Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, Angola and the United Republic of Tanzania), they 
have definitely provided a major infrastructure for pan-Africanism of liberation. In their 
involvement in pursuit of that goal, some of them have also experienced the beginnings ofregional 
integration. The rail link between Tanzanian territory and Zambia, partly conceived for reasons of 
liberation, has become part of the foundation of greater economic and social intercourse between 
these two countries. The closure of the border between Rhodesia and Zambia, while weakeningthe 
integration between those two countries, initiated integration with Zambia's northern neighbors. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a synthetic historical analysis of African nationalism as a creation of 
colonialism. This chapter serves as the springboard for further discussion in this study.  The chapter 
started by discussing the meaning of nationalism from a normative perspective in which scholars 
define nationalism interchangeably with race, tribe and ethnicity. However, it was shown that by 
the time of colonialism in Africa, the word nation was used as to describe the inhabitants of a 
particular country, and African Nationalism had already started way before the 15th Century.It was 
argued therefore that the concept of modern African Nationalism had its genesis in the African 
protest against all forms of injustices before and during colonialism. Some scholars maintained 
that triumphant nationalism was enabled by the African nationalists’ ability to take advantage of 
the general discontent of the majority of the African population against colonialism whereby they 
made the governing of colonial countries an implausible task for colonialists. There is also a 
scholarly opinion which says that modern African Nationalism was a creation of the colonial state 
because previously Africans lived as tribes and not as a nation. The main argument among these 
scholars was that the state-nation was comprised of different nationalities who were brought 
together to form a nation by the colonial state. 
Factors for the rise and growth of African Nationalism in pre and post-colonial periods were 
outlined. While scholars like Rotberg argues that African Nationalism is a creation of colonization, 
other schools of thought which demonstrate the existence of African pre-colonial nationalism were 
presented through periodization of African Nationalism and its categorization into stages. Another 
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school of thought which came from African nationalists was based on constructing African 
Nationalism on the basis of creating a post-colonial African nation. The argument here was that 
colonialism did not leave behind nation, but a divided African society. African Nationalism is 
believed to be so much linked to colonialism in ways that African scholars have not managed to 
completely debunk. The next chapter is on the investigation on the sympiotic relationship between 
African nationalism and western liberal political values. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFRICAN 
NATIONALISM AND WESTERN LIBERAL POLITICAL VALUES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the symbiotic relationship between African nationalism and western liberal 
values. The chapter begins by evaluating the key African nationalists and their arguments within 
the context of the western liberal values such as individual liberty; human rights, justice and 
equality, and constitutional democracy characterized by competition for political power. It is 
argued in this chapter that indirectly, the colonial administration gave birth to the nationalistic 
movements in Africa. According to Boahen (1981:147) one of the consequences of the colonialism 
was the birth of nationalism which he defines as “the consciousness, on the part of individuals or 
groups of Africans, of membership of a nation-state either already existing or to which they aspire, 
and of a desire to achieve political and economic freedom, overall social and economic 
development as well as the cultural revival of that nation-state”. The marginal African later formed 
a common front to make their grievances known, which cumulated to protest. Some of them were 
made through books, newspapers and leaflets. Africans who were given education, with the help 
of their counterparts in other continents, protested against the colonial order by publicising the 
corruption and injustice perpetrated by the colonial master. In addition, the contribution of 
Africans during the first and second World Wars demystified the claim of superiority of the 
colonial master.  
The new waves of nationalism in Africa were prompted by the colonial era and it was at the 
Manchester meeting of 1945 that the movement has known a formal organised beginning. Jomo 
Kenyatta of Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and Akintola of Nigeria were present at 
the meeting. Davidson wrote both in Which Way Africa and Africa: History of a continent that 
among the aims of the meeting were the demands for ‘autonomy and independence’. In Which 
Way Africa, he was more explicit about the resolutions of the delegates who stipulated ‘We are  
determined to be free’; they said, ‘But if the western world is still determined to rule mankind by 
force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve 
freedom…(Davidson, 1972:65-66). Infected by the seed of the philosophy dominating pan-
Africanism, Africans became more active in the movement whose head office was transferred to 
Africa. The meeting of Manchester in Britain had no representation from Francophone Africa. At 
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the end of the meeting, Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya returned 
to their countries to implement the resolutions of the Congress, taking up the struggle for local 
independence. The road to independence in Africa started in Manchester, which thus became a 
historical town for Africans. The struggle for independence is one of the impacts of the pan-
Africanism movement in Africa. It is critical to note that African nationalism derived the desire 
for freedom from western philosophy which emphasized on freedom and equality as critical in 
governance. 
3.2 African Nationalists and how they were influenced by Western Liberal Values 
Most African nationalists were committed to fighting social injustice and the existing order that 
gave the colonial master all the rights over the colonised. According to Readers (1989:19), they 
were also prepared to defend the rights of the Black ‘race’ which “has been the most divided, 
despised, humiliated throughout history”. Most of the time, they either attack the influence of the 
outside world on the peaceful coexistence of African societies, or they expose the side effects of 
the colonial era. African nationalists, criticised the slave traffic, but mostly they condemn 
acculturation and reject the new culture.  African nationalists stood firmly to attack the enemies of 
progress and ask for better conditions of living. Theywere revolutionary and critical of the status 
quo that pushed the Africans tothe periphery.According to Senghor (2000:438), “We had been 
taught, by our French masters that we had no civilization, having left off the list of guests at the 
Banquet of the Universal. We were tabular rasa, or better still, a lump of soft wax which the fingers 
of a white demiurge wouldmould into shape”. Assimilation was viewed as the only way of 
liberating the Africans from barbarism. However, it is instructive to note that, while the African 
nationalists criticized the western culture, they ironically borrowed the western systems of 
governance as propounded by the western philosophers such as the primacy of the constitution and 
the separation of powers; equality before the law; democracy; competition for political power; 
human rights; and universal suffrage. 
3.2.1 Leopold Sedar Senghor 
Léopold Sédar Senghor, the African statesman and poet who led Senegal to independence in 1960 
and became the country's first president, died at his home in France on 20 December 2001 at the 
age of 95. He reportedly suffered from heart problems. Senghor was born in the coastal town of 
Joal, south of the capital city of Dakar, on 9 January 1906. His father was a Serer trader, his 
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mother’s family was Fulbe. Later Senghor wrote: “I grew up in the heartland of Africa, at the 
crossroads of castes and races and roads” (http://www.ascleiden.nl/content/webdossiers). He 
attended the Catholic mission school in Ngazobil and continued his studies at the Libermann 
Seminary and Lycée Van Vollenhoven in Dakar, finishing his secondary schooleducation in 
1928.After winning a state scholarship, he moved to Paris and graduated from the Lycée Louis-
LeGrand in 1931. Among his friends in Paris were Aimé Césaire, with whom he would develop 
the idea of Negritude,and Georges Pompidou, who would become a future president of France. In 
1932 Senghor was granted Frenchcitizenship and in 1935 he obtained the ‘agrégation’ degree in 
grammar and started working as a teacher, first inTours and later in Paris. He joined the French 
army during the Second World War but spent 18 months in aGerman prison camp before being 
released in 1942, after which he resumed his teaching.The year 1945 marked the beginning of 
Senghor’s political career. When the constitution of the Fourth Republicthat allowed African 
representation in parliament was approved after the war, Senghor was elected as a deputyfrom 
Senegal. In the same year, his first collection of poems, ‘Chants d’ombre’, was published. In 1946 
hemarried Ginette Éboué, the daughter of a prominent Guyanese administrator.  
With Senghor’s help, Alioune Diop,a Senegalese intellectual living in Paris, established the 
cultural journal ‘Présence africaine’ in 1947. Senghor wasreelected for successive terms to the 
French National Assembly between 1946 and 1958. While in France he hadbecome involved with 
the Socialist International and on his return to Africa, he formed the Bloc DémocratiqueSénégalais 
(BDS), the start of his attempts to create African social democracy. In 1957, the BDS merged 
withother parties in the colony and 1958 saw the formation, by Senghor and Lamine Guèye, of the 
UPC, the UnionProgressiste Sénégalaise. Meanwhile, Senghor’s cultural and literary activities 
continued with the publication ofvarious collections of poetry.When Senegal joined with the 
Sudanese Republic to form the Federation of Mali, Senghor became president ofthe federal 
assembly. In August 1960 Senegal separated from the federation and Senghor was elected as the 
firstpresident of Senegal. On his election he pledged to govern honestly and fairly but added: “A 
country cannot begoverned without prison walls”. After crushing an attempted coup by his prime 
minister, Mamadou Dia, in 1962,Senghor tolerated no overt challenge to his policies. In 1964, Le 
Seuil published a collection of Senghor’s writings 
on Negritude, humanism, and socialism entitled ‘Liberté’. Four more volumes in the series, which 
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also includedSenghor’s political texts, were to follow in 1971, 1977, 1983 and 1993 
(http://www.ascleiden.nl/content/webdossiers). 
After leaving the presidency in 1980Senghor divided his time between Paris, Normandy (the home 
of his second wife) and Dakar. In 1983 Senghor Léopold was elected to the Académie Française. 
He received numerous international awards as a writer and politicalopinion leader, and was 
awarded honorary doctorates by 37 universities. As cofounder of the Negritude movement, 
Senghor tried to awaken African consciousness and dispel feelings ofinferiority. The term 
'Negritude' embraces the revolt against colonial values, glorification of the African past, 
andnostalgia for the beauty and harmony of traditional African society. The concept is defined in 
contradistinction toEurope. According to Senghor, the African is intuitive, whereas the European 
is more Cartesian. This statement led to numerous protests, with Sartre even declaring that 
Negritude was “an antiracist racism”. Senghor’s poetryoften displayed what he called "this double 
feeling of love and hate” regarding the “white” world (Ibid). Though hisAfrican nationalism 
emerged in his poetry and his politics, he refused to reject European culture.Senghor’s nonfiction 
includes writings primarily in philosophy, linguistics, politics and sociology. In the area ofpolitical 
philosophy, he examined African socialism, concluding that socialism was not new to Africans for 
whomthe concept of sharing has been important throughout history. He believed that there would 
be one unique anduniversal world civilization. 
The origins of Negritude can be traced to the shared experiences of Africans who suffered under 
slavery and colonialism. It developed partly as a response to western views of Africa as primitive 
and savage land and of blacks as inferior race, these views inspired people in the negritude 
movement to emphasise positive African qualities such as emotional warmth, closeness to nature, 
and reverence of ancestors. Negritude came to represent black protest against the colonial rule and 
assimilation of western culture and values by blacks. Thus many writers in the movement attacked 
colonialism and western values. The central objective of negritude is to assimilate what is positive. 
This support the views of Senghor who argued that Negritude should not be perceived and treated 
as expressing itself more and more in opposition to all western values rather it should be regarded 
as complementary aspect to human civilization. Supporters on negritude insist that negritude is 
humanistic as it accepts and welcomes the complementary values in western culture in particular 
as values to the extent that they can be viewed as ingredients in the construction of human 
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civilization that has the potential of embracing all humankind. That being the case Senghor to a 
greater extent was borrowing from the western philosophical ideas but was rather trying to develop 
conscious African philosophical ideas that borrowed a lot from traditional western philosophy. 
Simply put, by virtue of having been a product of western philosophy, he could not completely 
divest himself away from the philosophical guilds that shaped his intellectual development. 
For Senghor as was for Jomo Kenyatta colonialism had resulted in cultural and racial alienation 
particularly in former colonies of France and Portugal. Cultural alienation transcended all aspects 
of life that it also resulted in social, economic and political alienation. As such only the philosophy 
of negritude could end this culture of alienation. As such onlythe philosophy of negritude could 
end this culture of alienation and re-establish a process of cultural reintegration with the African 
culture and all itspositive values. For Senghor, political liberation was a necessary prerequisite for 
cultural liberation therefore he denies that culture is subservient to politics arguing that African 
politics have a tendency of ignoring our culture to make it appendage of politics. This was a 
mistake as culture should be viewed as the basis and aim of politics-indeed culture is the very 
texture of society. 
3.2.2 Kwame Nkrumah 
One of the pioneers within the African socialism is Kwame Nkrumah, also active in the Pan 
African Movement. Nkrumah was the first president of Ghana which attained independent in 1957. 
He was a charismatic person with passion for the African socialism. Even though Nkrumah from 
the beginning followed an autocratic line, he gained popularity as a consequence of the 
Africanization policy, new roads, new schools etc. that followed independence. However, it did 
not last long as the administration became involved in ruinous development projects, giving the 
country economic problems such as foreign debt and an enormously deficit to the balance of 
payments. Nkrumah gradually imposed a harsher political control and security but this control did 
not spread to the administration that increasingly comprised of corrupt party officials, while 
Nkrumah buried himself in the work of educating a new generation of African political activist. 
He went towards the status of a cult. In 1966 it was over for Nkrumah as he was the subject of a 
successful military coup (Encyclopedia Britannica). According to Skinner (1998), African 
politicians in the late 1950s and early 1960s were primarily interested in the issues of 
"independence", "national integration", and"modernization", somewhat in that order. This tiny, 
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largely urban and westernized minority,aspired to lead their largely rural, and basically agricultural 
societies, still governed bytraditional authorities who were often deemed decadent and reactionary. 
Kwame Nkrumah,and his cohorts, sought the "political kingdom" and felt that everything else 
would be addedthereunto. 
For Nkrumah, socialism and capitalism were diametrically opposed models of development. He 
rejected the capitalist idea arguing that; 
 The problems that the African had to solve had been created by the same capitalist system 
 Socialism was the only way to defeat colonialism because it would encourage self-reliance 
and reduction of dependency 
 Capitalism was characterized by insensitive competition and pursuit of supremacy as well 
as the unfair destruction of the fruits of national growth 
 Nkrumah considered government initiatives and its active in the development process to 
be necessary (centralized development planning), however he cautioned against uncritical 
adoption of a socialist measures that had been adopted elsewhere (one size fits all 
approach). 
 The caution was necessary because for him there was only one true socialism that was, 
scientific socialism as defined by Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels but there were many 
different paths of achieving that socialism dictated by specific conditions prevailing in a 
particular country at a defined historical period. 
 The crucial thing was therefore every socialist experiment was supposed to create a social 
society in which all citizens have equal opportunities, rights and responsibilities and free 
development of each individual 
In addition, Nkrumah saw an opposition political party as an irresponsible one seeking to add to 
the difficulties of the government rather than complementing each other. He described members 
of the opposition as “disgruntled amid disappointed politicians who were against the common man 
and were determined to undermine the democratic process and reactionaries carrying out vicious 
and treacherous activities” (Nkrumah 1966). His position on national unity and the centralization 
of authority was at the basis of his objection to the independence constitution. Nkrumah considered 
pan Africanism to be a higher level of ideological development than a nationalism. He envisaged 
a politically and economically united Africa (Nkrumah 1968). A united Africa would provide a 
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more rational and coherent economic setting for development. He also argues that all citizens are 
equal, entitled to the same rights and subject to the same law. 
For Nkrumah the role of reconstruction of the post-colonial country to achieve social justice. For 
him a social just society was one in which at the minimum the majority of the people can afford 
the basic needs of life. Therefore, creating such a just society required the removal of obstacles to 
progress that were left behind by colonialism and the rapid education, health and other social 
infrastructure and services. To make this possible, the economy has to be centrally controlled and 
planned. Nkrumah also borrowed from western philosophers such as Kant when he argued that the 
much needed social justice should only be achieved in a truly democratic society. Thus democracy 
in essence is a product of western philosophers which came to influence governance in Africa and 
across the globe. 
3.2.3 Julius Nyerere 
Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere was born in 1921 in Butiama, in the north of Tanzania, to the 
eastern shore of Lake Victoria, to a colonial chief of the Zanake ethnic group. Describing 
Mwalimu’s early life, Iliffe (1979:508) talks of him as “a first generation convert of sparkling 
intelligence who had been the archetypal mission boy and whose academic success had carried 
from local primary school to Tabora, Makerere and finally Edinburgh University in October 1949.” 
During his stay abroad, he associated very closely with George Padmore, the West Indian pan-
Africanist who had been Kwame Nkrumah’s mentor. Imbued with the spirit of pan-Africanism, 
Mwalim returned to Tanganyika in 1952. He arrived back at a time of rising political agitation 
against British rule. No sooner had he taken up his old job as a school teacher in St. Francis School 
Pugu near Dares salaam than he plunged into politics. He got involved in political agitation against 
the British colonial authority. On being elected president he turned an otherwise moribund 
Tanganyika African Association into a formidable political party, Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU), in 1954.  
Once described by an American official at the United Nations as a “symbol of African hopes, 
African dignity and African successes,”  Mwalimu carved himself a reputation as a most respected 
and staunch pan-African statesman whose qualities of warmth, humility and oratory skills 
captivated the public and helped to win widespread support for TANU (Chacha 2003). On 
ascending to the helm of TANU, Mwalimu guided Tanganyika through the various steps towards 
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independence. Tanganyika attained internal self-government in May 1961 and Nyerere became 
Prime Minister. Complete Independence was granted on December 9, 1961 and a year later, 1962 
the Republic of Tanganyika was proclaimed with Nyerere as president. Nyerere was to be president 
until 1985 when he voluntarily stepped down. During his tenure as president, Nyerere ensured 
peace and unity for Tanzanians who were made to actively take part in the governance of the 
country. His political contribution traversed Tanzania’s borders. More than any other leader in 
Africa, he played the most important role in the independence struggle for the countries that were 
still under colonialism as well as in the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. He was an 
innovator who crafted his own form of ideology in African socialism: Ujamaa which was meant 
to dismantle endemic dependence on EuroAmerican eco-political ideologies. As a relentless pan-
Africanist he provided sanctuary to all resistant movements from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Angola and South Africa. Despite his country’s weak economic base, he gave his all; 
materially and morally. When Iddi Amin subjected Ugandans into injustices, Nyerere was there to 
give sanctuary, material and moral support to the liberation struggle. Nowhere did his efforts fail 
to accomplish mission. Nyerere died of leukaemia trying to make and restore peace in war-torn 
Burundi. The cruel hand of death did not give him time to accomplish his mission. Even unto 
death, he has remained a most honoured ‘Father of the Nation,’ as the national radio service 
allocates him 30 minutes daily to speak to the people he left behind. 
Nyerere the renowned front figure of the African socialism was the teacher and first president of 
Tanzania. He was a strong believer of socialism and the architect behind one of the best known 
examples of government intervention and planned economy in Africa. Under the name “Ujamaa” 
(family hood) he initiated a socialist society based on cooperative agriculture. He collectivized 
village farmlands though he also showed an emphasis on education as he introduced free and 
universal education while executing literacy campaigns. Nyerere’s goal was to achieve a 
combination of economic cooperation, racial and tribal harmony and moralistic self-sacrifice. He 
considered this the path for Tanzania to achieve economically self-sufficiency and non-
dependence on foreign aid and foreign investment. Reality was far from the aspirations of Nyerere.  
Julius Kambarage Nyerere, or simply Mwalimu, stands out as a relentless pan-Africanist who 
sought the unity of the African people with a passion. Mwalimu was a teacher who taught the 
African continent about peace, democracyand unity-Mwalimu, the freedom fighter who became 
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one of the founding fathers ofthe Organisation of African Unity, he laid the foundation for the 
African continent tostart its long and arduous road towards peace and unity.  The bold cultural 
choice that Mwalimu made by adopting an indigenous language was not only a rejection of 
western-centricity but also as an instrument of social integration and unity of the people, both 
nationally and continentally. Mwalimu did not see the essence of balkanisation in Africa, and in 
one of his speeches he expressed his displeasure that: “Politically we have inherited boundaries 
which are either unclear or such ethnologically and geographical nonsense that they are a fruitful 
source ofdisagreements the present boundaries must lose their significance and becomemerely a 
demarcation of administrative areas within a large unit”. (Nyerere 1966:212). 
Julius Kambarage Nyerere is therefore remembered as a pan-Africanist who lived his entire live 
pursuing unity both at the national and at the continental level. He cherished a strong belief that 
only in unity can strength be found to tackle other challenges of life. He understood that the 
question of development is inextricably linked to whether or not a majority of the people are 
included in decision making by virtue of being conversant with the language of governance. And 
this he did by example. Neither did he believe in continued dependence on foreign languages to 
articulate African concerns, as this tended to retard pan-Africanism. Mwalimu’s linguistic 
nationalism traversed national boundaries, and its ultimate objective was to secure unity and 
solidarity for all Africans for greater growth, development and security. It is further demonstrated 
that Kiswahili has been successfully used in social integration and national unity in Tanzania, and 
therefore can do the same for Africa. 
The peasantry resisted the collectivization and it was recognized as an economically disaster. The 
programme was abandoned in 1976 but at this time Tanzania was already transformed from the 
largest exporter to the largest importer of agricultural products in Africa. Upon Nyerere’s 
resignation in 1985, Tanzania was still one of the poorest countries in the world; agriculture 
remained at the subsistence level, the industrial and transportation infrastructures were 
underdeveloped and one-third of the national budget was supplied by foreign aid. However, 
commends go to Nyerere for the fact that Tanzania had a high literacy rate and experienced 
political stability (Encyclopedia Britannica; Seddon, 2005). Nyerere was succeeded by Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi, and under his presidency Tanzania started to experiment with economic liberalization. 
Tanzania is though still one of the poorest countries in the world. 
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When Mwalimu Nyerere became president of TANU 1954, a new constitution was adopted which 
was to lead the country into independence. It stressed peace and equality and abhorred tribalism 
and discrimination. A staunch socialist, Mwalimu envisaged an independent, free and a self-reliant 
people. Speaking about the role of education in achieving this goal, Nyerere (1968:74) avers that 
education “mustencourage the growth of the socialist values we aspire to. It must encourage the 
developmentof a proud independent and free citizenry which relies upon itself for its 
development.” Pride, independence, freedom and self-reliance related not only to political 
liberation for Tanzania but also to economic, social and cultural spheres. In fact Mwalimu was 
cognizant of the Euro- centric cultural tyranny that was imposed on Africa during the colonial era 
and the need to provide a framework which indigenous cultural practices could be safeguarded. It 
is no wonder that he personally spear headed pursuits aimed at authentic African cultural 
expression and liberation. This he did by adopting a language policy which recognised African 
culture.  
Right from the time of TANU’S inauguration in 1954, the constitution of the party gave Kiswahlii, 
an indigenous African language a special place and role. Deliberate steps and measures were taken 
to develop, promote and popularise Kiswahili. Thus Kiswahili was the ideal tool to galvanise the 
people in the struggle for independence. Soon after independence in 1961, the TANU government 
made Kiswahili the national language and a year later in 1962 it was declared the official language. 
To demonstrate his resolve, Mwalimu Nyerere delivered his speech in Kiswahili. The years that 
followed saw policies formulated to develop and promote Kiswahili to become the language of the 
masses, the common man. This had the immediate effect of arousing feelings of cultural 
nationalism and cultivate equality among all citizens. The decision to make Kiswahili the language 
of policy, government, politics and education (at least in primary schools and adult education) and 
commerce ensured peoples involvement in government and decision making process.  
Thus the language policy adopted by Mwalimu Nyerere fostered social cohesion and unity. People 
did not feel alienated. It widened the range of political leadership as all citizens had equal 
opportunity to vie for any position, the pre-requisite being only the knowledge of Kiswahili. 
Opportunities were flung open for people with no knowledge whatsoever of foreign tongues. These 
gave the citizens a sense of involvement in the running of their country. A sense of identity was 
created in them. In the schools, Kiswahili was the language of instruction in primary schools and 
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adult education programmes. Commenting on this policy Mazrui & Tidy (1984:30) writes that 
“…the children are nationalized with a common language which is also an African language and 
which gives them a sense of common cultural identity” Similar sentiments are echoed by Khamisi 
(1991: 104), “Swahili which will increasingly provide the medium through which peasants and 
workers exchange ideas has been made the medium of instruction throughout the primary school 
system and adult education.” On the part of government several steps were taken to enhance 
Kiswahili’s status and among them, the government created the position of promoter of Kiswahili 
who was charged with efforts to promote and expand Kiswahili usage, including government 
business as well as the dissemination of research findings. This was followed by the establishment 
of a National Swahili Council, which took over all the functions of the Promoter of Kiswahili.  
On the other hand the Institute of Education was charged with among other things publication of 
books, while the university of Dar es saalam offered courses in Kiswahili language, literature and 
linguistics. The government also sponsored literally competition which in turn increased literature 
in Kiswahili. Mwalimu himself not only used Kiswahili in his discourses but he also wrote widely. 
For example he authorised several political and religious poems as well as translate some of 
Shakespeare’s plays. This had the effect of putting Africa in the map of global literally civilisation 
as well as demonstrate Kiswahili’s inherent capacity to absorb and express complex and 
philosophical ideas from other civilizations in the world.  
Some authors have ascribed the promotion of Kiswahili to other factors, for example Wright 
(1965:48) argues that, “the early radicalism of German policy made Swahili the language of power, 
the interwar conservatism ensured it a broad popular base. Together they have given Tanganyika 
a priceless asset, a national language.” Others like Legere (1991:120) enumerate several factors 
including trade, wage- labour in plantations, road constructors, urbanization, etc, which made the 
adoption of Kiswahili by the independent government a matter of course. He agrees with the 
Marxist-Leninist approach “that the emergence of a national language is a complicated and 
protracted process which cannot be accomplished at one stroke by a legislative act” (1991:120). 
Notwithstanding all such factors, it’s the position of this thesis that what Mwalimu did was a 
deliberate and bold cultural experiment which has no similarity elsewhere in Africa. He did not 
exhibit cultural self-contempt which makes other people think that the acquisition of foreign 
tongues is a status symbol. He was at liberty to choose otherwise, that is, opt for a foreign language 
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instead of Kiswahili. In fact the prevailing linguistic circumstances were hostile to Mwalimu’s 
efforts. This is adequately captured by Khamis (1991:96) thus:Linguistically the nation was tri-
focally stratified. There was the class of those whocould operate only Swahili or the tribal language 
or English….yet in terms of statusperhaps a bifocal division….English held high status and 
Swahili and the rest of thetribal languages a low status in society. Those who spoke and wrote 
reasonably inEnglish belonging to the privileged group, socio-economically and those who did not 
were the good for nothing…. If all the linguistic climate was unfavourable or negativefor 
Kiswahili, people’s attitudes, including those of Swahili speakers themselves,were no better either. 
But Mwalimu’s intervention marked a turning point in all this. With Kiswahili’s status elevated, 
the peoples outlook changed as they discovered their own selves, their lost dignity, their own 
institutions, culture and all that they had lost either through their own or through foreign influences 
(Khamis1991:96). Thus Kiswahili became embedded in the political and ideological work, social 
organisations, administrative bodies, the security organs, parliament and other representative 
bodies, education, industry, agriculture, trade, transport, telecommunication, media etc. Kiswahili 
became the language to create a national culture and preserve major parts of Tanzania’s rich 
cultural heritage and development its cultural life (Legere 1991:124). 
3.2.4 Felix Houphouët-Boigny 
The following quote seems to be symptomatic for a large part of the first leaders.“There is no 
number two, three, or four… There is only a number one: that’s me and Ido not share my 
decisions.” - Félix Houphouët-Boigny, as cited in Jones and Olken (2005). In the case of 
Houphouët-Boigny it appears to have a degree of truth to it as he was president for Côte d’Ivoire 
in the full period of 1960 to 1993. Nevertheless, his rule was not especially repressive and he 
pursued liberal free enterprise policies. HouphouëtBoigny welcomed foreign investment and Côte 
d’Ivoire became a major exporter of agricultural crops such as cocoa. The country developed into 
a successful capitalist state with close ties to France. However, in the 1980s declining primary 
product prices slowed down growth. Simultaneously, in his later years Houphouët-Boigny became 
obsessed with developing his hometown which included a construction of a massive Catholic 
cathedral. It was not until 1990 a multi-party system was established and Houphouët-Boigny still 
had enough power to win the election (Encyclopedia Britannica; Kavanagh, 1998). Côte d’Ivoire 
did not succeed in maintaining the prosperous state that rose after independence and after the death 
of Houphouët-Boigny longstanding ethnic and religious tensions increased. This was strengthened 
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by the actions of the politicians, exemplified with the government’s attempt to rewrite constitutions 
to prevent certain challengers from running for president. A growing student and industrial unrest 
was done little about and the overall consequence was political unrest, and changing governments, 
culminating in a civil war in 2002 (Encyclopedia Britannica; Seddon, 2005). 
3.2.5 Seretse Khama 
The story of the first president of Botswana Sir Seretse Khama launched with a love story as he 
got not only attention in Africa but also international attention when he during his education in 
Britain married the English lady Ruth Williams. Since then, it has nevertheless become the story 
of an African success. Khama was born into the royal family and inherited a chieftainship from 
his father at the age of 4. As a consequence of the controversy created from his marriage to 
Williams, Khama was forced to renounce his chieftainship to be allowed to return to Bechuanaland 
(Botswana). On the return he could not stay out of politics and instead entered into it as a private 
person. Khama helped negotiate the terms of independence and became the first president of 
Botswana. Khama had a conservative ideology and sought to diversify and strengthen the 
country’s economy. Public expenditure was large and included introduction of free and universal 
education, and the government played a role in the development of the country (Encyclopedia 
Britannica). After independence, mining companies were encouraged to explore the country which 
led to the discovery of nickel, copper and diamonds. The diamond industry has since then been 
responsible for a large share of Botswana’s output. Once the size of the industry was realized, the 
government managed to negotiate terms so that they received 50 % of the profits. With few sectors 
to develop, a part of the early developing plans was the development of the rural sector that mainly 
consisted of cattle ranching. This fell in line with the interest of the elite as 2/3 of the National 
Assembly in the early years were substantial cattle owners (Acemoglu et al. 2001a). Throughout 
Khama’s presidency the political system has been democratic. This system survived after Khama’s 
death in 1980 and likewise did the economic system that insured a continuation of growth and 
prosperity in Botswana surviving his absence (Kavanagh, 1998). In terms of growth Botswana has 
surpassed Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Tanzania, which merely demonstrates the general trend. 
Botswana has since independence been one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Seddon, 
2005). Acemoglu et al (2003) examines the reasons behind this development. Following the earlier 
literature, Botswana did not start out with advantageous conditions. It is a tropical and landlocked 
country and the natural resource of diamonds stands for a large part of the country's output. 
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Acemoglu et al. (2003) submits that the success of Botswana is a result of good economic policies 
that stimulated rapid growth, investment and a socially efficient utilization of resource rents. In 
line with the previous literature, they argue that the good policies are a result of good economic 
institutions with an emphasis on institutions of property rights. They continue that these 
institutions are a consequence of a mix of factors. A selection of these is argued to be that the most 
important rural interest were political active and it was in their interest to enforce property rights. 
In addition, the revenue from diamonds generated enough rents for the political actors 
discouraging rent seeking and finally the political leaders, including Khama, made a number of 
sensible decisions. Examples of the good political choices made is the transfer of property rights 
over diamonds away from his own tribe to the government and reduction in the tribal chiefs’ power 
that might have helped reduce tribal conflicts. It is instructive to note that Botswana’s stable 
democracy is attributed to her consistency in adhering to the democratic culture through peaceful 
transitions of political power  
3.2.6 Tom Mboya 
Tom Mboya was a Kenyan,a Pan-Africanist and a true nationalistwho reviled ethnic politics and 
sectarianism. Born ThomasJoseph Mboya on 15th August 1930, he was to die by an assassin’s 
bullet at the tender age of 39on 5th July 1969. It is widely believed that his high profile and 
illustrious career as a brilliant andcharismatic leader, led to his assassination. Mboya was a 
renowned trade unionist, politician and statesman, who joined active politics in 1957 
when he successfully contested and won a seat in the Legislative Council. Later in 1958, hefounded 
the Nairobi People’s Congress Party. He was instrumental in forming the Kenya African 
National Union (Kanu) which formed the government at independence, and became its first  
Secretary-General. At the time of his assassination, he was the Minister of Economic Planning 
andDevelopment. According to Akumu (2006), Mboya’s intelligence and charm earned him 
worldwide recognition and respect; his performanceat both national and continental level was 
remarkable. In 1958, during the All-Africa People’sConference convened by Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana, Mboya was elected the Conference Chairman then aged 28. 
Tom Mboya will always be remembered as a great trade unionist and a great son of Africa. He 
wasa self-made man, he worked hard, was generous to the poor and a strong Pan-Africanist who 
wascommitted to the total liberation of Africans in Africa, and Africans in the Diaspora. He 
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presidedover the first All African People’s Conference and was in touch with the African leaders 
in theDiaspora like A. Philip Randolph of USA, and trade unionist Michael Manley of Jamaica. In 
1953, when Mzee Kenyatta and his colleagues were detained by the colonial administration;they 
invited active student leaders including Mboya, the late W. W. Awori and the late WalterOdede to 
take over leadership of the Kenya African Union (KAU) (Nyagah 2006).Being an employee of the 
City Council, Mboya joined the City Council Staff Association and 
transformed it to a trade union (Kenya Local Government Workers Union, KLGWU). By then, 
the colonial authorities only allowed African workers to form staff associations. Mayor 
ReggieAlexander and city authorities refused to recognise the union. Mboya took them to the 
tribunal- ajudicial inquiry formed to look into the relations between the Nairobi City Council and 
the Nairobibranch of KLGWU, and won the case. One of his colleagues during this local 
government struggle,the late James Karebe, remained his friend for life. 
In 1952, his union joined the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions and he took over as 
Secretary-General in place of Aggrey Minya. He and his group changed the national union’s 
nameto the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL). Mboya expanded the international platform, 
whichMinya had started, by continuously attacking colonialism and the state of emergency. 
The KFL became the voice of Kenyan Africans during the emergency when all political parties 
were banned. It is KFL that led the struggle for the release of detainees, and for liberty. 
In 1956, while in Europe, Mboya made a speech which attacked detention without trial and the 
despicable ways in which Africans were treated by the British colonial authorities. This 
promptedthe settlers in the Legislative Council to move a motion seeking to ban the KFL. It took 
Mr ArthurOchwada, who was then the Acting Secretary-General of the KFL, to negotiate a 
compromise thatsaved the federation.Mule (2006), contends that in his capacity as KFL Secretary-
General, Mboya settled the dock workers major strike. He alsomobilised the International 
Plantation Union to support the late Japheth Gaya and Jesse MwangiGachago to organize 
plantation workers in Kenya. As a son of a plantation worker, he was very keen on the unionisation 
of workers. His father Leonard or ‘Leonardus’ Ndiege, was a sisal cutter in an estate farm 
belonging to Sir William Northrup McMillan, at Kilimambogo, a few miles east of Thika (Ibid). 
Mboya helped to build the present Cotu (K) headquarters. It is from that building that Mzee 
Kenyatta set off to address his first public rally on 20 October 1961 at City Stadium after his 
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releasefrom detention.Mboya laid the ground for the present National Social Security Fund which 
he left in the hands ofNgala Mwendwa. He worked on the Tripartite Agreement, which has been 
used as a guideline notjust in Kenya but in Africa.In East Africa, Mboya visited Tanzania and 
helped Hon Rashid Kawawa to form the TanganyikaFederation of Labour; while in Uganda, he 
worked with others to create the Uganda Trade UnionCongress (UTUC).Mboya was also for a 
while Africa’s Regional Representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
At that level, he was instrumental to the trade union movement throughout 
the whole of Africa.In 1958, Mboya sent Gideon Mutiso to Accra to attend a preparatory 
committee of theAll African People’s Conference. Later that year (1958) Nkrumah invited Mboya 
and Dr. JuliusGikonyo Kiano to the All African People’s Conference, which brought Pan-
Africanism home.Before then all Pan-African meetings had been held outside Africa.Mboya had 
a great commitment to Pan-Africanism. It must be remembered that when he wasassassinated, he 
had just returned to Kenya from Addis Ababa, where he had been attending ameeting of the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 
Tom Mboya advocated for the right to self-governance. He also lobbied for the termination of all 
forms of racial discrimination perpetuated by the then ruling colonialists who referred to Kenyaas 
‘Kenya Crown Colony and Protectorate’while discriminating against the Africansin many ways 
such as segregated residential areasin Nairobi, segregated social places that saw Europeans enjoy 
the most privileged restaurants, unequal provision of education, health facilities and other sectors 
such as employment, salaries and promotions.Mboya was particularly active in making 
arrangements for the elimination of racial discriminationagainst Africans and the support for 
African demands. For example, he visited Lokitaung wherefive freedom fighters (Jomo Kenyatta, 
Paul Ngei, Bildad Kaggia, Ochieng Oneko and KunguKarumba) were incarcerated. Further, he 
arranged for African students to study in friendly foreigncountries such as USA, India, and some 
European countries. 
One of Tom’s valuable contributions was in connection with the design of Kenya’s National 
Flag, whose colours represented the Kenya African Democratic Union (Kadu) and the Kenya 
African National Union (Kanu) party colours, and wananchi’s shield and spears for defence.As the 
world was raven by-“isms”: capitalism,communism, scientific socialism, Fabian socialism, 
African socialism, and many other-“isms”,Tom Mboya pushed for a variant of African socialism, 
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which advocated for a mixed economy–amixed ownership of productive assets, an economy open 
to international trade and capital, andan economy guided by principles of efficiency, equity, and 
fairness. By sheer force of personality,persuasiveness, and political astuteness, Tom Mboya carried 
the day. And this document has served Kenya well as it remains, a masterpiece of ideological 
architecture. It providedflexible guidelines in charting the economic future of the country, and 
spared the country theideological turbulence which has been the fate of many countries in Africa. 
Tom Mboya represented Kamukunji Constituency, which thenhad the biggest slums in Kenya. He 
was under pressure to demolish the slums and replace themwith modern high-rise apartments. This 
was politically appealing but financially unaffordable. Theurban housing problem is first and 
foremost an income problem. There is no point in buildinggood houses if the poor cannot afford 
to own, rent, or maintain them. Instead of pushing forunaffordable houses, Tom Mboya opted for 
a site and service scheme, which provided the poorwith serviced plots and encouraged them to 
build decent houses for themselves. 
According to Mboya; “Pan Africanism is changing the arbitrary and often illogical boundaries set 
up by the colonialpowers in their mad scramble for Africa. Many students of African Affairs are 
constantly askingus what sort of societies or governments we hope to set up when our freedom is 
won…It will notbe a blue-print copy of what is commonly referred to as western. What we shall 
create should beAfrican, conditioned and related to conditions and circumstances of Africa. It shall 
be enriched byour ability to borrow or take what is good from other systems, creating a synthesis 
of this with thebest of our own systems and cultures.” It is instructive from the above statement 
that Tom Mboya argued for a system where borrowing was good from other western systems 
provided it could be contextualized well. Mboya also asserts that, “Africa is a continent surging 
with impatient nationalist movements striving to win freedomand independence. Apart from this 
struggle, there is the struggle against disease, poverty andignorance. Unless these three evils are 
defeated, political freedom would become hollow andmeaningless…the motive behind various 
nationalist movements should always be geared towardsthe security of all our people, higher 
standards of living and social advancement.” 
At a meeting in Uganda at Makerere University in 1958, Mboya perceptively notes that, “African 
states will not tolerate interference from outside by any country – and that means powerblocs that 
have nothing better to do but fight each other – let them do it outside of Africa.”“We do not intend 
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to be undermined by those who pay lip service to democracy, but have a longway to go in their 
own countries.”“We will never, never sell our freedom for capital or technical aid. We stand for 
freedom at anycost.” From the foregoing, it is a fact that Tom Mboya represented the values of 
pan Africanism in as much as he believed that it was important to borrow systems of governance 
from elsewhere which points to him being a product of the western philosophical ideas. 
3.2.7 Sekou Toure (1922-1984) 
It is a fact that African attempts to question the political and institutional heritage of colonialism, 
re-shaped their relations with other former colonies, and re-defined the realm of their economic 
and political possibilities which were mostly associated with Pan-Africanism. According to 
Olisanwuche (1994), the Casablanca Group, comprising Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Algeria 
and Libya gathered the more ‘radical’ and usually pro-socialist states which were calling for the 
immediate formation of a Pan-African Government, and included the strongest critics of 
imperialism. The most significant ‘experiment’ in supra-national integration which emerged from 
this group was the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was on one hand a 
partial embodiment of the dream associated to the West African National Secretariat in the 1940s 
to establish a group of West African Socialist. ThePan-Africanism, the dream by people of African 
origins and descent that they have interests in common, has been an important by-product of 
colonialism and the enslavement of African peoples by Europeans.  
According to Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Sékou Ahmed Touré, trade union leader, Pan-Africanist 
and first President of theRepublic of Guinea, was born on 9 January 1922 in Farannah, near the 
source of theRiver Niger in what was then Afrique Occidental Française (French West Africa).  
Sékou Touré was born into a family of poor peasant farmers but traced his ancestryfrom Samori, 
the great African leader who had carved out two empires and foughtagainst the French in the 
western Sudan in the nineteenth century. He was educatedat a local Koranic school and then at 
Kissidougou. In 1936 he went to the EcoleGeorges Poiret in Conakry, but was expelled the 
following year for organising a studentfood strike. In the next two years he undertook a variety of 
jobs in order to pay for hiscontinuing education, which he obtained mainly through correspondence 
courses (Ibid). 
In 1940 he began working for the Compagnie du Niger Français and then in1941 passed an 
examination that allowed him to join the Post and TelecommunicationsDepartment. In 1945 he 
84 
 
formed the first trade union in French Guinea, the Post andTelecommunications Workers’ Union, 
and he became its general-secretary in 1946 (Ibid).In the same year he also helped to form the 
country’s first trade union centre, theFederation of Workers’ Unions of Guinea, and became its 
first general-secretary. Thistrade union centre was closely linked with the French Confédération 
Générale desTravailleurs (CGT), at that time associated with the communist movement in 
Franceand the World Federation of Trade Unions, and in March 1946 Touré attended theCGT 
congress in Paris. In the same year he was employed by the Treasury Departmentand was elected 
general-secretary of the Treasury Employees’ Union. In 1946 he alsobecame a founder member of 
the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA),the anti-colonial movement formed in Bamako 
in October of that year, which includedrepresentatives from all of France’s West African 
colonies.Sékou Touré lost his job in the Treasury Department because of his political activitiesand 
in 1947 was briefly imprisoned by the colonial authorities (Ibid). Thereafter he wasable to devote 
his time to the workers’ movement and the struggle for independencefrom French colonial rule. In 
an interview he explained that:Trade Unionism is a faith, a calling, an engagement to transform 
fundamentally any given economic and social regime, always in the search for the beautiful andthe 
just. To the degree that trade unionism is an apostleship, a choice, an engagement, it implies action 
against that which is contrary to the interests of theworkers. 
In 1948 he became secretary-general of the Coordinating Committee of the CGTin French West 
Africa and Togo, and in 1952 secretary-general of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), the 
regional branch of the RDA which had soon developeda mass character based on the workers’ 
movement. In 1953 he led a general strikewhich was openly anti-colonial in character, and 
managed to successfully utilise thestrengths of the trade union movement for political goals, at the 
same time encouragingthe unity of all African workers in opposition to ‘tribalism’ and any division 
betweenrural and urban workers. Trade union membership in Guinea increased rapidly, from 4,000 
in 1953 to over 55,000 two years later (Ibid). As a consequence Sékou Touré andother leaders in 
Guinea became famous throughout French West Africa. In 1953 hewas elected to the territorial 
assembly but in 1954 he lost in the election to theFrench National Assembly in Paris, after open 
vote-rigging by the colonial administration. In the same year he became a member of the 
Coordinating Committee of theRDA, in 1955 he became Mayor of Conakry and in January 1956 
he was finallyelected the deputy for Guinea to the French National Assembly in Paris. 
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Segal (1962)notes that Touré also became dissatisfied with the links between Guinea’s trade 
unions and the communist-led CGT. In 1956 he formed the Confédération Générale deTravail 
Africaine (CGTA) and broke with the CGT and the World Federation ofTrade Unions, although 
the following year there was a rapprochement between theCGT and the CGTA, which created the 
Union Générale des Travailleurs d’AfriqueNoire (UGTAN) with Sékou Touré as its first secretary-
general and later president.The formation of the UGTAN which aimed to unite and organise the 
workers ofBlack Africa to ‘coordinate their trade union activities in the struggle against thecolonial 
regime and all other forms of exploitation … and to affirm the personality of 
African trade unionism’ has been seen as a symbol of the growing demand forindependence from 
France as well as a significant pan-African movement in its ownright.In 1956 the French 
authorities enacted the loi cadre that established universalsuffrage and internal autonomy in 
French West Africa, and created an ExecutiveCouncil in each territory with an elected vice-
president. In the elections of March1957 Sékou Touré was elected Vice-President of Guinea and 
entitled to form a government under the overall control of the French Governor. He began a 
programme ofAfricanisation and industrialisation, and limited the power of the chiefs by 
establishing village councils and peasant cooperatives. 
In 1957 he became a member of the Grand Council of French West Africa, but ashe appeared 
willing to cooperate with France many more radical nationalists beganto criticise him for not 
demanding independence. In 1957 he was elected VicePresident of the RDA and began to advocate 
that France’s African colonies shouldform a federation through which they could determine their 
future relationship withFrance, rather than establishing a relationship as individual states (ibid). 
However, in thenext few years when the colonies were offered either a limited autonomy within a 
new ‘French Community’ or complete independence from France, Sékou Touré, unlikemost other 
leaders, called for complete independence. Before the referendum inSeptember 1958 he stated, 
‘We prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery’, andwassubsequently expelled from the RDA. 
However, the people of Guinea votedToureoverwhelmingly for independence and the country 
became a republic in October 1958 with Sékou Touré as its first President.The French abruptly 
pulled out of Guinea taking with them capital, equipmentand many skilled personnel, and for many 
years afterwards the two countries had noformal links. Sékou Touré was able to gain economic 
support from newly independent Ghana and from the Soviet Union, which both offered loans, as 
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well as frommany eastern European countries, the USA and China. Touré also began to developa 
neutral non-aligned foreign policy and established close relations with China, theSoviet Union and 
many eastern European countries as well as with the USA, WestGermany and other ‘Western’ 
countries. However, in 1961 his government expelledthe Soviet ambassador from Guinea 
following unrest in the country in which severalcountries appeared to be implicated. He publicly 
stated that Guinea would acceptsupport from any country but ‘refuses to be drawn into choosing 
sides in a powerstruggle between two blocs’ (Ibid). 
Like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, he also had Pan-African aims and in December1958 established 
an agreement to form a union between Guinea and Ghana. Tourésaw this agreement as developing 
a unity that would be translated ‘into a commonco-operation and action in all fields to realise 
rapidly a United States of Africa’ (Ibid). InMay 1959 the two leaders signed the Conakry 
Declaration opening the union to allAfrican countries. Sudan and Senegal briefly joined and in 
1960 Mali too and therewere plans for further economic and political cooperation in the future. It 
was statedthat the main objective was ‘to help our African brothers subjected to dominationwith a 
view to ending their state of dependence, widening and consolidating withthem a Union of 
Independent African states’. In 1959 Nkrumah, Touré and PresidentWilliam Tubman of Liberia 
signed the Sanniquellie Declaration setting out principlesfor a proposed ‘Community of 
Independent African States’, but in the next few yearsdisagreement broke out between African 
leaders about how Pan-African unity mightbe achieved. In 1961 Touré attended the Summit 
Conference in Casablanca andbecame associated with the ‘Casablanca bloc’ of states, Ghana, 
Mali, Morocco, the UAR, Algeria and Libya, which was seen, despite its diverse membership, as 
the moreradical grouping and was opposed by the more moderate ‘Monrovia bloc’ (Ibid).  
Sékou Touré made several efforts to establish unity between the two blocs and met withseveral 
other African leaders during 1962. His efforts along with those of others ledto the historic meeting 
in Addis Ababa in 1963 that founded the Organisation ofAfrican Unity.Touré was also a staunch 
supporter of Patrice Lumumbaduring the crisis in the Congo. In a speech to the UN 
GeneralAssembly in 1960 he bitterly attacked the UNand its Secretary-General for their policies 
towards the Congo and encouragedLumumba to call for the assistance of the ‘socialist camp’ to 
forcibly end Katanga’ssecession (Ibid). He was also a close friend and supporter of Nkrumah and 
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welcomed himto Guinea, where he remained until his death, when he was forced into exile 
following the coup in Ghana in 1966. 
According to Segal (1962), the idea of Sekou Toure best exemplifies the monistic model of 
democracy. For him there only existed one popular will and one general interest or one political 
party. In a democracy, the interest of a more general group or majority takes precedence over the 
interest of the more particular. In hierarchical fashion, the interest of the family lead to the interest 
of the village or district, to the province then finally to the national interest. Toure argued that at 
the highest most general level citizens in a democratic African state such as Guinea ought to 
achieve a consensus of universal interest of the entire continent (Pan African Interest) (Ibid). 
Consistent with this stress on the dominance of the general interest the political thought of Toure 
condemns both individualism and liberalism.Instead of individualism, the Guineans must focus on 
the solidarity and sovereignty of the people, since the distinctive African philosophy affirms 
collective values. He argued that “if it is necessary, we should not hesitate to sacrifice the 
individual the good of the nation” (Ibid). Since he equates individualism with selfishness Toure 
identifies liberalism with compromise, anarchy, and the reign of individual over the group interest 
that is not good for Africa. In accordance with his interpretation of democracy, he equates 
democracy with the dominance of the general will. 
In addition, Toure believed that African democracy is based on egalitarian relations where there 
are no privileged groups The leaders exercise their power in the interest of the whole nation rather 
than the interest of particular classes or groups in power (Olisanwuche 1994). Since 
Africa,generally has no antagonistic classes, it can construct a democracy that is founded on the 
unanimous will of the people than on the social class basis as is often the case with some western 
liberal societies or on religious conception such as characteristic of Islamic as what happened in 
the middle east or on the basis of a political system as is the case with parliamentary or presidential 
democracies.By stressing participation of all people in political affairs, Toure formulated a theory 
of popular dictatorship. The dictatorship will be democratic since the major political principles are 
defined in party congress andassemblies. The dictatorship would be popular since decision is 
meant to safeguard the rights of all people in society. However, in this popular dictatorship of the 
people (popular interest), the law of the people must reign rather than invoking a formal law to 
justify an action that is contrary to the interest of the nation (Ibid). 
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The single political party assumes the dominant political position in the nation and since there is 
only one general interest, one unanimous popular will, one preeminent thought (ideology), only 
one political party must carry out politicalactivities. Therefore,the democracy party of Guinea 
(PDG) defines the general interest it serves as the custodian and the depository of the popular will 
and embodies the collective thought, (collective ideologies) of the people of Guinea. The PDG by 
defining the general policies of all sectors of society it directs and controls activities of the state. 
Essentially, the PDG did not resemble any European party. Rather the PDG claims to represent 
the common indivisible interests of all African social strata.Toure shows the same ambivalence 
that is characteristic of those leaders who were influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. For 
Toure the party must be both the vanguard of the masses and in their midst. In the vanguard, the 
party defines the objectives and the meaning of a political struggle. It raises the political 
consciousness of the people. It educates the people and improves in all activities of the masses and 
serves as a good example to the masses. Working in the midst of the masses a good party leader 
participates in all activities of the masses and he serves as a good example to the masses. He 
demonstrates superior organizational and mobilising talent as well as encouraging a spirit of 
struggle and sacrifices. As he summed it,” everywhere the party is pre-eminent everywhere it must 
think, act, direct and control the actions of the toiling masses” (Ibid).  
In the government, the party exercise supremacy over administrative organs. The party is the brain 
conscience of the society while the state is simply the executive arm of the party. Therefore the 
party directs all state organs because it embodies the collective conscience. Consistent with this 
notion of party hegemony over government Toure’s ideology opposes the concept of omnipresent 
state and a representative government based on parliamentary supremacy. The pre-eminence of 
the party (PDG) connotes the supremacy of the people. By reasoning based on Rousseau’s 
principles, Toure holds that even a parliamentary regime does not ensure popular sovereignty 
where the parliament is supreme the voters become slaves of the elected representatives and their 
deputies, assert the dominance of partial interest only on election time. Toure believed political 
office should be granted on the basis of loyalty to the party and not according to class, origin, 
wealth, education or even technical knowledge. Sekou Toure also articulated the doctrine of 
democratic centralism-a bend of free and open discussion and unity in action. Democracy in this 
doctrine operates when party militants freely choose leaders and discuss various policy decisions. 
However, this emphasis on discipline and unity action also reviews Toure’s tendency towards 
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centralization. The leaders select what they think are appropriate tactics which they think and 
decide on the best ways to apply them. 
In light of the foregoing, Toure’s emphasis on party discipline, unity of purpose, absolute authority 
of the party and anti-factionalism increasingly made it difficult for the voicing of disagreement 
over policies. The establishment of many organisationsaffiliated to the party not only did it provide 
the popular participation in political life but it also facilitated total party control of the people.  
Under these conditions the opportunities for effective popular participation seem to be very 
limited. Undesirably, pressure towards total politicization resulted in the bureaucratisation of the 
social life within Guinea. In contrast with the western models of democracy, the party tended to 
produce a rather inefficient instead of nationally effective bureaucratic system. 
 
 
3.3 The nexus between Western Liberalism and African nationalism 
According to Claphan (1970), the African continent is one of those societies that are regarded as 
the Third World, in which their peoples have been making spirited efforts to re-discover 
themselves after so many years of enslavement and colonization. In order to do this, they usually 
embark upon the employment of certain ideologies, which they believe will achieve the goal of 
social, economic and political freedom. The advocates of African nationalism believed that their 
opinions and expressions amounted to political philosophies which could be said to have predictive 
and prescriptive values respectively. However, certain authors have raised issues in relation to the 
status of these ideologies. Clapham has suggested that there is need to critically examine the 
various opinions and expressions by African practitioners of politics in order to discover whether 
they indeed match up with the realities on ground in African countries (Ibid). Having analysed the 
use to which ideologies were put by African leaders, Clapham concluded that statements 
andopinions of politicians do not meet the standards of what can be regarded as political theory or 
political philosophy (Ibid). 
In order to argue for this position, he identified two views of ideology. The first is ideology as 
blueprints and the second, ideology as attitudes. Ideologies as blueprints represent a conceptual 
map with which to order the confused post-independence scene, whose function is systematically 
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to explain the present situation of the new states, and to guide and co-ordinate their planned 
development. One essential problem with this kind of ideology is that the principles and ideas 
canvassed by these leaders do not reflect the realities on the ground and consequently, one can 
question the coherency and consistency of such positions.One of the reasons which Clapham cited 
as supporting his position is that while ideologies are based on the fact that the African peoples 
form homogeneous group and hence there is the assumption that all the peoples are united, the 
realities on the ground suggest the opposite and consequently, there is gap between theory and 
practice and if it is one of the intentions of ideologies to link theory with practice, ideologies as 
blueprints will fall abysmally in this regard (Ibid). 
The second view of ideologyis ideologies as attitudes. Here, the term ideology is used to denote a 
set of political attitudes rather than an explicitly formulated theory. The advantage that this view 
of ideology has over the first is that it does allow that the theory is at variance with reality and 
therefore the charge of incoherence and inconsistency levied against ideologies as blueprints do 
not apply. But this advantage turns to be a weakness in this view because political attitudes can 
hardly be put together to form a coherent and consistent theory which can be relied upon for 
political action, given the fact that various political attitudes make sense to different segments of 
the population. Thus, in a campaign rally, a politician would want to promise different things for 
different peoples at different times and occasions and one can hardly find any reliable connecting 
principle among all the promises. 
However, it has to be observed here that what Clapham is doing was to assess or evaluate the 
political ideas of African leaders in terms of Western standard of political theory and political 
philosophy (a form of disciplinary decadence) (Ibid). For him, the ideals of coherence and 
consistency mark out political theory and political philosophy and because these African political 
ideas do not respect these ideals, they cannot be regarded as ideas that can yield any explanatory 
and justificatory imports. Consequently, Clapham suggested that the statements and opinions of 
African leaders should be interpreted from a different perspective (Ibid). The perspective 
suggested byhim is that these statements and opinions should be seen as responses to certain 
situations that confront these leaders. In other words, Clapham is suggesting that alleged ideologies 
of African leaders are more reactive than proactive (Ibid). To some extent, Clapham’s observation 
is essentially correct but based on wrong premises. The positive side of his view is that the various 
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ideologies of first generation African leaders were responses to colonialism in the sense that they 
were able to analyze the colonial situation and attempted in their various theories to put forward 
an alternative theory that is relevant to the social and cultural realities of their peoples. It was also 
true that the different ideologies that were enunciated were based on the specific situations of the 
different countries that make up the African space (Ibid). However, the reactive model of political 
theories and philosophies is not peculiar to the African continent; rather it is a feature of political 
theory and political philosophy in general. For instance, the contractarian political philosophy put 
forward by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau was a reaction to the medieval view of divine authority. 
Furthermore, the charge of incoherence and inconsistency can hardly be sustained; forthe concern 
is to set up ideals or standards for practicing politicians to emulate. However, what actually happen 
in practice are often at variance with what political philosophy prescribes. The conclusion from 
this analysis is that African theoreticians and practitioners of politics were attempting to grapple 
with certain and specific situations in their countries, especially during the post-colonial era; and 
they bothered less, with justifiable reasons, about philosophical ideals of coherence 
andconsistency. 
One useful insight that could be gained from Clapham’s critique relates to his view that ideologies 
put forward by African leaders are meant to perform certain specific duties/functions (Ibid). In 
connection with this position, it has been noted by scholars of African social and political thought 
that by means of these ideologies, African leaders want to bring their nation to mainstream of 
events in the global arena, depicted by modernity’s model of development. In doing this, they have 
come up with ideologies that will motivate diverse and diversified peoples to come together and 
create a political nation. In order to fulfill this purpose, they had to use pragmatic means, a position 
that does not put much premium on coherence and consistency but on the practical workability of 
these ideologies. This situation could be discerned in Hunt’s (1982) paper on Nkrumah’s 
Consciencism where he accused him of advocating an ideology with a “materialist theory and 
idealist practice”. 
Negritude is a consequence of the foreign influences particularly the Europeans on Africans. It 
was an immediate reaction to the policy of acculturation adopted by the colonial officers. 
Negritude was a means of protest, a weapon in the struggle to attain equality (Davidson, 1971:74). 
Every student of African origin wanted then to identify with the Negritude movement, which was 
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set to culturally free the African. “Engagé” or not, converted to Christianity or not, militant or not, 
some African elite were at the same time writer and political elite, and all of them had the same 
focus: Africa. It is interesting to note that these West African elite, writers and politicians who 
were aware of the colonial master’s culture, spearheaded the struggle for independence. This elite 
had no choice than to write and talk in the language of the colonial master such as English and 
French (Wauthier, 1964:24-25). It should be noted that Tovalou Houénou, a native of Dahomey, 
today known as Benin Republic, might be called the forerunner of the negritude movement. After 
taking his degree in law at the University of Bordeaux, he established his chambers in Paris. He 
was greatly influenced by the pan-African movements. 
He defended the equality of race, attacked Eurocentrism and the assumption of cultural superiority. 
Houénou in his attempt to fight racism published also two journals Ligue universelle pour la 
défense de la race noire and L’action coloniale. An anti-colonialist, he published also Les 
continents (Langsley, 1973:291-292; 294-295). Other people, however, refer to DuBois as the 
founding father of Negritude. He published in 1914 The Souls of Black Folks, considered as a 
reference book to all militant protest groups against the ill treatment of the Negro by the West. 
Senghor’s main target was the defence of African culture and realities like his predecessors, James 
Johnson, Dr. James Africanus, etc. The defence could only be carried out through writing. At the 
International Congress of Black Writers and Artists held at the Sorbonne in 1956, Léopold Sédar 
Senghor declared that African literature was a literature of struggle and liberation. In fact the 
African writer at the time had the colonial situation as a point of reference in developing his theme 
(Wauthier, 1964:154).  
For Senghor, Negritude was the only and best ideology, which could give the best interpretation 
in his entire life of the African Negro. Négritude, an ideology and literary movement of the French-
speaking Black intellectuals became a comprehensive weapon to fight the unwanted colonial 
situation. The literature of Négritude was to reposition the Black man in relation to his past. 
Senghor said that the conceptions of the world differed depending on the people, the race and the 
civilization. While Africans are noted for being emotional, European rationalism dictates the path 
to a logical way of seeing things. Both ways of interpreting the world are valid and summarised in 
the well-known dictum of the poet-President. This famous, controversial and questionable formula 
explains why some concerned African intellectuals were calling him to order. 
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With Botswana and Swaziland among the major exceptions, the emerging African leaders 
opted for the political cultures of their metropoles: the Westminster model, and the Belgian and 
African Political Cultures and the Problems of Government for example, French presidential and 
premier systems (http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v2/v2i3a3.pdf). These men ignored that the 
governmental processes they cherished had evolved in economically, industrially, politically, and 
socially complex state systems. Moreover the Europeans judged these "too civilized," for transfer 
to the colonies. African leaders ignored what Pearl Robinson would later term the "cultures of 
politics" that had developed during the colonial period, and used, as Gramsci stated, to maintain 
"hegemonyprotected by the armor of coercion". The African nationalists even ignored their own 
counter-racist philosophies such as "negritude" and the "African Personality." They occasionally 
paid lipservice to traditional political cultures, but firmly rejected compromise with African 
traditionalpoliticians for fear of derailing the drive for independence. 
It is instructive to note that the link between Western liberalism and African nationalism cannot 
be out rightly denied. In African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah there is evidence of a forward-
backward oscillation which was meant to resurrect the old national heroes, legends and events that 
gave the nation a deep-rooted history, as well as to legitimise and authenticate his regime. At the 
same time, nationalist ideology and its translation into policy throughout Africa, was very insistent 
about the imperatives of material modernization and economic transformation. Thus, Nkrumah-
although having an acute awareness of the African past and its traditions - focused on the future 
and saw the native chiefs as relics of the past with outmoded customs and traditions, and colonial 
collaborators who encouraged tribalism and political balkanisation. This made them obstacles to 
national unity and modernisation, and Nkrumah sought to curtail or eliminate their powers. 
Nkrumah’s rejection of tradition was exemplified by his political party motto, “Forward Ever, 
Backward Never.” Nkrumah opted for the forward-looking trajectory and instead of resurrecting 
a glorious past, he chose to propagate a new national narrative for the present and future, promoting 
himself as the nation’s sole Founding Father and focusing on modernization and development 
through African Socialism. 
Kwame Nkrumah had a bitter conflict with the Asantehene and other traditional leaders in 
Ghana who objected to being excluded from government. In Ouagadougou, a frustrated 
traditional emperor, the Mogho Naba of the Mossi people, attempted to use his traditional army 
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in a quixotic attempt to dissolve an embattled Territorial Assembly. Sir Edward Mutesa II of the 
Baganda quarreled with Sir Andrew Cohen, Britain's last colonial governor, about the future 
government of Uganda and was exiled to England where he died in poverty. Such reports were 
legion (Wilson 1994).Hoping to "modernize" their usual mono-economies, the new African 
leaders oftenespoused an "African Socialism" where the state controlled the economy. Insisting 
upon theneed for "national integration," in the face of a plethora of ethnic collectivities, African 
leaders imposed a single party system, claiming that this was close to the African "palaver."  
According to Decalo (1989), there wasoften some justification for these actions, since 
competitively engaged in the Cold War the protagonists did attempt to profit from African ethnic 
competition. What confounded many western theorists was that whether African leaders 
espousedMarxism-Leninism, African and non-African socialism, capitalism or mixed capitalism 
and soon, their efforts failed. They rejected compromises and ignored the advice of Sir Arthur 
Lewis toNkrumah, that the political-economy of the new African states should use agriculture to 
buildtheir economies and should employ ethnic-based coalitions for government (Lewis 1967:42). 
The result wasthat confusion reigned about how African leaders could and should deal with their 
economies and regimes. 
3.4 Post-coloniality and Decoloniality as products of African Nationalism 
Although both critique the colonial condition, this is done differently and both do not share the 
same genealogy, trajectory and horizon-and thus, they do not have the same understanding of the 
colonial condition. Mignolo (2011a: xxiii) amplifies thus: ‘Although both projects drink from the 
same fountain they are grounded in a different genealogy of thoughts and different existentia’. The 
distinction will be done briefly on three accounts of genealogy, trajectory and horizon. The 
genealogy of post-coloniality can be traced from the canonical works of Edward Said, Homi 
Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak who still remain prominent even though the trajectory of 
postcoloniality varies (Ashcroft et al. 2006). In elucidating this point, De la Campa (2008: 438-
439) states that ‘Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, though widely different in theory 
approaches, fashioned a long-award deconstruction of Anglo-American hegemony in their own 
terms’. The contours that shape the landscape of de-coloniality can be traced from Steve Biko, 
Bernard Magubane, WEB Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Ihechukwu Madubuike, V-Y Mudimbe, Paul 
Zeleza, Anìbal Quijano, Linda Alcoff, Archie Mafeje, Walter Rodney, Kwame Nrumah, Cheikh 
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Anta Diop, Aimé Cesairé, Ramon Grosfoguel, Ngũgĩ wa Thingo’o, Chinweizu, Walter Mignolo, 
Enrique Dussel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and Lewis R Gordon to name but a few. The 
aforementioned thinkers come from different thought traditions and different geographies but they 
pursue one mission that is intentional in their work-decoloniality. According to Hume (2008), post-
coloniality is the body of work that attempts to break with colonial assumptions of Euro-North 
American political and cultural criticism-that is, the resistance of the imperial power by the 
subjects who are wronged by that power. Post-coloniality is caught within the Euro-North 
American matrix, while de-coloniality is operating outside that matrix by emphasising the locus 
of enunciation (De la Campa 2008). Post-coloniality originates from the Euro-North American 
English academic departments and its epistemic locus is counter-hegemonic by form and content. 
It is the Third World voice inside the Euro-North American Empire. Post-coloniality has been 
concerned with ‘identifying the locatedness of European theoretical vocabulary as a way of 
challenging the easy and false universal claims made by that theory’ (Hume 2008: 395).  
Though post-coloniality advocates for the ‘marginal subject’ or ‘the subaltern’ from what it refers 
to the epistemic location of the Third World, de-coloniality stands outside the Euro-North 
American Empire through border-gnosis. While post-coloniality privileges culture and discursive 
practices in a form of a text, de-coloniality privileges power, knowledge, and being as tools that 
maintain coloniality that creates humanity that lacks of ontological density. De-coloniality, as 
Mignolo (2011a) states, privileges people as subjects of history and their existential conditions 
rather than privileging cultures and texts as post-coloniality does. The question of being, that might 
be understood as the ‘Other’ in post-coloniality is reduced to the processes of dislocation, exile 
and identity. In opposite to this conception, de-coloniality takes the ontology of the subject as the 
starting point in order to question the mode of existence and how knowledge and 36 power 
practices create the being whose humanity is always questioned. The being is not only the ‘Other’ 
in de-coloniality as it is the case with post-coloniality, but a subject that must constantly liberate 
itself through de-colonial practices. While post-coloniality calls for the transformation of the 
structure to solve problems, de-cololoniality calls for the structure to be destroyed to create new 
forms of lives. De-coloniality as Mignolo (2011a: xxv) aptly points out ‘became an epistemic and 
political project’. According to Maldonado-Torres (2008b: 382), post-coloniality ‘has left one of 
the stronger expressions of modernity/coloniality untouched’. Post-coloniality constitutes some 
efficiency of radical critique and tends to maintain the superiority of the Euro-North American 
96 
 
epistemology intact. Post-coloniality does not see modernity from its darker side whereas de-
coloniality does not take modernity for granted and understands modernity as coloniality—that is, 
the darker side of modernity. De-coloniality as opposed to post-coloniality does not in anyway, 
rehabilitate modernity. Its modes of criticism are not within modernity as in the case of post-
coloniality, but outside modernity. As Ashcroft et al. (2006:1) state that post-coloniality constitutes 
‘different indigenous local and hybrid processes of self-determination to defy, erode and 
sometimes supplant the prodigious power of imperial cultural knowledge’. Though for post-
colonialism is something that is transcended; to de-coloniality colonialism is something that is still 
informing the present and existing in the form of coloniality that is the constitutive part of 
modernity. Scott (2009) argues that post-coloniality assumes the anticolonial posture and it is 
being concerned about exposing the negative picture of colonialism.  
According to Maldonado-Torres (2008b:382), de-coloniality ‘positions some of the imperial 
underpinnings of modernity’. De-coloniality is attentive to the colonial structures, its expressions 
and effects that are in the form of coloniality and that are combated consistently. Simply put, de-
coloniality is a constant critique of modernity/coloniality and it continues to do so, to the extent of 
being labelled as ‘preoccupied’ or ‘obsessed’ with coloniality. De-coloniality unmasks coloniality 
wherever it seeks to hide itself. The major aims of de-coloniality are to render coloniality visible 
by exposing both its rhetoric and reality. De-coloniality as a standpoint does not hide its geography 
and biography of where the critique emerges from (Mignolo 2011a). De-coloniality is not fiction 
but legitimate in a sense that it authorises the lived experience of those who are at the receiving 
end of subjection and commands such subjects to declare their locus of enunciation. De-coloniality 
moves away from the deceit of coloniality that hides behind objectivity, neutrality and free-bias 
and argues that these are the devices alien to the lived experience of the subject more especially 
the one who suffers from subjection. De-coloniality emphasis the need to work towards de-colonial 
futures. De-coloniaity pursues de-colonial futures and not the preoccupation of colonialism as a 
problem to produce postcolonial futures (Mignolo 2011a). It means that the task of de-coloniality 
does not end and it is indefinite in so far as coloniality perpetually exists. It calls for the end of the 
universal as it is in favour of many worlds-that is, the world into that many worlds fit-pluriversality. 
This is articulated by Mignolo as pluriversal worlds and where the idea of the universal does not 
feature in that it reifies the conception of the world informed by coloniality.  
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3.4.1 African Socialism as an Ideology for Development of the African continent 
The need to break away from capitalist ideology embraced by the colonizing powers on the African 
continent was the main idea that bound first generation African leaders together. An alternative 
socialist ideology had therefore been embraced by them. However, there were varieties in 
interpretation of what constitutes “African socialism”. According to Sprinzak (1973:629) the thesis 
regarding African socialism is that village society was traditionally communal, and that 
consequently the introduction of socialist regimes in newly established African states might not 
pose major difficulties.The kernel of African socialism relates to the fact that traditional African 
peoples were socialist by nature and therefore there is no need to dissipate energy on arguing for 
a socialist ideology as a fitting ideology for the African continent. The essential features of this 
socialism include: equality among the peoples, the idea of sharing, which include burdens and 
privileges, community ownership of land and identification of the individual with the community. 
Thus, Senghor (1959) one of the foremost first generation African leaders, claimed that “We 
should learn that we had already realized socialism before the coming of the European” (1959:49). 
However, some commentators (Kopytoff 1964: Clapham 1970) have observed that the ‘socialist’ 
interpretation did not square with the empirically discovered/observed reality. According to these 
commentators, facts on the ground depicted that African peoples are diverse in several ways such 
that they cannot be identified with only one ideology. Furthermore, observation revealed that there 
were features of individualism, which is the major feature of the capitalist ethos, among some 
African peoples. These positions are by far not strange to contemporary scholars of African social 
and political thought. Thus, Taiwo (1985) and Hountondji (1996) among others have denied the 
unified thesis of African cultural distinctiveness on empirical grounds. Their view is that it can be 
observed that African peoples are so diverse as their beliefs, norms and practices and it is therefore 
fallacious to claim that there is one people called an African and one reality, called African reality.  
The response to these two corollary positions takes the form of what some scholars of African 
social and political thought have termed the socialist thesis (Sprinzak 1973; Kronenfield 1975) 
According to this thesis, the claim that African peoples are socialist by nature is not a scientific 
thesis and therefore it cannot be falsified by means of empirical fact. Rather, the thesis is more of 
ideological commitment which is supposed to motivate political action. It is therefore the belief of 
these scholars that the anti-homogeneous view about Africa and its people falls to the ground on 
the basis of lumping together of two different models, that of science and ideology. It is the 
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suggestion of these two scholars that the socialist thesis should be understood as making important 
theoretical and philosophical distinctions. Thus, Sprinzak suggested that the communal thesis 
should be understood as an ideal type explanation in the sense of grouping together a cluster of 
properties that distinguish African traditional society from the western modern way of life. He also 
went further to suggest that African ideologies do not hold that African societies are homogeneous. 
Their claim is that the dominant feature of social life before the advent of the European was the 
kinship group with its special social interactions. But more than this, it is the views of Sprinzak 
and Kronenfeld that the communal thesis is suggesting that there is an essential difference between 
traditional and modern societies as regards their social thinking and knowing. The social thinking 
of modern societies is predicated upon individualism while in traditional societies, it is communal 
way of thinking that enjoys the pride of place. 
The Triple heritage thesis has been identified with Ali Mazrui. However, there is evidence that 
Mazrui himself derived the term from Nkrumah‟s doctrine of philosophical consciencism. The 
Triple Heritage Thesis, according to Mazrui (1986) refers to the three main cultural influences on 
Africa: traditional African culture, Islamic culture and Western culture. Nkrumah linked the Triple 
Heritage Thesis with his doctrine of philosophical consciencism. According to him, (1995, 55) the 
main concern of philosophical consciencism was to develop a new kind of socialism that is in tune 
with the original humanist principles underlying African society. Thus philosophical 
consciencism is the “map in intellectual terms of disposition of forces which will enable African 
society digest the Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop 
them in such a way that they fit into the African personality”. According to Nkrumah, the African 
personality is defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African 
society. Philosophical consciencism is that philosophical standpoint which, taking its start from 
the present content of African conscience indicates the way in which progress is forged out of the 
conflict in that conscience. The above view brings about the dialectical nature of the doctrine of 
philosophical consciencism. As a matter of fact, Nkrumah believes that his doctrine has its basis 
in materialism, the view that asserts the absolute and independent existence of matter. 
The dialectical aspect of the materialism is that matter is a plenum of forces that are in antithesis 
to one another. It does seem to follow that Nkrumah rejects any explanation of natural and social 
phenomena that is based on divine/mythical beings. The application of this dialectical materialist 
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thesis is that matter is one, even when it manifests itself in different ways. By the same token, 
human beings are one even when they are manifested in different cultures and different historical 
situations. This is the egalitarian ingredient in philosophical consciencism. The identification of 
the unity of the human species with a non-spiritual element, thus by passing forms of relativism 
that can vitiate attempts at finding certain commonalities in human societies has been noted by 
Wiredu (1996) According to Wiredu, even when human beings are cultural beings, there are certain 
biological things that human beings share in common. He identified such commonality as human 
communication. According to Wiredu (1996:21) communication is an existential necessity. 
Without communication there can be no human community…in the total absence of 
communication we cannot even speak of human persons. The implication ofthis view for the triple 
heritage thesis is clear: it is that human beings, no matter our cultural orientations, we are bound 
together by certain (physical, biological) elements that make us distinctively human. That some 
segments of the human population had denied this is an exemplification of disciplinary decadence, 
which has become a slogan in some philosophical circles. Thus the traditional, the modern, 
Christianity and Islam cultures can coexist, even though there are certain disparities among them. 
Thus according to Nkrumah, philosophical consciencism was a response to 
colonialism,imperialism, disunity and lack of development (1995: 58) For Nkrumah, the first 
major task of the ideology is to liquidate colonialism in all its ramifications. Such liquidation is 
premised upon political action. Political action, according to Nkrumah, “is the constant struggle 
for emancipation as an indispensable first step towards securing economic independence and 
integrity” (1995: 59). It would be noted that Nkrumah vacillated on what form this struggle would 
take. Like Marx, it might either take violent or non-violent means, depending on the historical 
situations that obtained at a particular time. 
3.5 The Selected Residues of Western Liberalism in the post-colony 
Indeed, the significant fact about African cultural history is the convergence upon the indigenous 
tradition of the two external influences-the Arab-Islamic and the European-Christian—to which 
the continent has been exposed for well over a millennium. The values and lifestyles associated 
with these traditions have been assimilated and to a large extent indigenized on the continent. This 
observation provides a broader perspective on the phenomenon of Westernization in Africa, an 
observation made as early as the late nineteenth century by the great African cultural theorist 
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Edward Wilmot Blyden and summed up in the late twentieth century by Ali Mazrui as “the triple 
heritage” (Irele, 2010). The effects of western civilisation and culture on Africa are in several 
phases. It is the desire of this thesis to bring out three of these phases, viz: political effect, economic 
effect and social effect. By and large, the scope of this thesisis confined to those conceptsthat drive 
western civilisation: neo-liberalism, liberal democracy, globalization,individualism/family values, 
etc. Again, all these can conveniently be accommodated under the scope of wider phases of effects 
of western civilisation. Western civilisation is a commitment to neo-liberalism, commitment to 
liberal democracy, commitment to consumerism and commitment to Christian worldview as the 
origin of western civilisation. Colonialism and liberal democracy will be put under political effect, 
neo-liberalism under economic effect and missionary to be under social effect.  
3.5.1 Political Effect 
The colonial factor was essential to the understanding of the process of Westernization in Africa 
itself. The holistic distortions of the hitherto well organized African societies in every sphere of 
life pointed to the depth and effectiveness of colonization in the process of westernizing African 
societies and their cultures.  
a. Distortions of natural boundaries without due recourse to antecedent institutions and 
cultures. 
b. The western civilisation submerged and dismantled indigenous institutions and, in its 
place, a foreign rule was established. Traditional institutions before then were regarded as 
not only political authorities but also custodians of cultures. 
c. Introduction of Westminster liberal democracy: This did not just work in Africa. It is not 
that Africa did not have its own pattern of democracy before imposition of liberal 
democracy but the typical democracy in Africa and its processes were submerged by 
westernization. As insisted by Mimiko (2010:640), the point is that the so-called Kabiyesi 
syndrome, which was accorded as an explanation for the shortage of democracy in 
contemporary Africa, was actually a betrayal of inadequate understanding of the workings 
of the African traditional political systems.  
d. Liberal Democracy:It is important to interrogate the effect of embracing Western 
democracy on Africa. A lot of people argue that it was the right way to go as it created 
opportunities to participate in development, that liberal democracy promotes development. 
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Should democracy be defined and contextualized on the principle of or rather than 
substance, it is evident that Africaadopted liberal democracy.It becamenecessary to use 
western type and feasible and appropriate to arrive at the principles of democracy using 
African forms, patterns and processes. 
It is a fact that in the epoch before contact between Europe and Africa, the latter not only developed 
relatively advanced state structures, but that emergent pre-colonial African states also had 
“sophisticated systems of political rule” with strong democratic foundations. It is argued in this 
thesis that the basis of the advertised inability of African societies to sustain democracy in 
contemporary (postcolonial) times could not have consisted in the absence of a democratic culture 
on their part. Rather, it is the residue of constraints that were attendant upon imperialism, which 
has been the dominant experience of the African peoples since the fourteenth century-defined most 
profoundly by slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and their handmaiden, military governance 
(Ibid). 
3.5.2 Economic Effect 
A major effect of European colonialism was the progressive integration of Africa into the world 
capitalist system, within which Africa functioned primarily as a source of raw materials for 
Western industrial production. This point justifies the impact of western liberalism in post-colonial 
Africa. 
a. There was imposition of taxation, which forced Africans into wage labour. 
b. Colonial economy also caused agriculture to be diverted toward the production of primary 
products and cash crops: cocoa, groundnut, palm oil, sisal, and so on.  
c. There was sudden shift in production mode from production of food crops to cash crops, a 
situation that caused hunger and starvation in Africa. Africa began to produce more of what 
she needs less and produce less of what she needs most.  
d. Africa was perpetually turned to producer of primary raw materials, a situation that caused 
unequal exchange  
e. The plunderage method and systematically kleptocratic enterprises established in the 
colonies to expropriate natural resources of Africa to Europe has, in the perspective of 
Rodney, facilitated “underdevelopment of Africa while engendered the development of 
Europe”. Consequently, a dependency syndrome has been created. 
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f. This required a total reorganization of African economic life, beginning with the 
introduction of the cash crop and inexorable alteration of economic pattern. In the settler 
colonies—notably in Kenya and Rhodesia—the alienation of native land complicated the 
economic situation of the indigenous populations (Alkali, 2003).  
g. Economic Plan: it also altered the way Africa produce, create and recreate as well as 
consumption patterns.  
h. The infrastructure undertaken by the colonial administrations was minimal, developed 
strictly as a function of the requirements of the new economy, which saw the rise of the 
colonial cities such as Dakar, Lagos, Nairobi, and Luanda.  
i. Neo-liberalism: It is an economic process that distrusts the state as a factor in development; 
it is a nineteenth century philosophy that has continued to be repackaged, its latest form is 
monetarism. It believes that market mechanism is the most efficient allocator of productive 
resources and, therefore, to have an efficient and effective economy, forces of demand and 
supply must be allowed to play a leading role. This changed economy of Africa from 
communalism to capitalism and, lately, neo-liberalism. 
3.5.3 Social Effect 
a. Family/Social Relations: Extended family giving way to nuclear family. Traditional 
African family values broke down very rapidly. Extended family that was wonderful 
instrument like a social verve, social security in our community has given way to nuclear 
family. Little wonder that there is no more respect for age; no more respect for values that 
we held sacrosanct in Africa; younger ones now find it very difficult to greet elderly ones.  
b. Individualism: Contemporary Africa also has children of single parents, a phenomenon that 
is identifiable with America. People no longer communalize, nobody wants to be 
anybody’s brother’s keeper.  
c. Building Pattern: The way people build now is different from the way it was; people no 
longer take into cognizance our own peculiarity in the building process.  
d. Urbanization: It led to rural exodus and the displacement of large segments of the 
population.  
e. Corruption: Western civilisation has promoted corruption in Africa; leaders in Africa now 
look up to Europe and America as safe havens for looted funds. It is a consequence of 
Western civilization, corruption in Africa and misrule. 
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f. Sexuality: The conception of sexuality has changed completely; the desire to be like 
Westerners by our children has suddenly made them promiscuous; doing things that were 
never imaginable several years ago. This does not, however, in any way support cultural 
isolationism. Cultural isolationism is not possible in the context of globalisation. Cultural 
ideas and values grow and flow across borders unimpeded, but that should not make us 
lose sight of the fact that the weaker you are; the more likelihood of cultural dominance. 
Africa has been very weak and vulnerable since the last century. Africa now suffer from 
level of mental enslavement; cultural imperialism; the need for decolonisation of the mind. 
The trend of Western civilisation in Africa is pathetic, the strength of wave of Western 
civilisation is such that Africa is hardly capable of resisting it. The wave is so strong that 
it has become irresistible. 
g. Language: Proficiency in African languages is declining in Africa because people are 
compelled to embrace Western culture and civilisation as Western language; Western 
language has created a dichotomy between an elite and mass of our people who still cannot 
do business with foreign language. It causes alienation for people who cannot speak 
English or French. Language is a vehicle of culture, we are in a very serious problem. There 
is need to define and design means of helping Africa out of this language, cultural logjam.  
h. Christianity: The impact of Christianity has to be considered, for this has been the most 
important single factor in the process of Westernization in Africa. Western education, 
involving literacy and the mastery of a European language, became the condition for entry 
into the modern sector. Formost of the colonial period, education was in the hands of the 
Christian missions, who sought not only to convert Africans but also to inculcate Western 
values. Christianity challenged traditional belief systems and promoted the diffusion of 
new ideas and modes of life; in particular, it sought to impose monogamy and the nuclear 
family as the norm. The western perceptions about African traditional religion and culture 
was characterized by prejudices and condescension of African religion and culture as; 
primitive, fetish, backward, uncivilized, animist, untutored, savage, barbaric, ancient, 
illiterate and many other stereotypes. The religions and cultures of Africa were generally 
viewed as inferior and pagan. Unfortunately, some Africans believed in these myths and 
pejorative terms and descriptive nomenclatures and ended up adopting a schizophrenic 
religious attitude. Thus the imposition of Christianity as western religion in Africa 
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camouflaged by the so called civilizing mission presents complex exigencies of power 
between religion, politics and economics in Africa. The definition of religion from an 
African perspective and a western perspective also differed. Thus the western 
missionariesbelieved Africans had no sense of God. However, to an African religion is not 
a discreet human activity. In other words, religion permeates all aspects of life; and the 
whole life drama in encompassing religious and religion cannot be compartmentalized as 
a private affair. Just like in Christianity, the African traditionalist believe in a monotheistic 
God although the medium is not Jesus Christ but the ancestors. 
Ironically, the drastic reduction of infant mortality has also complicated the demographic issues in 
Africa, with consequences for agriculture and social services. Although no major effort of 
industrialization took place during the colonial period, and there has been no significant 
development since, Western technology has long entered the lives of Africans through familiarity 
with manufactured products imported from the West. The cultural alteration provoked by the 
pressures of colonial rule and missionary in all spheres of life are pervasive enough to qualify as 
the signs of a new cultural coup in Africa. This is more noticeable in the area of science and 
technology on African experience and consciousness. Modern medicine has largely taken 
precedence over traditional methods in matters of health. In as much as this is not negative, the 
danger is that the indigenous knowledge systems have been ignored thereby weakening the 
survival strategies of the African amidst adversity. Instead a radical resurrection of indigenous 
knowledge systems must be done in order to capacitate Africa in dealing with the problem 
affecting them. 
The trend of cultural westernization of Africa has become very pervasive and prevalent, such that 
Western civilization has taken precedence over African values and culture and the latter is regarded 
as inferior to the former. As with other societies and cultures in the so-called Third World, the 
impact of Western civilization on Africa has occasioned a discontinuity in forms of life throughout 
the continent. This has led to a cultural dualism that often presents itself as a real dilemma in 
concrete, real-life situations. In other words, the African experience of modernity is fraught with 
tensions at every level of the communal and social settings. The post-independence Africa is 
confronted with how to have a true identity, a new culture that is African in nature. It is on this 
basis that this thesis argues that Africa must begin to relate with countries that have “de-
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westernized” and have attained some level of appreciable economic development. The focus is to 
evolve viable options for truly African culture. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
To end this chapter, it is critical to note that African nationalism and liberalism are critical in 
addressing governance issues in post-colonial Africa. An analysis of liberalism from the above 
perspective allows for a comprehensive exploration of the possibilities of using African cultural 
realities to enrich and domesticate the Western liberal democratic frameworks that have been 
accepted as universal in ways that can promote development in Sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter 
endeavored to discuss how the tenets of African nationalism feeds into the overall objective of this 
study. The aim is to interrogate the relevance of liberal philosophy in the ideology and practice of 
African nationalism and nationalist politics in the postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa and 
demonstrate how these affect or may have affected ethics, leadership and governance in the sub-
region.  In this chapter, literature on the nexus between liberal philosophy and African nationalism, 
two ideologies that are often viewed respectively as representing or symbolising political values 
associated with the Western world, and a political ideology associated with Africa has been 
reviewed. The influence on pan-Africanism ideology as well as on the first generation of political 
leadership in the Africa of the 1960s, for example Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana by Western trained 
intellectuals such as William E DuBois (1868 - 1963) who constructed the grammar of anti-
colonial nationalism from within classical liberal tradition has been noted to have generated 
plausible arguments that African nationalism is not uniquely African. Again, the popularisation of 
some of the most important principles of liberalism such as liberty and equality by African 
Nationalists, and subsequent internationalisation of the same values through the United Nations 
regime on democracy and human rights (Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, 2008) has been presented 
as evidence not of the misconception that liberalism gave birth to African nationalism but of the 
impact that liberalism (both as a philosophy and intellectual tradition) had on the ascendency of 
modern African nationalism in the struggle against colonialism. Regardless of the residues of 
Western liberalism in African nationalism, it is a fact that these two philosophies stand as 
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oppositional in terms of how they are articulated by the ideologues representing different vantage 
points. Any attempt to view African nationalism as direct product of western liberalism is to distort 
history. Yes, affinities can be drawn but caution must be taken to avoid romanticizing two 
independent political philosophies that systematically represent different interests and foundations 
at the deeper epistemic level. In terms of political and ideological orientation, western liberalism 
and African nationalism are competing philosophical ideas whose existential foci can be 
typologically presented in the Hegelian formula of the thesis and anti-thesis model. The next 
chapter is a critical of western values of political liberalism in post-colonial Africa in the light of 
deconstructive post-colonial criticism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A CRITICAL STUDY OF WESTERN VALUES OF POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA IN THE LIGHT OF 
DECONSTRUCTIVE AFRICAN POST-COLONIAL CRITICISM 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the western values of political liberalism in post-colonial Africa in the light 
of deconstructive African post-colonial criticism. It is a fact that African nationalists such as 
Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere were committed to 
western liberal values such as equality before the law, the right of the individual to express their 
political choice in periodic elections and freedom of expression through the printed and electronic 
media as well as self-determination. This chapter will be based on the deconstructive African post-
colonial criticism which is based on the critique of post-colonial African scholars such as Franz 
Fanon through his books “The Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White Masks” where he saw 
the pitfalls of national consciousness in the sense that in the post-colonial African society, ‘the 
tribe is preferred to the state. In this case nationalism was exhausted and national consciousness 
an empty verbiage. In addition, the deconstructive African post-colonial criticism is also buttressed 
by Mazrui who saw moral dilemmas inherent in African nationalism and argued that nationalism 
did not help Africans in the nation building of post-colonial African modern states. Mbembe 
(2001:35) perceptively notes that, “as in the colonial era, in the African regimes whose crises and 
decomposition are now being played out, respect for individuals as citizens with rights and 
freedom on initiative has not been a chief characteristic.” Tensions between African traditional 
culture and modernity ensued within the context of post-colonial and economic values.  
It is also instructive to note that although the African nationalism drew its inspiration from 
colonialism, the post-colonial states in Africa witnessed one party political systems which were a 
direct opposite of western liberalism. For example, advocates of the one-party system appealed in 
their attempts to prove its African ancestry and authenticity. The illusory analogy was that in a one 
party system there is no conflict of parties (Wiredu 2000). No party loses because the party wins 
(Ibid: 378). But the comparison is faulty because in the traditional set-up no party lost because all 
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the parties were natural partners in power or more strictly, there were no parties. Thus in the one 
party situation the reason why no party loses is because murdered parties don’t compete (Ibid). 
In addition, the key argument given by the one party persuaders is that there is no necessary 
connection between democracy and the multi-party system. It should be borne in mind that the 
democratic culture as represented by western liberalism represented thoughts presupposed by the 
very idea of meaningful dialogue in the process of political decision making. These conditions of 
rational interaction that the one party system was so efficient in destroying provides the greatest 
weakness of the post-colonial state in Africa. The African dictators both civilian and military who 
took over power after independence were under sustained pressure to adopt the multi-party way of 
life. This resulted in the discovery of tricks for surviving multi-party elections (Wired 2000). 
However, the gains in freedom have accrued to African people. There were also tensions that 
existed between African traditionalism and modernity in the emergence of post-colonial political 
values and economic values. The coming of colonization sets in with its dominant culture it 
devours the native culture and leaves the bastardised culture that can only thrive at the rate and 
pace allowed by the dominant culture. The deconstuctive post –colonial criticism adherence to the 
western democratic ethos which initially influenced African nationalism has proved to be a mirage. 
Evidence abounds pointing to the direct continuities between colonialism and the post-colonial 
state. Nationalism has to a certain arguable extent an exhausted and vacuous political slogan 
without tangible fruits in the post-colony.  
4.2 Delineating Deconstructionism as a Philosophical Paradigm 
According to Mohniyan (1986), deconstruction argues that it is possible, within text, to frame a 
question or undo assertions made in the text, by means of elements which are in the text, which 
frequently would be structures that play off the rhetorical against grammatical elements. In 
addition, a prominent interpreter of Derrida's philosophy,  Rorty (1995) asserts that the term 
'deconstruction' refers in the first instance to the way in which the 'accidental' features of a text can 
be seen as betraying, subverting, its purportedly 'essential' message.".  The word accidental in this 
case is used in the sense of incidental.The term ‘deconstruction’ derives from the work of Derrida 
(1995:15); “I have never claimed to identify myself with what may be designated by this name. It 
has always seemed strange to me, it has always left me cold. Moreover, I have never stopped 
having doubts about the very identity of what is referred to by such a nick-name”. According to 
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Norris (1987), the deconstructive process comes not from the reader/critic but from the text itself; 
it is already there, it is the tension ‘between what the text manifestly means to sayand what it is 
nonetheless constrained to mean’. To say that deconstruction is impossible is therefore to 
acknowledge ‘the impossible desire of language to make present the permanently elusive’. There 
is no method to deconstruction because texts literallydeconstruct themselves in their impossible 
attempt to employ language as a ‘transcendental signifier’ (Usher & Edwards, 1994), that is, as a 
way of ‘pointing’ at some eternal truth or other. As Spivak (1976) observes, ‘All texts . . . are 
rehearsing their grammatological structure, self-deconstructing as they constitute themselves’ (p: 
lxxviii). All that the deconstructionist needs to do, then, is write, because in the final analysis, 
deconstruction is writing.  
According to Biddle and Fuwlier (1989), deconstructive criticism posits an undecidability of 
meaning for all texts. The text has intertwined and contradictory discourses, gaps, and 
incoherencies, since language itself is unstable and arbitrary. The critic doesn't undermine the text; 
the text already dismantles itself. Its rhetoric subverts or undermines its ostensible meaning. 
Delahoyde (2015) asserts that Jacques Derrida opposed the "metaphysics of presence - the claim 
in literature or philosophy that we can find some full, rich meaning outside of or prior to language 
itself." The hierarchy of binaries on which this assertion rests is untenable. Privileging speech over 
writing-logo centrism; spoken or written words have meaning only by "differance" from other 
words. Deconstructive critics focus on the text like the formalists, but direct attention to the 
opposite of the New Critical "unities." Instead, they view the "decentering" of texts and point out 
incompatibilities, rhetorical grain-against-grain contradictions, undecidability within texts. There 
is often a playfulness to deconstruction, but it can be daunting to read too. 
Look for binary oppositions and hierarchies that inform a text. The deconstructive critic is looking 
for hierarchies in which one term is privileged at the expense of the other: such as speech/writing, 
nature/culture, art/popular culture, depth/surface, teacher/student, center/margin, etc (Ibid). The 
subordinate term can usually be shown to define, constitute, or precede the first. This is not simply 
an injunction to reverse the current or present binary opposition, which would just create another 
hierarchy ready for dismantling. Texts, like identities, include what they try to exclude. Opposites 
are already united (that's why they can be opposite). So, one reads to discover the correspondence 
between the opposites: what is the thing that unites these binary terms? 
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 the marginal: the discarded, the denigrated, the unessential, the fragment, the subordinate 
term, the mistake, the frame, the absence or omission, the footnote, the supplement. How 
does this marginalia enable or call into being what is supposed to be central? 
 Search for points of condensation, where a word or concept brings together different even 
contradictory ideas, values, and arguments. Think back to Freud's discussion of the 
"uncanny." 
 Examine a text for the ways it undoes or undermines itself. Deconstructive readers like to 
read against the grain, to read a text against itself. Deconstructive readers are interested in 
errors, gaps, ironies, aporias, silences, paradoxes, shifts or breaks, contradictions, conflicts, 
fissures, digressions, ambiguities, puns, multiple meanings, linguistic quirks, 
intertextuality, repetitions, corruptions. Deconstructive readers look at the ways a text says 
something different from what it intends to mean or the ways texts don't always mean what 
they say. The reader's task is to look for texts or the moments in a text when the text refers 
to itself. Here is where you'll see texts start to unravel, to deconstruct themselves. 
 Ask questions about relations, contexts, and contingencies: How does difference or a trace 
of the other or some type of limit define, constitute, or call into being the text or object that 
I'm analyzing? How does this text or object assume meaning from its context, from its 
(always shifting) position in relation to other meanings, texts, or objects? How does this 
text or artifact gather meaning from the field of other signs or other texts that it is a part 
of? How does this text or object assume meaning from what is temporally before it, which 
is historically defined by what is before it, which is ... [and so on forever]? What are the 
historical, cultural, social, and political processes that have brought this text into being? 
 Look for conflicting interpretations of a text and analyze them in relation to the text itself. 
Deconstructive readers might see these contradictory readings as a re-enactment of 
conflicts within the text itself.  
According to Waugh (2006), Derrida’s deconstructive style of reading subverts the previous 
assumption that a text has an unchanging and definite meaning. He focuses mainly on language 
and argues that the traditional reading of a text makes a number of false assumptions. For Derrida, 
any mode of reading shows the slippery nature of language. Therefore, reading is an activity where 
the reader himself indulges in the game of language. The reader will interpret meaning with the 
help of devices like difference (difference and an endless postponement), trace (residual meaning) 
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and supplement (addition or substitution word) (Ibid). What the reader might have not been there 
in the author’s mind. It is because of the underlying inherent contradiction of language which is 
the medium of literature. So, we can say that deconstruction is a form of linguistics analysis of the 
text. In a sense, we cannot arrive at an absolute or fixed meaning for any text. 
Therefore, reading is an activity where the reader himself indulges in the game of language. The 
reader will interpret meaning with the help of devices like differance, trace and supplement. What 
the reader might have not been there in the author’s mind (Derrida 1978). Deconstruction is against 
the grand narrative. Every construction or grand narrative has always a center, without that center 
nothing can be constructed. So, deconstruction tries to deconstruct the construction of grand 
narratives. It is an activity of close reading where the free plays of binary oppositions are revealed. 
Thus, Derrida subverts the traditional hierarchical order of things. 
Deconstructive notion has revealed the text’s nature of indefinite and uncertain meaning. It has 
shown that the meaning of a text is really infinite and has a number of conflicting possible 
meanings. Derrida’s critique of structuralism has resulted in opening up further possibilities of 
analysis (Derrida 1978). The deconstructive approach of reading subverts the traditional mode of 
reading a text. After the arrival of this kind of reading, the critical theories in the past have become 
absolutely irrelevant. Besides, literary theories such as Marxism, Feminism, Gay and Lesbian and 
recent studies like New Historicism are also irrelevant after the application of deconstructive 
analysis. Many deconstructive arguments revolve around the analysis of conceptual oppositions. 
A famous example is the opposition between writing and speech (Derrida 1976). The deconstructor 
looks for the ways in which one term in the opposition has been "privileged" over the other in a 
particular text, argument, historical tradition or social practice. One term may be privileged 
because it is considered the general, normal, central case, while the other is considered special, 
exceptional, peripheral or derivative. Something may also be privileged because it is considered 
more true, more valuable, more important, or more universal than its opposite. Moreover, because 
things can have more than one opposite, many different types of privilegings can occur 
simultaneously. One can deconstruct a privileging in several different ways. For example, one can 
explore how the reasons for privileging A over B also apply to B, or how the reasons for B's 
subordinate status apply to A in unexpected ways (Ibid). One may also consider how A depends 
upon B, or is actually a special case of B. The goal of these exercises is to achieve a new 
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understanding of the relationship between A and B, which, to be sure, is always subject to further 
deconstruction. 
Deconstruction is useful here because ideologies often operate by privileging certain features of 
social life while suppressing or deemphasizing others. Deconstructive analyses look for what is 
deemphasized, overlooked, or suppressed in a particular way of thinking or in a particular set of 
legal doctrines. Sometimes they explore how suppressed or marginalized principles return in new 
guises. For example, where a field of law is thought to be organized around a dominant principle, 
the deconstructor looks for exceptional or marginal counter principles that have an 
unacknowledged significance, and which, if taken seriously, might displace the dominant 
principle. (Unger 1986; Frug 1984; Dalton 1985; Peller 1985; Balkin 1987). Sometimes 
deconstructive analyses closely study the figural and rhetorical features of texts to see how they 
interact with or comment upon the arguments made in the text. The deconstructor looks for 
unexpected relationships between different parts of a text, or loose threads that at first glance 
appear peripheral yet often turn out to undermine or confuse the argument.  
A deconstructor may consider the multiple meanings of key words in a text, etymological 
relationships between words, and even puns to show how the text speaks with different (and often 
conflicting) voices. (Balkin 1990b; Balkin 1989). Behind these techniques is a more general 
probing and questioning of familiar oppositions between philosophy (reason) and rhetoric, or 
between the literal and the figural. Although we often see the figural and rhetorical elements of a 
text as merely supplementary and peripheral to the underlying logic of its argument, closer analysis 
often reveals that metaphor, figure, and rhetoric play an important role in legal and political 
reasoning. Often the figural and metaphorical elements of legal texts powerfully support or 
undermine the reasoning of these texts. Deconstruction does not show that all texts are 
meaningless, but rather that they are overflowing with multiple and often conflicting meanings. 
Similarly, deconstruction does not claim that concepts have no boundaries, but that their 
boundaries can be parsed in many different ways as they are inserted into new contexts of 
judgment. Although people use deconstructive analyses to show that particular distinctions and 
arguments lack normative coherence, deconstruction does not show that all legal distinctions are 
incoherent. Deconstructive arguments do not necessarily destroy conceptual oppositions or 
conceptual distinctions. Rather, they tend to show that conceptual oppositions can be reinterpreted 
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as a form of nested opposition (Balkin 1990a). A nested opposition is an opposition in which the 
two terms bear a relationship of conceptual dependence or similarity as well as conceptual 
difference or distinction. Deconstructive analysis attempts to explore how this similarity or this 
difference is suppressed or overlooked. Hence deconstructive analysis often emphasizes the 
importance of context in judgment, and the many changes in meaning that accompany changes in 
contexts of judgment. Deconstruction's emphasis on the proliferation of meanings is related to the 
deconstructive concept of iterability. Iterability is the capacity of signs (and texts) to be repeated 
in new situations and grafted onto new contexts. Derrida's aphorism "iterability alters" (Derrida 
1977) means that the insertion of texts into new contexts continually produces new meanings that 
are both partly different from and partly similar to previous understandings. (Thus, there is a nested 
opposition between them.). The term "play" is sometimes used to describe the resulting instability 
in meaning produced by iterability. Although deconstructive arguments show that conceptual 
oppositions are not fully stable, they do not and cannot show that all such oppositions can be 
jettisoned or abolished, for the principle of nested opposition suggests that a suppressed conceptual 
opposition will usually reappear in a new guise.  
4.3 Deconstructing Western liberalism from an African Post-colonial Perspective 
Most contemporary African states were born from anti-colonial struggles, not from struggles for a 
national statehood. Whereas Europeans went from the nation to the state Africans wanted 
liberation from a colonial state to a search for a nation, where national statehood remains a dream 
that has not been fulfilled for so many years. Hobsbawn (1990) asserts that colonization is a project 
of dehumanization pursued rationally: (1) it sanctioned ontological gradation that confers 
humanity and superiority to some while squarely denying the humanity and equality of the other; 
for instance, racial divisions and apartheid, separated, segregated, and erected unequal residential 
townships. (2) It instituted spatial balkanization and/or imbricated communities and because they 
were unjustly separated or those who struggle for just separation because they were forcefully 
united against their wills and their ethnic and cultural groups confirm this. (3) Colonialism resulted 
in human affliction enmass that goes beyond ordinary human suffering and poverty. The structural 
violence, loss of natural human environment, personal/psycho-social crumbling and destruction 
are its existentially and empirically observable and sanctioned consequences. 
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According to Mazrui (1973:183), “balkanization is a breeding-ground for political violence,” he 
reminds us that, “It was…in Africa that Europe practiced the art of partition at its most elaborate. 
Where Europe attempted to unify those who were different, it sowed the seeds of future 
separatism… Where Europe divided, it left behind latent passions for reunification….. With the 
precision and mathematical indifference inherent in colonial cartography, colonial boundaries 
divided peoples sharing common ethnicity, language, cultures… and forced them to “settle” in 
different, even hostile bordering states. Such artificial constructs created borders that separated 
homogenous cultural and linguistic groups and mechanically merged groups on the basis of access 
to privileged natural resources. The configuration of pre-colonial traditional empires and kingdoms 
in Africa had nothing or little to do with the colonial borders imposed after the Berlin Conference, 
for indigenous African allegiances followed kinship, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural affiliations. 
Colonial partition is an act and method of mobilization for both space and resources that crafted 
and created pieces of disproportionate and unequally balkanized African states. Therefore, the 
territorialization of the natural lurks behind Europe’s detrimental project and still remains one of 
the most difficult hurdles fueling multiple conflicts reigning  
State-building in Africa operates within the framework of a borrowed knowledge system whose 
representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power, which intellectual and 
nationalist leaders in the continent seek to repudiate (Chatterjee 1986). Although the anti-colonial 
vision has been powerful in its influences throughout the postcolonial world (Chatterjee 1986: 4)–
instituting the foundations of modern critiques of socially unjust practices, of caste, oppressions 
of women, the lack of rights for labouring and subaltern classes, including the very critique of 
colonialism itself (Chakrabarty 2000: 4) has been ineffectual in erecting the foundations of 'an 
independent state' free from neo-imperial dominance, capable of delivering the expectations of a 
developmental state. Nationalism may have succeeded in liberating the nation from colonialism 
but not from the knowledge system of the post-Enlightenment West, which continues to dominate 
the continent, even more powerfully. Through its opposition of colonialism, nationalism 
administered a check on a specific political form of metropolitan capitalist dominance. It dealt a 
deathblow on such blatantly ethnic slogans of dominance as the civilizing mission of the West–
'the white man's burden'-but ignored the need for an epistemological revolution in the alien 
knowledge system on which the operations of the state are premised.  
115 
 
Thus, while the lessons of decolonization and what it means for world history are irreversible, this 
failure explains the continued dominance of the continent by the knowledge system of the post-
Enlightenment West under changing conditions and with much ideological turf. Ake establishes 
the connection between 'knowledge production', 'state-building' and 'development' in the continent, 
and bemoans the 'poverty of ideas' with which statebuilding has been undertaken since 
decolonization (Ake 1997). He suggests that democratization cannot ignore the 'neo-colonial' 
character of the state. After all, the colonial state was not just the agency that brought the modular 
forms of the modern state to the colonies. It was also the agency destined never to fulfill its 
normalizing mission in the post-colonies (Chatterjee 1993). And, the post-colonial state throughout 
Africa and Asia has "only expanded and not transformed the basic institutional arrangements of 
colonial law and administration, of the courts, the bureaucracy, the police, the army, and the 
various technical services of government" (Chatterjee 1993). Africa inherited the European system 
of government and administration in its original form-based on 'imitated' constitutional principles, 
'borrowed' technologies of power and administration-merely replacing the personnel. The elites of 
the 'new states' could not think of an entirely new system (Pylee 1967: v and Chatterjee 1993: 15). 
Having replicated the Western model, 'the state in Africa' remains "an imposed institution 
inappropriate to the conditions of Africa" (Cooper 2006: 186). This way, decolonization foreclosed 
alternatives that were once at the centre of attention, i.e. supra-national federations and Pan-
Africanism–and put in place a kind of state headed by a ruling class conscious of its own interests 
and fragility. 
Although water supply has obviously been an issue in the Nile basin ever since its settlements by 
a large number of people, it is the colonial and post-colonial carving up of the basin into individual 
states that is the key to understanding contemporary conflicts in the region. Post-colonial states of 
the Basin continue to use territorial strategies to control facets of nature that are aterritorial in 
essence. Despite the dam-building projects undertaken by the Egyptian state, the River Nile is not 
the exclusive property of any of the states, including Egypt. The Nile continues to flow through 
other states and across other territorial borders in the region. Conflict over water is a case in point. 
The conflict surrounding the Nile Basin shows what is meant by the ‘political framing of nature 
as a national/imperial resource.’ To reiterate the obvious, Egypt depends on the River Nile for 
much of its water needs. The head waters of the Nile pass through and supply many African states 
before it eventually reaches Egypt. This of course makes Egypt exceptionally vulnerable to 
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attempts by other riparian states to capture water from the Nile through irrigation schemes and 
dam-building projects. From the late 1970s onwards, the supply of water has been the top geo-
political priority of the Egyptian state-even more important than its political relations with the state 
of Israel in Africa today. Despite the dam-building projects undertaken by the Egyptian state, the 
River Nile is not the exclusive property of any of the states, including Egypt. The Nile continues 
to flow through other states and across other territorial borders in the region. Thus, in contra 
distinction to the argument that the persistent leakage of nature across sovereign territorial 
boundaries in places like the Nile basin makes discussions of the state meaningless, it is the 
historical legacy and continued desire of modern post-colonial states to territorially frame nature 
that is generating the conflict in the region (Kuehls 1996).  
The failure of authoritarianism to bring about the expected transformation, more than any factor, 
is responsible for the strong often-violent-agitation for democracy in the last two decades of 
Africa’s history. Rather than creating the enabling environment for national cohesion, social 
mobilization and economic growth, authoritarianism brought misery, squalor and complete loss of 
the fundamental inalienable rights of the citizens. It is this overwhelming African crisis of 
development that prompted the impoverished citizens to turn round to behold the other side of the 
ideological spectrum and begin to ask for their human and democratic rights, which include the 
joint ownership of the commonwealth. As Claude Ake appropriately describes the recent 
democratic turn, it is, “among other things, an expression of the will to survive. The survival 
strategies which ordinary people spontaneously devised to cope with economic 
austerity and to reduce their vulnerability to a predatory state…” (Ake 1992:4). The massive failure 
of the developmental project by the authoritarian regimes of Africa, combined with the similar 
dismal performance and eventual collapse of authoritarian Communism in Eastern Europe, 
provided empirical evidence for the position hitherto repressed, that democracy facilitates 
economic advancement and social enhancement more than other forms of government. 
Modernists argue that the institutional forms of liberal democracy are universally valid, and that 
Africans aspire to democratic systems of rule that look much the same as those in the West. They 
view traditional political systems as relics of the past that may actually impede democratic 
development, and which must therefore be overcome. Traditionalists counter that traditional 
institutions have proved both malleable and adaptable, and that even if they are much changed, 
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they still draw on their historical roots in unique and valuable ways. They see “tradition” – however 
contested – as a resource to strengthen the community and polity, and to overcome the many 
failures of the Western liberal democratic model as it has been applied in Africa. Traditional 
leaders, chiefs and elders clearly still play an important role in the lives of many Africans: only 
religious leaders are contacted more frequently by ordinary Africans in their efforts to solve their 
problems or express their views. And in many countries traditional authorities play a pre-eminent 
role as mediators of violent conflict. There is, however, considerable cross-country variation in 
these indicators of the status and importance of African chiefs and elders. 
According to Hamadi (2014), Said's theory of post-colonialism is mainly based on what he 
considers the false image of the Orient or the East that has been fabricated by western explorers, 
poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators since 
Napoleon's occupation of Egypt in 1798. According to Said (1980), these have always shown the 
Orient as the primitive, uncivilized "other", in an attempt to create it as the contrast to the advanced 
and civilized west. In his highly influential work, Orientalism, Said considers that "Orientalism is 
a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the 
Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident". Said believes that such discourse has been used 
either in preparation to military campaigns and colonialism against the Orient, or as a justification 
for the occupations and horrors that accompany them. He goes further, contending that it is quite 
misleading to consider that such horrors came to an end with the end of direct colonialism (Ibid). 
On the contrary, he believes that the consequences of colonialism are still persisting in the form of 
chaos, coups, corruption, civil wars, and bloodshed, which pervade many of these countries, 
mainly because of the residues of colonization. In this respect, Said believes that a powerful 
colonizer has imposed a language and a culture, whereas cultures, histories, values, and languages 
of the Oriental peoples have been ignored and even distorted by the colonialists in their pursuit to 
dominate these peoples and exploit their wealth in the name of enlightening, civilizing, and even 
humanizing them (Hamadi 2014). 
4.4 Defining African Post-Colonial Criticism 
According to Moore-Gilbert (1998:5) people such as W.E.B. Dubois (African-American), Sol 
Plaatje (South African), C.L.R. James (Trinidadian), Frantz Fanon (Martinique-Algerian), Chinua 
Achebe (Nigerian), Ngugi wa Thiong’o (Kenyan) and Ranajit Guha (Indian), to name just a few, 
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and such movements as the Harlem Renaissance (World War I and 1920s) and the Negritude 
movement (1940s and 1950s) are the precursors to a postcolonial paradigm. Moore-Gilbert 
(1998:5-6) is insistent that, while a postcolonial paradigm has had a long and complex history 
outside Euro-America, its arrival in the Euro-American academy was only recent. Since the 1960s, 
most of the literary productions that originated during and after colonialism in former colonies in 
Africa and Asia were lumped under the rubric of “Commonwealth Literature.” Mukherjee 
(1996:5) states that the phenomenon of a postcolonial paradigm was only given its imprimatur by 
Routledge Publishers when they changed the name of a volume from The Encyclopædia of 
Commonwealth Literature to The Encyclopædia of Postcolonial Literatures in English (Benson 
1994) at the last minute. Moore-Gilbert (1998:6) observes just how limited part English studies 
played in re-thinking the area of literary studies in what would now be termed postcolonial studies 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. An evident fact of its late arrival is the lack of acknowledgement 
of a postcolonial paradigm as a distinct category of inquiry in a number of relatively recent works 
of cultural analysis and critical theories, especially in Britain from 1976 to 1988. For instance, he 
argues that postcolonial reading was not considered as a distinct category of cultural analysis in 
influential works such as Raymond Williams’s Keywords (1976, revised in 1983), Terry 
Eagleton’s Literary Theory (1983), Raman Selden’s The Theory of Criticism (1988), Peter 
Widdowson’s Re-Reading English (1982) and Janet Batsleer’s Re-Writing English (1985) (Moore-
Gilbert 1998:6). These works did not address in any detailed way the cluster of interests now 
identified with either colonial discourse analysis or the already well-developed fields of post-
colonial literatures in English.  
A preliminary survey of postcolonial reading only appeared in 1989 with The Empire Writes Back 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1989), which was followed by Colonial Discourse and Post-
colonial Theory (William and Chrisman in 1993), the first critical reader in the discipline. 
Sugirtharajah (1998:93) argues that initially a postcolonial paradigm was not seen as advancing 
any particular theoretical concepts. It was not until the trio of cultural critics, the late Edward Said 
with his books Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993), Gayatri Spivak with her 
book In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (1987), and Homi Bhabha with his book The 
Location of Culture (1994) (Sugirtharajah 1998:93), gave a post-colonial paradigm its theorization 
and practice. Bell (2002:46) is insistent that these and other works have spun a new rhetorical web 
dealing with how to reclaim the identity of the cultures of the developing world, and have 
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developed a new critical discourse to analyze colonialism from their own postcolonial 
perspectives. 
The post-colonial resistance movements were armed and religio-cultural in nature, whose aims 
were self-determination and religio-cultural independence. There was always some form of active 
resistance and the armed resistance finally won in most cases (Ngungi 1993: 12-13). The 
understanding of colonialism draws the attention of colonized peoples to its violence, immorality 
and fostering of inequality. According to Thomas (1994), this understanding enabled political 
protest and prompted critical reflection in and among postcolonial subjects. Danmole (1974) 
perceptively notes that, the function of liberation from these encumbrances of the colonial heritage, 
from the crippling constraints that their continued presence entail, involves a revolutionary process 
that must run through the entire colonial fabric, the entire structure of colonial systems that have 
proven oppressive and historically irrelevant. The effects have been historically devastating to the 
colonized peoples. It must engage such systems in a cultural confrontation in a determined battle 
to remove the contradictions that have resulted in the slavery and poverty of the colonized peoples 
and the freedom and affluence of the colonizing peoples (Achebe 1989:1-20). Most varieties of 
the postcolonial paradigm will strike against the very notions of identity and unity in one way or 
another. There are many varieties and schools of thought claiming this phenomenon as their own. 
Sugirtharajah (1998:15) called it: A hermeneutical salmagundi, consisting of extremely varied 
methods, materials, historical entanglements, geographical locations, political affiliations, cultural 
identities and economic predicaments.   
 According to Gallager (1996:232), “a post-colonial paradigm is not an all-
encompassingoppositional master-narrative”, since “there is no self-evident project of resistance 
and emancipation for all in the periphery” (Gugelberger 1994:582). Instead, “the differences 
among the various discourses of resistance and emancipation are to be emphasized as much as the 
similarities” (Segovia 2000a:140- 141). Thus, a post-colonial reading “takes competing modes of 
discourse for granted, renounces the idea of any master-narrative as in itself a construct, and looks 
for truly global interaction” (Segovia 2000a:33). A postcolonial paradigm is “thoroughly self-
conscious of itself as construct” (Segovia 1998:63). Thus, as a critical reading enterprise, a post-
colonial paradigm is geared at uncovering the marriage between ideas and power lying behind 
most of western writings, theories and education (Sugirtharajah 1998:16-17). Given its short 
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history as a practice in the Euro-American academy, Moore-Gilbert (1998:6) argues that a post-
colonial paradigm has had a major impact upon the current modes of cultural analysis. It 
inaugurates a new era of academic inquiry, which brings to the hermeneutical forefront the inter-
marriage of issues of race, nation, empire, gender, migration and ethnicity with cultural production. 
Fuery and Mansfield (2000:118) also argue that it analyzes the meaning of colonial and post-
colonial history as it under-props language and socio-political life at its historically most enduring 
and constitutionally most fundamental way. 
A post-colonial paradigm has to do with a radical change of focus and purpose, which reserves 
particular attention for ideological and suspicious readings. It is usually fair to think of it as a 
movement of resistance. The name itself suggests that it defines itself against colonialism. Ahmad 
(2003:2) simply defines it as the emergence of a culture, literature, writings, discourse, attitudes, 
positions and ideologies, which deconstruct, expose, reject, and condemn colonialism entirely. 
Fuery and Mansfield (2000:118) see its impetus as towards the destabilization of the cultural place 
and authority of the ex-colonial powers and the promotion of diversity within the post-colonial 
cultures.  Post-colonial criticism articulates the desire of the colonized people concerning their 
sense(s) of identity and self-determination as well as attempting to pose a counter-offensive against 
political, economic and cultural forms of colonialism, without losing sight of the crucial aspects 
of gender, sexuality and ethnicity. Poignantly, it is about social formation and analysis as well as 
cultural production, which is an effort to rewrite history. It is a reflexive thinking, which permits 
a critical re-thinking of historical imbalances and cultural inequalities which colonialism erected 
and continue to pamper today through subtle forms today. 
 
4.5 Critiquing Democracy as a Feature of Western Liberalism from a Post-Colonial Critical 
perspective 
According to Ake (1991:33), the long struggle for democracy in Africa is beginning to 
showresults, as the continent is overcoming a legacy of authoritarianism and indifference to 
democratic culture. These results, are too impressive and too widespread to be ignored: the popular 
rejection of military rule in Nigeria; the demise of apartheid in South Africa; the down fall of 
Samuel Doe in Liberia and Kerekou in Benin; the gains of pluralism and multi-partyism in Niger, 
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Madagascar, Cameroon, Zambia, Algeria, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Mozambique, Angola, the Congo and Sao Tome and Principe; the growing 
democratization processes in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, 
Cameroon and Zimbabwe. 
Fayemi (2009:2) perceptively notes that, “the forces that led to democratization were both internal 
and external. Internally, it was occasioned by the development failures of many African states in 
the 1980s, and in particular the mixed and meager accomplishments under structural adjustment 
programs (SAP). This demand for improved governance led to the rise of pro-democracy 
movements in African states, which resulted in concerted popular agitation for change.” On the 
external front, there were serious concerns from international agencies and donor nations on the 
autocratic regimes in many African states. The pressure from the international scene for universal 
human freedom and life with dignity, coupled with promises of improved bilateral relations for 
non-dictatorial states, stimulated the internal drive for democratization in Africa (Ibid). However, 
this democratization trend taking shape in many states of Africa has paradoxically not yet produced 
the expected result of societal transformation, as cases of civil war, genocide, poverty, corruption, 
insecurity among others still dot the path of many African states (Ibid). It is important to 
understand that democracy as a governance principle is deeply rooted in western liberalism. It is 
the western liberal thinking and ideology that has prescribed democracy as the best form of 
political governance that is able to bring peace and security in the modern world. Be that as it may 
democracy in the context of the African set up has not contributed to sustainable peace and security 
as shall be demonstrated in this chapter. 
  
4.5.1 Deconstructing the ideals of democracy from an African optic 
The term democracy designates a system of government that allows the citizens freedom to decide 
their desires. Ancient Greece (Athens in particular) is widely regarded as the birthplace of Western 
democracy” (Lioba and Abdulahi 2005). The word democracy was derived from the Greek words 
demos which means “the people”, and kratia which means “to rule” (Fayemi 2009). The ancient 
Greeks used the word demos to refer to ordinary people, the masses of the population. So 
democracy is rule by the ordinary people, the masses. But in the context of this thesis, the people 
also mean “nation” or another Greek term, ethnos, an ethnic group-a people that shares a common 
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culture and sense of heritage, distinct from other peoples. But if the people is to rule in its nation 
state, and if the people is defined in ethnic terms, then its ethnic unity may outweigh the kind of 
citizen diversity that is central to democracy. 
According to Larock (2011: 6), in the Ekklesia (Citizen Assembly) which was the epic symbol of 
Athenian Democracy comprising thousands of adult male citizens, members voted on every issue- 
direct democracy prevailed. In the Boule, the penultimate organ of the Greek democracy 
determination was by random lot and not election and amongst the many compelling reasons for 
this was to ensure that decision making and participation was not influenced by money and also to 
avoid a permanent set of elites that took politics as a career as we see today. Finally in the 
Dikasteria (court), membership was open to adults of moral standing and reward for a sitting was 
no more than what an ordinary laborer would earn in a day because in the ancient city of Athens, 
citizens did not pay tax (Larock 2011).  It also made this a service and not an avenue to make 
money as politics is today. All this is said, not because much time must be spent in ancient history, 
but because some simple points must be made - that circumstances at any point in time shape 
practice. Athenian democracy was a response to centuries of rule by oligarchies and after the 
successful resistance against the Persian onslaught on Greece in 490 BC, ordinary people who 
were instrumental in the resistance struggles demanded a greater say in the affairs of the city and 
so a progressive aristocrat called Epilates presided over a radicalization of power that shifted the 
balance decisively to the poorest sections of society (Larock 2011). Ordinary citizens in their 
thousands thus became the decision makers in the Ekklesia that met at least 40 times a year. A few 
lessons to pick from this brief peep into history; first that democracy was dictated by history and 
response to specific circumstances; second, democracy was about direct participation and not overt 
delegation; thirdly, democracy was about negotiation and not a blue print.  
In addition, Neo-liberal democracy like ancient Athenian democracy had a specific history of a 
struggle against the absolute rule of monarchs. It was developed over a long period of transition 
from feudalism to capitalism. It was perfected after the industrial era in the west and the spread 
across global corners today is aided by capitalism.  Democracy is chracterised by; firstly ‘regular 
free and fair elections (Larock 2011)’. The assumption here is that with free and fair elections, an 
electorate of age will exercise oversight over leaders voted and given authority to act in trust of 
the public and rule the electorate in ways determined by the latter. In many respects, by 
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participating, voters surrender some rights over decision making to the so called elected 
representatives, who are well known all across the world, be it in Africa, in Europe or in America 
to wine and dine while majority wake up every day to struggle to eke a living, some wallowing in 
dire poverty.  
In many countries elections have indeed been regular usually five years, but the extent to which 
they have been free and fair are doubted not just in Africa but in America, Europe and elsewhere 
in the world. There is little evidence to suggest that the life of a majority of citizens change in any 
significant way after any election and if it does, it is a temporary patrimonial reward to a few agents 
who are sucked into a patronage system of exploitation of majorities to enrich minorities, while 
the majority continue to live in the same grass thatched hut in villages, election after election. 
Election after election they go to the same pit latrine behind the hut or if they spend most of their 
time in the city, like many do, they continue to pay rent (which increases every year) in the same 
depreciating apartment (Larock 2011). Any change of fortune has little, if anything to do with 
elections, but everything to do with economic ingenuity or social rewards or safety-nets in Africa’s 
love and care economy. And when one critically looks at who is behind the elections, it is always 
no further than some agents of western capitalism bankrolling the process to extend western culture 
to more global corners. Without western aid, Africa would not be talking about this practice called 
elections whether free, fair or not. 
Secondly, the liberal democracy doctrine is about ‘individual choice’through a secret ballot. It’s a 
celebration of the triumph, if not tyranny of the individual over the collective. The assumption here 
is that with some conditioning, the individual voter has the level of consciousness to decide for 
society, sometimes even without any consensus on what societal needs are. This tyranny is 
probably the most un-transparent manner in which societal needs can be responded to, devalue 
debate, surrenders rights and enslaves minds. As highlighted earlier on, this practice is not very 
compatible with many of Africa’s traditions where collective values regulate individual behavior. 
Whether the individual is able to make good judgment or not on behalf of society and not in 
response to a patron who just gave them an “envelope” during the campaigns is debatable. 
Thirdly, liberal democracy posits a struggle to govern society by supposedly opposed interests or 
formations. The assumption here is that political parties are the proxy representation of alternative 
ideologies and programmes for societal wellbeing. Multi-partyism is held as the most ideal way in 
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which genuine options are provided for the electorate. However, as is well known, this is the least 
true, for even in America, some things otherwise considered primordial such as physique, facial 
looks, how one talks, and other such considerations compete with ideology. This is partly because 
people over emphasize difference and celebrate competition over cooperation. 
Fourthand final, liberal democracy is about representationrather than direct participation, as in 
ancient Greece. The argument here is that, there is not enough space and capacity to deal with 
mass jurisdiction and decision making and yet at the same time when voting for representatives, 
the electorate are calling for mass participation and spend many days preparing for elections and 
participating in them!  (Larock 2011). It is highly debatable whether representative democracy is 
possible at all and yet often it is reduced to elite rule and tyranny over the majority for if  people 
consider policy and decision making as a process that considers ‘inputs’- citizen views, ‘with-
inputs’ elite judgment and finally ‘outputs’ in terms of policies and programmes in response to 
citizen demands, it is realized that the ‘with-inputs’ are most critical and therefore represents in 
some ways, a ‘coup’ by the elite. The crisis of representation the world over today suggests 
representative democracy produces career politicians often with an assumed mandate. 
Democracy in theory means a governance system by the people, for the people, as opposed to rule 
by one despot (autocracy), or a few (oligarchy). The concept of democracy has remained elusive. 
It is paradoxical that despite centuries of democratic governance in various parts of the globe, there 
is currently no univocally accepted definition of the term. There are intense debates among 
scholars of democracy, which can be placed into a continuum that ranges from maximalist to 
minimalist approaches (Ibid). The body of minimalist democratic theory is drawn from several 
thinkers, such as Adam Przeworski, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Popper, William Riker, and Russel 
Hardin. All these scholars share a viewpoint wherein democracy neither sets conditions for its 
outcomes, nor characterizes itself as anything other than an electoral system (Ibid). Przeworski 
(1999) simply defines minimalist democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections”. He sees 
the essential value of democracy being in the peaceful transfer of power enacted through regular 
elections. Schumpeter (1950) argues that democracy does not entail rule by the people, but that it 
is “…a method by which decision-making is transferred to individuals who have gained power in 
a competitive struggle for the votes of the citizens”. Popper (1963) asserts that democracies are a 
system wherein one administration can be replaced by another without bloodshed, which to him 
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indicates elections. He rejects the concept of sovereignty in favor of elections, stating that the 
imperfections and uncertainties of elections are preferable to the prospect of tyranny found within 
sovereignty. The above minimalist conception of democracy has been challenged by maximalists.  
In criticizing the minimalist conception, it is argued that without effective guarantees of civil 
liberties, elections do not constitute democracy, and that a “procedural minimum” for defining 
democracy must include not only elections, but reasonably broad guarantees of basic civil rights - 
such as freedom of speech, association and assembly. Thus beyond the procedural electoral 
minimum, maximalist scholars of democracy have identified further characteristics that must be 
present for these basic procedures to meaningfully constitute a democracy. Dahl (1971:221), for 
instance, advances three essential conditions for the well-functioning multiparty democracy. These 
are: a) extensive competition by political candidates and their groups or parties; b) political 
participation that provides the choice for the electorate to select candidates in free and fair 
elections; and, c) civil and political liberties that enable citizens to express themselves without fear 
of punishment. Larry Diamond, another maximalist, sees the definition of democracy as 
encompassing “not only a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free and fair 
elections and universal suffrage, but organizational and informational pluralism; extensive civil 
liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizat ions); 
effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for legislative, executive and 
judicial organs of the state” (Diamond 1988:33). Despite the many differences in how democracy 
is defined above, be it in minimalist or maximalist terms, or be it in terms of institutions, processes 
or outcomes, one can argue that there are two basic assumptions of democracy, namely, that all 
people are equal (equality) and that all people are free (liberty). In addition, certain minimum 
conditions must be met in order for a system to be labeled democratic. These include, among others 
and in no particular order, respect for human rights and the rule of law; collective deliberation, 
choice and participation; representative and accountable government. Democracy emphasizes that 
values should not be forced upon any people, and stipulates liberty, the separation of power, 
majority rule, and the sovereignty of the people. Democracy gives primacy to political and moral 
values of equality, reciprocity, and respect for the views of others. 
In addition, Fukuyama's “The End of History” (1989) represents a universalist position on liberal 
democracy as the model of democratic government practicable anywhere, and in fact the most 
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desirable to embrace. With the collapse of Communism and the “victorious” emergence of the 
USA from the Cold War, Fukuyama declared the liberal State as universally victorious. He argues 
that industrial development necessarily follows a universal pattern – that is set by the leading 
capitalist economies of the West - a process which will “guarantee” an “increasing homogenization 
of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances” (Fukuyama 
1992:xiv). Thus, he claims that "all countries undergoing economic modernization must 
increasingly resemble one another: they must unify nationally on the basis of a centralized state, 
urbanize, replace traditional forms of social organization (like tribe, sect and family) with 
economically rational ones based on function and efficiency, and provide for universal education 
[democracy] of their citizens"(Fukuyama 1992:.xv).  
Fukuyama concludes that the end has come for the struggle between different ideologies, because 
the universalization of Western liberal democracy has triumphed over other contesting democratic 
and economic alternatives. The universalist thinking that liberal democracy is the final form of 
human government implies that African states cannot but adopt liberal democracy with its 
economic correlate, capitalism, because historically, it has proved to be the most viable, desirable 
and imperative for addressing the challenges of development in third-world nations. When 
examined critically, this universalist view can be seen as an imperialist attempt at inventing a new 
scramble for Africa. While democracy could have some universal features, the presentation of 
liberal democracy as the political messiah to rescue Africa out of her multifarious proclivities can 
be seen as an integral part of the cordiality package of neo-colonialism. Fukuyama’s claim on the 
veracity of capitalism becomes gratuitous when people factor in the recent economic crunch that 
is currently plaguing first world economies. Moreover, it is arguable that Fukuyama’s liberal 
democracy cannot be the end of human history, simply because people are not at the end of human 
intelligence. Diverse nations have every right to construct new conceptions of democracy, which 
respond to their religious, economic, and social needs. Along similar lines, Jane (2002:17), argues 
that the problem of underdevelopment in many African states is not a problem of the adoption of 
liberal democracy in their political orderings.  
Like Fukuyama, Jane posits that liberal democracy has the inherent potentiality of guaranteeing 
development in Africa. He asserts that the reason why it seems to be failing is that many African 
states are in haste in struggling to consolidate their democracies and impatient in achieving the 
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developmental pace of the West. He pointed out that older democracies in the West tended to have 
in their favor some conditions that facilitated their societal development and consequently, 
consolidation of democracy. These are economic prosperity and equality (enhanced by early 
industrialization); a modern and diversified social structure in which a middle class plays a primary 
role; a national culture that tolerates diversity and prefers accommodation, and a long time span of 
practicing democracy. Today, however, the pre-conditions of the older democracies do not prevail 
in Africa, yet many African states are struggling to consolidate their democracies, eager to ape the 
development pace of the West (Jane 2002:19).  
Democracy in most parts of Africa is still in its infancy, with very poor and sometimes ethnically 
divided conditions. The fact that a democracy is old does not mean that it is likely to be stable. 
Long established democracies face their own unique challenges. For example, in consolidated 
democracies, there is a growing trend of apathy and disillusionment among voters, particularly the 
young, whereas in emerging democracies voter turnout tends to be high, and many democratic 
movements are led by youth. Local cultures and traditions impact upon the way democratic values 
and systems are built and supported. It is fallacious to think that certain cultures are inherently 
inhospitable to democratic values and institutions. A critical analysis of the evolution of the 
democratic idea and practices, and of the global advance of democracy in governance, suggests 
that democratic governance appeals to and grows out of the universal human values of dignity and 
freedom. Where democratic governance has failed, it has done so more due to imperfect 
institutions rather than to the “unripenness” of a given country. Democracy becomes rigid, corrupt 
and unresponsive in the absence of periodic reform and renewal (Lipset 2000:10).  
According to Obi (2008),observed that Africa in the spirit of the ‘global moment’ embraced 
democracy, more precisely liberal democracy because it found acceptance within Africa’s political 
elite and perhaps more significantly, within the donor community and western democracies that 
seek to connect the processes to market based economic reforms and development on the continent. 
He accuses the west of seeking to globalize their own political culture and market ideology as part 
of the process of universal homogenization, or more bluntly stated hegemonization. Democracy in 
that sense equalled liberal democracy and anything outside that was fought, sometimes with brute 
force and that is why Africa lost leaders like Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso and Patrice 
Lumumba in Democratic Republic of Congo. It is also the reason that Mwalimu Nyerere’s African 
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socialism was fought and undermined as primitive, barbaric and anti-development. However like 
many African Scholars (Mafege, Claude Ake, Cyril Obi, Francis Nyamnjor, Shivji, George Ayittey 
and others) have repeatedly argued that liberal democracy is the least suited for Africa’s realities.  
There are two main premises upon which these fervent critiques have based their arguments; the 
first is that liberal democracy is not democratic in the first place because it gives power to a few 
to rule the majority. According to this thesis, liberal democracy is least emancipatory because it 
alienates the majority from direct participation as attempted in ancient Greece. People’s rights to 
directly participate in their governance was surrendered in a practice called elections which claims 
to offer rights that people cannot exercise because voting often did not amount to choosing for 
political equality claims of ‘one man-one vote’ disguised highly unequal power relations. By 
reducing their stake in politics, competition in elections led to a struggle for power and resources 
among elites (Ake 1985 & 2000). Electoral democracy or electoralism dis-empowers African 
people, in what Claude Ake referred to as the democratization of disempowerment? Democracy 
spread because it had been rendered meaningless and innocuous without losing its symbolic value, 
and while it spread, the world was even more repressive (Ake, 1996:5). In Africa, argues Ake, the 
elite supported democracy only as a means to power, while international agencies supported it as 
an asset to structural adjustment and as a result, states in Africa got trapped between the demands 
of external donors for economic liberalization on the one hand, and the needs of political majorities 
on the other, leading to the creation of ‘exclusionary democracies’, which allow for political 
competition, but can’t respond to majority demands in a meaningful way.  
The secondpremise is that liberal democracy is not relevant to Africa’s historical and socio-
economic circumstances as it’s specific history as we saw in the previous section is far from 
representing the African problem. In his words, Ake (1994) observed that: The political 
arrangement of liberal democracy makes little sense in Africa. Liberal democracy assures 
individualism but there is little individualism in Africa...it assumes abstract universalism, but in 
Africa that would apply only to the urban environment, and finally political parties of liberal 
democracy do not make sense in societies where associational life is rudimentary and interest 
groups are essentially primary groups ... Ake argued that African Democracy in a collective social 
sense offered a form of political participation that was different from and superior to liberal 
democracy - because the African notion of participation did not rest on the assumption of 
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individualism or conflict of interest but on the social nature of human beings. Liberal democracy 
is deemed irrelevant because it is-looked at as the political correlate of advanced capitalism (Ake, 
1994). Authors from this school of thought argue that the liberal democracy prototype being foisted 
in Africa is unsuitable for the reality on the continent and what Africa needs is its own model.  
Democratization ensuing from the neo-liberal model led to democratic practice ‘totally indifferent 
to the character of the state. Democratic elections are held to determine who will exercise the 
powers of the state, with no questions asked about the character of the state. In the meantime the 
character of the state ruled out the politics of moderation and mandated politics of lawlessness and 
extremism, where winners in a competition for power won everything, while losers lost everything; 
nothing was worse than losing, nothing better than winning (Ibid).  
Democratization in Africa would therefore require fundamental changes which would involve 
challenging vested interests in the state, be they local, national or foreign, private or public. To 
democratize would mean to question basic monolithic assumptions and conventional wisdom 
about democracy, the state and society. From the fore going assault on liberal democracy emerges 
three key strands of thought on a possible way out of the democracy quagmire - the first is that for 
whatever African people do or want to believe, western style liberal democracy is a complete 
mismatch with African realities and should be radically rethought in light of Africa’s common 
history of slavery, exploitation, colonialism and dictatorships, most of which were fomented by 
the very agents of western liberal democracy, but more importantly an idea of African democracy 
anchored around an African Cradle around more cultural relevant realities like collective social 
aspirations, solidarity and humanism or as some have simply put it ‘obuntocracy’ (Larock 2011:9). 
4.6 Deconstructing African Post-Colonial criticism 
It is a fact that the post-colonial African state has witnessed the advent of many chronic conflicts 
and destruction that plagued numerous African societies such as Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, 
Angola, Mozambique and Democratic of Republic Congo to mention just but  a few. In as much 
as the African nationalists such as Kwame Nkurumah, Robert Mugabe, Julius Nyerere, Leopold 
Sedar Senghor talked about the solution of Africa’s problems as being found in African 
independence, the African state has been characterized by a plethora of challenges and destructive 
patterns of political existence. Nationalism is important because throughout history and around the 
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world, state policies on important issues like security, individual freedoms, immigration and 
citizenship, and the decision to go to war have all been made in the name of defending the nation. 
Greenfeld notes that a state’s conception of national identity determines the criteria of 
membership, which can either be ethnic or civic. According to Greenfeld  (1997) the “nation can 
be defined as a composite entity, an association of free and equal individuals, or in unitary terms, 
as a collective individual… the definition of the nation as a collective individual results in 
collectivistic nationalisms,” which she claims, “tend to spawn authoritarian political 
arrangements.” Thus, Greenfeld writes, “nationalism exists in three basic varieties: individualistic 
and civic, collectivistic and civic, and collectivistic and ethnic” (Greenfeld, 1997:192). The reason 
why ethnic nationalism is such a tricky concept to define, Greenfeld explains, is because, “the term 
‘ethnicity’ refers to various ascriptive characteristics... some of these ascriptive characteristics, 
such as language and religious or secular traditions and customs, are obviously cultural, but others, 
such as physical type or territorial roots, are not. Yet, the term ‘ethnicity’ applies equally to all of 
them” (Greenfeld, 1997: 90). Therefore, ethnic nationalism is one wherein ethnicity, political 
preferences and other traits either (biological or chosen) are used as a measure of true membership 
in the nation and affect subsequent rights, freedoms, and benefits provided and protected by the 
state. Traits that fall outside a state’s national identity can be considered subversive to that state’s 
security. Conversely, civic nationalism is one wherein citizenship and citizenship alone, the 
condition of existing as a person and a citizen of the state, allows one true and equal membership 
in the nation.  
It is important to ask why post-colonial leaders in Africa recognized the benefits of capitalism but 
then disregard them, leading to the economic detriment and extreme impoverishment of citizens. 
According to western liberal democratic values, regular elections are a vital requisite for political 
stability. For elections to be considered regular they should be held at least once within every five 
years. Free, fair, and transparent elections are of course even more desirable in the eyes of other 
credible international observers. Freeness and fairness of elections can be measured on whether or 
not the political opposition is allowed to participate without obstruction from the government and 
with legislation against government obstruction in place. Although regular elections are a vital 
component of political stability, they are not the only aspect. Political freedoms like free speech, 
free association, free press, and freedom of assembly are also critical to a healthy political 
environment. These freedoms can be found in documents and charters describing the goals of a 
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liberation movement, a government’s constitution, or in legislation. Independent branches of 
government are also key to a healthy democracy, where one branch cannot legally have influence 
over another branch. Conversely, when a president ignores decisions from the judicial branch or 
disregards the consent of the legislative body as has been witnessed in most African states, this 
displays an aversion to a stable political system. 
In addition, the incidence of political violence conducted by the state is another way to measure if 
a state has a fair and transparent political system, one that acts in accordance with international 
human rights laws and codes of conduct. Social stability is another independent variable used to 
measure the success of a state. Social stability is a measure of contentment among a state’s citizens, 
as well as the effectiveness of a state’s governance. If people trust the state and feel like they can 
effect change in regular elections, if they feel their jobs are earning them a sustainable living, and 
if other sectors of their lives are decent, then people may not be as inclined to break the law to get 
what they feel the state is not otherwise providing them. However, if the majority of people are 
not content with their government, or cannot earn a sustainable income, then civil war and crime 
may be more likely. If a large part of the population cannot earn a living wage, if their 
unemployment is high, or if there are high levels of poverty and homelessness, then government 
policies can be proven to be inadequate. Therefore, unemployment, poverty and homelessness are 
all important factors of social stability. Having said the above, it is critical to argue that the African 
state apart from advocating for western democratic values, has been experiencing various 
challenges related to the implementation of these values. According to Wiredu (2000), the 
majoritarian democracy has taken root in Africa yet seems ineffective.  
According to Rohio and Mutiso (1975), Kenneth Kaunda the first president of Zambia once said; 
“In our original societies we operated by consensus. An issue was talked about in solemn conclave 
until such time as agreement could be achieved. Julius Nyerere similarly said, “in African society 
the traditional method of conducting affairs is by free discussion and went on to quote Guy Clutton-
Brock with approval: ‘The elders sit under the big trees, and talk until they agreed”. However, it 
is instructive to note that all these pronouncements were made in the course of a defense of the 
one party system which is essentially an anti-thesis to multi-partyism espoused by the western 
liberal democratic culture. According to Wiredu (2000), where consensus characterized political 
decision making in Africa, it is a manifestation of an imminent approach to social interaction. 
132 
 
Nowhere was African society a realm of unbroken harmony. On the contrary, conflict among 
lineages and ethnic groups and also within them were not infrequent. However, the remarkable 
thing is that when a resolution of the issues was negotiated, the point of it was seen in the 
attainment of reconciliation rather than the mere abstention from further recriminations or 
collisions. 
Boahen (1987:98) agrees that nationalism was “one of the accidental” byproducts of colonialism.  
Boahen further explains that the nationalism generated by colonialism was negative “arising out 
of the sense of anger, frustration, and humiliation produced by the oppressive, discriminatory, and 
exploitive measures and activities of the colonial administrators” (Ibid). These feelings produced 
by colonial policies and actions did not alone create nationalist movements in the colonies. Rather, 
nationalism was a means of resolving the feelings of anger and indignation resulting from colonial 
practices. The several distinctions between types of nationalism is another way to compare and 
classify the factors that make a difference between successful post-colonial states and weak or 
failing post-colonial states. If culture shapes institutions, and the events and decisions made 
throughout history shape the then present culture, then historical institutionalism is a valuable 
paradigm in studying the development of post-colonial states. People learn from history just as the 
great revolutionaries of the 20th century learned about revolution, freedom, sovereignty and 
nationalism from their European predecessors. Although social scientists may disagree on which 
analytical framework is the best for analysis, most if not all would agree that events of history and 
people’s decisions have lasting impacts on societies around the world. Historical events and self-
interested decisions have an undeniable influence on society and culture.  
This is especially true in regards to imperialism where outside cultures impose themselves on 
faraway local cultures solely for the metropole’s own economic gain. Boahen shows how 
colonialism, nationalism, the abolition movement, and liberation movements sweeping the 
colonies are all events and ideas that directly affected one another. Boahen notes that the Europe 
that Africa was about to encounter was not the same Europe that they had been dealing with since 
the fifteenth century. It was now a Europe that had witnessed the industrial revolution and was 
desperately in need of new markets as well as raw materials. The metropole needed more and more 
raw materials to fuel their growth from the industrial revolution which led to a change in colonial 
policies that would create captive markets from which to extract such resources. With the abolition 
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of slavery, the switch to trade in natural products had Europe drop its “old attitude of free trade 
and informal political control in favor of one of trade monopoly and direct political and financial 
control or colonial imperialism” (Boahen, 1987: 26).  
Instead, Boahen agrees that a by-product of colonialism has been the, “uneven sizes and unequal 
natural resources and economic potentialities of these states” (Boahen, 1987: 97). Colonialism was 
a self-defeating enterprise because of other coinciding events and movements. Abernethy argues 
that colonial regimes were authoritarian by nature: “bureaucracies carried out decisions made by 
foreigners who were unaccountable to local people” (Abernethy, 2000, 367). Like Boahen, he also 
illustrates how imperialism could no longer be justified by the metropole. In addition, colonialism 
itself was conditioning its colonists in unforeseen ways. Opportunities like western education was 
expanding thought and homogenizing languages. Foreign events like the abolition of slavery and 
the gradual acceptance of individual human dignity caused colonials to recognize the hypocrisy of 
autocratic colonial practices. Their introduction to Western liberalism caused a rise in colonial 
nationalism, and the natives soon began to reject the colonial systems that controlled them. 
Ironically, ideas of nationalism that led to colonial aspirations of independence were brought 
directly to the colonies from imperialists themselves. Abernethy highlights the positive correlation 
between nationalism and colonialism, “Concepts of nation and nationalism become more 
appealing in colonies as they become more popular in Europe” (Abernethy, 2000: 330). 
Educated nationals in their travels to Europe also picked up nationalism. Many examples of this 
include great revolutionaries like Mohandas Gandhi, Ho Chi Minh, Sun Yat-sen, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Nelson Mandela and Kwame Nkrumah. These leaders inspired the masses, organized 
liberation movements, and attempted to create unity through nationalism to form states 
independent from imperialist rule. Abernethy notes that these “colonial elites wanted their 
territories to replicate not only the sovereignty but also the populism of European states” 
(Abernethy, 2000, 329). The many accords and revolutions of European history display the 
progression of Western liberalism.  
England had achieved the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 gaining its monarch more sovereignty. And 
later its Glorious Revolution in 1688, Parliament successfully limited royal prerogatives. The 
French championed “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” through revolution in 1789, resulting in the 
famous Rights of Man. These expansions of human liberties, nationalism, and popular sovereignty 
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have become examples for their colonial students to learn by. Indeed, without Europe’s 
innumerable political revolutions and philosophical ideas championing liberty and human rights, 
the greatest post-colonial revolutionaries of the 20th century might not have been as inspired to 
find nationalism in their own lands. Abernethy finds, “the more democratic the metropole, the 
greater the contradiction between domestic and colonial practice” (Abernethy, 2000, 328). Great 
thinkers like Steinmo, Abernethy, Barber, and writers like Fanon, and other historians, sociologists 
and political scientists agree that nationalism was a direct consequence, if not a by-product of, 
imperialism. Post-colonial writers Kincaid and Achebe write most effectively on how their native 
culture has forever changed through contact with the West and imperialism. Post-colonial 
institutions might have arguably looked very different today if they had not developed alongside 
Western liberalism’s hypocrisy and the shadow of self-interested imperial rule.  
Both the spread of nationalism and imperialism are vital to understanding post-colonial 
development. Both caused about nearly fifty arbitrarily conceived colonies to become independent 
states. These new states had to develop their own conceptions of a new national identity toreconcile 
their colonial past. This forcibly brought together multiple ethnicities, cultures, traditions, 
languages and races. As Greenfeld (1997) has explained, different types of nationalismspawn 
different political and social cultures ranging from authoritarian to democratic, just as different 
types of colonialism (settler colonialism, dependency colonialism, plantation colonialism, and 
trading post colonialism) have different lasting effects on post-colonial development. 
4.7 Conclusion 
A deconstructive post-colonial paradigm represents a radical shift from colonialism, not in 
complete abandonment of such discourse but in search of other discourses heretofore bypassed 
and ignored. A post-colonial paradigm is mainly concerned with the negative aspects of the 
colonial era, which continues to be very influential even today. In the context of Africa, the coming 
of independence was not sine qua non to the coming of democracy in Africa. New tensions and 
conflicts were witnessed and the ideas of democracy that characterize the African nationalism 
ideological movements were never realized in the broadest sense. Instead, civil wars, looting of 
natural resources and the culture of life presidents and tyrants became the order of the day. A 
critical analysis of the post-colonial state presents the state that is characterized by brutal and 
violent social conflicts, but also as a breathtakingly beautiful wild habitat. This is the main goal of 
135 
 
this study. The time of a discourse controlled by one center is over. The liberal situation calls for 
a discourse with many centers. This paradigm shift challenges African peoples to evaluate the 
relevance and impact of the colonial and postcolonial paradigms for their contexts. The next 
chapter will focus on the discontent with western values of political liberalism and the alternative 
forms of democratic values in the African context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE DISCONTENT WITH WESTERN VALUES OF POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM AND THE ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN 
THE AFRICAN CONTEXT. 
5.1 Introduction 
The term liberalism has its roots in the development of individual freedom. It assumes that people, 
having a rational intellect, have the ability to recognize problems and solve them and thereby 
achieving systematic improvement in the human condition. Although Christianity had long taught 
the worth of the individual soul and the renaissance had placed a value upon individuals in limited 
circles, it was not until the reformation that the importance of independent individual thought and 
action were expressed in the teaching of Protestantism. In essence the classical liberalism seeks to 
promote individual liberty and progress, including the principles of representative government and 
the protection of civil liberties.  Liberalism has to do with liberating the individual.It is a salient 
fact under liberalism that the government should be responsible for providing the minimum 
conditions necessary for decent individual existence. Liberalism does not support the socialist goal 
of complete equality imposed by the state control because it is still dedicated to the primacy of the 
individual, but it strongly opposes communism. Contemporary liberal goals include integration of 
the races, sexual equality and the eradication of poverty. It is instructive to note that under the 
scope of liberalism, individuals can decide for themselves what to do or believe with respect to 
particular areas of human activity such as religion and economics. As shall be highlighted below, 
western liberalism originates from the west’s preoccupation with individuality, as compared to the 
emphasis on other civilizations that prioritises status, caste, and tradition.  
The evolution of western liberalism was necessitated by critical events such as the philosophers, 
World Wars; the formation of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The above mentioned global historical events brought about significant changes on the political 
landscape in so far as governance, peace and security and international relations were concerned. 
These events later impact on African nationalisms which culminated into the political liberation 
of Africa.This chapter also seeks to understand the tenets, values or principles that define the 
morphology of liberalism and their philosophical presumptions. The chapter thus begins by 
engaging debates concerning the origins and development of liberal thought, explicating different 
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formulations of liberalism espoused in its diverse scholarly literature. Important liberal principles 
and core themes are distilled as a way of understanding what liberalism as a political ideology 
means, and what its implications on the systems of governance in post-colonial Africa. Attention 
is given to the socio-economic and political upheavals that were concomitant in the evolution of 
western liberalism and the attendant factors that influenced the hegemony of this ideology on 
global politics. In addition, the developments that came into being as a result of the First World 
War and the Second World War are examined and their implication for the development of western 
liberalism. The Universal declaration of Human rights and its implication for democracy is also 
enunciated in detail. Key philosophers who contributed to the development of western liberalism 
such as Thomas Hobbes; David Hume; Adam Smith; Jeremy Bentham; John Stuart Mills and John 
Locke are discussed in detail whilst highlighting their contribution to the development of 
liberalism. This chapter follows the following sequence: the roots of liberalism; critical epochs in 
the development of western liberalism; the first and second world wars; the key philosophers; 
values of political liberalism; the development of western democracy and forms of liberalism.It is 
argued in this chapter that western liberalism provides a solid background upon which the 
contemporary systems of governance are pivoted. The theoretical propositions enunciated by 
western philosophers such as Kant, Rousseau, Hobbes, Bentham contributed monumentally to the 
evolution of African nationalism and contemporary democratic systems with particular reference 
to issues such as freedom, equality, liberty and constitutionalism. 
5.2 The Roots of Western Liberalism 
The concept of neo-liberalism suggests a particular account of the development of liberal thought. 
It suggests that liberalism was at one point in time an influential political ideology, but that it at 
some point lost some of its significance, only to revive itself in more recent times in a new form. 
As it turns out, however, liberalism has dominated normative political thought as well as practical 
politics in the West for the past sixty years, up to the point in which it has become a shared 
inheritance among political theorists, professional politicians, and nearly all significant political 
movements in its native countries. This is attested by the fact that hardly anyone speaks out against 
freedom or democracy anymore, which are the primary values of liberalism, as identified in the 
dictionary definition quoted above. 
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Neo-liberalism could therefore scarcely be understood as the recovery of a lost tradition of liberal 
political thought. It should, in the researcher’s view, instead be seen as an ideology different from, 
and often opposed to, what is more commonly described as liberalism. The word liberal took on a 
specifically political meaning with the establishment of liberal parliamentary caucuses in Sweden 
and Spain, and later on throughout Europe, in the first decades of the nineteenth century (Gray 
1995). When these embryonic political parties coined the term liberal, they wanted to signal their 
favourable assessment of the emerging democratic systems in Britain and especially the United 
States, as opposed to their conservative opponents, who wanted to return to pre-revolutionary 
forms of government (cf. Sartori 1987:367f). The epithet is usually, however, held to describe a 
considerably older phenomenon, dating at least back to the political theories of John Locke, and 
his philosophical and theological defence of popular sovereignty and religious toleration at the end 
of the seventeenth century (Laski [1936] 1997; Ryan 1993; Gray 1995).  
Partly because of its relatively long history, the term liberalism has become a rather nebulous 
concept, and usage has tended to vary quite considerably over time, and in accordance with varying 
regional experiences. The opening sentences of one entry in a reference book should suffice to 
describe the lexicographer’s headache: “Anyone trying to give a brief account of liberalism is 
immediately faced with the question of whether it is liberalism or liberalisms? It is easy to list 
famous liberals; it is harder to say what they have in common. John Locke, Adam Smith, 
Montesquieu, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton, T. H. Green, John Dewey and 
contemporaries such as Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls are certainly liberals. However, they do not 
agree about the boundaries of toleration, the legitimacy of the welfare state, and the virtues of 
democracy, to take three rather central political issues” (Ryan 1993:291). The matter is not helped, 
either, by the fact that many have used liberalism as a generic term “of praise or obloquy in the 
political struggle”, with many liberals themselves attempting to “define liberalism in such a way 
that only the very deluded or the very wicked could fail to be liberals” (Ryan 1993:292). In 
addition, different liberal parties, politicians, and political philosophers have often put forward 
differing opinions of what the original or true meaning of liberalism actually is. This is often what 
happens when adherents of economic liberalism clash with more left-leaning adherents of social 
liberalism on such basic political questions as with what, and with how much, the state ought to 
concern itself. It is easy to identify, however, some of the common varieties of liberalism and 
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liberal thought. Frequently the distinction between classical and modern types of liberalism is 
discernible (Ryan 1993:293-296).  
Classical liberalism is associated with earlier liberals such as the already mentioned John Locke 
and Adam Smith. In addition, he names Alexis de Tocqueville from the nineteenth century, and 
Friedrich von Hayek from the twentieth, as belonging to the tradition of classical liberalism. 
Classical liberalism is often associated with the belief that the state ought to be minimal, which 
means that practically everything except armed forces, law enforcement and other “non-excludable 
goods” ought to be left to the free dealings of its citizens, and the organisations they freely choose 
to establish and take part in. This kind of state is sometimes described as a “night-watchman state”, 
as the sole purpose of the minimal state is to uphold the most fundamental aspects of public order. 
Some of these authors, especially John Locke ([1689/90] 1823), even consider the state to be a 
freely established association between individuals, where its members have a justified cause for 
rebellion if the state seizes more power than what has been originally ceded to it by its citizens. 
Classical liberalism has thus much common ground with what we described above as “economic 
liberalism‟. And it is often the case that classical liberals are, with their tendency to favour laissez-
faire economic policies, portrayed as leading proponents of neo-liberalism. 
Modernliberalism, on the other hand, is characterised by a greater willingness to let the state 
become an active participant in the economy. This has often issued in a pronounced tendency to 
regulate the marketplace, and to have the state supply essential goods and services to everyone. 
Modern liberalism is therefore, for all intents and purposes, a profound revision of liberalism, 
especially of the economic policies traditionally associated with it. Whereas classical or economic 
liberals favour laissez-faire economic policies because it is thought that they lead to more freedom 
and real democracy, modern liberals tend to claim that this analysis is inadequate and misleading, 
and that the state must play a significant role in the economy, if the most basic liberal goals and 
purposes are to be made into reality. Such views could be associated with nineteenth-century 
theorists such as Benjamin Constant and John Stuart Mill. More recently, John Dewey, William 
Beveridge, and John Rawls have articulated similar ideas. Modern liberalism could generally be 
thought of as being situated politically to the left of classical liberalism, because of its willingness 
to employ the state as an instrument to redistribute wealth and power – in order to create a society 
deemed to be more decent or equitable (cf. Beveridge 1944; 1945; Rawls 1993). Another 
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dimension within liberal thought Ryan (1993:296-297; cf. also Kymlicka 2002:53-165) described 
is the more recent conflict between liberalism (or liberal egalitarianism) on one hand, and 
‘libertarianism’ on the other. This dimension overlaps to a degree with the division between 
classical and modern liberalism, but not entirely so. One might perhaps perceive of libertarianism 
as a radicalised variety of classical liberalism, at least as this position has been expressed by for 
instance Robert Nozick (1974) and Murray Rothbard ([1962/1970] 2004), and liberal 
egalitarianism as a more systematic or theoretical restatement of modern liberalism (cf. especially 
Rawls 1971; Ackerman 1980).  
Libertarianism is typified, as its name suggests, by a remorseless concern for liberty above 
everything else, especially economic or commercial liberty, coupled with a corresponding de-
emphasis of other traditional liberal purposes and values such as democracy and social justice. 
This sets libertarians apart from many earlier classical liberals such as Smith and Tocqueville who, 
while they vigorously advocated quite extensive economic liberties, also acknowledge the validity 
and legitimacy of other concerns. According to (Mises 1962; Hayek 1973; 1976, 1979), classical 
liberals such as Hayek are however hardly distinguishable from the libertarians, even if he and the 
other economists of the ‘Austrian school’ insists on describing themselves as proponents of 
classical liberalism, while at the same time accusing mainstream liberals of advocating “a program 
that only in details differs from the totalitarianism of the socialists”.  
Liberal egalitarians, meanwhile, generally share the traditionally liberal view that legitimate goals 
and ideals are many, and that commercial freedom is merely one of these goals. The name, liberal 
egalitarianism, indicates that liberal egalitarians would like to see equality as well as liberty 
brought about, which places them alongside other modern liberals, politically to the left of classical 
liberals and libertarians alike. Surveying the history and recent developments of liberal thought, 
one could quite easily come to agree with Ryan (1993), that it would be difficult to pinpoint exactly 
which political ideals, goals, and beliefs liberals have in common. There have, however, been 
made several attempts to make a reunified definition of what sort of ideology liberalism actually 
is John Gray’s solution is to emphasise what he believes all liberals have in common. He identifies 
four basic elements of a highly abstract conception of man and society which he believes liberals 
of all quarters adhere to, and which sets them apart from non-liberals: “Common to all variants of 
the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society. 
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What are the elements of this conception? It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of 
the person against the claims of any social collectivity: egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all 
men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in 
moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species 
and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and 
meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and 
political arrangements.  
It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends 
its vast internal variety and complexity” (Gray 1995: XIII). Ryan’s introductory essay on 
liberalism also contains an elaboration of some core tenets of liberalism, summated under the 
headings of three “liberal antipathies”, and three ‘liberal prescriptions’. The liberal antipathy for 
political absolutism, theocracy and unrestricted capitalism are common to all liberals from Locke 
to our day, according to Ryan (1993). Of these, it is perhaps the last which sounds a bit surprising, 
given the emphasis put on commercial liberty by the classical liberals. As Ryan shows, however, 
there are marked differences between the favourable assessment of the market economy given by 
classical liberals such as Smith, and the uncompromising support of any type of market activity 
shown by many libertarians, which Ryan implicitly places outside of liberalism. The prescriptions 
he alludes to are, on the other hand, more familiar. Liberalism is, he says, a set of political theories 
which emphasise first of all that individuals ought to be free to choose between different 
meaningful options in life-defining decisions. Secondly, liberalism includes the view that society 
ought to be subjected to the rule of law and to democratic governance.  
Finally, Ryan hook up liberalism with the idea that state power ought to be exercised with caution 
and within constitutional limits, for instance within a system based on the separation of powers, as 
suggested by earlier liberals such as Locke and Montesquieu. Liberalism is, undoubtedly, a rather 
vague and often highly contested concept. It usually describes a disposition towards individual 
liberty and democracy which might be present in a person’s political point of view, or ingrained 
in the political culture of a country, rather than a well-defined and clearly demarcated set of 
political beliefs (Waldron 1987; Shklar 1989; Walzer 1990; Larmore 1990; Rawls 1993; Galston 
1995; Kekes 1997; Gray 2000). Liberalism, is best understood as a political programme or 
ideology whose goals include most prominently the diffusion, deepening and preservation of 
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constitutional democracy, limited government, individual liberty, and those basic human and civil 
rights which are instrumental to any decent human existence.  
This definition is in part inspired by Sartori (1987), who notes that liberalism is better understood 
as a practical theory of building and maintaining democratic politics and securing individual 
liberty, rather than a metaphysical conception of man and society. This means that liberalism is 
less of a partisan ideology, and more like a shared heritage between those that are committed to 
goals and ideals such as democracy and freedom. This definition is better because it highlights the 
practical side of liberal politics, and the most central goals which liberals wish to see realised. 
According to (Abbey 2005; Gallie 1956), because our definition does not try to escape into 
metaphysical unreality, it is more likely to be controversial than Gray’s, but also, we believe, more 
politically relevant than some of the other attempts to capture (with little hope) what has become, 
in effect, an essentially contested concept.  
5.3 Critical Epochs in the Development of Western Liberalism 
As highlighted earlier on, there are major recognised events that were catalytic to the development 
of western liberalism. Andrew Vincent (2010) locates the roots of liberalism in English Civil War 
and French Wars of Religion, the movements out of which ideas on individual rights, individual 
freedoms, consent, the separation of the private and public reals, limited government, and popular 
sovereignty among other values were popularised in Europe. Discussed below are the Glorious 
Revolution (also known as Whiggism) of 1688, the American Revolution of 1765, and the French 
Revolution of 1789.   
5.3.1 The Glorious Revolution (1688-89) 
This revolution, also known as Whiggism concerned itself with the defence of parliamentary 
supremacy, expansion of democratic values and constitutional reforms (Vincent, 2010). The 
revolution replaced the reigning King James II, with the joint monarchy of his protestant daughter 
Mary and her Dutch husband, William of Orange. It was the keystone of the Whig (those opposed 
to a Catholic succession) who then established the supremacy of parliament over the crown, setting 
Britain on the path towards constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. Causes of the 
revolution were thus as much religious as political. Many Whigs were deeply attached to the 
mythology of the ancient British constitution and believed that vigilance was required to protect 
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the fundamental rights embodied therein. According to Steven Pincus (2009), the Glorious 
Revolution led to the armed overthrow of what was seen as tyrannical rule in Europeanmonarchies, 
subsequently enshrining parliamentary sovereignty and the right of revolution.  
English Philosopher and politician John Locke (1632-1704) who is often credited with founding 
liberalism as a distinct philosophical tradition is one of the philosophers of the Glorious Revolution 
which overthrew absolute monarchy, establishing one with limited powers constrained by a 
judicious balance of elements (Vincent, 2010). This was a constitutional monarchy. In his two key 
political writings A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) and Two Treaties of Government (1690) 
Locke consistently opposes absolutism arguing that lawful government did not have a supernatural 
basis but should acquire consent from the governed that have a right to share in the government 
through advice and counsel. He argued that each man has a natural right to life, liberty and property 
which governments must not violate, thus when government violates these rights and becomes a 
tyrant, the people have a right to overthrow the tyrant through any and all possible means. Locke 
also argues that government should be limited by the people and power rests on the consent of the 
ruled and the purpose of government was to protect private property. Thus the state is not the 
creator of rights but was limited to the enforcement of individual rights which are inalienable such 
as life, liberty and property. 
5.3.2 The American Revolution (1765-1783) 
As with the Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution was a political upheaval in which 
colonists in different American Colonies rejected the British monarchy and aristocracy. The 
revolution culminated in the founding of the United States of America after the overthrow of the 
authority of Great Britain. The revolution grew after 1765 over the issue of race relations and 
taxation without representation and was linked to the virtues of political participation. Parliament 
passed various legislative laws imposing customs duties and direct taxes on the colonies as a way 
to raise revenue. However, members of American colonial society rejected the authority of the 
British Parliament to tax them without colonial representatives in the government. This ignited the 
revolution. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) an American natural rights theorist and third President 
of the USA is considered to have had considerable influence on the development of liberal 
democracy by popularising the notion of natural rights also known as human rights. He was the 
principal author of the Declaration of Independence that articulated these rights.  It was against a 
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long history of human rights violations that the American Revolution was born through violent 
and non-violent revolutionary movements that demanded universal suffrage rights. These 
movements culminated in the Declaration of Independence of a new republic and writing of a 
liberal Constitution of the United States (Bernstein, 2004; Roberts, 1992). This implied that black 
Americans could now participate in the electoral process so as to advance or defend their interests 
by enhancing their understanding, strengthen their sensibilities and achieve a higher level of 
personal development (Heywood, 2007). Theorists and civil rights movement leaders such as 
William E.B. DuBois, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr, and James Farmer among others 
believed that universal suffrage was the only way, from a utilitarian perspective, of promoting the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number.  
For Jefferson, a right is an entitlement to act or be treated in a particular way, and is natural not 
least because it is invested in human beings by nature or God. Rights are thus universal and 
inalienable because human beings are entitled to them by virtue of being human, and natural rights 
for him include life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The attempt to universalise individual human 
rights that underlie classical liberalism has created problems especially in third world communities 
such as Africa where people act not merely in pursuit of their own happiness but other people as 
well not least because of interpersonal conception of humanity among Africans (see Murove, 
2009). 
5.3.3 French Revolution (1789 – 1790) 
As with the American Revolution that preceded it, the French Revolution (1789 – 1790) involved 
French citizens razing and redesigning their country’s political landscape, uprooting centuries-old 
institutions such as absolute monarchy and the feudal system. Seen as the most important event in 
history and widely associated with the triumph of liberalism (Frey and Frey, 2004), the French 
Revolution witnessed not only the abolition of feudalism and collapse of old traditional rights and 
privileges and restrictions in France but also the passage of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen. Intellectually influenced by Enlightenment ideals and concepts of popular 
sovereignty and inalienable rights championed by French moral and political philosopher Jean 
Jackes Rousseau (1712-1778), the French Revolution rejected authoritarian political and economic 
structures advocating a radical democracy based on the idea of general will or vision of the 
people/nation governing itself. By the time of this revolution, Whiggism had mutated with the 
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emergence of new forms of discourse such as the commercial ideas of Adam Smith, David Hume, 
and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism. But most importantly were the nationalist ideas of Rousseau 
who is also considered as the father of modern nationalism (Heywood, 2007). The basic thesis of 
Rousseau placed emphasis on nation-building but holding that sovereignty did not lie in either 
monarchy or some privileged aristocratic faction, but in the general will (Vincent, 2010). 
As a result of the Polish struggle for independence from Russia, Rousseau came to believe that 
this was vested in a culturally unified people. The general will was for him the common or 
collective interest of society as long as all act selflessly (Heywood, 2007). Many scholars believe 
that this was the seed from which not only French Revolution but nationalistic doctrines emerged 
not least because French people were galvanised as citizens possessed of inalienable rights and 
duties and not subjects of the cronies so much so that sovereign power resided with the French 
nation. There is little doubt, if any, that the above revolutions may have contributed to the 
ascendancy of modern African nationalism characterised by similar struggles against colonialism 
and human rights violation by the west.Through the above revolutions, the West encouraged liberal 
policies and values which unarguably were catalytic to modern nationalisms around the World. 
Liberalism as a traditional form of European nationalism formulated objective marks of 
nationhood that enabled other nationalists to provide rational justification of a demand for self-
determination (Ghia, 1992). For example, the nineteenth century colonial state through the policies 
its mind set encouraged is argued to have dialectically engendered the grammar of the nationalisms 
that eventually arose to combat it (Anderson, 2001).  
The above highlighted mentioned notable events are widely accepted as central to the origins and 
development of liberalism and Western nationalism. It is unarguable that these events may also 
have had substantial influence, directly or indirectly, on the rise of African nationalism. A number 
of other world events embodying European ideals that are considered to have directly contributed 
to the rise of modern African nationalism were examined in Chapter two. These include among 
others World Wars I and II, Missionary Education, Slavery, The Atlantic charter of 1941, and 
DuBois’ Pan-Africanism. Further brief historical examination of some of these events are 
examined below in this chapter.Owing to the above revolutions across the European continent and 
America, liberal democracies began to be established in different nations including those in Africa 
at the beginning of the 20th Century. The period saw the overthrowing of the autocraticRussian 
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czar in 1917, winning of both the first and second World Wars by the liberal allied powers, 
ensuring the further spread of liberal ideas. It is against this background that liberal ideas 
throughout the Western world are argued to have led to independence from tyrannical regimes and 
imperial powers. Here liberals demanded written constitutions, representative democracies, greater 
suffrage rights, and freedom of the press among other liberties (Palmer and Colton, 1995). For this 
reason, the historical roots of liberalism have been traced to the Western world which is now 
viewed as the source and center of nationalism.  
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that the concept of liberalism, as understood today, has no 
single definition as scholars agree that there is no such thing as a single theory of liberalism (Panke 
and Risse, 2007). Further to that argument, several definitions have been proffered but they are 
not exhaustive and are not necessary to dissect here. From the ideas central to its development 
articulated in the foregoing, liberalism can be viewed as an approach to government that not only 
emphasizes individual rights, constitutionalism, democracy and limitations on the powers of the 
state through separation of powers but also an ideology that champions scientific rationality, 
freedom and inevitability of human progress. It is from this perspective that liberal thinkers 
converge on democratic and human rights ideals such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
freedom of religion, free markets, civil rights, democratic societies, secular governments, and 
international cooperation (Donohue, 2003; Wolin, 2004).But in Europe, for example, liberalism is 
further categorised into English and French versions. This is perhaps due to the ideas and impact 
of the French Revolution discussed above. The former emphasises the expansion of democratic 
values and constitutional reform and the latter rejects authoritarian political and economic 
structures, as well and places emphasis on nation-building. It is perhaps from such dichotomies 
that there are different concepts of the form liberalism can take as evidenced by numerous 
adjectives that have been attached to the word “liberalism”.  
Young (2002) identifies some of these adjectives as follows: egalitarian liberalism, economic 
liberalism, welfare-state liberalism, ethical liberalism, humanist liberalism, deontological, 
liberalism, perfectionist liberalism, democratic liberalism, and institutional liberalism among 
others. Regardless of its many variations, quite telling from the foregoing discussion are 
similarities in aspirations of liberals who - because of the unfairness of the feudal system in which 
social position was determined by ‘the accident of birth’ (Heywood, 2007) - criticized the political 
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and economic privileges of the landed aristocracy and sought to reform government; to those of 
African nationalist who - as already discussed in previous chapters - not only questioned colonial 
policies but also sought freedom through revolutionary movements.. Presented below are cursory 
overview of First World War, Second World War, and contribution of key philosophers to Western 
Liberalism. 
5.3.4 A brief history of the First World War 
The First World War was a Great War whose origins were complex on a vast scale. The impact on 
military operations was revolutionary with an enormous and costly human and material value. In 
modern history, it is a truism that the First World War was a global conflict. It was characterized 
by the involvement of thirty two nations. Out of the twenty eight of these constituted the Allied 
and Associated Powers, whose principal belligerents were the British Empire, France, Italy, 
Russia, Serbia, and the United States of America. These were opposed by the Central Powers: 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire (http://www.english.illinois.edu). 
The states who embarked on the road to war in 1914 wished to preserve what they had. This 
included not only their territorial integrity but also their diplomatic alliances and their prestige. 
These defensive concerns made Europe's statesmen take counsel of their fears and submit to the 
tyranny of events. The Austrians feared for the survival of their multiracial Empire if they did not 
confront the threat of Serb nationalism and Panslavism. The Germans feared the consequences to 
themselves of allowing Austria, their closest and only reliable ally, to be weakened and humiliated. 
The Russians feared the threat to their prestige and authority as protector of the Slavs if they 
allowed Austria to defeat and humiliate Serbia. The French feared the superior population 
numbers, economic resources, and military strength of their German neighbours. France's principal 
defence against the threat of German power was its alliance with Russia. This was imperative to 
defend. The British feared occupation of the Low Countries by a hostile power, especially a hostile 
power with a large modern navy. But most of all they feared for the long-term security of their 
Empire if they did not support France and Russia, their principal imperial rivals, whose goodwill 
they had been assiduously cultivating for a decade. All governments feared their peoples. Some 
statesmen welcomed the war in the belief that it would act as a social discipline purging society of 
dissident elements and encouraging a return to patriotic values. Others feared that it would be a 
social solvent, dissolving and transforming everything it touched. 
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The process of expansion did not end in August 1914. Other major belligerents took their time and 
waited upon events. Italy, diplomatically aligned with Germany and Austria since the Triple 
Alliance of 1882, declared its neutrality. In the following months it was ardently courted by France 
and Britain. On 23 May 1915 the Italian government succumbed to Allied temptations and declared 
war on Austria-Hungary in pursuit of territorial aggrandizement in the Trentino. Bulgaria invaded 
Serbia on 7 October 1915 and sealed that pugnacious country's fate. Serbia was overrun. The road 
to Constantinople was opened to the Central Powers. Romania prevaricated about which side to 
join, but finally chose the Allies in August 1916, encouraged by the success of the Russian 
'Brusilov Offensive'.  
The process of expansionism through alliances was a fatal miscalculation. The German response 
was swift and decisive. Romania was rapidly overwhelmed by two invading German armies and 
its rich supplies of wheat and oil did much to keep Germany in the war for another two years. 
Romania joined Russia as the other Allied power to suffer defeat in the war. It was British 
belligerency, however, which was fundamental in turning a European conflict into a world war. 
Britain was the world's greatest imperial power. The British had worldwide interests and world-
wide dilemmas. They also had worldwide friends. Germany found itself at war not only with Great 
Britain but also with the dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa and with 
the greatest British imperial possession, India. Concern for the defence of India helped bring the 
British into conflict with the Ottoman Empire in November 1914 and resulted in a major war in 
the Middle East. Most important of all, perhaps, Britain's close political, economic, and cultural 
ties with the United States of America, if they did not ensure that nation's eventual entry into the 
war, certainly made it possible.  
The American declaration of war on Germany on 6 April 1917 was a landmark not only in the 
history of the United States but also in that of Europe and the world, bringing to an end half a 
millennium of European domination and ushering in 'the American century'. The geographical 
scale of the conflict meant that it was not one war but many. On the Western Front in France and 
Belgium the French and their British allies, reinforced from 1917 onwards by the Americans, were 
locked in a savage battle of attrition against the German army. Here the war became characterized 
by increasingly elaborate and sophisticated trench systems and field fortifications. Dense belts of 
barbed wire, concrete pillboxes, intersecting arcs of machinegun fire, and accumulating masses of 
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quick firing field and heavy artillery rendered maneuver virtually impossible. Casualties were 
enormous. The first phase of the war in the west lasted until November 1914. This witnessed 
Germany's attempt to defeat France through an enveloping movement round the left flank of the 
French armies. The plan met with initial success. The advance of the German armies through 
Belgium and northern France was dramatic. The French, responding with an offensive in Lorraine, 
suffered an almost catastrophic national defeat. France was saved by the iron nerve of its 
commander in chief, General J. J. C. Joffre, who had not only the intelligence but also the strength 
of character to extricate himself from the ruin of his plans and order the historic counterattack 
against the German right wing, the ‘miracle of the Marne’. The German armies were forced to 
retreat and to entrench. Their last attempt at a breakthrough was stopped by French and British 
forces near the small Flemish market town of Ypres in November. By Christmas of 1914 French 
lines stretched from the Belgian coast to the Swiss frontier. Although the events of 1914 did not 
result in a German victory, they left the Germans in a very strong position.  
The German army held the strategic initiative. It was free to retreat to positions of tactical 
advantage and to reinforce them with all the skill and ingenuity of German military engineering. 
Enormous losses had been inflicted on France. Two fifths of France's military casualties were 
incurred in 1914. These included a tenth of the officer corps. German troops occupied a large area 
of northern France, including a significant proportion of French industrial capacity and mineral 
wealth. These realities dominated the second phase of the war in the west. This lasted from 
November 1914 until March 1918. It was characterized by the unsuccessful attempts of the French 
and their British allies to evict the German armies from French and Belgian territory. During this 
period the Germans stood mainly on the defensive, but they showed during the Second Battle of 
Ypres (22 April to 25 May 1915), and more especially during the Battle of Verdun (21 Februaryto 
18 December 1916), a dangerous capacity to disrupt their enemies' plans. The French made three 
major assaults on the German line: in the spring of 1915 in Artois; in the autumn of 1915 in 
Champagne; and in the spring of 1917 on the Aisne (the 'Nivelle Offensive').  
Townshend (1997) asserts that the First World War redrew the map of Europe and the Middle 
East. Four great empires, the Romanov, the Hohenzollern, the Habsburg, and the Ottoman, were 
defeated and collapsed. They were replaced by a number of weak and sometimes avaricious 
successor states. Russia underwent a bloody civil war before the establishment of a Communist 
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Soviet Union which put it beyond the pale of European diplomacy for a generation. Germany 
became a republic branded at its birth with the stigma of defeat, increasingly weakened by the 
burden of Allied reparations and by inflation. France recovered the provinces of Alsace and 
Lorraine, but continued to be haunted by fear and loathing of Germany (Ibid). Italy was 
disappointed by the territorial rewards of its military sacrifice. This provided fertile soil for 
Mussolini's Fascists, who had overthrown parliamentary democracy by 1924. The British 
maintained the integrity and independence of Belgium. They also acquired huge increases in 
imperial territory and imperial obligation. But they did not achieve the security for the Empire 
which they sought. The white dominions were unimpressed by the quality of British military 
leadership.  
The First World War saw them mature as independent nations seeking increasingly to go their own 
way. The stirrings of revolt in India were apparent as soon as the war ended. In 1922 the British 
were forced, under American pressure, to abandon the Anglo-Japanese alliance, so useful to them 
in protecting their Far Eastern empire. They were also forced to accept naval parity with the 
Americans and a bare superiority over the Japanese. 'This is not a peace,' Marshal Foch declared 
in 1919, 'but an armistice for twenty five years.' The cost of all this in human terms was 8.5 million 
dead and 21 million wounded out of some 65 million men mobilized (Ibid). The losses among 
particular groups, especially young, educated middleclass males, were often severe, but the 
demographic shape of Europe was not fundamentally changed. The real impact was moral. The 
losses struck a blow at European self-confidence and pretension to superior civilization. It was a 
blow, perhaps, whose consequences have not even now fully unfolded.  
According to Winter and Prost (2007), the historiography of civilian life during the First World 
War has developed significantly since the 1960s. It now encompasses how the masses and classes 
of the belligerent populations engaged with the war effort, in conjunction with the emergence of 
various war cultures across the belligerents which provided the ideological understanding of and 
support for the war effort (Williams 1972). Through comparative analysis, the experiences of the 
British population from 1914 to 1918 have been positioned within a wider international context 
(Winter 1998). These socio-cultural histories of the belligerent nations have analysed a number of 
different aspects of the civilian experience and reflected on the nature of wartime mobilization. 
Therefore, the historiography of the Home Fronts of the First World War has grown in an attempt 
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to encompass the diversity and complexity of the wartime experiences of civilians across Europe. 
Marwick (1975), postulates that, these include the support that the masses of the belligerent nations 
invested into the war effort, and how the efforts of various groups of civilians for example, farmers, 
fishermen, women and children constituted the wartime Home Fronts. The First World War 
resulted in the League of Nations which was an attempt at maintaining peace in the world as well 
as the eruption of war in the world. 
During the First World War, the Allies (the United States of America, France, Britain, Belgium, 
Italy, Japan, and Russia) fought against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey 
and Bulgaria). At the end of WWI, in 1918, The Treaty of Versailles was drawn. This peace 
settlement stated that Germany was at fault for starting WWI and therefore was responsible for the 
damage caused. The Central powers were to pay reparations to the Allies and were also forced to 
sign separate treaties that penalized them in different ways. During the 1920’s Germany fulfilled 
its obligations as demanded by the Treaty of Versailles. In order to make reparations, Germany 
took a loan from the U.S., and in order to make the payments, it relied on international trade, 
especially with the U.S. This is an important fact, because even though the U.S. was insistent on 
repayment, in 1922 it passed considerably high tariffs on imported goods, which made 
international trade difficult, and therefore nearly impossible for reparation payments to be made. 
Then, in 1929 the U.S. stock market crashed, sending the U.S. into the Great Depression. Because 
of the loans the U.S. had made to the rest of the world, including Allies, the Great Depression was 
eventually felt worldwide. 
Japan, being on the Allies’ side during WWI, was closely allied with Britain and expected to 
receive the spoils of war as did the other victor nations. However, Japan felt unrecognized by the 
Western Powers as the dominant force in the Pacific. The sense of discrimination against those of 
color, and in particular, Asians, was apparent in the United States with such acts passed as the 
1913 Alien Land Law in which Asian immigrants could not purchase nor lease land. This law was 
again passed in 1920 after WWI. Japan had proposed a Racial Equality Clause for the League of 
Nations Charter in 1919 which was rejected. Even though the U.S. did not join the League of 
Nations, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was the chairman of the committee for the creation of 
the League. He, along with Britain and France, opposed the Racial Equality Clause and therefore 
added to the ever-growing tension between the Western powers and Japan. In the late 19th and 
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early 20th centuries, Japan had won territory in China as a result of two wars, one with China and 
one with Russia. In this, Japan took control of parts of Manchuria (Eastern China) and Korea. This 
was important because of the lack of raw materials in Japan. During the 1930’s, when Japan was 
still in control of certain parts of China, she controlled the raw materials and the trade of materials 
such as rubber. At the writing of the Treaty of Versailles, the U.S. urged Japan to concede parts of 
China so that there would be open trade between countries and less imperialism. Japan agreed, but 
kept a military presence in China. This agreement with the U.S. allowed Japan’s industrial 
production to double, and exports increased with 40 percent going to the United States (Adams 
cited in Mason 1975) 
Due to the Great Crash of the U.S. stock market in 1929, the export business between Japan and 
the U.S. plummeted; the raw silk industry alone fell 65% in one year (Ibid). The U.S. then 
implemented the Smoot-Hawley Tariff which raised import taxes by 50%. “Overall, world trade 
declined by some 66%, between 1929 and 1934. More generally, Smoot Hawley did nothing to 
foster trust and cooperation among nations in either the political or economic realm during a 
perilous era in international relations” (U.S. Dept. of State). The Tariff was initially implemented 
to try and help preserve the U.S. economy at home. It really did nothing except provoke other 
nations further into a depression and into a more militaristic stance while projecting a stronger 
image of U.S. isolationism. It prompted the Japanese to react by reengaging in a militaristic way. 
Japan now identified themselves with the other self-proclaimed “have-not” nations: Germany and 
Italy. Italy, too, was expecting more spoils from the Treaty of Versailles. Instead they returned 
from WWI with a depressed economy, high unemployment, and a reduced naval fleet in the 
Mediterranean. Benito Mussolini rose to power as the dictator of Italy in 1922. He wanted to gain 
the respect, land, and reparations he felt was due to his country that the Treaty of Versailles 
ignored. He introduced Fascism-a governmental system led by a dictator having complete power; 
forcibly suppressing opposition and criticism; regimenting all industry, commerce, etc.; and 
emphasizing an aggressive nationalism and often racism. 
With the decline of the German economy as well, Adolf Hitler, a charismatic political leader 
emerged. He declared that Germany would no longer take the blame for WWI, that reparation 
payments would be stopped, and that land he believed belonged to Germany would be taken back. 
He formed the Nazi party and in 1933 became Chancellor of Germany. “Hitler became a social 
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Darwinist of the simplest and most dangerous kind, dedicated to German survival through the 
national adoption of military values and goals” (Ibid). Hitler admired Mussolini’s Fascism and 
duplicated the style of dictatorship. “These three countries recognized German hegemony over 
most of continental Europe; Italian hegemony over the Mediterranean Sea; and Japanese 
hegemony over East Asia and the Pacific” (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). In this 
way, Italy, Japan and Germany formed an alliance which was named the Axis Powers. In 1937, 
Japan attacked China in a full-scale battle, upsetting the U.S. and their trade interests with a semi-
independent China. The Second World War threatened to shift the rubber wealth. With Japan 
occupying prime rubber-producing areas in Southeast Asia, the U.S. feared it would run out of the 
vital material. Every tire, hose, seal, valve, and inch of wiring required rubber, along with rubber 
used for fashion. Silk was also a commodity of Japan that would become scarce once the war 
began, as Japan was the largest supplier in the world.  
In September 1939, Germany invaded Poland and WWII began when Britain and France declared 
war on Germany. Perhaps one of the most important events to happen regarding fashion was the 
invasion and occupation of Paris on June 14, 1940 by Nazi Germany. Paris was the pinnacle and 
center of the fashion world until that time. The rest of the world looked towards it to establish the 
trends that would spread and become popular. Important fashion houses such as Chanel, Jean 
Patou, Jeanne Lanvin, and Elsa Schiaparelli maintained their headquarters in Paris. Most of the 
designers fled the country upon France’s declaration of war in 1939. Others closed shop, and still 
others remained open; and with the occupation in 1940, they were cut off from the rest of the 
world. With Paris being in isolation, the fashion world had a gap which the U.S. and Britain filled. 
This would be the first time a country other than France would be the driving force behind the 
fashions.  
The U.S. supported its Allies by supplying materials to make ammunition, building war ships and 
through monetary lending. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) proposed and then 
helped to pass the Lend-Lease Act in 1941. “In the 1940 Presidential election campaign, Roosevelt 
promised to keep America out of the war. He stated, ‘I have said this before, but I shall say it again 
and again and again; your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.’ Nevertheless, 
Roosevelt wanted to support Britain and believed the United States should serve as a ‘great arsenal 
of democracy’ (Lend Lease Act 1941). The plan for the U.S. to maintain its isolation from the war 
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was derailed in December of 1941 when Pearl Harbor was bombed. Because of the help given to 
the Allies, the rationing of materials in both the U.S. and U.K. began as early as 1940. Metals that 
were used in clothing such as fasteners, boning for corsets, and zippers were all allocated to be 
used for the military. This allowed new innovations in science and fashion design to develop, 
mainly in the area of synthetic materials used for daily life and fashion. When the U.S. did finally 
enter WWII after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, rationing then greatly affected the general 
population. 
5.3.5 Towards a brief history of the Second World War 
The Speech of Adolf Hitler, in 1930 as he prepared for war is instructive when he said;  
If the German people does not solve the problem of its lack of space, and if it does not open 
up the domestic market for its industry, then 2,000 years have been in vain. Germany will 
then make its exit from the world stage and peoples with more vigor will come into our 
heritage. Space must be fought for and maintained. People who are lazy have no right to 
the soil. Soil is for him who tills it and protects it. If a people disclaims soil, it disclaims 
life. If a nation loses in the defense of its soil, then the individual loses. There is no higher 
justice that decrees that a people must starve. There is only power, which creates justice … 
Parliaments do not create all of the rights on this earth; force also creates rights. My 
question is whether we wish to live or die. We have more right to soil than all the other 
nations because we are so thickly populated. I am of the opinion that in this respect to the 
principle can be applied: God helps him who helps himself: Völkischer Beobachter, (May 
7, 1930. http://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/.html. Accessed on; 13 August 2015). 
According to Mason (2011) the events for the Second World War can be characterized as economic 
factors; diplomatic factors and military factors. In their specific references, the economic factors 
were characterized by the following significant events:May 1933 German Labor Front replaces 
trade unions; 1935 Nuremberg Laws and later loss of Jewish expertise and talent weakened 
German economy; 1936 “Four-Year Plan” largely failed: steel, iron, fuel, rubber all heavily 
dependent on imports; Food shortages continued until 1936, although rearmament did lead to 
economic recovery; German exploitation of economic resources of conquered states effective in 
short-run; Diversion of resources to pursuit of genocide proves costly; Allied bombing highly 
destructive, although German industrial capacity continues to expand; Soviet industrialization (5-
Year Plans) underestimated; U.S. economic mighty underestimated: Lend–Lease program; 
Arsenal of democracy; Hitler’s refusal to commit to full war economy prior to 1943 is detrimental 
(Ibid). 
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Secondly, the diplomatic Factors were characterized by the following aspects;Hitler repudiates 
Versailles Treaty and League of Nations; March 7, 1936: Hitler remilitarizes Rhineland; October 
1936: Germany allies with Italy, followed by Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan; September 1939: 
Having agreed to the absorption of the Czech Sudetenland the previous year, Chamberlain signed 
Munich agreement promising “peace in our time; April 6, 1939: Following invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, Britain signed defense pact with Poland; May 1939: Germany and Italy enter 
military alliance, Pact of Steel; August 23, 1939: Germany and Soviet Union sign Molotov–
Ribbentrop Pact; France and Britain declare war on Germany; German invasion of Soviet Union 
in June 1941 invalidates Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact; December 11, 1941: Germany declares war 
on United States, following Pearl Harbor; Hitler unable to shake solidarity of Big Three (U.S., 
U.S.S.R., G.B.) (Ibid). 
Thirdly, the military Factors were marked by the following significant developments;Hitler 
announces military expansion in 1935; March 12, 1938: Anschluss brings Austria under German 
control; March 16, 1939: Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, occupying Prague; September 1, 
1939: Germany invades Poland with 1.5 million troops—Blitzkrieg; Spring 1940 saw defeat of 
Norway and Denmark, Netherlands, and Belgium; June 14, 1940: Paris occupied, with Pétain 
signing armistice on June 22; Britain, however, evacuates troops from Dunkirk and also survives 
the blitz; June 22, 1941: Germany invades Soviet Union with 3 million troops; Two-front war, 
German over-extension; Stalingrad, February 1943 leaves 300,000 German soldiers dead; Allied 
technological and industrial capacity surpasses that of Germany; Submarine warfare in Atlantic 
proves ineffective; and North African front collapses after El Alamein in November 1942 (Ibid). 
In terms of its timelines on Beginning and End Dates of World War II, thePossible beginning dates 
for the Second World War was 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria ; 1937 Japanese invasion of 
China; 1939 German invasion of Poland; 1940 German attacks on Britain 1941;  Japanese attacks 
on Pearl Harbor and Singapore. On the other hand the possible ending dates for Second World 
War was February 1943 German army surrendered to Soviets; June 1945 German army 
surrendered to Allies in Germany; August 1945 Japanese government surrendered to Allies on US 
naval ship. The Second World War resulted in the formation of the United Nations whose intention 
was to maintain peace and security in the world. The next section discusses the history of the 
universal declaration of Human Rights as well as highlight its major tenets. 
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5.3.6 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
The history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on 
10 December 1948, came as a result of the consequences of the impact of both WW1 and WW II. 
The scope and content concurs to a large extent with the writings of philosophers such as Immanuel 
Kant on the Social contract. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a foundational 
document of the UN human rights system. Its adoption marked the first time in history that the 
international community collectively agreed upon a body of fundamental rights and freedoms to 
which all persons, simply by virtue of their humanity, were entitled. Indeed, the principle of the 
universality of human rights is the cornerstone of international human rights law. 
It is a fact that, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) along with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, represent the principal foundation of the concept development in the modern era. 
Their creations were initially provoked by the atrocities of the Second World War, but they have 
come to constitute the inspiration for numerous other human rights instruments, both international 
and regional. At a time when society was going through drastic changes, its perception of human 
rights was forced to change along with it. According to Morsink (1999), having ended World War 
II, the holocaust inevitably shed light on the rights issues and brought those concerns to the 
foreground in the dawn of the post-war era. A growing consciousness of the blatant disregard that 
had been shown for basic human values was represented by a series of events in that era. Among 
these, two occurrences are especially interesting since they clearly propelled the said evolution 
forward and consequently led to the creation of the UDHR. The first one was the establishment of 
the International Military Tribunal that resulted in the Nuremberg trials (Nuremberg Trials 1946).  
These trials followed promptly upon the end of the war as they were meant to try the most 
important captured leaders of Nazi Germany. Despite the fact that the trials suffered from much 
debated deficiencies, they were successful in convicting the main offenders and ultimately ended 
up setting a precedent with the international format that was used for the trials. Glendon (2001) 
postulates that the Nuremberg Principles of the trials established the definition of that which 
constitutes a war crime, considered viable to this day. The Nuremberg trials gave credibility to this 
new concept of war crimes that has subsequently been confirmed by a Commission established by 
the General Assembly of the UN in 1947 (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 177 (II)). 
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The Tribunal later provided the inspiration for the creation of other Tribunals and must therefore 
be considered to have served as a catalyst in the consequent founding of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) (U.N. Doc. 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). The other circumstance that contributed to the creation 
of the UDHR did not merely constitute an indication of the recent progress on the human rights 
arena, but rather established a direct condition for its existence; namely the founding of the United 
Nations. The drafting of the UDHR was made possible by the vision that this new truly 
international organization had for the post-World War II era. However, the initiation of the drafting 
process was complicated since that very moment in time saw the beginning of the Cold War. This 
circumstance presented a number of difficulties during the drafting stages of the UDHR, resulting 
in forceful debates about government responsibility, individual freedoms and racial, gender and 
cultural differences.  
It was not until World War II had ended that Roosevelt along with the rest of the world, fully 
comprehended the actual extent of the Holocaust. To a certain degree, the millions of combatants 
and civilians in the war had already been accounted for, but the visits to Displaced Camps in 
Europe opened everyone’s eyes. The Atomic bomb constituted yet another factor that had to be 
taken into account. Humankind was now capable of total self-destruction and in possession of an 
enormous destructive power that posed an impending threat, targeting individuals and nations 
worldwide. The fear of that possible outcome led to the conclusion that something had to be done. 
There existed a general consensus that an initiative to prevent war had to be taken, or else we 
would all be doomed, an opinion shared by Mrs. Roosevelt herself: “Man's desire for peace lies 
behind this Declaration. The realization that the flagrant violation of human rightsby Nazi and 
Fascist countries sowed the seeds of the last world war has supplied the impetus for the work which 
brings us to the moment of achievement here today”(Roosevelt 1948). 
On December 10th of 1948 the General Assembly of the UN adopted the UDHR as a legally non-
binding document, as is the nature of declarations (UDHR 1948). It was adopted with the intention 
of serving as an outline defining human rights and fundamental freedoms as they were to be 
interpreted throughout the world, an international set of recommended standards. For such 
universal intentions to be meaningful, the elaboration of the document had been carried out by an 
internationally acclaimed organization; the UN. This guaranteed the acquiring of a great number 
of signatory states and the formulation of the Declaration through debates involving participants 
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from different cultures. This admirable reason for the diverse composition of the drafting 
commission forced the participants to overcome all imaginable differences concerning language, 
politics, culture and religion (Ibid).  
Although representation in the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), which drafted the 
Universal Declaration, was not global, it was not limited to the Western states and included a wide 
range of countries in elaborating and discussing its formation. The formulation of the Preamble of 
the Declaration included mention of the recent experience of the Second World War and the 
permanent and undeniable scars it left, the horrendous memory of which served as the main 
incentive for the declaration’s creation (Ibid). Equality is an essential concept throughout the 
Declaration that not only aims to protect the tabulated rights and freedoms by claiming to give 
voice to a global understanding of their contents, but also by widening the perspective and aspiring 
towards world peace and friendly relations (UDHR article 1,26, 1nd 28). The mere approval of the 
UDHR, not to mention its ensuing success, was no uncomplicated task considering that it 
coincided with the commencement of the Cold War (as mentioned above). It was a time when 
ideological differences and hostilities were threatening to result in yet another cataclysm that might 
evoke an even larger war than ever before, especially when considering the use of atomic bombs 
at the end of the last war. 
Despite the fact that the UN’s ensuing covenants on human rights were eventually adopted and 
ratified by a large number of states, there are still quite a few that have not ratified them. However, 
the majority of those states have signed the UDHR which renders the Declaration an applicable (it 
may even be the only one of consequence in such countries) and exceptionally important human 
rights instrument. Together with the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration is now considered to 
define the general human rights obligations of all the UN member states. The specific obligations 
were later elaborated in the two international covenants of 1966.The UDHR contains a preamble 
and 30 articles, which include a general prohibition of discrimination and set forth various types 
of rights and obligations, including political and civil rights (such as the right to life, liberty and 
security of person, freedom from slavery and servitude, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to recognition before the law, and the freedoms of 
thought, conscience, religion, expression, opinion, assembly and association) and economic, social 
and cultural rights (among them the rights to social security work, education, and to a standard of 
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living adequate for health and well-being). Although the UDHR is not a legally binding instrument 
(i.e. it does not create legalobligations for States), it has over time been widely accepted as a 
universal agreement on fundamental human rights norms that duty bearers are expected to respect, 
protect and fulfil.  
The UDHR has inspired a large number of legal documents at the national, regional and 
international levels. Many subsequent international instruments are based on its catalogue of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and 
its two Optional Protocols) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (see below), in particular, have effectively translated those rights into binding treaty law 
for the States that ratified these instruments. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. In light of the foregoing, 
it is clear that the UDHR acted as a foundation in inspiring the nationalist movements in Africa 
because the emphasis in these documents were centred on justice and equality. The quest for 
liberation across the continent and elsewhere were a result of the need for liberation from the 
shackles of oppression and fulfilment of the values of UDHR. 
 
5.4 Evolution of Key Philosophers and their contribution to western liberalism 
As already alluded to in the foregoing, historically liberal philosophy was founded against the 
feudal governance system common in the pre- 18th century Europe which included such practices 
as hereditary privilege, state religion, absolute monarchy, and the Divine Right of Kings. The term 
‘liberal’ was first used in Spain between 1810 and 1820 to denote a political allegiance or faction 
(Vincent, 2010). Individuals or groups who opposed the traditional royalist factions in favour of 
the establishment of a secular constitution and freedom of the press were known as liberals. For 
Russell (2000), these included Western philosophers, economists and intellectuals of the 
Enlightenment Era who began to question and resist established power of old traditions of 
European absolute monarchies and aristocracies.  
From the above perspective, the Liberal thinkers or philosophers were considered as radicals who 
advocated fundamental reform and revolutionary change of such systems of government along 
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more constitutional and liberal lines. They questioned the authority of the state religion and sought 
to replace the absolute power of the monarchy, autocracy and militarism in government with 
constitutionalism, representative and responsible government, cultural pluralism, religious and 
ethnic toleration, national self-determination, free-market economics, free trade, unionism and 
constitutionalism among other values (Heywood, 2007). Fukuyama (1992) viewed nationalist 
thinkers who played a pivotal role in liberating various countries in Western Europe from 
monarchical absolutism, much as African Nationalists fought to liberate Africa from Western 
imperialism. Instructive as this may be, the debate on whether liberal democracy (one key tenet of 
liberalism) and nationalism are two separate notions is considered at the end of this chapter.  
But also important to note is that liberalism as an ideology is understood to have emerged out of 
the industrialised West so much so that it is synonymously identified with western civilisation. As 
a developed political ideology, liberalism has been traced back to the mid-18th century in England 
when industrialisation spread throughout western countries. Here, liberal thinkers such as John 
Locke (1632-1704) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) among others advocated an industrialised 
and market economic order that was not only free from government interference but also allowed 
private businesses to pursue profit and nations to trade freely with one another. Industrial 
capitalism is generally accepted to have started then in the United Kingdom (UK) before its spread 
in the 19th century to North America and across Europe, then extended in the 20th century to 
developing states in Africa, Asia and Latin America where social and political development was 
defined in essentially western terms.Because the ideology of liberalism first became a distinct 
political movement during the Age of Enlightenment when it became popular among Western 
philosophers, it became associated with the Western ideals. Puchala (2005) contends that 
liberalism is distinctly Western as it amalgamates Greek rationalism, Roman stoicism, 
Christianity, Newtonian physics, and the critique of the European ancient regimes. This is 
particularly so as it is the liberal philosophy which inspired and was used to justify Western 
revolutions discussed above. These include the Glorious Revolution (1688), American Revolution 
(1765), and the French Revolution (1789) among others as alluded above. 
Liberalism is culturally determined, and in the context of this study, as with any other society, it 
becomes easy to argue that liberal values do not fit into other cultural contexts. Thus third world 
states have sometimes been resistant to some attractions of liberal capitalism not least because 
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their political cultures have emphasised community rather than the individual (Heywood, 2007). 
This brings to bear the import of chapter three above whose objective is to examine the inter-
relationship between African nationalism and Western liberalism by not only looking at specific 
values or principles of liberalism that may have influenced African nationalism but also 
interrogating the perceived relevance of these principles in the ideology and practice of nationalism 
and nationalist politics in the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. The next segment of the study will 
concentrate on discussing different western philosophers and their contribution to the development 
of western liberalism. The philosophers sighted among others are: Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, 
Adam Smith, Jeremy Bethan, john Stewart Mills and John Locke. 
5.4.1 The philosophical ideas of Thomas Hobbes 
Thomas Hobbes is one of the towering philosophers whose writings have left an indelible mark on 
political theory. In his pioneering work, the Leviathan, Hobbes begins his investigation by 
describing man’s basic characteristics. He describes human being in two different ways, one as 
that of the man who lives in the state of nature and the other that of a civil person or a citizen who 
lives in a society. In the state of nature, “natural man is considered as if he were simply an animal, 
not modified in any way by education or discipline.” (Hobbes (1991). Hobbes’s basic aim is to 
protect himself and to live in a secure place without being disturbed by other men. Living in the 
state of nature is not easy since, in this condition, there is no restriction on humans except natural 
forces. According to Minoque (1972), the main motive in the state of nature is fear, and “man’s 
thoughts and feelings are concentrated to a single point by the pervasiveness of fear.” Fear is the 
basic characteristic of humanity for Hobbes. Therefore, he tries to construct his political system 
on the idea of eliminating fear. What is important here is why people fear each other. Why is the 
human being afraid of his fellows? The answers to this question is for Hobbes key to understanding 
what man is and what his nature is. 
According to Hobbes (1987), “everything is best understood by its constitutive causes.” This claim 
can be considered as outlining Hobbes’s principle of construction of his political and moral 
philosophy, since he was influenced by scientific explanations advanced by Galileo and Harvey. 
He claims that basic features and defining characteristics of human beings arise from nature, since 
he believes that human beings are sensitive creatures. In other words, human beings’ actions are 
defined by their interactions with the natural environment and other human beings. Hobbes aims 
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to define the basic characteristics of human beings by reducing them to their movable parts: they 
are first reduced to a body, and the body is further reduced to matter and motion. Matter and motion 
are basics concepts in Hobbes’s philosophy, because he thinks that they construct all reality, 
including human beings. Therefore, it is assumed that natural phenomena and the body politic can 
be explained by considering their constitutive parts, and further that they can be recomposed by a 
theory that explains their interrelationships and interactions. However, when looking for 
constitutive causes, as Hampton puts it, “Hobbes expects to find parts that are, in effect, wholes 
themselves. This means that all constitutive causes, first, are separately defined, then, second, they 
are taken as interacting parts of a unified mechanism.” (Hampton 1986). Hobbes asserts that “the 
World [...] is Corporeal, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, 
Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body [...] and consequently every part of the 
Universe.”(Hobbes 1991:463).  Hobbes’s belief that the entire universe is a material phenomenon, 
and can hence be comprehended by way of physical laws, can best be understood in relation to 
Descartes’s distinction between body and mind, of which Hobbes’s whole philosophical and 
political project is a rejection. Descartes claims that the human body is composed of two distinct 
entities, namely mind and body.  
According to Gregory (1986), in Leviathan, Hobbes claims that “the general inclination of all 
mankind is a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power.”  Through power and freedom, 
human beings are able to pursue whatever they wish. Freedom, in this sense, is an endless 
satisfaction of limitless desires. Since the human being’s desires are determined by his/her natural 
instincts, and since there is no social or ethical limitation, men act without considering others. 
Therefore, there is always a chaos in the state of nature. In Hobbesian theory, human beings are 
by nature equal. Because of this natural equality, every man has a natural right to everything, and 
“having equal rights to same things are bound to be in competition for them, and this leads to war” 
(Glover 1993).  War or conflict is the main concern in the course of Hobbes’s formation of the 
civil society. In all of his political views, war or conflict is to be considered as the factor most 
detrimental to human flourishing. Therefore, in order to eliminate conflict, Hobbes uses security 
or self-preservation as a tool to legitimatize his political views. Although “men differ as compared 
one with another in what they regard as good and evil for themselves,” physical preservation is the 
main motive to maintain their lives. If there is a danger, humans have a natural right to protect 
themselves (Warrender 1957).  
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In the state of nature, since there is no governmental authority to keep humans in peace, men are 
always in conflict. In other words, the state of nature includes the condition of human beings prior 
to the establishment of governments and laws. In the condition of war, we cannot talk about justice, 
injustice or law. Therefore, nothing is good or evil in the state of nature. Humans act only following 
their interests. The state of nature or natural conditions of men is pictured in a negative manner by 
Hobbes. He claims that each man has the right of nature, which means the liberty each man has. 
From this liberty, every man has the right to preserve his life. However, if every individual 
exercises the right of nature and does literally whatever he wishes to promote his own preservation, 
the result will be a state of war. As Charvet  (1981:41) puts it, “the state of war is the product of 
the inherent tendency of men’s natures, which underlies all social life, and which would break out 
in unrestrained form where it is not held in check by the devices of a commonwealth.” Therefore, 
exercising the right of nature is not a sufficient means of securing self-preservation. For this reason, 
Hobbes suggests some rules. These rules are the guide for human beings and, by following these 
rules, human beings could leave the state of nature and erect a commonwealth that would allow 
them to live in security. Hobbes calls these rules Laws of Nature. 
According to Hobbes, a law of nature, “is a Precept, or general Rule, found by Reason, by which 
a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive to his life, or taketh away the means of 
preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved” (Hobbes 
1998). The reason why Hobbes connects the idea of natural law with reason is that, according to 
him, it is not possible to deduce the laws of nature from another source. This is the case because 
he believes that any action that is performed in relation to the right reason should be considered a 
right action. In this sense, as Sommerville (1992:46) puts it, “right reason is the true guide to the 
law of nature, which he defined as the dictate of right reason, concerning what should be done or 
avoided continually to preserve life and limb, as much as in us lies.” The above statement points 
to the significance of right reason as a general rule guiding a human being not to do that which is 
destructive to life. Thus reason regulates the transition from savage and solitary to the civilized 
and social contract.  
Having said that natural laws are the dictates of the reason, Hobbes enumerates the several of 
these laws in order. The first natural law is “to seek Peace, and follow it”, and it is derived from 
fundamental natural law which is an agreement between men. It is the dictate of right reason and 
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it also concerns what must or must not be done for long preservation. The second of the derivative 
laws of nature is: “Stand by your agreements, or keep faith.” Hobbes says that “anyone therefore 
who makes agreement with someone, but does not believe he is obliged to keep faith with him, 
believes that making agreements is meaningless and at the same time meaningful, and that is 
absurd”(Ibid). In this context, Hobbes is emphasizing on mutual trust and the keeping of covenants. 
The third natural law is gratitude; the fourth that everyone must be considerate of others; the fifth 
that anyone who is sorry for his bad action must be pardoned in the future; the sixth that 
punishment is given only for future good or past evil; the seventh that nobody must show his hatred 
by actions or words; the eight is about equality in nature; the ninth that one must want what he 
wants for himself for every one; the tenth natural law that if one distributes right to others (Ibid).  
He must be just – in other words, he must not give more or less to any one than another (this natural 
law presupposes fairness); the eleventh that a thing that is not distinguishable must be used in 
common, or if there are enough things they must be distributed to everybody equally; the twelfth 
that, if there is a thing that is neither distinguishable nor can be used in common, it must either be 
used in turn or the right of using it must be transferred to one who is determined by lot; the 
thirteenth primogeniture and first occupation; the fourteenth that mediators of peace should have 
immunity; the fifteenth that if there is a conflict between two groups, these groups must apply to 
another group who is arbitrator; the sixteenth that no man can be a judge in his own cause; the 
seventeenth that anyone who is expecting glory or benefit from one of the conflicting parties may 
not be arbitrator; the eighteenth that if there is not enough evidence, the arbitrator must accept one 
testimony or more than one testimony and the witnesses must be fair to both parties; the nineteenth 
that the arbitrator must be independent from everything, that is, he must not make any agreement 
with any of two conflicting parties at any time; the twentieth that drunkenness is an offence against 
natural laws because it impedes the use of reason, and knowing or observing natural laws requires 
reason. As discussed above, the laws of nature are enumerated differently in De Cive and Leviathan 
(110). 
Hobbes was a determinist, who believed that every event, including all human actions, are the 
necessary causal result of earlier states of the universe. However, if all events in this universe are 
the results of a prior cause, can we believe that human beings are free and that their actions stem 
from their free will? Interestingly, Hobbes says that liberty and necessity are consistent attributes 
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and actions which men voluntarily do to proceed their will, proceed from liberty, and yet because 
every act of man's will and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from 
another cause, in a continual chain proceed from necessity (Leviathan 110). Hobbes insistently 
says that, without a cause, we cannot talk about events that take place in this universe. Accordingly, 
Hobbes claims that our nervous system cannot proceed if there is not a cause that affects it. In this 
sense, our actions are the reactions to those effects. Therefore, we can say that determining factors 
of our will do not stem from reason but from causes external to us. Nevertheless, the first thing we 
must be aware of is that, for Hobbes, freedom and determinism should be understood as coherent, 
rather than contradictory. Hobbes conceives of two types of freedom, the first relating to irrational 
creatures and inanimate objects, the second to rational beings. According to Hobbes, rational 
beings can have an impact on the physical world, and the rational dimension of their freedom refers 
to the human will. Therefore, human beings should be considered free if their action stems from 
an act of will. This means that, although their actions are determined by external causes and the 
source of those actions are sense perception, human beings can choose between two 
alternatives.Hobbes’s treatment of the nature of justice and its relation to injustice is introduced in 
connection with his account of the state of nature. According to Hobbes, by nature, all human 
beings are equal in respect of their physical and mental capacities and no one has the ability to 
dominate another in the state of nature. He claims that “the difference between man, and man, is 
not so considerable (Leviathan 113). 
Commonwealth Civil Society the institution of a commonwealth, for Hobbes, puts an end to the 
natural right that all men have in the state of nature. Giving up natural rights is important because 
if the citizens cannot do this, conflict between them is inevitable, even in the commonwealth. For 
this reason, Hobbes says that civil society or the state provides an assurance to the citizens and 
protects its members from the attacks of others. In respect of how a commonwealth comes into 
being, Hobbes states, a common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do agree 
to a Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be 
given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their 
Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorize 
all the Actions and Judgments, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they 
were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other 
men. While transferring natural rights in order to institute a commonwealth is, I think, not enough 
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to eliminate exploitation between men completely, it may bring such exploitation down to a 
tolerable level. However, even in the commonwealth conflict between men may continue in 
different ways. 
According to Hobbes, there are two types of commonwealth, the first established by agreement 
and the second by coercion. The first type of commonwealth is established among people who 
agree to give up their natural rights to a man or an assembly, by who the transferred rights are 
represented. In Hobbes’s words, men say that I authorize and give up my Right of Governing 
myself, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to 
him, and authorise all his actions in like manner”(Leviathan 113). Such renouncing and 
transferring of natural rights is necessary to create a commonwealth because Hobbes thinks that, 
by establishing a commonwealth, men escape from the destructive effects of the state of nature. In 
addition, it is the sovereign’s duty to protect them from dangerous situations and provide them a 
peaceful place to live.  
According to Hobbes, the action of two or more persons reciprocally transferring their rights is 
called contract (Ibid). In every contract either both parties immediately perform what they 
contracted to do, so that neither trusts anything to the other; or one performs and the other is 
trusted; or neither parties perform. When both parties perform immediately, the contract ends with 
the performance. But when either or both trusted, the trusted party promises to make performance 
later; and a promise of this kind is called agreement. Contract pertains only among those who agree 
to give up their rights. The parties to the contract are individuals who promise to hand over their 
right to govern themselves to the sovereign. The contract is not between the sovereign and the 
citizens. Hobbes, argues that the political covenant cannot be an agreement between ruler and 
ruled, because the ruled, considered themselves, are a mere multitude of individuals and cannot be 
a contracting body (Ibid). As being party to a contract implies a single will, the only possible form 
of covenant open to such an aggregate is one between its several members. As pointed out above, 
natural laws are not enough to preserve lives and provide peace between human beings. Therefore, 
men are obliged by civil laws to enter civil society or a commonwealth.  
According to Hobbes, all men are by nature bound by the natural laws. Since there is no authority 
who guides men and interprets those laws for them, they are used by men for their own self-
preservation and physical and mental satisfactions in the natural condition (Leviathan 115). 
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However, once the commonwealth is established, people, as citizens of this commonwealth, 
transfer their natural rights to a sovereign who interprets and implements those laws in order to 
provide a secure place for the subjects. In the commonwealth, men are bound by civil laws, not by 
natural laws. This point is very important: For Hobbes, men are free and equal in the state of nature. 
In addition, their basic aim is to protect themselves from the attacks of other men. If this equality 
and freedom continues in civil society, there will be chaos in the society as there is in the state of 
nature. This is unacceptable for Hobbes. For him, natural laws, by themselves, cannot provide 
people a secure place to live in peace in the civil society. There must be civil laws and an authority 
who has the power to enforce the laws of civil society. In this sense, the sole authority who 
interprets and implements civil laws that stem from the natural laws is the state. 
Although men make a contract with each other, according to Hobbes, without sufficient force to 
safeguard it, the contract simply means empty words. Hobbes defines civil law as follows: “Civil 
Law is to every subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath commanded him, by Word, 
Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and 
Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule”(Ibid: 115) Just as 
the laws of nature are those we are bound to obey because we are men, civil laws are those we are 
bound to obey because we are citizens. Civil laws are derived from natural laws. The main 
difference between natural laws and civil laws is that, while natural laws are found by reason and 
are therefore unwritten, civil laws are written by the sovereign on the basis of natural laws. 
Therefore, since civil laws are derived from natural laws, they do not differ from each other. 
According to Hobbes, civil laws play an important role in civil society. These laws arrange public 
issues under the governance of the sovereign power. By his/her absolute authority, the sovereign 
forces the people to obey civil laws. In this sense, all natural rights men have in the state of nature 
are restricted by the civil laws in order to create an organized and peaceful society. 
If sovereign power is an assembly and everyone has the right to vote, then it is called a democracy, 
and the dominant power is the people. If the sovereign power is an assembly but only some part 
of the citizens have the right to vote, it is called an aristocracy, and the dominant power is nobility. 
Lastly, if the sovereign power is an individual, then it is called a monarchy, and the dominant 
power is called a monarch. The differences in the three forms are based on their efficiency, 
convenience, and safety. Hobbes claims that monarchy, the location of sovereign power in the 
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hands of one man, is the best form because decisions about public problems are taken by only one 
source. He rejects the division of powers since he believes that if there are more opinions about a 
public issue, decisions cannot be taken correctly and this creates uncertainty and distrustfulness on 
the part of the sovereign or government. 
According to Hobbes, monarchy is the best kind of commonwealth because this system protects 
all people from all negativity. However, Hobbes makes a distinction between monarchy and 
tyranny. Although they are in outer form not different from each other, their differences arise from 
the citizen’s sentiments and opinions. In both cases the sovereign power is one individual, but 
“they differ only in the way they exercise power, he is a king who rules well, a tyrant who rules 
badly” (Ibid: 116). Despite the fact that citizens have an obligation to obey the law, their freedoms 
are provided by the commonwealth. In general, liberty in the Hobbesian conception means the 
ability to carry out one’s will without the interference of others. Indeed, our agreement to be subject 
to a common authority helps each of us to secure liberty to others. Consent is an important concept 
in the political philosophy of Hobbes and submission to a commonwealth is consistent with both 
obligation and liberty. Since people have entered into the commonwealth by their own consent, 
they agree to obey the commonwealth’s laws, which are the sovereign’s commands. Without a 
commonwealth and an absolute power, the lives of people, as Hobbes repeatedly says, are in 
danger. However, in a commonwealth, although people have limited rights, their lives are 
protected by the civil laws that are implemented by the sovereign. Hobbes’s aim is hence to 
convince people to institute an absolute governmental system by claiming that even the worst 
government is better than the state of nature. Hobbes identifies some reasons that might cause a 
collapse in a commonwealth 
A commonwealth collapses when it is not governed according to the laws made by the people. In 
this case, the reason is not the absence of the laws but their implementation. In the natural 
condition, since there is neither civil law nor an absolute power, people can decide what they are 
going to do, what is good or bad, for themselves. However, in civil society, the legislator, who is 
always the holder of the sovereign power, determines the civil laws and he must decide what is 
good and what is evil for the citizens who are under his sovereignty. Since people have already 
transferred their will and rights to the sovereign, they have to accept his commands without 
question. If someone tries to question what good is and what evil is, this means that he wants to 
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have the sovereign power. This situation causes a danger for the commonwealth. However, for 
Hobbes, the sovereign power cannot be divided. If power is divided, this situation undermines the 
commonwealth. In addition, the sovereign power cannot be subject to the civil laws of society 
because those laws are made by himself (Ibid). He is only bound by the natural laws. Divine 
inspiration is considered another reason by Hobbes. The legislator thinks that belief and sanctity 
stem not from scientific and rational inquiry but from inspiration and intuition. If the decisions in 
a commonwealth are taken in accordance with religious rules, social order breaks down since in 
this condition every citizen decides what is good and bad in relation to his beliefs. Hobbes also 
mentions some less important reasons that can cause a collapse of the commonwealth, among 
which are high taxes. Taxes are important for a commonwealth, but when they are extremely high, 
the citizens get poorer, which is dangerous for the polity. 
Hobbes’s views on human nature, morality, and politics in relation to each other are clear. Hobbes 
proposes a political system that holds the commonwealth in unity. His system shows a rigid logical 
unity and appears coherent at first sight (Ibid: 117). He starts to construct his system by proposing 
a state of nature in which humans are described as animals until they institute a commonwealth. 
This is the state of nature or the state of war. Humans who act in the state of nature have natural 
rights to protect themselves from any external danger. For this reason, they are free to pursue 
whatever they wish, although what they wish is determined by their natural tendencies. In other 
words, in the state of nature humans cannot be judged for what they do. Since there are no moral 
codes (justice, right, wrong etc.) humans hurt one another. In the tradition of the theory of social 
contract, Hobbes has a distinctive place since his system gives an extreme power to the sovereign. 
The sovereign is defined as one who is the absolute master of all his subjects and the final arbiter 
of all questions of right and wrong in the commonwealth. Moreover, the sovereign has the right to 
execute citizens if they are found guilty, but a citizen has no obligation to assist in his own 
execution or death. The state of nature is identified as the state of war. Therefore, humans must 
escape from this condition in order to live in a secure and peaceful state. Hobbes’s systematic 
examination of human nature, morality, and politics begins with the basic characteristics of human 
being. For Hobbes, men’s basic desire or passion is for survival, and this requires obtaining the 
necessary resources. Hobbes says that all passions stem from the master passion, namely survival 
or self-preservation. Since good and evilare defined by what is beneficial and destructive for men, 
men always try to get the best for themselves both biologically and psychologically. In this sense, 
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it may be said that all passions can be reduced to biological functions (Ibid). However, biological 
functions are not the only sources for survival, because in both the state of nature and society men 
cannot live by isolating themselves from other men. Human beings might have different appetites, 
desires and, passions, and these lead them to search for the best for themselves. As Hobbes said, 
“because the constitution of a man’s body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the 
same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions; much less can all men 
consent, in the desire of almost anyone and the same object” (Ibid).  
The struggle to secure the best inevitably creates a conflict, and the result is war between human 
beings. This is the situation that is called the state of nature in which all human beings feel 
insecurity, which creates diffidenceto other men and the fear of death (Ibid). Since human beings 
cannot live under the feeling of fear of death, they have to create the conditions of living in peace 
defined as the basic law of nature. As highlighted above, what is important here is that Hobbes 
connects this reasoning with the formation of a commonwealth, claiming that if there is no 
commonwealth or a sovereign power who decides what is good and what is bad for citizens?(Ibid). 
Hobbes aims to describe human beings or human nature without reference to possible 
characteristics of human beings, such as inborn rights, in their primitive state and applies those 
descriptions to establish standards for human conduct. In other words, he is not interested in 
finding the total pattern of human nature that man has to have in order to fulfill himself.  
Hobbes scholarship has been, of course, a virtual battleground upon which interpretative and 
hermeneutical approaches to the history of political thought. Hobbes clearly advocates dominion—
the possession of authority-as a resolution to two distinct problems. First, Hobbes considers the 
chief cause of civil war to be when more than one person or institution is recognised to possess 
authority; “man cannot serve two masters (Leviathan, 392)”. Second, the foremost obstacle to 
defending one’s commonwealth is a lack of concord, or “the concurrence of many men’s wills to 
one action” (Elements, 19:5). For these two rather straightforward reasons, Hobbes argues, the 
sovereign must be recognised to be the sole possessor of authority. That Hobbes advocated 
absolute possession of authority, or in other words, that he depicts the sovereign as the sole 
institution in possession of authority, is largely uncontroversial. Nor is the claim that civil peace 
is the intention behind it. However, remarkably little has been made explicit in terms of how 
absolutism was intended by Hobbes to practically effect civil peace, or in other words, the strategy 
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of it; the three central debates described above are generally more concerned with the legal, 
deontological and hypothetical problems presented by Hobbes’s arguments. There should be little 
doubt that Leviathan was intended by Hobbes to be a prescription for peace; it is a systematic 
detailing of what is inimical and necessary for the maintenance of a peaceful commonwealth. 
Central to this broad objective in Leviathan is the relationship between authority and obedience.  
It is evident that Hobbes considered this relationship to be of crucial importance for the 
maintenance of a peaceful commonwealth; he believed that the proper conceptualisation and 
implementation of this relationship would lead to peace, whereas an improper understanding and 
institutionalisation of the relationship would inevitably lead to the condition of war. Problems arise 
in this relationship, Hobbes argues, whenever humans are forced to obey one authority rather than 
another, or are conflicted over the question of to which authority their duty to obey is ultimately 
owed. Problems arise, therefore, when two or more institutions exist, each claiming to possess 
authority, and each claiming that obedience is owed to them. Hobbes’s general solution to this 
untenable situation is fairly straightforward: he proposes an absolute sovereign who is the sole 
legitimate possessor of authority, and the sole person to whom, or institution to which, all subjects 
owe their obedience. In simple terms, Hobbes’s solution proposes the creation of a sole master. 
The State of Nature is the conditions under which men lived prior to the formation of societies, 
which may be considered as an historical fact or a hypothetical claim. It is not important if this 
pre-contractual situation ever actually occurred, nor does it matter if there are actually men living 
in it still today or that societies will collapse back into this pre-social condition once the contract 
terminates.  
The Primary State of Nature is a State of War. Hobbes arrives at this conclusion after considering 
the condition men think that they are in with respect to each other. Men are naturally made so 
equal in physical and mental abilities taken together that one cannot consider his greater strength 
or quicker mind alone as sufficient enough to make him superior to others. Hobbes wrote that a 
man could out-maneuver a stronger opponent by either using his cunning or by banding together 
with others who were similarly endangered to overcome the common threat (Hobbes). Since men 
are equal in ability, they are equally similar in hope for attaining the ends of their desires. 
Furthermore, two people cannot both have the same thing which each desires, so they "endeavour 
to destroy, or subdue one another" (Hobbes).  Hobbes wrote earlier in the Leviathan, that men are 
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generally inclined to desire power after power, perpetually, until death brings an end to their 
struggle (Hobbes).  From these strong desires and competition from other men begins a diffidence 
which Hobbes wrote allows "no way for any man to secure himself", except, "by force, or wiles, 
to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he sees no other power great enough to 
endanger him ... ". (Hobbes).  Since all men are basically equal, there is no common power to keep 
them in check. That is why a State of War exists between them. A State of War does not need to 
consist of fighting, according to Hobbes, but in a tendency to do so. He wrote that “it can be 
compared to the weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a shower or two of rain; 
but in the inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War, consistent not in actual 
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the 
contrary” (Leviathan, 392). 
To sum up, Hobbes’ theory identifies government with force which must always be present in the 
background whether it is applied or not. To justify force Hobbes used the contract which he 
described as covenant between individuals by which all resign self-help and subject themselves to 
a sovereign. For Hobbes the advantages of government are tangiable and they must accrue quite 
tangeably to individuals in the form of peace, comfort and security of person and property. 
5.4.2 The philosophical ideas of David Hume 
Hume’s conception of British liberty as a modern conquest stems from his criticism of two 
associated and typically Whig tenets: on the one hand, the notion of an ancient constitution 
allegedly free and balanced and on the other hand, the notion of a contract between king and 
people, renovated in every crisis and implicit in the last settlement. Two consequences follow from 
these criticisms: firstly, that the degree of liberty enjoyed in Britain is a genuinely modern outcome 
of the 1689 Revolution rather than an immemorial native privilege and secondly, that the said 
revolution cannot be described as a contract of government.  
The idea that liberty was the product of rather than the condition for the Revolution was 
anticipated by Lord Hervey’s pamphlet ‘Ancient and Modern Liberty’ (1734) in which he defends 
the Whig administration. It was addressed to Bolingbroke and the Old Whig opposition, who 
appealed to the ancient constitution to denounce the new system of government introduced in 
Walpole’s regime for the management of Parliament by influence and corruption. 
In spite of Hume’s criticism of traditional Whig historiography and even though he cannot endorse 
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the actions of those who introduced the radical innovations that brought the modern British 
constitution in 1689, he nevertheless endorses the basic Whig understanding of the intimate 
connection between constitution and liberty as settled after the Revolution, that is: Limited 
monarchy, parliamentary representation and the checks and controls that maintain habeas corpus 
and civil liberties. This fundamental Whig assumption coincides in this respect with what we have 
called the republican understanding of liberty: Liberty is not only endangered by actual 
interference but by the mere vulnerability to arbitrary interference. For Hume such vulnerability 
occurs when the balanced constitution ceases to function correctly, either because it relapses into 
faction and anarchy or because the monarchical part of the constitution takes over the republican 
one. Frequent parliament and free press are essential to the maintenance of liberty in a limited 
monarchy. The first two volumes, covering the Stuart monarchy and entitled History of Great 
Britain, appeared between 1754 and 1756, and are part of a self-conscious attack on the prevailing 
notions of parliamentary history and its attendant Manichean classification of patriotic and 
tyrannical monarchs. The Whig distortions on history and the romanticized view of the constitution 
were thought by Hume to go even further back in time than the Stuarts, so Hume engaged in the 
rest of English history from the Roman invasion to the Tudors.  
According to Wexler (1979), the bulk of Hume’s work was produced during a period (George II’s 
reign) in which Whig ideas concerning the constitution were dominant: History had been self-
consciously used as part of the polemic in the conflicts of the seventeenth century by both 
absolutists and parliamentarians. According to the prevailing Whig interpretation of the events 
leading to the Revolution, the settlement in the protestant line merely restored pre-existing 
liberties, which in turn were part of an ancient and perfectly balanced constitution that was 
supposedly subverted by the late Stuarts by breaking the original contract between king and people. 
Poocok (1987), postulates that, ancient constitutionalism was linked with the belief in a contract 
of government which the constitution was supposed to embody and the oaths of allegiance to 
renovate. Hume sought to challenge the reading of history in Whig contractualist terms not only 
for the sake of historical truth but also because it was a dangerously weak foundation for the 
instituted form of government, and because such distorted view would establish a precedent and a 
potential pretext for rebellion. 
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The stability and authority of the modern British constitution, Hume argues, cannot be grounded 
on a supposedly popular contract: Far from being the case that liberty was restored, it is rather the 
result of the increasing ability to guarantee the rule of law thanks to the unprecedented new powers 
acquired by Parliament. Those who brought the Revolution about were not the bulk of the people 
but a much reduced minority acting as quasi-legislators. Hume argues that the form the constitution 
began to take in favour of a new ‘plan of liberty’ (HE Vol VI) was the effect of the struggle between 
parliamentarians and royalists. The uncertainty of the legal nature of the constitution was settled 
then not by deliberate reform but by an appeal to an imaginary ancient constitution and a contract 
allegedly broken. In general, Hume attempts to accommodate a compromise between Whig and 
Tory principles in their controversies. Seeing the events in retrospective detachment helps Hume 
understand the role that principles and interests played in the actions of the leading actors of the 
conflicts without identifying himself with any of them in particular. 
In the conflicts between Charles II and parliamentarians neither party was right because they held 
partial views of the constitution, a constitution that was neither perfectly free and balanced so that 
any encroachment on the part of kings was illegal, as the parliamentarians pretended, nor an 
absolute monarchy, as the Stuart kings fancy themselves to be in the manner of other European 
monarchs. The truth was that the limits to royal prerogative were very imperfectly defined in the 
constitution and the two parties were ignorant of the significance of this. Judged from the point of 
view of the standard that the commons were trying to bring about, the principles of which Hume 
shared, liberty is undermined not only by the actual exertion of tyrannical power but by the mere 
absence of expressed legal protections (rights) against such power. However, Hume’s reluctance 
to accept this as the right standard from which to judge events is manifest immediately after. 
Hume’s clear-cut idea that liberty cannot subsist without authority, that is, without a reasonable 
regard to established political power, gives us a good understanding of Hume’s pro ject. It entails 
that liberty exists only when there is in place a constitutionally limited authority. For a subject to 
be free in this sense two conditions are required: in the first place, that such limited authority does 
not arbitrary interfere with her and secondly, that it has the capacity to stop others from interfering 
arbitrarily with her. Such constitutionally limited authority requires broadly republican 
institutions. Although there are both negative and positive elements in this concept of freedom, 
Hume’s concept of liberty can best be fitted within the republican tradition. 
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Liberty in its full sense requires republican institutions that guarantee that there is no subjection to 
arbitrary power. The development of liberty is not a necessary result of economic progress but 
requires special circumstances, which to some extent are owed to contingent circumstances. It is a 
‘refinement’ in politics, an improvement upon primitive monarchy. It therefore contrasts both with 
Lockean notions of liberty as based on natural rights and the common Whig notion of immemorial 
rights. The view of modern liberty that Hume favours is that of a more stable form of liberty based 
on the rule of law. The improvements upon ancient political practice that Hume wants to emphasise 
are as follows: a division of powers, a representative system, the mechanisms of check and 
balances, liberty of the press, and the possibility of a republican government in a large territory by 
means of a federal structure, developed in the essay ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’. 
One of the important differences between Hume and some of the figures of the republican tradition 
is the special prominence that Hume argues for the instrumental value of the political aspect of 
liberty and free institutions, for example, on the instrumental value of the liberty of the press, and 
the subordination of liberty itself to a negative and more private or passive (i.e. more social and 
less political) role. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that Hume’s concept of liberty is 
fundamentally republican but with important features of what arguably may become part of the 
liberal tradition associated with negative freedom. Hume’s theoretical solution to the controversy 
between ancient and modern liberty appears as the last attempt to reconcile the old and the new 
conception. 
5.4.3 Adam Smith and his key philosophical ideas  
The contribution of Adam Smith that is most clearly celebrated today—and has certainly not been 
neglected-is the way he helped to reshape the subject of economics. Smith is standardly accepted 
as “the father of modern economics”, and it is widely acknowledged that he has contributed more 
than almost anyone else to the emergence of the scientific discipline of economics. Even as Smith’s 
pioneering investigations explained why (and particularly how) the dynamism of the market 
economy worked, they also brought out the support that the markets need from other institutions 
for efficacy and viability. Smith (1975 [1790]) identified why the markets may need restraint, 
correction, and supplementation through other institutions for preventing instability, inequity, and 
poverty. in one part of The theory of moral sentiments, when Smith argues that while “prudence” 
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is “of all the virtues that which is most useful to the individual, humanity, justice, generosity, and 
public spirit, are the qualities most useful to others”.  
Despite Smith’s frequent discussion of the importance of motivations other than self-interest, he 
has somehow developed the reputation of being a champion of the unique importance of self-
interest for all human beings. Smith famously argued that to explain the motivation for economic 
exchange in the market we do not have to invoke any objective other than the pursuit of self-
interest. In his most famous and widely quoted passage from the Wealth of Nations, Smith wrote: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their 
self-love (Smith 1976 [1789], 26-27). The butcher, the brewer, and the baker want to get our money 
in exchange for the meat, the beer, and the bread they make, and we—the consumers—want their 
meat, beer, and bread, and are ready to pay for them with our money. The exchange benefits us 
all, and we do not have to be raving altruists to seek such exchange. This is a fine point about 
motivation for trade, but it is not a claim about the adequacy of self-seeking for economic success 
in general.  
Smith 1976 [1789]:292) argued that; When the people of any particular country has such 
confidence in the fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe he is always 
ready to pay upon demand such of his promissory notes as are likely to be at any time presented 
to him; those notes come to have the same currency as gold and silver money, from the confidence 
that such money can at any time be had for them. Even though the champions of the baker-brewer-
butcher reading of Smith, enshrined in many economic books, may be at a loss about how to 
understand the present economic crisis the devastating consequences of mistrust and lack of mutual 
confidence would not have puzzled Smith. Smith also made the point that sometimes our moral 
behaviour tends to take the form of simply following established conventions. While he noted that 
“men of reflection and speculation” can see the force of some moral arguments more easily than 
“the bulk of mankind” (1975 [1790], 192), there is no suggestion in Smith’s writings that people 
in general systematically fail to be influenced by broader considerations-broader than sheer pursuit 
of self-interest-in choosing their behaviour. What is important to note, however, is Smith’s 
recognition that even when we are moved by the implications of moral arguments, we may not see 
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them in that explicit a form and may perceive our choices in terms of acting according to some 
well-established practices in society.  
As he put it in The theory of moral sentiments: Many men behave very decently, and through the 
whole of their lives avoid any considerable degree of blame, who yet, perhaps, never felt the 
sentiment upon the propriety of which we found our approbation of their conduct, but acted merely 
from a regard to what they saw were the established rules of behaviour (1975 [1790], 162). This 
focus on the power of “established rules of behaviour” plays a very important part in the Smithian 
analysis of human behaviour and its social implications. However, neither specifically reasoned 
choice nor the following of established rules of behaviour takes us, in Smith’s analysis, to the 
invariable pursuit of self- interest. This has huge implications for practical reason in addition to its 
epistemic merits. Both individual reasoning and social convention can make a real difference to 
the kind of society in which we live. People are not imprisoned in any inflexible box of the 
unconditional priority of self-love. The pillaging bosses of perverse businesses are not doomed to 
any inescapable pursuit of plunder; they choose to plunder in line with their inclinations, making 
little use of rational scrutiny, not to mention moral reasoning. 
Smith 1975 [1790], 11) asserts that;  
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment 
concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, 
and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we can do this in no other 
way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people 
are likely to view them. Smith was particularly keen on avoiding the grip of parochialism 
in jurisprudence and moral and political reasoning.  
In a chapter in The theory of moral sentiments entitled “On the influence of custom and fashion 
upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation” Smith gives various examples of 
how discussions confined within a given society can be incarcerated within a seriously narrow 
understanding: the murder of new-born infants was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of 
Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the circumstances of the 
parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or to wild beasts, 
was regarded without blame or censure.  Uninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly 
authorized the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world tolerated this barbarous 
prerogative, but even the doctrine of philosophers, which ought to have been more just and 
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accurate, was led away by the established custom, and upon this, as upon many other occasions, 
instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations of public utility. 
Aristotle talks of it as of what the magistrates ought upon many occasions to encourage. The 
humane Plato is of the same opinion, and, with all that love of mankind which seems to animate 
all his writings, nowhere marks this practice with disapprobation Smith (1975 [1790], 210).  
Adam Smith’s insistence that we must inter alia view our sentiments from “a certain distance from 
us” is, thus, motivated by the object of scrutinizing not only the influence of vested interests, but 
also by the need to question the captivating hold of entrenched traditions and customs. While 
Smith’s example of infanticide remains sadly relevant today, though only in a few societies, some 
of his other examples have relevance to many other contemporary societies as well. This applies, 
for example, to Smith’s insistence that “the eyes of the rest of mankind” must be invoked to 
understand whether “a punishment appears equitable” (Smith 1982 [1762-1763], 104). To listen 
to distant voices, which is part of Adam Smith’s exercise of invoking “the impartial spectator”, 
does not require us to be respectful of every argument that may come from abroad. Willingness to 
consider an argument proposed elsewhere is very far from a predisposition to accept all such 
proposals. We may reject a great many of the proposed arguments-sometimes even all of them-
and yet there would remain particular cases of reasoning that could make us reconsider our own 
understandings and views, linked with the experiences and conventions entrenched in a particular 
country, or culture. Arguments that may first appear to be “outlandish” (especially when they do 
actually come, initially, from other lands) may help to enrich our thinking if we try to engage with 
the reasoning behind these locally atypical contentions.  
5.4.4 The political ideas of Jeremy Bentham 
Bentham (1748-1832) is a renowned utilitarian legal philosopher. However, he is often 
encountered in the history of ideas as a radical democrat, a political theorist and reformer of 
consequence. Although he wrote extensively in the area of political philosophy, he did not write 
one single work-like Hobbes' Leviathan or Rousseau's Le Contrat Social-that encompasses all the 
primary features of his political thought. Rather we find interesting material scattered in 
voluminous published and unpublished writings, produced at various times through a long, 
industrious, and extraordinarily productive career. The conventional account of Bentham's 
political convictions usually begins by assuming that he was apolitical for much of his life. In the 
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first approach the disputed evidence is: (1) the nature of Bentham's (largely unpublished) 
political writing of the years 1788-90; (2) the apparent retreat from political reform sketched out 
in manuscripts dated 1793-95;5 and (3) the character and import of the Mill-Bentham association 
of 1808-9. Preliminary investigations suggest that Dinwiddy's view cannot be sustained, that 
Bentham had indeed worked out the logic of democratic reform inspired by the upheaval in France, 
that in the furore of the post-revolutionary years he decided to put aside his recommendations until 
more propitious times, but that the essential components of his democratic theory had not changed 
when he joined with James Mill and others in the general agitation for reform in the 1810s.  
Benthamite radicalism was part of a broader movement in Britain for constitutional change. 
According to Burns and Hart (1996), Bentham defined utilitarianism as ‘that principle which 
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears 
to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question’. This is 
based on the idea that ‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure’ (Ibid). This principle can be applied to the individual, but can also be a principle 
for the foundation of government. As a political idea, Benthamite utilitarianism proposes that 
society should be ordered to maximise happiness in the population. As a result Bentham was an 
early advocate of democracy. Bentham’s journal, the Westminster Review, declared: If the 
happiness of men was the object of government, it was plain that this object was to be obtained by 
their being governed with a view to their own interest, and not to the interest of somebody else 
(Ibid). The way to effect this was that they should govern themselves. 
Bentham, and many of his followers, became active in the campaign to implement democracy in 
Britain and the colonies. Several leading figures in the story of the move to democracy in Australia 
were utilitarians with strong associations with the Benthamite school. Through their combined 
efforts, Bentham and his followers helped develop a program for constitutional reform, the most 
complete early adoption of which was in British colonies, including Australia. Bentham and his 
followers rejected the idea of liberty through the rights of man. Rather, constitutional design should 
align the interests of the ruled and the rulers, the guiding principle being to maximize happiness 
(Mill 1937). Many of Bentham’s ideas were not wholly original (Austin 1869). The large majority 
of those utilitarians who allied themselves with Bentham’s heritage were strongly democratic at a 
time when democracy was a radical idea and it was this influence that was felt in Australia.  
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Bentham’s influence has been noted by many scholars such as Hume’s article ‘Jeremy Bentham 
and the Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government’ saw Bentham as holding a substantial 
place in the reform of government during the nineteenth century (Roberts 1960 and McDonough 
1961. J.B). Brebner suggested that state intervention from 1825 to 1870 was essentially 
Benthamite (Ibid). Dicey (1876) declared that ‘The history of modern English law is the history 
of a gigantic revolution produced by the ideas of one man.’ Hart gave Bentham first place in 
commencing the positivist tradition in English jurisprudence (Ibid). In 1900, the American scholar 
Charles Gregory observed that many reforms of the previous century had emerged from 
Benthamism. Gregory refers to Bentham’s central role in legal reform, the introduction of state 
education, and the introduction of the ballot: ‘It has been freely said that hardly an important 
reform in law has been effected within this century which Bentham had not foreshadowed and he 
emphasises his own concern for the possibility of an oppressive majority rule arising from 
Bentham’s system. 
The writings of Bentham produced a silent revolution in the mode of treating all political and moral 
subjects. The habits of thought were entirely new, and a whole body of political writers, without 
(for the most part) knowing whence the inspiration came were full of a new spirit, and submitted 
all acts to a new test. During the first half of the [nineteenth] century the law of England was 
thoroughly reformed and humanised. That signal achievement was due to the genius of Jeremy 
Bentham and his eminent disciples (Ibid). Kelly (1990) postulates that, Bentham was further able 
to develop his ideas within a framework of a security-oriented liberalism demonstrated by his 
commitment to political democracy, to gradual reform based on security of expectation and to an 
extension of suffrage and participation to as many members of society as possible may have 
involved a rejection of some ideas traditionally associated with liberty. Bentham’s concentration 
on security and on the instruments of good government enabled him to move towards one more 
appropriate for a modern democratic society where security would be conceived more widely in 
terms of education, health, and welfare as well as real property and wealth. Thus the whole aim of 
legislation should be to promote happiness, not of the nobility or the gentry, or even the 
shopkeepers, but of the artisans and other wage-earners. As a result of this shift, during the 
nineteenth century there was a change in expectation as to what government should do, how it 
should be formed, and how liberty could be realised. The reform of the nineteenth century after 
the 1832 Reform Bill had resulted in enormous change. These included: The emancipation of the 
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West Indian slaves, the Factory Acts, the amendment of the Poor Law, the reform of municipal 
corporations, the mitigation of the criminal code, the foundation of a system of national education, 
the repeal of the Corn Laws – these and a host of minor improvements, such as the establishment 
of the penny post or the abolition of the press gang, were all the more or less direct fruits of 
Parliamentary reform. Many other reforms were introduced, resulting in the provision of services 
and interference in economic life. 
5.4.5 The philosophical ideas of John Stuart Mill 
When Mill was born in 1806 the British Isles had become a single political entity. The unification 
of the different parts of the Isles was a long process. England conquered Wales in the 13th century 
and Wales got its own representatives to the Parliament of England in 1536. England and Scotland 
had the same monarch from 1603 but the countries still had their own parliaments. According to 
Jeremy (2003), this changed in 1707 when the Act of Union created the Parliament of Great Britain 
in which England, Wales and Scotland had their representatives. England and Scotland had ruled 
parts of Ireland from the Middle Ages, but first in the late 16th century did England manage to 
subjugate the whole of Ireland under its rule (Ibid). The union between Great Britain and Ireland 
in 1801 abolished the Parliament of Ireland and created the Parliament of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, where the Irish also had their representatives (Ibid). By the early 19th 
century most of the executive power had transferred from the monarch to the Cabinet, which was 
headed by the prime minister. The Cabinet needed the support of the lower house of parliament, 
the House of Commons, to be able to pass legislation. Therefore the formation of Cabinets was 
mostly based on elections results of the Commons. It became quite exceptional for the monarch to 
influence the process to a considerable degree. The upper house of parliament, the House of Lords, 
was also a powerful institution, because it could block legislation that had been passed by the 
Commons and because members of the Lords usually had a significant presence in the Cabinet. 
Because of the imperfections of the electoral system the Lords could also influence to a great extent 
the elections of the Commons. 
In the 1820s the acquaintances of James and John Stuart Mill formed a group called the Philosophic 
Radicals. Like other radicals, they advocated universal or near universal suffrage, shortening of 
parliaments and the ballot. But their main goal was to create a political party completely committed 
to parliamentary reform, because they considered the Whigs and the Tories as both representing 
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the aristocratic interest. It was this goal that separated them from other radicals, who usually had 
more specific goals in mind. They took inspiration from Bentham’s thoughts, but James Mill was 
the real leader of the group (Hamburger 1965). The mouthpiece for the Philosophic Radicals, for 
some time at least, was the Westminster Review, which had been started by Bentham in 1824. It 
was supposed to be a counterweight to the Whig Edinburgh Review and the Tory Quarterly 
Review. Both John and James Mill contributed articles to the review, but eventually stopped, 
because they had disagreements with its editor John Bowring (Ibid). John Stuart Mill was eagerly 
involved in their work until 1826, when he suffered a mental crisis, which was probably caused by 
the defects of his upbringing. He had been taught how to reason well, but not much more. He now 
realized that his zeal for reform was mostly theoretical. It was not based on any real sympathy for 
the people he was supposed to be fighting for. Mill eventually recovered from his crisis, but as a 
changed man. He started to evaluate more critically the teachings of his two mentors and found 
them defective in many ways. Their approach to human affairs was too theoretical and based on 
simplistic assumptions about human nature. He now understood how important the cultivation of 
human feelings was. He started to appreciate poetry and art, something he had not been taught to 
do by his father. Mill also became interested in reconciling different modes of thought. He saw 
that socialists and conservatives also had valid viewpoints, and he wanted to include those views 
into his own theories. He still considered himself a utilitarian and a Philosophic Radical, but he 
was not as dogmatic as he had earlier been (Ibid).  
Mill was still in favour of political reform. He believed in universal suffrage, though in his view it 
could lead to good government only if the uneducated voted for the educated. An obstacle to these 
reforms was the existing rule of the aristocracy. Mill was therefore very much involved in the 
Philosophic Radical cause in the 1830s, relentlessly criticizing the Whig administrations of that 
decade for enacting only small political reforms (Ibid). The future looked bright for the Philosophic 
Radicals after the passage of the reform bill. Roebuck, Grote and Buller had been elected to the 
parliament and they worked together with MPs like John Mill and Edward Romilly, Edward Strutt, 
William Ewart and Sir William Molesworth. Grote was a leading figure among the radicals in the 
Commons. He took the secret ballot as his central issue and he proposed its introduction regularly 
during the 1830s. The proposals did not pass, but the radicals could find solace in the fact that 
through the years the ballot gained more support (Mill 1986). Mill very much believed in the 
importance of political journalism, saying it “is to modern Europe what political oratory was to 
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Athens and Rome” (Ibid). It is therefore natural that he, and the other radicals, wanted to eradicate 
the tax on newspapers, which they called the “tax on knowledge”. This was partially achieved in 
1836, when the tax was lowered (Hamburger 1965). In 1835 the Philosophic Radicals formed the 
London Review, which merged the next year with the Westminster Review to become the London 
andWestminster Review. Mill, who became the editor, was determined to make the review into 
something more than just a mouthpiece for orthodox radicalism.  
5.4.6 John Locke and his philosophical Arguments 
John Locke remains, after over 300 years, a central figure in philosophy and a key thinker for an 
understanding of the culture and categories of modern society. He walked through the stage of 
England’s history at a time that was particularly turbulent, and he was personally associated with 
some of the dramatic episodes, despite possessing a rather quiet and retiring character (Lowe, 
1995). Locke’s first works were written at Oxford, but were not published during his life time. 
These works are Two Tracts on Government and Essays on the Law of Nature. In the views of 
Ashcraft (1988) and Laslett (1988), Locke is the suspected author of A Letter from a Person of 
Quality to his Friend in the Country, which infuriated the government and may have led to his 
departure to France in 1675. He is also the author of Essays Concerning Human Understanding 
and Two Treatises of Government. He also published a couple of minor works in his later years: 
Some considerations on the Lowering of interest and Raising the Value of Money (1668), The 
Second Letter for Toleration (1691), Third Letter for Toleration (1692), Some thoughts on 
Education (1693), and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). Locke was not just a writer; he 
played a prominent role in the political life of his country. He was Commissioner for Appeals, 
Commissioner for Trade. 
Locke influenced the repeal of the Acts for the Regulation of Printing in 1695, and also the re-
coinage of the debased English currency in the 1690’s. Before his death, Locke was not only an 
international renowned intellectual figure, he had moved in the most influential political circles in 
England (Iloyd, 1995). Born in August 29, 1632, Locke was the eldest child of a respectable 
Somersetshire Puritan family. His father was a small landowner, a lawyer and a captain of a 
volunteer regiment in the parliamentary army (Anaulogho, 1997). In spite of his family’s moderate 
income, Locke received an excellent education, first at Westminster School, where he received a 
thorough grounding in Latin and Greek; then in 1652, he went to Christ Church, Oxford. His 
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association with the University of Oxford lasted for more than thirty years. He received his B.A 
degree in 1656, and graduated with a Master of Arts degree in 1658. After his graduation, he 
remained at Oxford where he taught Greek, served as a reader in rhetoric and finally censor of 
moral philosophy in 1664 (Ilyod, 1995). 
In Locke’s political philosophy, the state of nature is the first stage in the process of transition into 
civil society. The state of nature with all its inadequacies creates the need for a political society. 
This need speaks of the inadequacies of the state of nature, which creates the appetite for 
anticipating a good system of governance in the civil society. Moving from a state of nature where 
individuals are not subject to common legitimate authority with the power to legislate or adjudicate 
disputes, Locke stresses the dynamics of individual consent as the mechanism for forming the civil 
society. Locke (1999) writes, “Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal and 
independent, no one can be put out of this state, and subjected to the political power of another, 
without his own consent”(Ibid). These propositions centered on freedom, equality and 
independence were the basis of the philosophical ideas of John Locke’s democratic ideas. 
The first process of transition, leads to the formation of the community, where each person agrees 
to surrender individual control over their executive power of the law of nature in exchange for an 
equal share, along with the other contractors, in the joint control of everyone’s pooled executive 
power of the law of nature. As such, the executive power of the law of nature is de-privatized 
(Lloyd, 1995). The formation of the community only takes us half way into the formation of the 
political society. It is thus an intermediate state between the state of nature and the civil society. It 
is not yet a state because there is no formally constituted body which has the authority to legislate 
and enforce the law. The formation of the community leaves things incomplete and calls for a 
second stage in order to establish a civil society. This involves the formulation of a formally 
constituted authority to exercise the collective executive power of the state of nature. It should be 
noted that the entrustment of their executive power is not to individual persons, but to a 
constitutional form. The constitutional form would help people identify those who hold political 
power with right. By majority decision, the members of the community entrust their collective 
executive powers of the law of nature into the hands of a constitutional form of government, and 
thus, the state is created (Lloyd, 1995). 
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For the constitutional form of government to run a system to be ascribed as good in Locke, certain 
values are indispensable. For Locke, justice and moral goodness are indispensable variables for 
good governance. For this reason, the violation of treatises, political assassinations and unjust war 
are inimical to good governance (Maritain, 1985). Good governance must show itself in the 
government’s ability to create a bond that is teleological, ontological, affective, moral, 
organisational and communicative (Messner cited by Anaulogho, 1997). Good governance should 
be able to create a society where people are responsible for one another as well as towards the 
community as a whole. This moral responsibility gives rise to the affective bond of the community. 
The Lockean great principle of morality is, “to do as one would be done to” (Locke, 1999). The 
reason why people unite themselves under a civil society, is to preserve their property. By property 
he means lives, liberties and estates (Locke, 2003). And thus for a government to be good, it should 
be able to protect property, and punish people who go against the preservation of property. If the 
purpose of the civil society is to be attained, people must come together and be bound by a common 
factor.  
Locke fought a fierce battle against the abuses of language, for an abuse of language could cripple 
the politic. Language makes existential interaction possible, and to corrupt it would lead to the 
corruption of human society and existence (Anaulogho, 1997). Aristotle (1962:28) argued that 
man is by nature a political animal. By this he means that man is meant to live in a society, and 
thus a social being. One of the evidence of this is the gift of language that man has; for nature does 
nothing in vain. It is only in the society that the gift of language has any meaning, and anyone who 
is unable to live in a society, Aristotle argues is “either a beast or a god”. From this, we begin to 
understand the influence of Aristotle on Locke’s philosophy of language. Locke beliefs that God 
endowed mankind with the gift of language for both the improvement of knowledge and the 
maintenance of society; as man is naturally inclined to live in the society, so also is he furnished 
with language to interact with his fellow human beings in that society. Language then becomes an 
ingredient for governance. 
Locke's primary aim in the Second Treatise is to show that absolute monarchy is an illegitimate 
form of government, lacking the right to coerce people to obey it. The theory of government 
defended by Sir Robert Filmer, which Locke attacked in the First Treatise, held that : a) the king's 
authority/right to rule his subjects derives from the right that a father has to command obedience 
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from his children, a right that is divinely ordained, b) that right is unlimited; the king has an 
unlimited right over the lives and property of his subjects, as a father has an unlimited right over 
the lives and property of his children (as long as they remain children). c) Hence, government does 
not require the consent of those subjects to restrict their liberty or seize their property, and d) those 
subjects do not have a right to revolution, to replace the king with someone who will better serve 
their interests (Ibid). From the foregoing, it is poignant that all the above mentioned western liberal 
scholars played a monumental role in advancing the values of liberalism which prepared a solid 
foundation for democratic governance. The medieval system of governance rooted in monarchs 
and Kings of the time were challenged as ludicrous. The following segment discusses the key 
values of political liberalism. 
5.5 An Anatomy of the Key Values of Western Political Liberalism 
Liberalism has since produced diverse and rich scholarly and academic output so much so that 
different formulations about it have been proffered in ways that not only popularised some of its 
principles in the modern world but also present a challenge to anyone looking for its clear 
definition. Generally, liberalism is understood as a product of the breakdown of feudalism - a then 
European system of agrarian based production that was characterised by fixed social hierarchies 
and rigid pattern of obligations - and growth in its place of a market of capitalist society. Scholars 
who have attempted to theorise liberalism relate the philosophy  to what William Galston’s (2002) 
refers to as a principle of expressive liberty that favours individuals and groups leading lives as 
they see fit, and in accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value. 
Russell (2000) defines liberalism as a political philosophy or worldview founded on ideas of 
liberty and equality. Heywood (2007: 23) notes that, as a political ideology, liberalism is associated 
with ideas of freedom and choice, its central theme being “a commitment to the individual and the 
desire to construct a society in which people can satisfy their interests and achieve fulfilment”. 
According to Lubombo (2015), Western liberal commitment to the individual is a Western moral 
thought ingrained in Kantian philosophy (1724-1804) that firstly conceives a person as an atomised 
and unfettered agent endowed with free will or reason. This is also illustrated by Reine Descartes’ 
cogito ergo sum argument “I think therefore I am”. For Immanuel Kant (1785), as a rational agent, 
a human being can be considered as a member of an intelligible world who has not only an ability 
to freely choose but also intelligible and autonomous. Liberalism ideology entitles individuals to 
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equal legal and political rights so much so that each individual can enjoy the maximum possible 
freedom, the idea being to protect citizens from the danger of feudal of tyrannical government 
(Heywood, 2007).The objective of the remaining paragraphs of this chapter is to discuss how the 
tenets of liberal thought play out in the grammar of modern liberalism. It is important to begin by 
understanding the notion of liberalism itself, in the context of various forms of freedoms, i.e. 
liberty, human rights, justice and equality, constitutionalism, the development of western 
democracy and the enlightenment enterprise.  
5.5.1 The meaning of Individual Liberty 
Liberty means protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived 
(except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to 
the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing by one person or a governing tribe or 
caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest, who, at all events, did not hold it 
at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, 
to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was 
regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use 
against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of 
the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should 
be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of 
the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was 
indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defense against his beak and claws. Liberalism 
provides an interpretation of liberal political morality which is more faithful to the basic liberal 
ideal that individuals be at liberty to form, pursue and revise their conceptions of the good life. 
Liberalism is identified with a "progressivist" reformist position which holds that liberty, and 
particularly economic liberty ("market forces") should be tempered with elements borrowed from 
socialism and social-democracy: government interventionism to promote social objectives such as 
equality and welfare.  
Liberalism in the traditional, classical sense-meaning a set of beliefs tending towards the 
promotion of political arrangements which recognise individual liberty as the supreme political 
value, not to be subordinated to the pursuit of "social" objectives like welfare or equality. 
Liberalism in this sense holds that the range of functions of the state ought accordingly to be 
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limited. It insists, moreover, that individual liberty must extend to the economic sphere, so that 
free enterprise, the operation of markets, and capitalism, are preferred to state ownership. 
Individual liberty has to do with the ability to choose decisions and to vote for any party without 
limitations from institutional strictures. Libertarianism, properly speaking, entails opposition not 
just against legal coercion but to moral constraints as well. The hallmark of the liberal teachings 
and the enlightenment movement was individual liberty. 
5.5.2 The scope of Human Rights 
Human rights are understood, worldwide, to be the basis of society. To begin with, human rights 
are rights. According to Alexy (2002), with respect to their structure, rights in general can be 
divided into, first, claim rights, second, liberties, and, third, immunities as well as powers. This 
implies that the concept of a right is intrinsically connected with the concept of the ‘ought’. Human 
rights, as rights, are characterized by five properties. The first is universality. The beneficiary or 
holder of human rights is every human being qua human being. Universality on the side of the 
addressees is more complex. Some human rights as, for instance, the right to life are addressed to 
all who can be addressees of duties, that is, to all human beings but also against all states and 
organisations.  
The Existence of Human Rights such as the right to participate in the process of political will-
formation, especially the right to vote, are addressed only to the state to which the holder enjoys 
citizenship or in which he resides. The second property of human rights is the fundamental 
character of their subject-matter. Human rights do not protect all conceivable sources and 
conditions of well-being but only fundamental capacities, interests, and needs. The question of 
which capacities, interests, and needs are fundamental determines the content of human rights. 
Human rights also refers to fundamental needs, interests, or capacities such as, for instance, life, 
including good health, freedom, and self-determination. The third property, too, concerns the 
subject-matter of human rights. This property is their abstractness. The right to good health is an 
example of an abstract right. It is easy to agree that all have a right to good health, but on the 
question of what that means in a concrete case, protracted controversy is possible. The distinction 
between human rights as abstract rights and their application in concrete cases will be of overriding 
significance for the question of their existence. The fourth and the fifth properties concern neither 
the holder nor the addressees nor the subject-matter of human rights but rather their validity. 
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Human rights as such have only moral validity. For that reason the fourth property of human rights 
is their morality. A right is morally valid if it can be justified against each and every one who is 
willing to take part in a rational discourse. In this sense, moral validity is universal validity. The 
universality of the structure of human rights as rights of all against, in principle, all is thus 
complemented by a universality of validity. A right that is valid is a right that exists.  
The existence of human rights consists in their justifiability, and in nothing else. To be sure, the 
moral validity of human rights can be accompanied by positive validity consisting in due 
enactment and social efficacy. Examples are the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights from December 19, 1966, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms from November 4, 1950, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
from December 7, 2000 and December 12, 2007, and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany from May 23, 1949. But such transformations of human rights into positive law never 
count as ultimate solutions. They are attempts to give institutional shape, secured by positive law, 
to what is valid solely owing to its correctness. For that reason, constitutional rights have to be 
defined as rights that have been recorded in a constitution with the intention of transforming human 
rights into positive law – the intention, in other words, of positivizing human rights (Ibid). This 
leads to the fifth property of human rights, their priority. Human rights qua moral rights cannot be 
invalidated by rules of positive law. On the contrary, human rights are standards for the assessment 
of positive law. This is to say that human rights conventions and catalogues of constitutional rights 
as well as decisions of human rights courts and decisions of constitutional courts can violate human 
rights. With this, the list of the five properties that distinguish human rights from all other rights 
is complete. Human rights are, first, universal, second, fundamental, third, abstract, and, fourth, 
moral rights that, fifth, take priority over all other norms. For the question of the existence of 
human rights, the third defining element, the morality of human rights, is of special importance. 
Rights exist if they are valid. Human rights qua moral rights are valid if they are justifiable. Thus, 
the question of the existence of human rights turns out to be the question of their justifiability.  
A justification of human rights does not require that an answer be given to all human rights 
questions. It only requires that sufficient reasons be given for what has to be balanced, that is, for 
human rights qua principles. This reduces the burden of justification considerably. If all questions 
about the assessment of claims respecting human rights had to be resolved in order to justify human 
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rights, a justification of human rights could never be achieved. According to Rawls (1993), it could 
never be achieved for in many cases balancing leads to ‘reasonable disagreement’. Human rights 
are in simple terms rights that one has by virtue of being human. They are inalienable in the sense 
that they belong to all people as a right and consideration of human rights is deeply entrenched in 
western liberalism. 
5.5.3 The scope of the principle of Justice and Equality 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. For this reason 
justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. 
It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of 
advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken 
as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of 
social interests. The modern world is a context in which wealth, power, resources, life-prospects 
are very unevenly distributed. Justice, though considered to be an individual virtue, is social in its 
application regarding obligations, rights and duties. Justice is grounded not only in morality and 
religion, but also in law and Constitutional order. It generally depicts a well-ordered society or 
State where the responsibility of the State is to ensure justice to all sections of people. Generally, 
justice means ‘joining’ and ‘fitting together’. Justice is the principle of order in political society. 
Without justice there can be no peace, because where there is no justice there can be no law. In 
western concept Justice means the existence of ideal relations among men and between men and 
the state. Equality and liberty are no doubt the deepest concern of democracy. Without fraternity, 
liberty would destroy equality and equality would destroy liberty. A democracy is more than a 
form of government. Its roots lie not in the form of Government, Parliament or otherwise. The 
roots of democracy are to be searched in the social relationship, in the terms of associated life 
between the people who form a society. The concept of justice is again rooted to the western 
liberalism and philosophical thought patterns. 
 
5.5.4 Constitutional Democratic State 
According to Rosenfeld (1994), Constitutionalism is “a three-faceted concept”, as it requires 
imposing limits on governmental powers, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of human 
rights. Constitutionalism is the antithesis of arbitrary rule. Its opposite is despotic government, the 
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government of will instead of law (McIlwain1947).  As far as democracy is concerned, its different 
definitions revolve around what Abraham Lincoln referred to as “government of the people, by the 
people and for the people” (Mangu 1987). It is a political system characterised by the participation 
in government of the people through their freely elected representatives, by the recognition and 
promotion of human and peoples’ rights, including the rights of the opposition and the minorities. 
The people are sovereign in any democratic government which is based on the rule of law 
expressing their will. Modern constitutionalism is democratic constitutionalism and modern 
democracy is a constitutional one. Britain has been generally cited as a case of democracy without 
a constitution, in ignorance of the fact that constitutionalism is as much known in Britain as it is 
in democratic countries with a supreme constitution. Britain also has a constitution, even if this 
constitution is a customary or unwritten one. Constitutionalism and democracy are so related that 
“constitutional democracy” may appear to be a tautology. Grey (1979) and Olukoshi (1999) rightly 
deplore such confusion between constitutionalism as defined earlier and written constitutions, or 
between constitutionalism and the constitution-making process. The constitution is not a novelty 
in Africa.  
Except for those people who embarked on a struggle for independence in countries like Guinea, 
Algeria, and the former Portuguese colonies, these constitutions were received from the 
former colonial powers and imposed on African people. On and after independence, the 
constitution was seen as evidence within the international community that the state deserved 
independence and it became an admission card within the club of “civilised nations”. Coups d’état 
and violent changes of government followed that honeymoon of constitutions in Africa and were 
characterised by the repeal of the previous constitutions and by the adoption of the new ones, 
which were to be repeatedly amended and violated. Unfortunately, this proliferation of 
“constitutions” throughout Africa did not usher in a paradise for constitutionalism.As Schochet 
(1979), has pointed out, “there is a closeness between constitutionalism per se and the having of a 
Constitution, a closeness that is behind the easy and frequent slippage from one to the other”. Yet, 
constitutionalism and constitutions should be distinguished. The latter refers to the form, to the 
document itself, while the former relates to the substance, to values embedded 
in the constitutional provisions. Constitutions may go with constitutionalism and vice versa but 
the rule is far from being absolute as there have been many exceptions. Constitutionalism 
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presupposes the existence of a constitution, whether written or unwritten. However, the 
opposite is not true as can be demonstrated by a brief enquiry into the political and constitutional 
history of many African countries since independence. Constitutional democracy and 
constitutionalism are distinct but related concepts. While constitutions are instruments of 
constitutionalism and elections crucial for democracy, they cannot be confused.  
With the exception of countries such as Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius, South Africa, 
Tanzania, and to some extent Namibia and Mozambique, it has been a story of failure. 
African leaders proclaimed in their national constitutions and African instruments such as the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU, 2000), the Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance (2002) and the Base Document of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM, 2003) adopted within the framework of the New Partnershipfor Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD, 2001) that they were committed to constitutional democracy and 
constitutionalism as a prerequisite for an African renaissance. Arguably, the absence of 
constitutional democracy, lack of respect for constitutionalism, and poor governance has been 
andstill remains the main cause of conflicts on the continent.There is no way to embrace the 
triumphant Afro-pessimism denying democracy, constitutionalism, and development to the 
continent. Constitutional democracy and constitutionalism also belong to Africa and are feasible 
in the continent, as they are anywhere else. However, Africans should understand that 
constitutional democracy and constitutionalism can never be given on a silver platter. 
Constitutional democracy and constitutionalism will always be the result of struggles in which 
many sacrifices will have to be made. 
5.6 The Development of Western Democracy and the Enlightenment Enterprise. 
The enlightenment period is also known as the age of reason. Its motto was the emphasis on reason 
as the judge of truth. The period challenged the medieval cosmology and ushered in a new 
dispensation characterised by freedom and independence. The concept of democracy, in its 
simplest form, can be defined using the two Greek words demos (people) and kratos (rule) that 
combine to make the word democracy, meaning “rule by the people”. This is the classical idea of 
democracy. Democracy is basically the mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules 
and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be 
that where all members of the collective enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision 
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making directly - one, that is to say, which realizes to the greatest conceivable degree the principles 
of popular control and equality in its exercise. Theories of democracy attempt to make this basic 
concept operational by prescribing the content of democracy, how democracy might be realized, 
and its institutional form.It is a fact that any of the ideas developed during the Enlightenment 
underpin elements of western liberalism today. The idea that government is a social contract 
between the state and the people, for instance, is fundamental to democracy. It is critical to note, 
however, that many of the ideas of the Enlightenment have had a negative impact since their 
elaboration in the eighteenth century. When examining how ideas influenced later events, 
historians must also consider many other causes and contingencies; we must therefore be careful 
not to ascribe to ideas more importance than is warranted. 
Many of the ideas that the philosophers of the enlightenment developed are intrinsic to modern 
democratic society, and they were often developed with the intent of creating such a society. 
English philosopher John Locke’s principles of religious tolerance, the separation of church and 
state, and the social contract, for instance, greatly influenced the Founding Fathers of the United 
States as they planned their new country. Locke’s idea of a social contract, which Rousseau in 
particular developed, was also of great importance in France both before and after the French 
Revolution. These are only two of many examples of how these ideas influenced later events. It is 
important to note that Enlightenment thinkers were not the only source of such ideas. Democratic 
institutions were in existence to some degree in England, Switzerland, and the United Province of 
the Netherlands when Rousseau elaborated his social contract. In fact, these three countries were 
important centers for printing and discussion, even though much of the discussion was about how 
to change the repressive society in France; French exiles, including both Rousseau and Voltaire, 
took refuge in these countries when the French state sought to silence them. Principles of 
democracy had also existed in ancient Greece and Rome, and were elaborated in, among other 
places, various institutions of Christian denominations. While the role of ancient and contemporary 
precedents stimulated Enlightenment thinking, the importance of the philosophers should perhaps 
be traced to their role in expressing these ideas clearly and cogently in a time and place where 
many people were interested in them and they became popularized. The elaboration of 
enlightenment ideas on democratic life have been used many times since as part of the 
philosophical underpinnings for revolutions and resistance movements. 
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Many Enlightenment thinkers argued that “enlightened despotism” was the best way to rule the 
people. According to this theory, the people could not necessarily be trusted to govern themselves 
properly. Rather, a wise and cultured prince could best determine what their needs were and govern 
accordingly. Enlightened despotism, which is also called “enlightened absolutism,” assumes that 
the ruler is an absolute monarch. Unlike repressive absolute monarchs like France’s Louis XIV. 
The philosophical argument behind the separation of church and state has had great influence in 
the formation of democratic societies. At the time, it strongly influenced some of the Founding 
Fathers, especially Thomas Jefferson. It is important to note, however, that arguments for the 
separation of church and state had particular resonance in France, where the clergy had 
traditionally supported the power of the monarchy. Though most philosophers were Christians or 
deists, they considered religion in society to be primarily for keeping people moral. In their 
opinion, the Golden Rule was the central part of all religion, and everything else was merely 
designed to attract people to hear the core message. As long as religion ensured that the people 
remained moral, the philosophes argued, it served its public purpose.The philosophers generally 
favoured reducing government control over the market, which we call “laissez-faire” economics. 
The most prominent school of laissez-faire thinkers in France were the physiocrats, who believed 
that the only real source of national wealth was agriculture. An unobstructed supply of grain in 
France would be a means of increasing total output. Their idea was to allow the price to rise, which 
would increase production. As a result of the greater grain production, prices would go back down 
and everything would balance out. In 1776 Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations, which 
forwards similar ideas.  
Enlightenment ideals underpinned the American and French Revolutions at the end of the 
eighteenth century, and some aspects of modern society. Nonetheless, a study of their impact must 
balance the importance of ideas with other factors. Enlightenment ideals underpinned the 
American and French Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century, and some aspects of modern 
society. Nonetheless, a study of their impact must balance the importance of ideas with other 
factors. Enlightenment ideas about democracy, in particular the idea that government is a social 
contract, have become very influential as the number of democratic societies has increased. Some 
Enlightenment thinkers espoused enlightened despotism, in which a wise and cultured ruler 
determines the needs of his people and acts accordingly. Enlightenment thinkers advocated the 
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separation of church and state as an ideal. Enlightenment philosophers also developed their ideas 
about how civilizations came about, and in so doing provided a justification for considering 
Western Europe (sometimes including the European colonies in the United States) as the pinnacle 
of civilization. This provided some of the philosophical backing for European imperialism and 
colonialism for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
5.6.1 The Western Democratic Theory and its Focus 
In many of the new democracies that have emerged during the past two decades - what Samuel 
Huntington has called the “third wave” of global democratization - competitive elections do not 
ensure liberty, responsiveness, and a rule of law. To varying but often alarming degrees, human 
rights are flagrantly abused; ethnic and other minorities suffer not only discrimination but 
murderous violence; power is heavily if not regally concentrated in the executive branch; and 
parties, legislators, executives and judicial systems are thoroughly corrupt. In such countries, 
democracy - if we can call it that - will not become broadly valued, and thus consolidated, unless 
it also becomes more liberal, transparent, and institutionalized. In these circumstances, governing 
elites must be made accountable to one another and to the people, not only in theory but in fact. 
And institutions must be constructed or reformed to ensure that this will happen. In such 
circumstances of entrenched corruption and repression, the elites who come to govern have a stake 
in the existing system - and those who favor real reform are too weak to accomplish it by 
themselves (Gutmann and Thompson 2004). Students of democratic development should not 
ignore the serious problems of democratic functioning in the United States, Western Europe, and 
Japan: the deeply corrosive influence of big money in politics; the political alienation of large and 
in some countries growing segments of the population; the decline of political parties as effective 
instruments of interest articulation and aggregation, and the waning of popular attachment to them; 
the entrenchment of a culture of entitlements that is fiscally unsustainable; the rising hostility to 
immigrants and outsiders.  
In some of these respects, the mass public itself - in its expectations and patterns of behavior - 
constitutes a major source of the problem. But when the decay of democratic institutions is 
accompanied by (or even provokes) growing public disengagement from politics, democracy may 
settle into a low-level equilibrium that persists until it is shaken by genuine crisis. In the absence 
of such fiscal or political crisis, political leaders themselves typically cannot muster the will, 
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courage or power to bring about change on their own. They need the stimulus and the support of a 
mobilized public. Dryzek (2000), notes that, “The public” - like “the people” - is a concept that is 
diffused, and easily misused or abused. Politicians invoke it for their own ends. According to 
Bohman (1999), contemporary democratic theory, therefore, has focused itself on the task of 
creating deliberative forums in which the discourse will treat all views equally and will be equally 
acceptable to all who take part. The creation of such forums would then signify the achievement 
of democracy, because these forums would effectively nullify the impact of any unequal power 
relations prevailing in the broader society, and would ensure that any viewpoint with convincing 
reasons behind it can influence the direction of policymaking. 
According to Dewey (1935)’s democratic theory a commitment to deliberative practices 
diminishes democratic theory’s capacity to account for the effects of unequal social status on 
political interactions. It is central to Dewey’s thought that political democracy (i.e., a democratic 
process for evaluating and selecting policies to be enacted by a people’s government) cannot be 
achieved in isolation from the presence of vast social and economic inequality. Dewey also notes 
that, even apart from its effect on political processes, this inequality is also simply a direct threat 
to the foundational purpose of democracy: allowing all individuals, as much as possible, to 
exercise some control over their lives (Ibid). Dewey (1935) postulates that, we must be aware of 
constantly changing threats to the capacity of individuals to exercise control over their lives, and 
of how these threats relate not only to the quality of political, policymaking debates, but also to 
our broader social relations. Dewey does want honest deliberation characterized by fair inquiry 
into different policy proposals, but he criticizes the attempt to focus primarily on the quality of 
policy debate in the face of structural social inequality; and further, he himself supported and even 
participated in such practices as marches, protests, and strikes (i.e., non-deliberative practices) 
aimed at redressing the various social inequalities he confronted in his time, and this exhibits a 
recognition that deliberative reason-giving should not be automatically equated with 
democratization (Ibid).  
Rather than associating democracy with a process in which the people’s aggregate preferences are 
simply weighed against each other in a vote, deliberative democrats connect democracy with a 
policy debate in which those involved in the debate exchange reasons for their various policy 
positions. Within such a debate, the deliberators are to give reasons that could be endorsed by their 
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opponents in the debate. To the extent that deliberators exchange these types of reasons, the theory 
goes, the resulting policy decisions will have democratic quality because everyone involved has 
been treated respectfully, has had the opportunity to articulate their views and to challenge others’, 
and has had the policy decisions justified to them with reasons they can accept. According to 
deliberative theorists, this use of reason-giving can ensure that policy decisions are not affected by 
broader power relations prevailing outside the deliberative forum, and that policy decisions are 
determined simply by who makes the most convincing argument. Reason-giving is also meant to 
ensure equality of opportunity to influence policy outcomes, in that all deliberators are equally 
required to give reasons for their policy proposals, and all proposals are equally subject to being 
challenged by others (Dryzek. 2007). 
According to Dewey (1927) the idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be 
exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes of human 
association, the family, the school, industry, religion.” In Dewey’s theory, then, there are political 
obstacles to democracy, such as the disproportionate influence of powerful economic interests over 
the candidates who are selected to hold office, and over the policies produced by government. And, 
there are also threats to self-government coming from the quality of social relations, such as vast 
economic inequality and undemocratic relationships in the workplace. Dewey holds that these 
social threats to self-government affect individuals’ capacity to govern their lives at least as much 
as political institutions do, and that these social threats also inevitably affect political institutions 
in an undemocratic way (Ibid).  Dewey recognizes that poverty and other instances of social 
inequality are affected by policy outputs from political forums, and that if the policymaking 
process is effectively controlled by wealth, then there will not likely be policies that benefit the 
poor (Ibid).  
5.6.2 Western Democracy as a Market Society 
As alluded to earlier on, democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece. Athenian democracy 
had a specific history of a struggle against the absolute rule of monarchs. It was developed over a 
long period of transition from feudalism to capitalism. In the Ekklesia(Citizen Assembly) which 
was the epic symbol of Athenian Democracy comprising thousands of adult male citizens, 
members voted on every issue - direct democracy prevailed. In the Boule, the penultimate organ 
of the Greek democracy determination was by random lot and not election and amongst the many 
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compelling reasons for this was to ensure that decision making and participation was not 
influenced by money and also to avoid a permanent set of elites that took politics as a career as we 
see today. Finally in the Dikasteria(court), membership was open to adults of moral standing and 
reward for a sitting was no more than what an ordinary labourer would earn in a day because in 
the ancient city of Athens, citizens did not pay tax.  
It also made this a service and not an avenue to make money as politics is today. All this is said, 
not because too much time must be spent in ancient history, but because some simple points must 
be made - that circumstances at any point in time shape practice. Athenian democracy was a 
response to centuries of rule by oligarchies and after the successful resistance against the Persian 
onslaught on Greece in 490 BC, ordinary people who were instrumental in the resistance struggles 
demanded a greater say in the affairs of the city and so a progressive aristocrat called Epilates 
presided over a radicalization of power that shifted the balance decisively to the poorest sections 
of society. Ordinary citizens in their thousands thus became the decision makers in the Ekklesia 
that met at least 40 times a year. A few lessons to pick from this brief peep into history; first that 
democracy was dictated by history and response to specific circumstances; second, democracy was 
about direct participation and not overt delegation; thirdly, democracy was about negotiation and 
not a blue print. The key contemporary feature of liberal democracy is the assumption that with 
free and fair elections, an electorate of age will exercise oversight over leaders voted and given 
authority to act in trust of the public and rule the electorate in ways determined by the latter. In 
many respects, by participating, voters surrender some rights over decision making to the so called 
elected representatives, who are well known all across the world, be it in Africa, in Europe or in 
America to wine and dine while the majority wake up every day to struggle to eke a living, some 
wallowing in dire poverty. 
Liberal democracy posits a struggle to govern society by supposedly opposed interests or 
formations. The assumption here is that political partiesare the proxy representation of alternative 
ideologies and programmes for societal wellbeing. Multi-partyism is held as the most ideal way in 
which genuine options are provided for the electorate. However, as we all know, this is the least 
true, for even in America, some things otherwise considered primordial such as physique, facial 
looks, how one talks, and other such considerations compete with ideology. This is partly because 
people over emphasize difference and celebrate competition over cooperation.  
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Liberal democracy is about representationrather than direct participation, as in ancient Greece. The 
argument here is that, there is not enough space and capacity to deal with mass jurisdiction and 
decision making and yet at the same time when voting for representatives, people are calling for 
mass participation and spend many days preparing for elections and participating in them! It is 
highly debatable whether representative democracy is possible at all and yet often it is reduced to 
elite rule and tyranny over the majority for if people consider policy and decision making as a 
process that considers ‘inputs’ - citizen views, ‘with-inputs’ elite judgment and finally ‘outputs’ in 
terms of policies and programmes in response to citizen demands, they realize that the ‘with-
inputs’ are most critical and therefore represents in some ways, a ‘coup’ by the elite.  
Democracy spread because it had been rendered meaningless and innocuous without losing its 
symbolic value, and while it spread, the world was even more repressive (Ake, 1996:5). In Africa, 
argues Ake, the elite supported democracy only as a means to power, while international agencies 
supported it as an asset to structural adjustment and as a result, states in Africa got trapped between 
the demands of external donors for economic liberalization on the one hand, and the needs of 
political majorities on the other, leading to the creation of ‘exclusionary democracies’, which allow 
for political competition, but can’t respond to majority demands in a meaningful way. The second 
premise is that liberal democracy is not relevant to Africa’s historical and socio-economic 
circumstances as it’s specific history as we saw in the previous section is far from representing the 
African problem. In his words, Claude Ake observed that: 
The political arrangement of liberal democracy makes little sense in Africa. Liberal 
democracy assures individualism but there is little individualism in Africa...it assumes 
abstract universalism, but in Africa that would apply only to the urban environment, and 
finally political parties of liberal democracy do not make sense in societies where 
associational life is rudimentary and interest groups are essentially primary groups ... Ake 
argued that African Democracy in a collective social sense offered a form of political 
participation that was different from and superior to liberal democracy - because the 
African notion of participation did not rest on the assumption of individualism or conflict 
of interest but on the social nature of human beings. Liberal democracy is deemed 
irrelevant because it is looked at as the political correlate of advanced capitalism (Ake, 
1994).  
Nyamnjoh (2005) for instance argues that the greatest shortcoming of liberal democracy is its 
exaggerated focus on the autonomous individual, a reality which is contrary to Africa’s dominant 
communal spirit. He argues that Africans continue to emphasize relationships and solidarities over 
200 
 
the illusion of autonomy and that for democracy to succeed in this context, it must recognize the 
fact that most Africans are primarily patriotic to their home village, to which the state and country 
in the modern sense are secondary. Questioning the appropriateness of the neo-liberal democracy 
in Africa, Nyamnjoh (2005:25) observed that: 
implementing liberal democracy in Africa has been like trying to force onto a body of a 
fully figured person, rich in cultural indicators of health with which Africans are familiar, 
dress made to fit a slim, de-fleshed Hollywood consumer model of a Barbie-doll 
entertainment icon…then when the dress fails to fit the African body, instead of blaming 
the tiny dress or its designer, the tradition has been to fault the popular body for 
emphasizing too much bulk, for parading the wrong sizes, for just not being the right thing. 
Not often is the experience of the designer or dress maker questioned. Such high levels of 
insensitivity is akin to the behavior of a Lilliputian undertaker who would rather trim a 
corpse than expand a coffin to accommodate a man-mountain or a carpenter whose only 
tool is a hammer and to whom every problem is a nail…’ 
 
5.6.3 Primacy of the Constitution and Separation of Powers 
Constitutions are made because there is need to define the nature of the system of government the 
people have chosen. Whilst the definition of the nature of the system of government and 
distribution of the powers of the state to be exercised by the government are important aspects of 
constitution making one of the fundamental principles is the rule of law. Constitutionalism does 
not only require that all people living under a constitution must obey those of its tenets that are 
binding on them, it also requires that every decision made on behalf of the state must be in 
accordance with an existing and valid law. Separation of powers is a fundamental principle on 
which any constitutional and democratic system of government is based. On its basis the 
powers of the state to be exercised by the government are divided into legislative, executive and 
judicial. The powers are vested separately in the institutions created for the purposes of exercising 
them. The powers are related but to be kept separate. All the powers constituting judicial authority 
are vested in the courts and must be exercised by the judiciary because it is their duty to administer 
justice.  
In Book XI of the Spirit of Laws (1748) Montesquieu states: “Again, there is no liberty if the 
judiciary power be not separated from the legislature and executive. Were it joined with the 
legislature, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge 
would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with 
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violence and aggression. There would be an end of everything, were the same man and the same 
body, whether of nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that 
of executing public resolutions and of trying the causes of individuals.” It is not enough that the 
judiciary is separated from the legislative and the executive branches of government. They must 
be independent from the two branches of government in the sense that the latter should not interfere 
in the exercise by the judiciary of judicial authority in the administration of justice. 
Judicial independence is a requirement demanded by the Constitution, not in the personal interests 
of the judiciary, but in the public interest, for without that protection judges may not be, or be seen 
by the public to be, able to perform their duties without fear or favour. Conceptually, judicial 
independence has been defined in various ways. Admittedly, the principle is very extensive and 
complex and this creates enormous definitional difficulties. However, the common thread that runs 
through the various definitions is that judicial independence exists at two levels: firstly, at an 
individual level – the ability of a judge to impartially and independently apply his or her mind to 
a matter without undue influence; and secondly, at an institutional level – the ability of the 
judiciary to control the administration and appointment of court staff. Considering whether judicial 
protection is sufficient in the South African context is the task of this article. In making that 
determination, we begin from the premise that judicial independence entails the ability of a judge 
to make a decision without undue influence and interference from internal and external forces. 
Moreover, the judge must have security of tenure and financial security in order to guard against 
bribery and related interference and corrupt conduct. Judicial independence is often understood to 
refer to institutional and decisional independence of the judiciary. Decisional independence is the 
idea that judicial officers should be able to decide cases solely based on the law and facts without 
letting the media, politics or other concerns sway their decisions and without fearing penalty in 
their careers for their decisions. Institutional independence means that the judicial branch is 
independent from the legislative and executive branches of government as a consequence of the 
operation of the principle of separation of powers. 
5.6.4 Equality before the Law 
Equality before the law is one of the most fundamental tenets of democracy. Justice is the 
foundation of moral order and justice is related with equality. Justice is to be secured through 
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Equity signifies equality. In a nutshell, justice is simply another 
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name for liberty, equality and fraternity. Unlimited liberty destroyed equality and absolute equality 
left no room for liberty. Equality is one of the most fundamental values of democracy. The extent 
to which power is exercised in a democracy to a greater extent points to equality before the law. 
The law has no respect for persons and every citizen regardless of political power is and must of 
necessity be a law abiding citizen. We have witnessed many instances whereby the politicians have 
failed to observe the law and refuse to hand over power, the case in point is Zimbabwe’s former 
President Robert Gabriel Mugabe. The most flagrant abuse of the concept of equality before the 
law was witnessed when the military usurped power from the civilian leadership through a coup 
de tat. Evidence abounds in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea. Niger, Ivory Coast, 
democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville to mention just but a few. Equality before 
the law means, the law is not applied selectively but each and every citizens has unfettered access 
to the law without limitations. The extent to which a state is democratic is determined by the way 
the law protects its citizens. 
5.6.5 Competition for Political power 
In a democracy and according to the western liberal paradigm, competition for political power is 
determined by elections. These periodic elections are a cornerstone for democratic practice.  
Competition for political power is characterised by periodic elections which are held to choose the 
president. This tradition is rooted in multi-party democracy where competition for political power 
is done by selling the best ideology to the electorate. It is the right of the voters to choose a political 
party with best political policies that will benefit them. The power of the rulers is derived from the 
consent of the ruled. The electoral field  according to the western liberal tradition must be free 
meaning to say candidates aspiring for political positions of leadership must be free to campaign 
and launch their political parties without institutional strictures or hurdles,. Thus freedom of 
expression must be guaranteed by the constitution and the law must protect all the people 
competing for political office. Both the opposition parties and ruling parties must have equal 
opportunities to access the levers of political power without hindrances created by their 
competitors. The rule of law and the global indicators of good governance such as observance of 
human rights; freedom of expression; freedom of association; transparency; and accountability 
must be guaranteed in a constitutional democracy. According to Bush (2010:71), Freedom works, 
freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on earth: through 
free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state.” 
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He further argues that “for the first time this century we don’t have to talk late at night about which 
form of government is better. We don’t have to wrest justice from the Kings, but we only have to 
summon it from within ourselves. We must act on what we know. I take as my guide the hope of 
a saint: In crucial things, unity; in important things, diversity; in all things, generosity” (Ibid). 
Competition for political power in a free and transparent way is one of the cornerstones of western 
liberal democracy. 
5.7 The Forms of Liberalism 
Liberalism as a political ideology takes different versions and forms in different contexts. In the 
researcher’s view, different forms of liberalism are a result of futile attempts to universalise 
Western liberalism in unique cultural contexts, a situation which variously influence different 
meanings assigned to this Western ideology. But, owing to fundamental ideas that liberalism 
represents which are also universally important to humanity, there are two broad categories of 
interest to this study through which, as discussed below, this philosophy is often understood. 
Generally, these ideas as noted earlier relate to liberty and equality of which the former features 
strongly in classical liberalism and the latter in modern liberalism (see Russell, 2000; Gray, 1995).  
5.7.1 Contouring Classical liberalism 
Sometimes called nineteenth century liberalism, classical liberalism was the earliest liberal 
tradition and political philosophy developed during the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
which was founded on egoistical ideas of individual liberties. It represents Galston’s (2002) 
principle of expressive liberty that, as already highlighted allows individuals to lead lives in 
accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value. Those who have 
defended classical liberal values appeal to classical theories and doctrines that include natural 
rights (Locke, 1632-1704 and Jefferson, 1743-1826), utilitarianism (Bentham and Mill, 1748-
1832), and economic liberalism (Smith and Ricardo, 1770-1823). These doctrines are the key 
values of classical liberalism that highlight its concern on the nature and limits of the power that 
can be legitimately exercised by the state over the individual.  
The above progenitors of classical liberalism conceptualized human beings as rationally self-
interested creatures who have a pronounced capacity for self-reliance so much so that they were 
all committed to individualism, liberty and equal rights (Heywood, 2007). They also believed in 
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what is called negative freedom where liberty is seen as the absence of interference from 
government and from other individuals. Here individuals are considered free insofar as they are 
left alone. Instead, all people should have the freedom to develop their own unique abilities and 
capacities without external constraints or being coerced or sabotaged by others. In this tradition, 
society is thus seen to be consisting of atomistic self-sufficient individuals.  
At its heart, classical liberalism places emphasis on limiting the power of the state over individuals 
who are entitled to natural rights and freedoms such as thought and expression, association and 
assembly among others. In defence of people’s liberties, Mill (1859) viewed free discourse as a 
necessary condition for intellectual and social progress and therefore called social liberty which 
could only be brought by protection of individuals from the tyranny of political rulers through 
constitutionalism. For Mills, social liberty meant limits on the ruler's power through obtaining 
recognition of political liberties or rights. In this light, the state is considered as a necessary evil in 
that it lays down the conditions for orderly existence while imposing a collective will on society 
thereby limiting the freedom of individuals. For Locke (1632-1704), a limited state to act only as 
a ‘night-watchman’ is thus desired. Human rights relate to entitlements to act or be treated in a 
particular way that individuals have by virtue of being autonomous. They are thought to establish 
the essential conditions for leading a truly human existence (Heywood, 2007). 
The other doctrine of classical liberalism is economic liberalism, an economic theory developed 
by political economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo (1770-1823) as a reaction to mercantilism, 
a school of economic thought that emphasises the state’s role in managing international trade. 
Smith argued that the economy works best when it is devoid of government restrictions, but as a 
market operating according to the wishes and decisions of free individuals. Here, freedom within 
the markets means the ability of business to choose what goods to make, the ability of workers to 
choose an employer, and the ability of consumers to choose what goods or services to buy 
(Heywood, 2007). Market forces are considered as necessary to promote economic wellbeing as 
no single producer will be able to set price for commodities but by the forces of demand and 
supply. It is from this perspective that markets should be free from government interference, an 
idea that became orthodoxy in the United Kingdom and United States of America during the 
nineteenth century. Classical liberalists thus have a high regard for a self-regulating economy and 
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civil society which are considered as a realm of freedom as compared to the state which is a realm 
of coercion.  
Lastly, utilitarianism, propounded by Jeremy Bentham as an alternative to the idea of human rights 
suggests that individuals are motivated by self-interest which can be defined as the desire for 
pleasure or happiness and the wish to avoid pain. Good is equated with pleasure or happiness and 
evil with pain or unhappiness, all calculated in terms of utility or use-value. Here, each individual 
is seen as able to perceive his or her own best interest, something that cannot be done on their 
behalf by some paternal authority such as the state. However, when applied to society at large this 
principle downplays individualism by having majoritarian implications as it uses the happiness of 
the greatest number as a standard of what is morally correct. Here it allows that the interest of the 
majority outweighs those of the minority or the rights of an individual (Vincent, 2010). Be that as 
it may, classical liberalism is strongly associated with individualism which is strengthened by the 
popularisation of the natural or human rights and freedoms discourse.  
There are various issues levelled against classical liberalism. One issue relevant to this study is the 
reproach that classical liberalism as advocated by such liberals as Mill creates societies that are 
populated by autonomous or self-determining moral agents who are driven solely by self-interest 
and have no duty to others but only to themselves. This becomes problematic in African societies 
whose universe is built upon the principles of coexistence due to the interpersonal quality of 
humanity (Murove, 2009). The world-view here considers community as an essential aspect of 
personhood as persons as viewed as relational beings: persons exist only in relation to other 
persons (Murove, 2009; Shutte, 2009).It is worth noting, however, that although Mill initially 
supported free markets and argued that progressive taxation penalised those who worked harder, 
he later altered his views in support of some socialist causes that saw him proposing government 
interventions such as co-operative wage system to protect workers not least because within a free-
market economy the relationship between employers and employees are voluntary and contractual. 
5.7.2 The tenets of Modern liberalism 
Also known as twentieth century liberalism (Heywood, 2007), modern liberalism was influenced 
by the economic downturns marshalled by changes in people’s lives introduced by further 
developments of industrialisation. It consists of the following values: individuality, positive 
freedom, economic management and welfare state. While industrialisation had brought about 
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massive expansion of wealth for others, it was also accompanied by a widened social inequality 
characterised by poverty, disease, unemployment; developments which led to the agitation of 
organised labour in Western industrial cities and made implausible the ideal of the self-made 
individual who through hard work and talent could make his or her place in the world (Vincent, 
2010; Heywood, 2007).The worldwide Great Depression, starting in 1929, hastened the 
discrediting of liberalism (following its defeat in Russia by the Communists in 1917, in Italy by 
Mussolini’s dictatorship in 1922, as well as in Poland, Spain, Japan in the 1920s and 30s) and 
strengthened calls for state control over economic affairs. Liberalists thus found it progressively 
more difficult to maintain the belief that the arrival of industrial capitalism had brought with it 
prosperity and liberty for all. They realised that formal or official guarantees of individual rights 
are irrelevant when individuals lack the material means to benefit from those rights.   
According to Young (2002) modern liberals then rethought their attitude towards the state and 
called for government control in the administration of economic affairs as well as encouraging 
willingness by people to contribute larger proportions of private resources to create social balance 
that can result in the welfare of others. Greater government intervention, as Gray (1995) notes, 
was supported by a former liberalist and sociologist Thomas Hill Green (1836-82) who realised 
that the unrestrained pursuit of profit had given rise to new forms of poverty and social injustice. 
He observed that alcohol abuse, a culture that was associated with poor economic conditions, could 
enslave individuals and believed that the state could intervene to foster and protect the social, 
political and economic environments in which individuals will have the best chance of acting 
according to their consciences. Here the state’s intervention was legitimate only to the extent that 
it upholds a system of rights and obligations that is most likely to foster individual self-realization 
(Gray, 1995). Essentially, modern liberalism thus supports a welfare state that has government 
control over economic affairs so much so that state services and provisions are fairly distributed 
to ensure equal rights. 
Unlike classical liberalism which values negative individualism, modern liberalism is founded on 
ideas of positive freedom or individualism. According to Green, based on common humanity 
individuals have sympathy for one another and are concerned for the interests and welfare of 
others. An individual is conceived here in communitarian terms as possessing not only individual 
but also social responsibilities so much so that one is linked to the other by ties of empathy and 
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caring (Green, 1836-82). Green also believed that the notion of equality need to ensure not only 
equality under the law, but also the equal distribution of material resources that individuals 
required to develop their aspirations in life (Young, 2002) while others privilege equality before 
the law, claiming that no one is inherently entitled to enjoy the benefits of liberal society more 
than anyone else. It is the former idea that led to the establishment of liberalism as a key and 
popular component in the expansion of the welfare state especial in Europe and North America 
(Schlesinger, 1956).That the poverty, squalor, and ignorance in which many people lived was an 
impediment for freedom and individuality is a reality that dawned upon modern liberals who then 
believed that poor economic conditions could be ameliorated by a welfare-oriented and 
interventionist state (Heywood, 2007; Gray, 1995). For these liberals, individual liberty was 
achievable only under favourable social and economic circumstances. 
Here it is also apposite to highlight that despite all the variations on liberalism noted in the 
foregoing, they all assume that individuals are equal as they all possess the same right to liberty. 
However, in modern liberalism, there is emphasis on positive liberty or freedom which recognises 
that freedom can be threatened by social disadvantage and inequality. Green challenged the 
classical notion of negative liberty which simply removes external constraints on the individual, 
giving him or her freedom of choice. But when this liberty is applied by businesses that wish to 
maximise profits, it may result in the hiring of the cheapest labour possible such as children. That 
negative liberty can lead to exploitation, makes freedom of choice in the market place an 
inadequate conception of individual freedom (Heywood, 2007). It is precisely because of this 
argument that protection by the state of individuals from social evils that threaten to cripple their 
lives is justified.  
The above values have been promoted globally especially by the United States of America, 
European Union and the United Nations under the banner of democracy and human rights (see 
Brown, 2013; Crawford, 2010). If liberalism and modern African nationalism both assert the same 
values listed above; it is therefore plausible to suggest that the interface between these two 
ideologies lies nowhere other than in the principles of democracy.  This analysis leads to another 
debatable notion of the relationship between nationalism and democracy (see Fukuyama, 1992; 
Nodia, 1992). While the study does not subscribe to the notion that nationalism and democracy 
are mutually exclusive, or that African nationalism was born out of Western enlightenment or 
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nationalism, this study has no intention to engage in this debate. The study is again neither 
interested in value judgements on which between the two is better or worse than the other, nor the 
extent to which nation states adhere to these principles. What this chapter seeks to accomplish is 
to provide an analysis on how the two ideologies interface. 
Probably due to Western dominance over the whole world, a scenario which may be attributed to 
colonisation of Africa as well as liberal triumph during the Cold War, the fundamental elements 
of contemporary African states are organised around the ideals of modern African nationalism 
which also find expression or feature strongly in the notion of liberal democracy. It is unarguable 
that the establishment in post-colonial Africa of constitutional governments and parliamentary 
authorities that prize important individual freedoms, independent judiciary, and abolition of 
kingdoms would never have been realised had it not been for African nationalism.  
But at the same time, from the signing of the ‘Great Charter of the Liberties’ popularly known the 
Magna Carta Libertatum by King John of England on 15 June 1215, liberal values in the West 
were concretised in several seminal documents including the 1787 constitution of the United States 
of America which established a national government with separation of the executive, legislature, 
and judiciary. Its subsequent ten amendments known as the United States Bill of Rights provide 
for some of the natural rights and liberties espoused by liberal thinkers discussed in the previous 
sections. Here it is important to note that the writing of the American constitution was occasioned 
by a revolution which culminated in the writing of Declaration of Independence (Jefferson, 1776) 
which holds that “all men are created equal, and are endowed by their creator with certain 
unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. The US 
example is pertinent here because even today, the country, alongside the European Union, claim 
to represent universal democracy. 
5.8 Conclusion 
In light of the foregoing discussion on the forms of liberalism, it is evident that liberal thought in 
its various morphologies represented a standing protest to established government, a tendency that 
moved from demands for life, property, free speech, political self-determination and religious 
freedom into claims for minorities, racial groups, women and the poor.  All of the above aspects 
of liberalism exhibit definite and fundamental conceptions and objectives of modern African 
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nationalism discussed in the previous chapter. Modern African Nationalism has been described as 
a form of anti-colonial nationalism or pan-Africanism which is often traced to the emergence of a 
new class of educated Africans who, with the support of different social/economic groups with 
own interests to protect, forged alliances in initiatives directed toward securing greater political 
rights and independence for their colonised African states. 
The objectives of modern African nationalism as presented in the previous chapter are indeed no 
different from the values of the above standing protest to established western governments 
discussed in the foregoing as Western liberalism. In fact, modern African nationalism asserts its 
roots in the following core liberal values which stress not only the self determination by nations 
(absolute sovereignty of the national state) but also individual liberties such as political, economic 
and religious within each nation state. This chapter has attempted to discuss the development of 
western liberal democracy as well as highlighting its main tenets and impact on the development 
of democracy. Liberalism in the political sphere cannot be a simple application of individual 
liberty, because decisions have to be taken collectively and are binding to all. Political liberalism 
means, that individual citizens are free to vote for representatives of their choice and to form 
voluntary associations to promote their ideas and interests in the realm of collective decision 
making. In contemporary democracy, even in the context of Africa, it means adoption of 
constitutional procedures for limiting government power and making it accountable to citizens. 
Western liberalism also derives from the practise of adversariality in European political and 
economic life, a process in which institutionalised competition, such as the competition between 
different political parties in electoral contests between prosecution and defence in adversary 
procedure, or between different producers in a market economy- generates a dynamic social order 
(http://www.britannica.com). The adversariality refers to the conviction that human beings are 
essentially rational creatures capable of settling their political disputes through dialogue and 
compromise. This aspect of liberalism became politically prominent 20th century projects aimed 
at eliminating war and resolving disagreements between states through organisations such as the 
League of Nations, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. Having said the 
above, an analysis of African nationalism points to the attempt by African philosophers to chart 
an ideological pathway that is counterpoised to western liberalism, or a kind of epistemic 
disobedience or border thinking although the epistemological foundations are rooted in western 
liberalism. A critical analysis of the philosophical ideas of African nationalist points to the fact 
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that the ideas propagated by western philosophers were borrowed by the nationalists as they were 
advancing the cause of liberation and independence of Africa. Ideas such as equality, justice, 
universal suffrage and freedom all borrowed from western philosophers also became cornerstones 
of the African nationalist struggle. The next chapter discusses constructive African post-colonial 
critics and deomocracy by consensus alternative.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONSTRUCTIVE AFRICAN POST-COLONIAL CRITICS AND 
DEMOCRACY BY CONSENSUS ALTERNATIVE 
6.1 Introduction 
The African continent has been subjected to many external changes that have affected the religion, 
culture and systems of governance in significant ways. The conquests, colonization, the slave 
trade, Arabic and European cultural elements,Islam and Christianity and recently the spread of 
consumerist society have all transformed Africa. Colonialism used the denial of African history to 
establish the necessity of westerners to bring innovation and western liberal democratic systems 
of governance. However, colonization obstructed the internal process of state formation and the 
development in Africa and left scars of political instability and impoverishment. However, the 
post-colonial African state has discovered that the prescriptive western systems of governance in 
Africa were not entirely new in Africa but rather were deeply rooted in the pre-colonial African 
societies 
This chapter attempts to proffer a constructive African post-colonial paradigm of democracy by 
consensus within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. It is a fact that for democracy to succeed in 
Africa, there is need to appreciate the fact that African societies have different traditions and 
cultures that shape their ways of life. That being the case, Africa’s history, culture and beliefs 
should shape its way of life. In this chapter, the argument is made that owing to its history, socio-
economic development status and differentiated conditioning, it is important that Africa negotiates 
a form of democracy that most suits its context. The key thesis is that Africa does not have to 
struggle to meet standards of liberal democracy because that has its own history and logic. Instead 
Africa should invest time on modeling democracy in a fashion that builds on contextual realities 
while tapping from the African traditional religions and culture. It is presumed that, this is the way 
in which Africa would find its own way, one not without problems, but which will be closer to its 
realities. This is a process that need the resuscitation and acknowledgement of the fact that African 
traditional systems of political governance and democracy are not an anti-thesis of the western 
democratic paradigms. Thus similarities can be drawn and areas of convergence must be used in 
order to reconstruct contextually relevant democratic systems that are rooted in the authentic 
African systems and expressed explicitly in terms of indigenous African knowledge systems, 
categories, thought patterns, and nuances. 
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6.2 Link between traditional systems of governance and western democratic values 
Traditionalism as a school of thought in the discourse on the state of democracy in Africa frowns 
at the way democracy is practiced today in the continent. For this school, democracy as currently 
practiced in Africa can neither be sustained, nor can it solve the bulk of the crises besetting the 
continent. The apologists of this orientation have sympathy for an indigenous democratic system, 
which they believe is more natural to African culture. They have put forward different arguments 
to establish that the Western idea of democracy, which is gaining currency in contemporary Africa, 
should be jettisoned in lieu of the indigenous democratic culture. Some of the prominent 
representatives of this school of thought are Wambia dia Wamba, Marie P. Eboh, Francis Offor 
and Kwasi Wiredu. Before elucidating the arguments of these scholars, it is important to have an 
understanding of the governance systems of pre-colonial Africa. In a bid to justify the imposition 
of “civilized government” on their colonial territories, European imperialists characterized African 
pre-colonial political structures as autocratic and oppressive. Nevertheless, that conception was 
grossly inaccurate for many traditional African societies.  
In the case of the Yoruba in Nigeria for instance, an investigation into their socio-cultural history 
will reveal the democratic structure of their political-cultural heritage, evident in their process of 
choosing leadership, the principle of checks and balances, the kingdom structure, their recognition 
of and respect for rights and freedoms, and representational and participatory features of political 
organizations and social ordering. This is despite the fact that at the surface, it is arguable that the 
traditional Yoruba system of governance was monarchical, since it was headed by an individual. 
Using Tangwa’s expression, governance in pre-colonial Yoruba society was a synthesis of “the 
autocratic dictatorship and popular democracy”, as traditional Yoruba kingdoms exhibited a 
balance of authority and democracy (Tangwa 1998:2). An anthropological description of the 
traditional Yoruba governance system may suffice. Pre-colonial Yoruba societies were kingdom 
based. Each of the kingdoms comprised a central town and several villages. The ruler of the whole 
kingdom is called the Oba (king). A subordinate ruler, called Baale (village head) ruled each of 
the subordinate towns and villages and acknowledged the sovereignty of the king. Every town was 
divided into quarters, and each quarter was under the control of a quarter chief. Each quarter was 
made up of many large family compounds each of which housed many nuclear families (a nuclear 
family being a man and his wife or wives and their children) all of whom claimed descent from 
213 
 
one ancestor (Akintoye 2009: 1). The leader or head of a family compound is called Olori ebi 
(family head). Each of these stratifications is interconnected with the other with respective internal 
governments. The choice of who governs at these various levels is done through democratic means. 
The choice of the Baale and the Olori ebi is mostly based on age and prominence in the ancestral 
tree of the village or compound, and each has a number of royal families from which the Oba is 
chosen (Salami 2006, 69). The family group in every compound was the nucleus of the Yoruba 
traditional system of government. The compound had a corporate existence recognized by the 
whole society, with their family property rights and duties. There were usually frequent meetings 
where issues concerning the affairs of all members of the family group were deliberated upon. The 
family head, exercising his judicial authority with other elderly members of the family, settled 
disputes within its nuclear families, between nuclear families, and between individuals in the 
compound. Some family groups, in the course of the history of their town, became vested with 
chieftaincy titles. At the death of the family group member who held such a title, the family group 
meeting had to choose his successor (even though his power as chief went beyond the family 
compound); and the family group would then hand him over to the king for the investiture 
(Akintoye 2009: 2).  
During family compound meetings, every member had full rights to express his views. In fact, it 
was one of the most important duties of the Family Head and the elders to ensure, not only that 
every member’s opinion was heard, but also that every member was encouraged to express 
opinion. Participation was regarded as every member’s duty, and any member who habitually 
failed to honor that duty risked becoming obnoxious in the compound. In the exercise of their 
powers and judicial authority in their quarters, quarter chiefs were supposed to consult the leaders 
of the family compounds regularly. Even at the highest levels of government, in the palace, 
leadership at the family compounds was treated as a very important level of authority. The title of 
king was hereditary in the royal family group. So too were the titles of village heads and quarter 
chiefs in their own particular family groups (Akintoye 2009:3).  
Nevertheless, in the appointment of a king, the Yoruba political system was decidedly democratic. 
When a king died, he was not automatically succeeded by his son as in many other monarchical 
systems. Instead, candidates for Obaship would emerge from the royal families, involving all male 
members of the royal family group. Thus sons (and even grandsons) of former kings, were eligible 
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for selection as king. When they emerged, they were all treated as equal candidates to the stool, 
hence subject to the same rules and treatment. The power to carry out the selection on behalf of 
the people was vested in a standing committee of chiefs, now known as the Council of Kingmakers, 
in consultation with the Ifa oracle, who guides and authenticates the Council of kingmakers in their 
selection process. The Council of Kingmakers was all-powerful in this matter of selecting a king. 
Yet the decisions were not arbitrary, as there were laid down principles and norms that stringently 
guided their final decision on who became the Oba (king). First, they investigated the historical 
family background of each of the candidates and their respective personality traits, as well as their 
moral dispositions. They also allowed the general populace to lobby individually and collectively, 
and to express opinions on the princes, whether positive or negative. The kingmakers were obliged 
to give due considerations to the people’s opinions. 
To be successful at these tedious processes of screening by the Council of Kingmakers, a 
candidate’s choice must have been supported by the majority of the Council of Kingmakers upon 
overwhelming merits in the historical, personality and moral yardsticks used. Not until these 
mundane requirements were fulfilled by the candidate that the spiritual guidance of the Ifa oracle 
was sought. Once support was received from the Ifa oracle, other ritual processes would commence 
for the ascension of the king to the throne of his forefathers. The Oba as the head of the political 
organization of traditional Yoruba society had political, juridical, and executive power, but he did 
not exercise it alone. While the King occupied the highest seat of the kingdom, there existed an 
elaborate organization of palace officials and council of chiefs with whom he directed the affairs 
of the kingdom. This council included civil, military and ward chiefs, as well as heads of 
compounds and extended families. The council of chiefs met with the king daily in the palace to 
take all decisions, and to function as the highest court of appeal. After its decisions were taken, 
they were announced as the king’s decisions.  
The functions of the King as the head of the council included overseeing the general health of the 
society, entailing internal security, issues of peace and war, and the administration of justice, with 
the King as the final court of appeal in the whole Kingdom, and also responsible for the 
management of relations with other regional Kingdoms and societies (Fadipe 1970, 206). The 
power arrangement in the traditional Yoruba political setting was such that it provided checks and 
balances. If a king became over-ambitious and tried to establish personal power beyond the limited 
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monarchy system, or if he became tyrannical, greedy, or otherwise seriously unpopular, some 
chiefs bore the constitutional duty of cautioning, counseling and rebuking him in private. If he 
would not mend his ways, the chiefs might take his matter before a special council of spiritual 
elders called Ogboni, where he would be seriously warned. If he still would not change, the quarter 
chiefs might alert the family heads, who might in turn inform their compound meetings. The final 
action would then be that certain chiefs, whose traditional duty it was to do it, would approach the 
king and symbolically present him with an empty calabash or parrot’s eggs. The meaning of this 
sign is that he must compulsorily evacuate the throne and commit suicide. This final action against 
a king was very rarely taken, but every king was informed at the time of his installation that it was 
in the power of his subjects.  
Thus the democratic import of the traditional Yoruba mode of social organization and governance 
is discernible from the fact that there were rules set for the choice of leaders, and governance was 
based on the rules and laws of the community. It was democratic to the extent that the rules were 
strictly followed, which made it difficult for anyone to impose himself on the society, as they 
ensured that to become an Oba, both the spiritual and material criteria were observed (Salami 
2006, 74). There was the recognition of people’s rights and freedoms. The people had the freedom 
to express their opinion of the Oba and the rulers either directly, or through songs and other forms 
of symbolism during various festivals. The political system therefore accommodated the 
participation of both the rulers and the ruled: although the Oba was the supreme commander, every 
cadre of society was in various ways included in managing the affairs of the Kingdom, to the point 
that the activities of the Oba-incouncil at the societal level were replicated at the ward and 
compound levels to indeed establish a participatory democratic process in traditional Yoruba 
society (Salami 2006:75).  
However, it must be stated at this point that the continuum of the Yoruba indigenous system of 
governance was historically truncated by the advent of colonialism. The sustainability of the 
traditional democratic system was uncertain in view of the serious tensions that resulted from the 
synthesis of monarchism and democracy in traditional Yoruba culture. The Yoruba social history 
is replete with cases of power tussles between the executive power of the Oba (king) and other 
democratic institutions meant to check the excesses of the Oba. These institutions were sometimes 
weak in the face of the powerful and immensely influential Oba superstructure within the Yoruba 
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traditional society (Salami 2006:76). In the main, this is an examination of the arguments of the 
traditionalists in the discourse on democracy in Africa. Wambia dia Wamba (1990), in his 
distinction between democracy in Africa and democracy for Africa, asserted that since the 
inception of democratization in Africa, Africans have nurtured the culture of consuming what 
others (the West) have articulated for them on democracy. Speaking on the Africancontext, he 
rejects the view that democratization of Africa consists of imposing Western parliamentarism upon 
the continent. He is of the view that the Western multi-party system is unsuitable for the African 
situation. For him, one cannot democratize Africa by imposing the Western democratic system on 
the African situation from the top. On the contrary, he advocates for a democracy from below. 
Here, the concept of self-responsibilitization plays a key role. For him, democracy in Africa must 
not be seen primarily as a mode of politics; rather, it must be viewed as a process of emancipation, 
self-determination and the meeting of the needs of the people.  
According to Wambia dia Wamba (1990:129), democratization has to be considered as a “process 
of struggle to win, defend and protect rights of people and individuals against onesidedness-
including the right of self-organization for autonomy and not necessarily right of participation in 
the state process”. As a way forward, he charged Africans to reflect on the possibility of attaining 
African democracy. According to Moshi and Osman (2008), liberal ‘democracy failed in many 
parts of Africa mainly because the Western political parties aggregate primarily along class 
interests, whereas in Africa an established class system is mainly absent. Thus contemporary 
Western insistence on multiparty politics’ does not consider indigenous cultural values, which 
makes multiparty electoral politics to degenerate into ethnic or communal conflicts. Moreover, in 
view of Africa’s complex problems, where, because of lack of a consensual norm on democracy 
coupled with insufficient political pressure from the African society, political regimes tend to pay 
less attention to elite abuse, fears of majoritarian tyranny and corruption prevail.  
Therefore like Wambia dia Wamba, they urged for a resurgence of African indigenous democracy. 
Similarly, Eboh (1990:167) argues that the Western style of democracy is not an authentic 
expression of contemporary African political culture, which must address so many peculiar issues. 
Just as one hears of Greek philosophy, Western philosophy and African philosophy, one can also 
talk about Greek democracy, Western democracy and African democracy, among others. This 
suggests that like philosophy, democracy is culturally relative. In different circumstances, various 
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types of societies improvized different social approaches to their respective contradictions. This 
gave rise to different conceptions of democracy, among which were specific forms of the state and 
civil society, direct or indirect people’s sovereignty, etc. As a consequence, Eboh (1993: 98) notes 
that the solution to the problem of governance in Africa lies in tackling the African socio-economic 
and political realities, thereby giving democracy an African flair. Different reasons have been 
adduced for why democracy seems not to be working in Africa.  
Offor (2006) attributed this to the refusal to accept that democracy varies from one society to 
another, and that by reason of this elasticity, democracy need not be practiced in strict adherence 
to those attributes that define it in its Western conception. For Offor, the problem with democratic 
practice in Africa therefore stems from a fundamental misconception that democracy as a form of 
government can be imported wholesale from one society to another, regardless of cultural 
differences. He advances the thesis that democracy is desirable and can be made to work in Africa 
only if the indigenous continent’s democratic heritage is explored, and those ideas that define good 
governance are brought to bear in evolving a kind of democracy best suited for resolving Africa’s 
peculiar problems. However, the fundamental problem with Offor’s conclusion is in his false 
assumption that democratic ideals are culturally specific. Democratic ideals such as liberty, 
equality and peoples’ sovereignty are universal, so that what differs are the democratic practices 
in different cultural and political societies. Wiredu (1996) is of the view that Africa’s political 
salvation cannot come from the presently known model of majoritarian democracy, which African 
states are currently practicing. Majoritarian democracy involves a multi-party system of politics, 
in which the party that wins the most seats at the election forms the government. In such a political 
set-up, the losing party or parties become the opposition, singly or jointly. In this system, the 
minority representatives’ votes are overridden by the votes of the majority.  
The implication of this is that the right of the minority representatives and their constituencies to 
meaningfully participate in the actual making of decisions is rendered nugatory. In many 
contemporary African states, certain ethnic groups and political parties have found themselves 
perpetually in the minority, consistently staged outside the corridor of power. Not only this, their 
fundamental human rights of decisional representation are permanently denied with impunity. This 
violation of the right to be well represented, Wiredu argues, is one of the most persistent causes of 
political instability in Africa. Consequently, in anattempt to provide a way out of this serious 
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deficiency of majoritarian democracy in Africa, Wiredu explores the resonance of a non-party and 
consensual democracy in forestalling many of the socio-political ills in Africa: A non-party and 
consensual democratic system is one in which parties are not the basis ofpower. People can form 
political associations to propagate their political ideas and help toelect representatives to 
parliament. But an association having the most elected members willnot therefore be the governing 
group. Every representative will be of the government in hispersonal, rather than associational 
capacity (Wiredu 1996: 179) Fundamental to Wiredu’s argument is the need to consider the 
individual’s personal views, before all important decisions are made on the principle of consensus. 
This process of deliberation on issues rather than resorting to popular vote, is according to Wiredu, 
capable of promoting mutual tolerance, thereby contributing to demarginalization in a polity. 
Wiredu uses the example of the traditional Akan political system to illustrate the plausibility of 
this approach. The complaint of the traditionalist school of thought is not new. However, the 
context in which it is now being voiced is novel.  
Traditionally, the appeal to cultural specificity has been a weapon in the hands of self-justifying 
elites: African despots long insisted that democracy is a stalking horse for a new colonialism. 
Today, however, the complaint is usually voiced by a new breed of African democrats and 
scholars, who are apologists of the African intellectual heritage. The rulers are now often 
preoccupied with simulating democracy, in the hope of attracting aid and trade, not with 
rationalizing its absence. The critics are understandably unwilling to conclude that Africa is not 
good enough for liberal democracy, but insist rather that liberal democracy is not good enough for 
Africa. Reflection on the writings of scholars from the traditionalist school reveals that their 
concern is with the question of African identity. Their arguments are geared towards establishing 
that many traditional African societies were democratic, even in their monarchical social 
organizations, and that resorting to their values and principles in contemporary Africa would be 
an antidote to the plethora of Africa’s problems. Furthermore, in discussing these traditional 
African democratic values, scholars in this school point to such precepts as consensus, human 
rights, social responsibility, tolerance and participation.  
Suffice it to note that the plea for consensus and non-party politics as espoused by Wiredu is 
problematic in many fronts. Wiredu’s position borders on mere utopian veneration of a past that 
has not existed anywhere. In all societies, those in traditional Africa included, there are conflicts, 
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which are either resolved by the stronger parties having their way, or the weaker ones being 
realistic enough to concede (Owolabi 2004:439). If indeed there been the kind of consensus that 
Wiredu is venerating in African culture, there would not have been cases of intra-ethnic wars, civil 
uprisings and migration of certain segments of society. Yet cases of these abound in pre-colonial 
African history. Documentations of the Yoruba experiences in this regard can be found in the 
historical and anthropological writings of Johnson (1956), Fadipe (1970), Akinyogbin and 
Ayandele (1980), among others. These therefore nullify Wiredu’s thesis that consensus is 
generally the means of decision making in traditional Africa. Even if it is taken for granted the 
existence of this democratic element of consensus in traditional Africa, it may be asked whether it 
is still applicable to cope with the complexities of contemporary societies.  
Bearing in mind that traditional African societies were relatively small and therefore suited to the 
idea of consensus, the reality of the ultra-complex state of human relations in contemporary Africa 
hardly leaves room for that kind of detailed consultation. Wiredu’s critique of the multiparty 
system, and his claim that there was none in traditional African politics, can be vitiated. While 
there were no formal political parties as we have in today’s democracy, we cannot deny that people 
of like minds would always identify with one another and came together to discuss how their 
interests could be promoted. Such “clusters” were informal political associations, akin to today’s 
political parties.  
In fact, party politics is not as inherently evil as painted by Wiredu, and his advocacy for non-party 
democratic polities in contemporary Africa does not in any way foreclose the possibility of the 
recurrence in a non-party system of those internal factors that make a multi-party system 
problematic. Western liberal scholars also ask the extent to which people may be truly represented 
in a consensual representative democracy. Contrary to Wiredu’s view that the major problem 
confronting the present model of democracy in Africa is multi-party politics, the researcher thinks 
that the major problem of democracy in Africa is that of how the true will of the people can reflect 
in the results of elections. Wiredu clearly fails to recognise that the underlying principles and goals 
of consensual and non-party democracy, as he advocates, is bound to fail as long as it involves 
elections. In view of the foregoing observations, it is arguable that what the traditionalists like 
Wiredu have succeeded in doing is to “ethnophilosophically” provide a defense of an African 
identity of the tradition of democracy, rather than a theory of African democracy. For the most 
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part, they have failed to explain in concrete terms how these identified African traditional 
democratic values and principles (which though not entirely unique) could be incorporated into 
contemporary governance in Africa, such that they help to shape the contours of politics and social 
conditions in Africa for the good of her people. Thus apologists of the traditionalist school of 
thought have not succeeded in proposing an African theory of democracy, which could be 
compared with and/or contrasted to various Western democratic theories such as liberal, radical, 
neo-idealist, elitist and pluralist democratic theories (Holden 2000). 
6.3 Scaffolding the African Democratic Paradigm 
Contrary to Iwuchukwu’s (1998: 90) claim that any meaningful search for an African theory of 
democracy must begin with a radical rejection of liberal democracy, this thesis favours eclecticism, 
albeit with some modifications. An African theory of democracy must not only be a reflection of 
both traditional and contemporary African socio-cultural and ontological realities, but must also 
entail a critical avoidance of some misconceptions and inadequacies inherent in liberal democratic 
theory. The reason for the emphasis on liberal democratic theory is simply that it is the model of 
democracy foisted on Africa. Given the nature of traditional African societies which were 
communalistic in ethos, it is expected that communalism should be one of the basic constituent 
elements upon which the theory would be grounded. Communalism in an African theory of 
democracy would entail revising the very concept of development, to mean collective well-being, 
instead of the euro-centric equation of development with modernization, high GDP and other 
economic indices. Putting people at the center of development and seeking their collective well-
being would promote shared material and non-material benefits, mutual trust, citizen participation 
in decision making, and the accountability of state/government officials to the general public. 
Unlike liberal democratic theory where individualism, majority rule, and autonomy of elected 
representatives in making political decisions on behalf of the people, African democratic theory 
demands greater commitment to entrenching the communalist spirit in social organization and state 
management: it is more committed to strengthening popular participation in policy formulation 
and other governmental processes. Where liberal democratic theory ideally entails an economic 
correlate and homology of advanced capitalism, African democratic theory must maintain a 
balance between political ideals and economic expediency. With the current global economic 
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crunch having emanated from the leading liberal democratic state, the USA, the credibility of 
capitalism now faces serious skepticism.  
As a matter of fact, African democratic theory need not have capitalism as its economic correlate, 
but rather a mixed economy of socialist and capitalist orientations. This becomes imperative 
because the economic problems of contemporary Africa constitute a serious cog in the wheel of 
genuine democracy. The veracity of the above can be further substantiated by making a distinction 
between democracy as a form of government and democracy as a social principle. An erroneous 
conception has been paraded by scholars in conceiving democracy as a form of government. 
Abraham Lincoln’s now conventional definition of democracy as “the government of the people, 
by the people and for the people” has led to the popular view that democracy is a form of 
government. However, this definition gives no clue about the specific structure, be it political or 
economic, of a democratic society. In consonance with Sophie Oluwole (2005:420), democracy, 
adequately understood, is a theory that sets some basic [socio political] principles according to 
which a good government, whatever its form, must be run. Such principles include those of justice, 
freedom, equity, accountability, rule of law and liberty. These social principles are universal 
criteria for distinguishing between good and bad governments. In other words, there are features 
of democracy that are not culturally specific, and whose abrogation inevitably produces tyranny. 
To give a few examples, accountable government, the citizens’ right to decide, speak and organize 
are essential to free political expression. Where African tradition is invoked to dilute or deny 
pluralism, the outcome is tyranny, however iron cast its indigenous cultural form might appear. 
It is often argued that indigenous democratic institutions, values and principles could be co-opted 
into a liberal democratic system (such as the current democratic experiences of South Africa, 
Botswana and Mauritius). However, it must be noted that the question of tradition touches on the 
identity issue, which is most uncomfortable to some intellectuals. While there clearly are important 
elements of tradition that are incompatible with full democratic citizenship - patriarchy, for one - 
it could be argued that a formal democracy that is incapable of accommodating those elements of 
tradition and the identities that they generate which are compatible with notions of full and equal 
citizenship is inadequate. Indeed, the ability to ensure that traditional authority and loyalty to it are 
expressed within democratic norms could be a key source of the system's strength in Africa. The 
test for new democracies in Africa therefore rests on the degree to which they can recognize, 
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perhaps even celebrate, differences in institutional forms that respect democratic essentials. The 
key to African democracy may not only be the recognition of the right to difference, but institutions 
that reward co-operation between political leaderships which articulate it. Citizens of Africa need 
to be critical of concepts such as multi-party systems, electoral bodies, civil societies and justice 
systems in their theoretical consideration of African democracy. These ideas should be given an 
African cultural flair in the light of Africa’s social exigencies and values.  
Given the above observations, any progress towards state-building and state management in Africa 
will require more than liberal democratic ideals. Justice, in whatever form of democracy, seems 
an essential precondition not only for liberty, but for state-building and thus for stability and 
economic development too. If this is agreed, then in the quest for an African theory of democracy, 
the search for a viable justice system must necessarily be taken into consideration. In view of the 
problems of social justice in contemporary Africa vis-a-viz that of corruption, poverty and bad 
leadership, which seem to have defied solutions, it is imperative to appropriate relevant traditional 
institutions and values that define an indigenous justice system. The institution of social justice in 
pre-colonial Africa has a complementary relationship between traditional religion and morality. 
Where human knowledge and power is incapacitated, morality and religion are the ultra means of 
social justice. One way of overcoming social injustice with all its threats to sustainable democracy 
is to embrace the complimentary contribution of spirituality and morality, which African 
traditional democratic practice affords. C.S. Momoh captures this in his work, Philosophy of a 
New Past and an Old Future: The present oath by our public officers during swearing-in 
ceremonies is a passive one. What is needed is an active oath. An active oath is one …. Invoked 
in the name of indigenous gods, or spirits or juju… spelling out what should befall the oath taker 
if he/shewilling-fully anddeliberately enriches himself/herself, friends or relations by exploiting 
or abusing his/her office (Momoh1991:132). There are two major objections that may be raised 
against the above. First, what if the religious faith of the swearer (that is, the public officer in 
question) does not permit swearing in the names of indigenous gods or spirits? Second, it may be 
argued that this suggestion is primitive, retrogressive and incongruous with contemporary 
democratic practice. The veracity of these possible objections can easily be plausibly vitiated on 
the following grounds.  
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Firstly, it is irrelevant whether or not the swearer believes in indigenous gods, spirits or juju: this 
has nothing to do with the efficacy of the oath. Even if the swearer insists that he/she cannot swear 
based on his/her religious convictions, he/she can be made to take active oaths on the Quran or the 
Bible. But this has to be carried out by reading relevant passages from the relevant Holy Book, 
followed by an invocation of what should befall him/her immediately he/she acts contrary to the 
rule of law, duties and obligations of his/her position.Secondly, there is nothing primitive or 
undemocratic about active oath-taking. In fact, apart from making indigenous religion relevant in 
contemporary African democracy, active oath-taking will engender faith and loyalty in the political 
system. As the public officer who has been actively sworn-in will be conscious of the invisible 
mystical force tele-guiding him/her, the citizens will be taking cues from the actions/inactions of 
the leaders. In addition, given contemporary realities, the African people need to note that 
globalization has captured democracy, capitalism and human rights. There is currently great flux 
around these issues in the global international relations, as well as the many challenges they have 
created. Africa cannot therefore pretend to be oblivious of these challenges in future efforts 
towards developing an African theory of democracy. 
6.4 The Hybridised product of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa 
According to Idahosa (2004), Fanon’s major contribution is to have opened to African people an 
alternative path to Western liberal democracy and capitalist development, exemplified by the 
powerful and thought-provoking ideas included in the concluding sentences of Les damnés de la 
terre:  
Come on, comrades, let us decide to change course, here and now (…) Let us abandon our 
dreams, our old beliefs, and our old friendships (…) Let us abandon this Europe which 
constantly talks about man, yet exterminates man wherever she finds him, at home or 
abroad (...) Come on, comrades, the European game is definitely up, we must find 
something else. We can do anything today, provided we do not blindly imitate Europe, 
provided we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe (…) Let us decide to 
not imitate Europe, and let us focus our thoughts and energies in a new direction. Let us 
invent the whole man that Europe has been incapable of bringing to life (…) The Third 
World must start a new history of man (…) If we are to satisfy the demands and needs of 
our peoples, we must look elsewhere than in Europe (…) For Europe, for ourselves and for 
humanity (…) we must shed our skin, invent new concepts, and create a new man. (Fanon 
1979: 229-233). 
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Fanon is telling African people, leaders and scholars that for popular democracy and development 
to succeed in Africa, they must stop blindly following the West; they must stop aping Western 
culture, traditions, ideas, and institutions; they must think outside of the box; and, above all, they 
must be bold and innovative, and develop their own ideas, concepts and institutions based on 
African culture, values, and traditions. Fanon also saw the youth and women as key actors in the 
African revolution, as well as the main agents of political change and socio-economic 
transformation in post-colonial Africa.  
The words of wisdom that the late former president of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, left for 
the benefit of Africans on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday evoke similar ideas: Africa 
(…) is isolated. Therefore, to develop, it will have to depend upon its own resources basically, 
internal resources, nationally, and Africa will have to depend upon Africa. The leadership of the 
future will have to devise, try to carry out policies of maximum national self-reliance and 
maximum collective self-reliance. They have no other choice. Hamna ! [meaning: “there is none” 
in Ki-Swahili] (Nyerere 2000). This alternative path to Western liberal democracy and capitalist 
development is precisely the line of thinking of an emerging African scholarship, exemplified by 
the Ghanian scholar Daniel Osabu-Kle (2000), the late Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake 
(1996), as well as (more recently) by two African political scientists, Mueni wa Muiu and Guy 
Martin (Muiu & Martin 2009).  
In Compatible Cultural Democracy (2000), Daniel Osabu-Kle argues that neither liberal 
democracy nor socialism or the military provide the cure to Africa’s democracy and development 
predicament. The author’s main thesis is that a democracy based on African culture is the only 
type that can lead to development (Osabu-Kle 2000: 274). To protect the continent, Osabu-Kle 
argues, an African high command should be created within the broader framework of a United 
States of Africa à la Kwame Nkrumah. The author also advocates the creation of a youth 
organization to educate youth about African culture and history. Osabu-Kle concludes that it is 
only when Afro-centrism replaces Euro-centrism, and a new type of democracy – Jaku democracy 
– is established that Africans both inside and outside the continent will be proud (Osabu-Kle 2000: 
278). In Democracy and Development in Africa (1996), Claude Ake argues that the African state 
is an instrument of political domination and economic exploitation of the people in the hands of 
the African elite, rather than an agent of democracy and development. According to Ake, a suitable 
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democracy for Africa should have the following characteristics: a democracy in which people have 
some real decision-making power; a social democracy that emphasizes concrete political, social, 
and economic rights; a democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on 
individual rights; and a democracy of incorporation, which should be as inclusive as possible (Ake 
1996: 132, 139; Martin 1998). 
The development strategy derived from such a people-driven democratization process should be 
based on: a popular development strategy; self-reliance; empowerment, and confidence; and self-
realization rather than alienation (Ake 1996:140-42; Martin 1998). Building on the works of 
various African scholars (including Ake and Osabu-Kle) Mueni wa Muiu and Guy Martin (2009) 
propose a new paradigm of the African state. This new paradigm called Fundi wa Afrika (i.e. the 
“builder” or “tailor” of Africa) uses a long-term historical perspective to present an exhaustive, 
panoramic view of the issues at stake in Africa’s economic, political, and social development so 
that Africans can get out of the African predicament. More specifically, Fundi (a) analyzes the 
creation and evolution of the African state (from indigenous to colonial and postcolonial), using a 
long-term historical perspective; (b) shows how internal and external events and actors in Africa 
shaped the state and its leadership; and (c) prescribes what the ideal state and its leadership (as 
determined by the Africans themselves) should be (Muiu & Martin 2009:194, 212). Like Fanon 
and Nyerere, Fundi urges Africans to be autonomous and self-reliant; in particular, it calls on 
Africans to get rid, once and for all, of their dependency syndrome; to cease to be supplicants in 
international economic forums and institutions; to take control of the resources within their borders 
for the sole benefit of every African; and to focus production on domestic needs rather than on 
export markets (Mueni & Martin 2009: 195, 198, 214). Like Fanon, Fundi sees the African youth 
and women as key agents of political change and socio-economic transformation in Africa (Muiu 
& Martin, 2009: 199, 201-202). Muiu and Martin (2009:206)  argue that a new, stable, and modern 
African state based on five political entities--the Federation of African States (FAS) – should be 
built on the functional remnants of indigenous African political systems and institutions, and 
should be based on African values, traditions, and culture. 
6.5 Conclusion 
From the foregoing it is important to note that the hybridised model of democracy in sub-Saharan 
Africa will assist in dealing with some of the current socio-political problems besetting current 
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democratic experiences in Africa. The tension that ensued because of the interface between 
African systems of governance and western liberal democracy can only be resolved by adopting a 
hybridized model that is eclectic in scope and outlook. However, it is important to be wary of 
internal and external forces that may work towards vitiating its realisation. Inclusive and 
committed democratic education of the citizens and commitment to participatory democracy create 
a bulwark against internal saboteurs. On the external front, it is hoped that the western world must 
come to the realization that democracy is not as a rigid structural form of government, but as a 
civilized value to be fostered and a principle upon which to build the new world order. Again it 
should be appreciated that democratic principles were practiced in pre-colonial societies well 
before the colonization of Africa. Therefore, African as well can develop unique African forms of 
democracy that will authentically speak to the African situation. What is therefore urgently 
required of western powers is that they correct their policy to suit the demands of the new world 
realities, instead of forcing the world to suit their supposed universal ideological perspectives. This 
pluralistic understanding of democracy is imperative, especially in the light of the multi-ethnic, 
religious, ideological, linguistic, regional and cultural cleavages of African states. Given the global 
collaborations and coalitions taking root in the wake of the 21st century, hybridization is a viable 
African method of reconstructing any authentically responsible African democratic dispensation. 
It is all encompassing and holistic in outlook that is critical in making Africa a ‘united chemistry’ 
and symbiotic political superstructure that will foster socio-economic and political development.   
It is only upon such a solid bedrock foundation that Africa may promote power sharing among 
different tribes, races, gender without bloodshed. The last chapter is the conclusion to the study. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION TO THE STUDY 
7.1 Introduction 
The African continent is the worst global region to have experienced oppression under the 
Europeans imperialists.Colonialism was a system based on the imposition and acceptance of 
superiority of the coloniser over the colonised. Before the colonial intervention, many African 
governing systems were traditional monarchies, many of which seem, by design or accident, to 
have struck a viable balance between autocracy and democracy, due to the ritualised control of 
power. Within such systems, extensive powers were accorded the monarch but only on trust and 
in reciprocity.From the 1950s right up to the 1980s, the African continent was ravaged by wars of 
liberation which were part of themomentous mission to remake African societies, to regain 
Africa’s historicalagency so cruelly seized by the west through colonialism. The anti-colonial wars 
were protracted and brutal. These were defensive, unavoidable wars, waged at enormouscost in 
African lives and livelihoods, driven by the desire to maintain orregain political autonomy, the 
precondition for establishing the socialcontract of democracy, the political culture of human rights, 
and theeconomic possibilities of development. Thus the hallmark of African nationalism was to 
establish autonomous African democratic systems that would allow Africa to develop and build 
institutions rooted in the African systems of governance. Unfortunately, independence brought 
little respite from the ravages of warfor people in many sub-Saharan African countries.  
The instabilities and insecurities of post-colonialAfrica are rooted in the political and 
culturaleconomies of both colonialismand the post-independence latched on to the shifting 
configurations and conjunctures of the international division of labor,especially thelegacies and 
challenges of state-making and nation-building. Sub-Saharan Africa has been caricatured as a 
place of continuous civil wars and conflicts. There are also the struggles over underdevelopment, 
dependency, andsustainable development, and how to establish modern societies thatare 
politically, economically and technologically viable in a highly competitive, unequal and 
exploitative world. The diversities of sub-saharan Africa’s nation-states,the fact that they are 
almost invariably multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural in the midst of 
relatively high levels of materialpoverty and uneven spatial and social development, dominated by 
authoritarian governments, created a combustible mix that periodically erupted into civil wars. At 
theheart of all these conflicts and wars were struggles over power and resources;power cohered 
228 
 
around the state and its governance structures, developmentalcapacities, delegative practices, 
distributional propensities, and resources interms of their availability, control and access. Typical 
examples are countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and Democratic Republic of Congo who 
experienced conflicts soon after independence inspired and or instigated and supported by the 
former colonisers.The process of trying to bring about peace, security and development by 
adhering to the democratic practice proved to be very difficult to achieve to an extent that many 
Africans in the post-colonial era began to question the relevance of the western democratic 
precepts in Africa. The African nationalists borrowed the values of democracy from the western 
philosophers and used these in prosecuting the wars of liberation but post-independent Africa 
witnessed the failure to adhere to achieve the merit of peace and security even under the western 
democratic principles characterized by periodic elections. 
7.2 Summary of the thesis  
This thesis has examined ethics, leadership and governance and the rise of African nationalism in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and how the western philosophers influenced the rise of nationalism. It has 
also highlighted the limitations of African nationalism as a response to colonialism mainly because 
the post-colonial state did not usher in the much anticipated ‘heaven’ characterized by peace, 
security and development. The study highlighted the practice of modern nationalism and 
nationalist politics in the contemporary sub-Saharan African democracies and the challenges of 
the western model of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. The study find out that there is continued 
social and political polarization as well as material inequalities in democratic post-colonial 
governments more than half a century after colonialism mainly because Africa has not developed 
a hybridised version of democracy that is deeply rooted to the African traditional culture and 
context. Instead there is need to tap from African political and cultural realities and be able to 
domesticate the Western liberal democratic frameworks that have been accepted as universal in 
ways that can promote development in the sub-continent. Colonialism came with the ideas of 
western liberalism which were later used as basis for African nationalists motivation for the 
prosecution of African Liberation struggles. These philosophical ideas were borrowed from people 
such as John Locke; Jeremy Bentham; Thomas Hobbes, George Hegel, Francois Marouete 
(Voltaire); Diderot and Montesquieu to advocate for democratic governance. Western liberal ideas 
such as liberty, freedom, individualism, universal suffrage, equality, democracy and the social 
229 
 
contract ideas underpinning western liberalism proved to be the critical ideas borrowed by African 
nationalists in the development of African nationalism 
African governance and leadership systems have been debated since the late 1950s followingthe 
independence of some African countries.Thus Africa as a continent emerging from the colonial 
legacy, facedmultifarious governance challenges since the early years of the independence.This 
was mainly because of the contradictions that were caused by the failure to renegotiate western 
democratic practices from the African cultural systems of leadership and governance. Sub- 
SaharanAfrican leaders started working for the development vision of Africa since the end of the 
1950sand the beginning of the 1960s. They convened to work as a unique and common group 
toovercome the crucial challenges facing Africa and their fragile states. African nationalism arose 
as an attempt to challenge colonialism and the marginalization of the African people.It is argued 
therefore that the concept of modern African Nationalism had its genesis in the African protest 
against all forms of injustices before and during colonialism. Nationalism was enabled by the 
African nationalists’ ability to take advantage of the general discontent of the majority of the 
African population against colonialism whereby they made the governing of colonial countries an 
implausible task for colonialists. Typical examples such as Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkurumah, 
Houphouet Boigny, Kenneth Kaunda, Sekou Toure, Jomo Kenyatta, Nelson Mandela, Patrice 
Lumumba,and Leopold Senghor are some of the critical exponents of African nationalism who 
borrowed from the values of western liberalism. It is a fact that modern African Nationalism is a 
creation of the colonial state because previously Africans lived as tribes and not as a nation.  
Factors for the rise and growth of African Nationalism in the colonial period were outlined. While 
scholars like Rotberg argues that African Nationalism is a creation of colonization, other schools 
of thought which demonstrate the existence of African pre–colonial nationalism were presented 
through periodization of African Nationalism and its categorization into stages. Another school of 
thought which came from African nationalists was based on constructing African Nationalism on 
the basis of creating a post-colonial African nation. The argument here was that colonialism did 
not leave behind nations, but a divided African society.  
This thesis also focused on western liberal democracy as well as highlighting its main tenets and 
impact on the development of democracy. Liberalism in the political sphere refers to the process 
of how individual citizens are free to vote for representatives of their choice and to form voluntary 
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associations to promote their ideas and interests in the realm of collective decision making. In 
contemporary democracies in Africa, it means adoption of constitutional procedures for limiting 
government power and making it accountable to citizens. The idea that human beings are 
essentially rational creatures capable of settling their political disputes through dialogue and 
compromise is a product of western liberalism which has become part of contemporary democracy 
in Africa. This aspect of liberalism became politically prominent 20th century projects aimed at 
eliminating war and resolving disagreements between states through organisations such as the 
League of Nations, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. In light of the 
foregoing, an analysis of African nationalism points to the attempt by African philosophers and 
nationalists to chart an ideological pathway that is counterpoised to colonialismwhose foundations 
were rooted in western liberalism. A critical analysis of the philosophical ideas of African 
nationalist points to the fact that some of the ideas propagated by African philosophers were 
borrowed from the western philosophers as well as from African traditional culture as they were 
advancing the cause of liberation and independence of Africa. As alluded to earlier on, the ideas 
such as equality, justice, universal suffrage and freedom all borrowed from western philosophers 
also became cornerstones of the African nationalist struggle theoretical framework. 
In this thesis, it has been noted that African nationalism and liberalism are critical in addressing 
governance issues in post-colonial sub-saharan Africa. In this thesis, a link has been established 
between the liberal philosophy and African nationalism, two ideologies that are often viewed 
respectively as representing or symbolising political values associated with the Western world, 
and a political ideology associated with Africa has been reviewed. The influence on pan-
Africanism ideology as well as on the first generation of political leadership in the Africa of the 
1960s, such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana by Western trained intellectuals such as William E 
DuBois (1868 - 1963) who constructed the grammar of anti-colonial nationalism from within 
classical liberal tradition has been noted to have generated plausible arguments that African 
nationalism is not uniquely African by partly influenced by western liberalism. Again, the 
emphasis on some of the most salientfeatures of western liberalism such as liberty and equality by 
African Nationalists, and subsequent internationalisation of the same values through the United 
Nations regime on democracy and human rights (Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, 2008) has been 
presented as evidence not of the misconception that liberalism gave birth to African nationalism 
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but of the impact that liberalism had on the ascendency of modern African nationalism in the 
struggle against colonialism.  
Despite the trajectories of Western liberalism in African nationalism, it is a fact that these two 
philosophies stands as oppositional in terms of the advent context of nationalism as an antithesis 
of African nationalism. Of course trying to link African nationalism as a direct product of western 
liberalism is tantamount to adulterating historical circumstances under which the two philosophical 
paradigm came into being.There are similarities but caution must be taken to avoid romanticizing 
two independent political philosophies that systematically represent different interests and 
foundations at the deeper epistemic level. Western liberalism and African nationalism are 
competing philosophical ideas although some ideas of western liberalism influenced the 
development of modern African nationalism. Therefore, there is need for Africa to develop unique 
African forms of democracy that will authentically speak to the African situation. This is a radical 
process that demands an analysis and appreciation of the African indigenous knowledge systems 
that will inform the development of relevant and sustainable forms of governance. 
7.3 The contextualization of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 
It is a fact that throughout the African continent during the pre-colonial era, African political 
systems were essentially democratic. According to Osabu-Kle (2000), they were democratic 
because they exhibited all the common characteristics of consent of the people and a balance 
between centralized power and decentralized power to prevent the abuse of authority by any one 
person. Although, the systems at times did manifest exclusionism, that is, elitism, the same can be 
said about most political systems. Poignantly, no political system worldwide is all-inclusive. Pre-
colonial African systems can be separated into two main types. Fortes and Pritchard, (1940) 
postulate that the Logoli, the Talensi, and the Nuer, did not have centralized governance systems, 
administrative bureaucracy, centralized judicial systems, or sharp divisions in rank or status. 
Central authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions characterized the second and 
most common type of political system in pre-colonial Africa (Ibid). The second type 
encompassedhierarchical and concentric levels of governance at the national, regional, state, and 
local levels. The localized groups had the least amount of authority, much like Western liberal or 
constitutional democracies. Nations, which practiced decentralized governance, included the Zulu, 
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the Bemba, the Bankole, the Yoruba, the Akan, the Ga, the Ijaw, and the Ewe (Ibid). Thus, this 
illustrates that democracy as a concept and as a substantive matter is not alien to Africa. 
In addition, Ohachenu (1995) vividly suggests that African people’s idea of democratization is 
essentially derived from their own historical knowledge, experience, values and capabilities. 
Ohachenu goes on to say that the wealth of knowledge, experience, values and capabilities are 
essential ingredients for mass mobilization in the articulation of an African discourse and program 
on governance and democratization (Ibid). Juxtaposed to the paternalistic dominance of 
Westerntheories of democracies with its historical exclusion of women in politics, are the active 
roles women have played in African traditional decision-making circles outside the household 
during the pre-colonial era. In the Shona traditional culture in Zimbabwe and the Congo, the 
examples of Heroines such as Nyanhita Nehanda of Zimbabwe and Queen Nzinga Nkuwu of the 
Congo provide a typical example of influential women under the African governance structures. 
According to Bradley (2011) in pre-colonial Nigeria, the state and its bureaucracy tried to dictate 
the lifestyles of women, including the domesticity of women and their “wifely” and “motherly” 
duties of unpaid services they provided for the family. Colonial rule in Africa further undermined 
the economic and political aspirations of women, because colonial rule brought the European 
notion that women belonged in the atmosphere of hearth, nurturing her family (Ibid). Thus, the 
state and colonial rule began to change and restrict the role of women throughout Nigeria by means 
of legislation. 
Democratization studies typically overlook the salience of traditional loyalties in regard to 
governance in Africa. For example, many areas of national life are still governed by pre-capitalist 
relationships, especially in regards to land tenure relationships. Thus, in order for democracy to 
“stick” in many parts of Africa, it must be on the basis of radicalizing the basic institutions 
ofgovernance at the grassroots level (Mabogunje, 1995). The grassroots level is where locally 
based NGOs can make an effective impact on democratizing the locales. Unfortunately, the 
bureaucrats and so-called experts, as illustrated for example, have always resisted the grassroots 
organizations by the 1968 reform of the Local Government system in Western Nigeria 
(Mabogunje, 1995). The bureaucrats and local citizenry desires are often at odds, and a conflict of 
interests is at the root of the problem and only makes democratic efforts that more arduous. 
Mabogunje (1995) has suggested that by taking the governance institutions at the local level of the 
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diverse ethnic and nationality groups and infusing them with new and uniform operational rules, 
they can help fomentdemocracy. 
The establishment of a consensus-orienteddialogue for decision-making, a constitutional 
legitimating of the rule of ethnic groups, and a decentralization ofpolitical power, so that local and 
regional autonomybecomes possible has been vividly put forth by suchAfrican scholars as Gyekye 
(1992), Wiredu (1996), and Oladipo (2001). Forexample, prominent African philosopher 
Gyekyemakes the case for the relevance of traditional political ideas in contemporary African life. 
Gyekye has suggestedthat there was a democratic order in pre-colonial Africa,which would be 
advantageous for modern day Africa. While Wiredu, another eminent Africanphilosopher, makes 
a case for a nonparty polity in Africa. Wiredu views the Western model of multi-partyism basedon 
majority rule as not securing a reasonable system ofdemocracy whether in the Western world or 
not, butespecially in African multiethnic countries like Nigeria.Wiredu also contends that in at 
least some Africantraditional systems of politics, there is the potential fordemocracy based on 
consensus upon which the countries can construct a workable model. Both Gyekye(1992) and 
Wiredu (1996) posit that viable politicalinstitutions can be developed on the basis of Africa’s 
owntraditions of political rule, such as consensus and notwinner-take-all or majority rule as in 
many Westerndemocracies. More succinctly, they claim that thetraditional system of government 
in pre-colonial times didhave some democratic features from which a newpolitical system can 
benefit. 
Held (1995) suggests that democracy in modern times is defined in terms of a number of liberal 
democratic tenets. Held asserts that these liberal democratic tenets include 1) the centrality in 
principle of an impersonal structure of public power, of a constitution to help safeguard rights, 2) 
a diversity of power centers within and outside the state, including the institutional arena to 
promote open dialogue and deliberation between alternative viewpoints and agendas. As Oladipo 
(2001) has posited, although, the traditional African political order was based primarily on kinship 
and it was guided almost entirely by oral tradition and a body of unwritten conventions, it did not 
lack the core ingredients of a democratic order as identified by Held (1995). According to Oladipo 
(2001), the basic components of the traditional African democratic order included the fact that 
power was derived from the people for whom it was held in trust. These conditions of democratic 
governance were safeguarded by the provision for the removal of rulers, and the specifics for such 
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removal, witness the case of the Akans of Ghana.Although the monarch’s power was and is still 
hereditary, he orshe could be removed from office on such offenses asoppression and arbitrariness 
in governance; corruption;and neglect of state affairs. These points wereenumerated (that is, 
constitutionally-based) in the charterof leadership that defined the contract (for example,Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract of 1762) between the king and his people. Thus, in 
traditionalAfrican societies there existed a system of checks andbalances (essential for any 
democracy) which was meantto ensure that the king did not become authoritarian inhis/her rule, 
whether it was King Sonni Ali of Songhai,Queen Nzinga of Ndongo, or Queen Makeeba of theonce 
powerful Ethiopian empire. 
The reliance on dialogue and consultation asa means of decision-making was and still is in 
manyinstances, a democratic feature of the African democraticorder. Busia (1967:28) several years 
ago expressedthis democratic feature when he wrote “When a Council,each member of which was 
the representative of alineage, met to discuss matters affecting the whole community, it had always 
to grapple with the problem ofrepresenting sectional and common interests. In order todo this, the 
members had to talk things over; they had tolisten to all different points of view. So strong was 
thevalue of solidarity that the chief aim of the counselors was to reach unanimity, and they talked 
until this wasachieved.” Nwala (1985: 168) expressed the sameidea, with specific reference to the 
Igbo of southernNigeria, “unanimity and all the rigorous processes andcompromises...that lead to 
it are all efforts made tocontain the wishes of the majority as well as those of theminority”. In 
short, they are designed to arrive at what may be abstractly called the general will of the people of 
thecommunity”. Hence, this is another feature of the Africantraditional democratic order. In the 
Shona traditional culture of Zimbabwe, the concept of a dare (African court) is basically rooted in 
the capacity of the leader to deliberate issues of justice based on the majority. The role of the chief 
is to uphold a ruling reached by consensus using the authority invested in him or her. From the 
foregoing, it is clear that there are no much differences with the western model of democracy. 
Decision-making was basedon consensus rather than on majority rule as in Westernmodels of 
democracy. 
The challenges of the western liberal oriented multi-partyism is that it may actually polarize multi-
ethnic states even further by condoning the “winner takes-all” mentality, thus reducing the state’s 
capacity to keep the lacy countries intact. As a result, there is need to create a form of Social or 
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People’s democracy like in China, or welfare democracy that is congruent with traditional African 
social structures. Nevertheless, this excludes the one-party system, which was popularized in the 
early independence years of the 1960s as a manifestation of African democracy (Post 1991). 
Thus, the tendency to place any one group of persons consistently in the position of the minority 
can easily generate divisiveness in society. This is part of the challenge within the Zimbabwean 
body politic where the Ndebele tribe is almost playing second fiddle when it comes to governance 
because of the hegemony of the Shona tribe. This has resulted in calls for devolution and also the 
advent of a secessionist political party called Mthwakazi under the leadership of Siwela that is 
advocating for a separate state in Matebeleland which are the southern provinces of Zimbabwe. 
Another limitation that Wiredu (1996) points out with the multiparty system is that it is a system 
in which the party that wins the majority of seats or greatest proportion of votes is consistently in 
power like in Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mozambique, and Rwanda whose ruling political parties have 
been periodically winning elections.That being the case, this constant struggle for power promotes 
conflict and disaffection rather than consensus and cooperation. Above all, the minority parties 
always have to capitulate to the whims and wishes of the majority parties. Compromise becomes 
an issue if and only if the majority parties view the outcome as potentially destroying the status 
quo which they directly benefit from.  
Oladipo (2001) raises the salient question of whether the traditional African model of democracy 
was adequate for modern times. Oladipo(2001) opines that the traditional African model 
ofdemocracy may be inadequate because of the emphasison the clan as a basis of leadership, an 
arrangementwhich required “the establishment of a hierarchy ofclans.” He views such an 
arrangement as anachronistic.And how would justice play out in such a traditional 
model of democracy in Africa, based on heads of clans?Oladipo (2001) has suggested that the 
above limitationsof the traditional order of democratic rule can beovercome with decentralized 
power that allows for asignificant degree of regional and local autonomy inAfrica’s multiethnic 
countries. The decentralization wouldallow for political representation to be structured along 
lines that would yield each ethnic group to developaccording to its values, culture, historical 
experience andaspirations. Secondly, according to Oladipo (2001) thisdecentralization would 
prevent a situation in which somesee themselves as permanent outsiders to the state.For Oladipo, 
the consensual, nonparty form ofdemocracy and a structure of political power, which guarantees 
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substantial sovereignty to the various groupsin Africa’s multiethnic, multi-religious states, appear 
to bethe best type of democracy under the currentcircumstances.Wiredu (1996) advises not to 
glorify consensusdecision-making too much, because it too has flaws. Forexample, consensus in 
the past was not always attained;conflicts arose between lineages and ethnic groups. Andthat it is 
important to note that disputes can be resolvedwithout achieving reconciliation. Furthermore, as 
Wiredu(1996) notes, reconciliation is a form of consensus, thusdemocratic tendencies are manifest 
in at least someform, just short of war. And war is obviously the mostextreme negation of 
consensus, and the most blatantform of anarchy. 
Africa’s democratic experiments and the West’s view of how Africa should go aboutdemocratizing 
are often firmly rooted in the belief that Africa’s economic marginalization impedes its democratic 
aspirations. Ironically, the successful anti-colonial movements throughout Africa inthe 1960s were 
inspired by the most essential of democratic principles, that people should rule themselves via 
governments of their own choosing. Joseph (1997: 363) summons “Who should be the social 
agents of democracy?” Moreover, cries of Africa’s minimal desire to become or once again be 
democratic echoes loud from either side of the Pacific throughout theWestern world. Thus, there 
are several traditional arguments against establishing Western-styledemocracies in Africa (Ake 
1991). 
Democracy in the Western sense may be antithetical to Africa’s brand of democracy based on 
communal traditions of consensus building. As Nigerian political economist Ake (1991)suggested, 
this fallacy stems from confusion between the principles of democracy and its institutional 
manifestations. Ake (1991) goes on to say that traditional African political systems were imbued 
with democratic values, such as patrimony and communalism, a strong emphasis onparticipation 
and standards of accountability. “Chiefs were answerable not only for their own actions but for 
natural catastrophes such as famine, epidemics, floods, and drought” (Ake, 1991: 34). Another 
argument that is espoused against democracy in Africa revolves around the social pluralism of 
African societies, notably ethnic dissimilarities (Ake 1991). The problem is not ethnicity but 
horrendous leadership; there is nothing inherently conflictual about ethnic differences (Ibid: 34). 
If ethnicity was inherently antagonistic, countries like the United States and Canada would be in a 
constant state of flux! Ake’s (1991) third reason given by doubters of democracy in Africa involves 
the issue of democratization to economic development. That is, that Africa must be emancipated 
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from “ignorance, poverty, and disease” before it can assume the role of a democratic state. Once 
again, how does one explain India’s phenomenal success with democracy since its independence 
in 1947 (with the exception of eighteen months in the mid-1970’s), eventhough it has rampant 
poverty? And what about Botswana and Mauritius as members of the African Union (AU)? And 
how does one explain democratic Jamaica (as part of the African Diaspora) with its low levels of 
economic development? Hence, Ake (1991) challenges researchers to consider the primary issue 
as not whether it is more important to eat than tovote, but who is entitled to decide which is more 
significant. 
Therefore, economic development in and of itself cannot explain the democratization process, 
especially in Africa. African countries (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) are mostly economically 
impotent. The average growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa from 1980 to 1989 was minus percent 
(Ake, 1991). Consequently,factors other than economic development are also likelyto play a role 
in influencing democracy (Bollen andJackman 1990). For example, what roles do colonialism and 
neo-colonialism play? Lastly, another factor reportedin most theories of democracy is that 
democracy is highlycorrelated with levels of education (Lipset, 1959; Almondand Verba, 1963; 
Dahl, 1971; Diamond et al., 1995) butothers have found that education has an independent effect 
on democracy (Gonick and Rosh, 1988). 
Furthering democracy would require the creative customization of the conventional values and 
principles of democracy with the social realities of Africa; otherwise democratization degenerates 
into another assault on indigenous cultures and becomes alienating (Ake 1996). To democratize in 
Africa is to provide the missing cultural link to current efforts, links informed by popular ideas of 
personhood and domesticated agency. Above all, to democratize is to observe and draw from the 
predicaments of ordinary Africans forced by culture, history and material realities to live their lives 
as ‘subjects’, rather than as ‘citizens’, even as liberal democratic rhetoric claims otherwise. The 
second school is one that encourages Africans to simply abandon ship and resort to their 
precolonial way of life and try to rebuild an African democratization project from traditional forms 
of rule and political establishments like Kingdoms, chiefdoms and clans. This school seems the 
most radical and least popular today because of the African’s sustained interaction with the outside 
world especially western civilization and so called modernization. However, care should be taken 
not to over romanticize pre-colonial social and political formations as many of them lacked the 
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basic democratic culture of compromise, tolerance, fair play, the rule of law and constitutionalism. 
Commenting on Uganda’s pre-colonial setting, Mugaju (cited in Conyers and Larok 2008) 
concludes that, ‘regardless of their scale or complexity, all pre-colonial social systems were rooted 
in varying degrees of authoritarianism, conformism and compliance. The point though is that these 
very factors rather than utopian conditions could shape the very democracy model Africans search 
for.  
The thirdschool promoted by the more liberal thinkers and elites, is closer to the first and suggests 
the need for a careful customization of democracy as a universal value to represent realities that 
Africa faces today including another wave of a scramble for Africa, advances in fields such as the 
emancipation of women and technology, to construct a distinct Africaresponsive democracy 
prototype that would neither look like western liberal democracy, nor be a reproduction of 
traditional systems and forms of governance. As observed by Bruce, et al, 2004…cited in Conyers 
and Larok 2008), ‘democratic development in multiethnic societies as in Africa depends on the 
contingent interaction and adaptation of both indigenous and exogenous institutions and cultural 
ones. Successful democracies in Africa will probably neither look nor function like facsimiles of 
familiar forms of Western Liberal Democracy, but rather produce distinctive variants as the 
fundamental issues are argued and negotiated in each state’. As we can see from the emerging 
schools of thought above (and it is possible that there are many others), there isn’t absolute 
consensus even within Africa about the form and precise course of action.  
7.4 Recommendations 
This is certainly the hardest part for in questioning the existing paradigms, critiques alone are not 
enough. Whenever the subject of alternatives to the dominant liberal democracy canon has been 
raised two options are quickly adduced especially by protagonists of liberal democracy - first is 
monarchismand second dictatorship, with an ‘in-between’call in some circles for ‘benevolent 
dictatorships’, but again all these have been contested. Typically therefore, the response has been 
that despite all its flaws, liberal democracy is a better option to monarchism, dictatorship or even 
benevolent dictatorship. This study seeks to proffer the following recommendations necessary if 
Sub-Saharan African countries are to achieve sustainable democratic, ethical leadership and good 
governance. The following suggestions suffice;  
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The firstis to stick to the conventional democracy promotion efforts and believe that with time, 
Sub-Saharan Africa can create or recreate the necessary conditions for liberal democracy to work 
in Africa. Sub-Saharan African states can therefore choose to do more civic education to improve 
the overall civic competence of every citizen and ultimately societal consciousness. Africa can 
choose to invest more in reforms to improve the administration of elections in Africa and thus 
engage in the business of electoral reforms looking at technical and legal matters such as electoral 
legislations, reconstituting management bodies such as the incessant demand in many African 
countries to disband and reconstitute Electoral Commissions.  
Another pointrelated to the first option of creating the necessary conditions is the heightening of 
civic mobilization for political accountability in between elections. The argument is that elections 
by themselves do little to improve the democratic trajectory of any nation, it is what happens in 
between elections that really matters for if political accountability is strengthened, elected leaders 
and the state would be more responsive to citizens’ demands and aspirations. The bottom line 
would be that elected leaders either perform or you are voted out. Efforts such as the Citizens 
Manifesto and the Movement for Political Accountability in Uganda and Kenya are projected as 
civic innovations to reduce the democracy deficit especially on the demand side of governance. 
However, for all the attractive elements in this conditioning agenda which incidentally is what is 
likely to be preferred by civil society, including in this room and of course the democracy 
promotion community and donors, for all intents and purposes, most of the specific proposals 
engage with the symptoms rather than respond to the fundamental questions about the character of 
the state and the relevance of the post-colonial predatory tax state. This suggests other possibilities 
would be explored. 
Anothercritical point going forward is for Sub-Saharan Africanstates to do a bit more difficult 
soul-searching and construct a democracy prototype that fits its traditions, culture and other socio-
economic political realities. This prototype, as observed earlier will neither look like the facsimiles 
of dominant western liberal democracy with its attendant institutional designs, nor will it be a 
reproduction of pre-colonial traditional or primordial formation for Africa’s interactions with the 
global community has no doubt had an impact on its course of history. First is the emphasis on the 
basic tenets of participatory rather than representative democracy. This would practically mean 
de-emphasizing the centrality of elections and all the paraphernalia associated with it and creating 
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more spaces for direct involvement of citizens in planning for and making decisions that affect 
their lives. Africans must spend more time building and or strengthening village citizen assemblies 
rather than institutions like Parliament, which must be reformed with a specific executive oversight 
and less representation, the latter, will be more decentralized. The other element to this radical 
agenda would be a delicate integration of diverse cultural expressions in governance and politics 
and so rather than buy into arguments that kingdoms and cultural institutions should stay away 
from politics as in most African states.  
Reformingthe cultural institutions to respond to contemporary development opportunities and 
challenges in a culturally sensitive manner could be a lot more rewarding and possibly easier than 
recreating the values and ethos of liberal democracy. As citizens pick more interest in cultural and 
traditional histories, negative values discarded in the name of modernity would be rekindled in the 
searching for local solutions to contemporary problems. It may well mean that none of the above 
options would, on their own, redeem and reclaim Africa’s future and a closer analysis may actually 
reveal some overlaps between the two. This being the case, what is needed is a negotiation of an 
appropriate democracy prototype for Africa that suits its specific circumstances. There is need for 
Africa to start embarking on serious research on the possibilities of building an African hybridized 
version of democracy that takes serious cognizance of the pluralism that characterize sub-Sahara 
Africa and its rich cultural traditions. 
Rather than finding themselves trapped between two competing spheres of politicalauthority, Sub-
Saharan Africans appear to have adapted to the hybridization of their political institutions more 
seamlessly than many have anticipated or assumed. Chiefs and Councillors, Sultans and MPs, 
Kings andPresidents all inhabit the single, integrated political universe that, for better or worse, 
shapes each individual’s life. In the perceptions of ordinary Africans, it seems that democracy and 
chiefs can indeed co-exist. Traditional leaders may also be valued because they provide a sense of 
continuity and stability in an eraof great change. Williams (2004) suggests that they can serve as 
intermediaries to “ensure that change occurs in an orderly and familiar way”. Yet at the same time, 
chiefs have also displayed impressive flexibility, adapting to meet the needs of the day in an effort 
to preserve or enhance their position withinlocal communities (Van Kessel and Oomen 1997: 561). 
In South Africa, for example, Oomen (2000)cites “vehement discussions” about allowing women 
and youth “accessto the shade under the thorn tree”(69), while Williams (2004:115-116) notes the 
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adoption of more participatory rules and practices as chiefsresponded to pressure from local 
populations, local government institutions, and development agencies”in an effort to preserve their 
legitimacy in the era of democratization. In fact, Williamssuggests that even as chiefs “have sought 
to direct and redirect the democratisation process,” theinstitutions of traditional leadership 
anddemocratic electoral politics may actually be interacting in a“mutually transformative 
process”that causes each to shape and reshape society’s interpretations and understandings of the 
other. As in the past, “tradition” continues to be a movingtarget. 
Democracy is essentially a mode of governancethat respects and ensures the promotion of the 
fundamental human rights of the citizens, such as freedom and equality ofall. Democracy is also 
about various rights of the people. Thisincludes the right to be involved in the process of policy 
making, the right of the majority to rule, and the right of theminority to nurse and voice their 
dissent and disagreement. Inthis type of atmosphere differences can be managed to 
produce consensus and a community of citizens can emerge,fostering national cohesion and 
common interests that can bejointly promoted by even parties who are not of the same 
orientation. The conclusion therefore is that the overallnational development can be fostered more 
by a cohesive civilsociety that can moderate the excesses of the state than onewith a monolithic 
culture, where only the interests of thepowerful or the elite are identified as communal 
interests.Inclusive democracy must respect the right of the majorityto rule, protects the interest of 
the minority to benefitmaximally from the product of democratic rule,allows the market forces to 
control the economic activities andstrictly and constantly makes the state officials to beaccountable 
to the totality of the electorate. 
Poignantly, in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, new tensions and conflicts were witnessed and 
the ideas of democracy that characterize the African nationalism ideological movements were 
never realized in the broadest sense. Instead, civil wars, looting of natural resources and the culture 
of life presidents and tyrants became the order of the day. A critical analysis of the post-colonial 
state presents that state that is characterized by brutal and violent social conflicts. That being the 
case, unless the ideas of western democracy are conjoined with the ideas from the indigenous 
governance systems, achievement of peace, security and good governance will continue to be a 
mirage in Africa. Thus, there is need to develop an eclectic and hybridized version of democracy 
that will influence the development of sustainable peace and security in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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In addition, despite an increasing convergence towards governance principles, African countries 
still faceinconsistencies between governance concepts and implementation of good governance 
strategies. The State and public sector institutions need to work inclusively in aholistic manner 
with the private sector institutions, the civil society, the citizens, the fundingagencies and the 
development partners to address priority issues following the same guiding principles. All actors 
need to improve the convergence of their actions which need to complement each other and align 
with agreed priorities and aim at achieving development goalsfocused on the public interest and 
the common good of all citizens. This is the only way to foster socio-economic and political 
development that is sustainable and relevant to the African context.  In order for all these objectives 
to be fulfilled, there is need for Africa to maintain peace and security. Peace and stability is a 
panacea to all the challenges bedeviling the African continent. This initiative must also include; 
capacity building for conflict prevention, resolution and management and establishing 
commissions for reconciliation. 
In trying to renegotiate the western liberal ideas, the African state must promote the rule of law 
and human rights. These include;  provision of support to the judicial process, human rights 
protection for special groups, equal status and human rights for women,basic awareness of legal 
issues and human rights among citizens and civil society organizations; reform of thelegislation, 
including constitutional reforms, support of human rightsorganizationsand “human rights 
legislation.For democratic governance and leadership to develop in Africa, accountable 
governance requires the creation and sustenance of a variety of cross cutting institutions and 
processes: free, fair and regularly scheduled elections in which incumbents face a real possibility 
of losing; an independent media strong in investigative reporting; independent judiciary; 
independent election authority; effective parliamentary oversight, effective public accounts 
committee of parliament, independent audit body, independent ombudsman and other independent 
constitutional commissions. There must be constitutional independence, the processes of 
appointing and removing the officials in these institutions must be insulated from politics and 
political regimes, and they must have operational as well as financial independence.  
Inaddition, the cancer of corruption need to be addressed in Sub-Saharan Africa. In most African 
states,for example, there is a culture among politicians to be corrupt hiding behind the veil of 
political character assassination.Corruption’s net effect is negative for all societies, especially 
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developing countries. It leads to economic inefficiencies; distorts development; inhibits long-term 
foreign and domestic investments; misallocates talents to rent seeking and away from productive 
activities; induces wrong sectorial priorities and technological choices. It also undermines state 
effectiveness in the delivery of services, and the protection of the vulnerable and the environment. 
Corruption promotes economic decay and social and political instability, perverts the ability of the 
state to foster rule of law, and eventually corrodes trust and undermines legitimacy. These 
costsmean that sustained African development and ethical leadership requires mounting a frontal 
attack on corruption. Of course, corruption is highly rewarding for those who engage in it. 
Therefore, the creation and sustenance of a low corruption environment requires the establishment 
of effective mechanisms of discovery and punishment. An institutional framework conducive to 
fighting corruption must promote easy oversight, assessment of wrongdoing and punishment for 
those convicted of wrongdoing without fear or favour. 
The foundations of African traditional values rooted in the Ubuntu/Hunhuism philosophy are 
humanistic and communitarian. Africans place great emphasis on community, human welfare, and 
on what philosophers describe as “personhood.” Communitarianism fosters a strong sense of 
community and a spirit of collectiveness. It emphasizes the relationality of individuals-the fact that 
individuals are interdependent and subscribe to the same communal values. The notion that 
individuals must always seek communal, rather than individual good encourages people to be each 
other’s keeper. The spirit of communality seeks the welfare of other less fortunate members of 
society, and requires that wellto-do family members provide for and uplift poorer members of the 
family. Finally, because communitarianism considers the community as a fundamental human 
good in an interdependent world, it constantly stresses harmony and co-operation and recognizes 
that actions of individuals affect the community as a whole. African morality promotes the well-
being of individuals and emphasizes that the desired attributes of a person are those things that 
bring about dignity, respect, contentment, prosperity and joy to the individual and the community. 
But the communal being does not live in isolation; he is embedded in society. A communal being 
therefore naturally relates to others and is constituted, to an appreciable extent, by social 
relationships. This essentially will promote the development of ethical and democratic leadership 
ideal for the contemporary African set up. 
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There is need to infuse traditional governancewith contemporary governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Naturally there are indeed limitations imposed by the very complex nature of contemporary 
institutions that render some of the workings of indigenous values and institutions untenable. For 
example, sceptics point out that the complex, heterogeneous political settings of today are likely 
to frustrate any attempt to merge with smaller, simpler homogeneous polities of traditional Africa. 
In the area of entrenched leadership in contemporary Africa, fingers have often been pointed at 
heredity in traditional leadership. Some African leaders refuse to quit simply because they confuse 
contemporary leadership with the hereditary status of chiefs. Various visions for Africa’s 
development have been proposed: using Africa’s traditional institutions and structures as the 
foundation to build the future, and integrating certain aspects of traditional institutions of 
governance within structures of the modern nation state. Putting people at the centre of 
development and seeking their collective well-being would promote shared material and non-
material well-being, trust within society, citizen participation in decision making processes, and 
the accountability of state/government officials to the general public. Indeed the core values of 
African society, including the extended family system and shared concern for the vulnerable have 
sustained Africa through decades of crisis, and could serve as the cultural foundation for future 
development of sustainable democracy.  
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